CLOROX CO /DE/ (CLX): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CLOROX CO /DE/ (CLX) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CLX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCLX
CompanyCLOROX CO /DE/
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$102.53/sh
CompositionHealth and Wellness 40% / Household 27% / Lifestyle 17% / International 17% / Corporate and Other 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid16x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 6.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)33

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings1.54x3expensive
Relative1.72x2expensive
Growth1.61x5expensive

Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$16.916.06xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth -4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$95.191.08xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 90.9x / 92.9x / 94.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.6x / 22.0x / 25.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 30.8x
Simple DDMGrowth$53.641.91xyesDPS $4.96, g=0.0% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$97.061.06xyesStage 1: 5% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$63.501.61xyesRev $6.8B, growth -4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$73.921.39xyesEPS $6.16, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.02 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.17B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$6.6915.33xyesFCF $380.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.79129.78xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.31B (FCF $0.38B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$99.911.03xyesEPS $6.16 × (8.5 + 2×5.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.76B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$50.142.04xyesEPS $6.16 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 8.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$66.591.54xyesEPS $6.16 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Health and Wellnessoperatingenterprise$2.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Householdoperatingenterprise$1.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Lifestyleoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.97x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.96x
Interest coverage10.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The fear is easy to state. A shelf full of familiar household brands, sold mostly to a handful of enormous retailers who now put their own labels next to them, with revenue going backwards. The 10-K does not soften it, listing the channels the company sells through and noting they are increasingly offering "private label" brands that are typically sold at lower prices and compete with the Company's products in certain categories. If that is what is happening, no multiple is low enough.

The data says something more specific is happening. Management's own outlook attributes about 7.5 points of the roughly 9% organic sales decline expected for fiscal 2026 to a single mechanical cause: retailers built about two weeks of extra inventory at the end of fiscal 2025 ahead of the company's enterprise resource planning transition, then drew it back down. That reversal is worth roughly 90 cents of earnings per share and about 30% of the year's diluted earnings, and it is not a statement about how many bottles of bleach households bought. Strip it out and the picture in the quarter just reported was ordinary rather than alarming: net sales of 1.67 billion dollars, flat against the year-ago quarter, organic sales down 1%, and diluted earnings per share of 1.54 dollars, up 3% from 1.50 dollars.

What sits underneath is a portfolio with genuine category positions and, unusually for a company this size, real product breadth inside each one. The Household segment carries bags and wraps under the Glad brand; cat litter primarily under the Fresh Step and Scoop Away brands; and grilling products under the Kingsford brand, while Lifestyle consists of food, water-filtration and natural personal care products marketed and sold in the United States. These are categories where the store brand has existed for decades and the branded product still holds its shelf. The company reported a gross margin of 43.2% in its most recent quarter, which is not the profile of a business being commoditized; CHD, the closest peer by size at 6.205 billion dollars of trailing revenue, runs a 17.3% operating margin, and KMB earns 14.1% on 16.556 billion dollars.

The Purell acquisition, completed April 1, 2026, is the clearest signal of where management thinks the next dollar earns most. It adds a brand with genuine professional and institutional distribution to a portfolio that is heavily consumer, and it was bought with debt facilities rather than equity, so the shareholder count did not move to pay for it. Shares outstanding have in fact drifted down about 0.4% a year over the past four years. Trailing earnings of 6.16 dollars a share against a price near 95.51 dollars put the stock in the lower half of its peer multiple range, which for a company whose reported decline is largely a timing artifact is the whole argument.

Bear Case

Look at where the cash has gone this year. Net cash from operations for the first nine months of fiscal 2026 was 282 million dollars against 687 million dollars a year earlier, a 59% decline that management attributes primarily to the payment terminating the Glad joint venture agreement. In the same window the company signed and closed the GOJO purchase, arranging a 1.0 billion dollar 364-day revolving facility and a 1.25 billion dollar delayed-draw term facility to fund it. And through all of it the dividend kept running: 4.93 dollars a share against trailing earnings of 6.16 dollars. A payout near four-fifths of profits is defensible for a stable staple. It is a different proposition when the operating base is being rebuilt and the balance sheet is simultaneously absorbing an acquisition.

The customer side is where the leverage against the company sits. The 10-K states plainly that The Company's five largest customers accounted for nearly half of the Company's consolidated net sales for each of the fiscal years 2025, 2024 and 2023, and Walmart alone was 27% of consolidated net sales in fiscal 2025. When one buyer is more than a quarter of your business and five buyers are half, price negotiations are not really negotiations. Gross margin is already moving the wrong way: down 140 basis points to 43.2% in the most recent quarter, with the full year now guided down 250 to 300 basis points.

The organizational churn is worth noticing rather than dismissing. In June 2026 the company announced a simplified operating structure, consolidating all business units under a newly appointed chief operating officer and moving the other group president into a chief growth and strategy role. Reorganizations of that kind usually follow performance rather than precede it, and this one arrives after an ERP transition, a joint venture unwind, a divestiture and an acquisition inside roughly two years. Each was defensible on its own; together they describe a company doing a great deal of structural work while its top line shrinks.

Which brings the price into it. The methods used to triangulate this business all land below where the shares trade, and the dividend arithmetic shows why in the cleanest possible way. Value the payout on the assumption that it never grows again and the result sits far under the current quote. Assume it grows about 5% a year for five years and 3.5% a year thereafter and the result lands essentially on the current price. That is the whole bet in one line: today's price requires the dividend to keep growing at something close to its historical pace, which requires earnings to grow, which requires the top line to stop shrinking for reasons that are not about last year's inventory. Meanwhile CL grew revenue 4.3% and PG 3.3% over their trailing years while CLX went backwards. If the recovery does not arrive, the multiple has nothing underneath it except the payout, and the payout is already consuming most of the earnings.

Valuation

Trailing earnings of 6.16 dollars a share against a price near 95.51 puts Clorox toward the cheaper end of its cohort, and the priced-in read agrees, placing the multiple in the lower half of the peer range and describing the price as sitting below what even a business with modestly declining profits would warrant. That read comes with a caveat worth stating: it rests on a trailing profit base that this year's inventory reversal has distorted, so treat it as a direction rather than a measurement.

The methods themselves are less forgiving, and they are worth reading as a group rather than one at a time. Not one of the four families reaches where the shares trade today. Quoted stock sits about 28% above where the peer-multiple lens lands, and about 43% above where the earnings-power methods land once trailing profit is capitalized at the return an investor would demand for this kind of risk. The methods that project the business forward land furthest below of all, and the reason is not subtle: they are fed a shrinking top line, so extending the recent trajectory produces a smaller company. When every family sits under the price and the gap widens as the method looks further forward, the market is paying for a recovery that none of the backward-looking frames can see.

The dividend brackets that recovery precisely. Value the payout of 4.93 dollars a share assuming it never grows again and the result sits well below the current quote. Assume roughly 5% growth for five years followed by 3.5% in perpetuity and the result arrives essentially at today's price. Nothing else in the valuation is as clean as that pair, and it means the question a buyer is actually answering is narrow: can this company grow its dividend at roughly its accustomed pace? Not whether it is a good business, and not what the terminal multiple should be.

The comparison set frames the difficulty honestly. CHD is almost exactly the same size, 6.205 billion dollars of trailing revenue, and grew 2.2% while earning a 17.3% operating margin. KVUE, a larger and more recently separated peer, earns 17.2% with revenue essentially flat. NWL sits at the other end of the same industry with a 0.7% operating margin and revenue down 4.1%, which is what the market prices when it stops believing a brand portfolio can hold its shelf. Clorox trades closer to the middle than to either extreme.

On the balance sheet, trailing profits cover interest about eight and a half times, liquid assets stand near 1.19 billion dollars, and the share count has drifted slightly lower rather than higher over the past four years. That is a company with room to be patient, but not unlimited room, since the new facilities arranged for the Purell purchase add to what has to be serviced. The decisive number in the next twelve months is not a multiple. It is whether organic sales turn positive once the inventory comparison stops distorting them.

Catalysts

The reported quarter for the three months ended March 31, 2026 gave a mixed baseline. Net sales of 1.67 billion dollars were flat against the year-ago quarter, with organic sales down 1%. Gross margin fell 140 basis points to 43.2%, which the company attributed to higher manufacturing and logistics costs and unfavorable mix, partly offset by cost savings. Diluted earnings per share rose 3% to 1.54 dollars from 1.50 dollars. Year-to-date net cash provided by operations was 282 million dollars against 687 million dollars a year earlier, a 59% decline the company attributed primarily to the Glad joint venture agreement termination payment. Chair and CEO Linda Rendle described results as mixed, with slower-than-anticipated market share recovery in parts of the portfolio.

The full-year outlook was updated at the same time and is dominated by one transitory item. The company now expects fiscal 2026 net sales down about 6%, including slightly less than 3 points of positive impact from the GOJO acquisition, with organic sales down about 9%. Roughly 7.5 points of that organic decline comes from retailers unwinding inventory they had built ahead of the ERP transition at the end of fiscal 2025. Management sizes that reversal at about 90 cents of earnings per share, or a year-over-year reduction of roughly 30% to fiscal 2026 diluted earnings per share. Gross margin is now expected down 250 to 300 basis points for the year. The fiscal fourth quarter is the last period that comparison distorts.

Two structural events bracket the quarter. The GOJO purchase agreement was signed March 6, 2026 and funded through a 1.0 billion dollar 364-day revolving credit agreement and a 1.25 billion dollar delayed-draw term credit agreement, both arranged with JPMorgan Chase, Citibank and Wells Fargo; the deal closed April 1, 2026, bringing the Purell brand and GOJO's health and hygiene lines into the portfolio. Then on June 17, 2026 the company announced a simplified operating structure, appointing Chris Hyder executive vice president and chief operating officer with all business units reporting to him, and moving Nina Barton to chief growth and strategy officer. Purell integration progress and the first clean organic sales comparison are the two things the next report can actually settle.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Health and Wellness (reported)

Household (reported)

Lifestyle (reported)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q3 FY2026 results, April 30, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K · company 8-K, March 10, 2026, and Q3 FY2026 results · Q3 FY2026 results · company 8-K, March 10, 2026 · company press release, June 17, 2026

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