lululemon athletica inc. (LULU): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for lululemon athletica inc. (LULU) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LULU
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LULU |
| Company | lululemon athletica inc. |
| Current price | $120.12/sh |
| Composition | Women's apparel 63% / Men's apparel 24% / Accessories and other categories 13% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 2.3% |
| Operating margin today | 16.9% |
| Margin compression implied | -14.6pp |
| Multiple paid | 9x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 9, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.16σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 12 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.88x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 1.42x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.55x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.77x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $273.13 | 0.44x | yes | FCF base $1.3B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $156.45 | 0.77x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 5.0x / 7.0x / 9.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $219.25 | 0.55x | yes | P/E 17x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 10x), scenarios: 14.2x / 17.0x / 19.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 11.19x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $136.65 | 0.88x | yes | BV/sh $41.79, ROE (TTM) 30.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $255.41 | 0.47x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $99.81 | 1.20x | yes | Rev $11.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $124.62 | 0.96x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.99B × (1−32%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $208.62 | 0.58x | yes | BV $41.79 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 30.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $107.76 | 1.11x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $12.35 × BVPS $41.79) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $276.03 | 0.44x | yes | EBITDA $2.57B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $84.77 | 1.42x | yes | FCF $1280.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $78.03 | 1.54x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.21B (FCF $1.28B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $10.35 | 11.61x | yes | EPS $12.35 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $11.21 | 10.71x | yes | BV $41.79 × (ROIC 2.1% / WACC 7.9%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $194.03 | 0.62x | yes | Revenue $11.20B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $133.51 | 0.90x | yes | EPS $12.35 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $0 |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.00x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.00x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Lululemon now trades at roughly 8 times operating income, in the lower half of its apparel-peer multiple range, on a stock that has fallen to an eight-year low after a guidance cut.
- The defining risk is its home market: Americas net revenue fell 3% in Q1 to $1.6 billion and dropped to 66% of total revenue from 71% a year earlier, while the FY2025 10-K notes the Americas "represented 75% of our total net revenue" in the prior year.
- What to watch next is the trajectory of North American comparable sales against lowered full-year guidance of $11.0 to $11.15 billion in revenue and $10.95 to $11.15 in EPS, plus a roughly 280-basis-point tariff drag on gross margin.
Bull Case
The earnings trajectory is the wrong place to start a bull case right now, which is exactly why it is the right place. Q1 fiscal 2026 EPS fell to $1.69 from $2.60, gross margin compressed 4.1 points to 54.2%, and management cut full-year guidance. The bull case is not that this is good news. It is that the price has already absorbed it and more. At about 8 times operating income, the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. The market is pricing erosion; the bull argues the underlying business is built to do better than erode.
The asset behind that argument is the brand and the returns it still generates. Lululemon's FY2025 10-K describes its edge as the ability to "introduce new product innovations, combine function and fashion, and connect through in-store, online, and community experiences", a positioning that has historically supported gross margins well above the apparel average. Even after the margin hit, the business earns a 30.2% return on equity and converts to about $1.28 billion of free cash flow, on a balance sheet with no net debt. A company throwing off that much cash at that return, trading at single-digit operating-income multiples, is priced like a structurally impaired retailer rather than a premium brand having a bad year.
The geography is where the bull sees the offset. The weakness is concentrated in the Americas, where revenue fell 3%, while Canada grew 9% and the international business continues to expand; the 10-K notes China Mainland as a contributor to growth, with net new stores added across recent years. The bull thesis is that the international engine, China Mainland in particular, keeps growing while North America stabilizes, and that a brand still adding stores abroad and generating premium returns is being valued as if its best markets are permanently behind it. The share count has also fallen about 2.6% a year on buybacks, so the cash the business generates is retiring stock at a depressed price.
Bear Case
The narrative the price depends on is a stabilization in North America, and that is the assumption most under threat. Lululemon's home region is its foundation: the FY2025 10-K states the Americas "represented 75% of our total net revenue" and that operations there "are core to our business". In Q1 fiscal 2026 that core shrank, with Americas revenue down 3% and falling to 66% of the total, and US revenue improving only to 2% growth off a weak base. Management then guided North American sales to fall by a low-double-digit percentage in the current quarter and a high-single-digit percentage for the full year. A brand whose largest, most profitable market is guided to decline is not a value stock that simply needs patience; it is a business where the central revenue engine is reversing.
The margin assumption is the second fragile dependency. Gross margin fell 4.1 points to 54.2%, with tariffs alone a roughly 280-basis-point drag in the quarter, only partly offset by efficiency initiatives. Tariffs are not a one-quarter event, and the company sources globally, which means the margin pressure is structural until the supply chain or the trade regime changes. The 10-K is candid that Lululemon competes against "large, diversified apparel companies with substantial market share, and established companies expanding their production and marketing of technical athletic apparel". The premium that justified the historical margin depends on the brand staying differentiated against exactly those entrants, in the home market where it is now losing share.
This is why cheap does not settle the question. Most valuation methods land above the current price, which would normally read as value, but the price is low for a reason the methods do not capture: the earnings base they capitalize is falling, and full-year EPS guidance was cut to $10.95 to $11.15 from a prior $12.10 to $12.30. A method that values a shrinking earnings stream at a normal multiple flatters a business in decline. The analyst response was swift and bearish: BNP Paribas downgraded to Underperform with an $88 target, while Piper Sandler cut to $110, Jefferies to $115, Stifel to $134, and JPMorgan to $149. The bear case is that the cheapness is the symptom, not the opportunity, until North American demand and the tariff-pressured margin both turn.
Valuation
The unusual feature of Lululemon today is that the price sits below where most methods land, which is the opposite of the premium-stock problem. At $126.46 the price is roughly 8 times company-wide operating income, low enough that it implies operating profit declining and stays below what even a 5%-a-year decline would warrant. The multiple is in the lower half of the apparel-peer range. In plain terms, the market is not paying for growth; it is bracing for contraction, and the question the valuation poses is whether the contraction is as deep and as lasting as the price assumes.
The methods mostly disagree with the price, but read them carefully. The asset-based and relative-multiple families land above $126.46: the relative lens blends a trailing P/E near 10 times up toward a 22 times sector multiple, and the excess-return methods credit a 30.2% return on equity against book value of $41.79 a share. The growth-DCF methods also reach higher on modest assumptions. Only a couple of earnings-power reads sit near or below the price. Normally that pattern says cheap. The complication is that the earnings the methods capitalize are falling: EPS dropped to $1.69 from $2.60 in the quarter, and full-year EPS guidance was cut. A static method applied to a declining base overstates value, so the apparent margin between price and method is partly an artifact of capitalizing a number that management says is heading lower.
The balance sheet is the cleanest part of the case and bounds the downside. Lululemon carries no net debt and generates about $1.28 billion of free cash flow, with a share count that has declined about 2.6% a year. There is no solvency risk and no leverage amplifier; the company can keep buying back stock and funding international expansion through a downturn without financial strain. So the bet is not about whether the business survives. It is whether the methods that say cheap are valuing a temporary trough or extrapolating from an earnings base that has further to fall before it stabilizes.
Catalysts
The June 4 print was the event that reset the stock. Lululemon reported Q1 fiscal 2026 revenue up 4% to $2.5 billion with a 1% comparable-sales gain, but EPS fell to $1.69 from $2.60 and gross margin compressed 4.1 points to 54.2%. Americas revenue fell 3% to $1.6 billion, dropping to 66% of the total from 71% a year earlier, with Canada up 9% and US growth at just 2%. Tariffs were a roughly 280-basis-point drag on gross margin, offset only partly by enterprise efficiency initiatives.
The guidance cut was the harder blow. Management lowered full-year fiscal 2026 revenue guidance to $11.0 to $11.15 billion from a prior $11.35 to $11.50 billion, and EPS guidance to $10.95 to $11.15 from $12.10 to $12.30. The company guided North American sales to fall by a low-double-digit percentage in the current quarter and a high-single-digit percentage for the full year. The next quarterly report, and the trajectory of North American comparable sales within it, is the catalyst that decides whether the trough is forming or deepening.
The analyst reaction was uniformly negative. BNP Paribas downgraded to Underperform and slashed its target to $88 from $179; Piper Sandler cut to $110 from $130; Jefferies cut to $115 from $145; Stifel cut to $134 from $176 while holding Neutral; and JPMorgan lowered its target to $149 from $173. The stock fell more than 12% after the report to an eight-year low, leaving it down roughly 45% for the year. The desk's targets now straddle the current price, which is itself a measure of how unresolved the North American question is.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
China Mainland (reported)
- COLM (COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AS (Amer Sports, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UAA (UNDER ARMOUR, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CRI (Carter's, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GIII (G III APPAREL GROUP LTD /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LEVI (LEVI STRAUSS & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ANF (Abercrombie & Fitch Co.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AEO (American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Lululemon Q1 fiscal 2026 earnings release, June 2026 · Lululemon FY2025 10-K · TipRanks analyst summary, June 2026