AppLovin Corp (APP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $318.50, AppLovin Corp (APP) is priced for +43.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAPP
CompanyAppLovin Corp
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$318.50/sh
CompositionUnited States 52% / Rest of the world 48%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)31.4%
Operating margin today77.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-45.7pp
Implied growth43.6%
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 4: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 14.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.35σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)35

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.50x5expensive
Earnings2.40x5expensive
Relative0.87x5justifies
Growth0.74x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$588.330.54xyesFCF base $5.0B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$429.040.74xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.7x / 21.7x / 24.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$430.770.74xyesP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 28.0x / 35.0x / 42.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$127.402.50xyesBV/sh $7.03, ROE (TTM) 167.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$2418.890.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$302.331.05xyesRev $5.8B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$139.682.28xyesEPS $11.64, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=23.20 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$46.636.83xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.76B × (1−16%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$218.731.46xyesBV $7.03 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 167.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$42.907.42xyes√(22.5 × EPS $11.64 × BVPS $7.03) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$366.630.87xyesEBITDA $4.96B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$140.192.27xyesFCF $4430.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$132.682.40xyesSBC-adj FCF $4.20B (FCF $4.43B − SBC $0.23B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$375.580.85xyesEPS $11.64 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$30.3810.48xyesBV $7.03 × (ROIC 38.9% / WACC 9.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$138.912.29xyesRevenue $5.84B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$436.500.73xyesEPS $11.64 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$125.842.53xyesEPS $11.64 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
AppLovin (single segment - advertising)operatingenterprise5.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.1b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.27x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.23x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.3%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with what management has done with the money, because it is unusually legible. Share count has fallen about 2.3% a year over the four years to March 31, 2026, and the FY2025 10-K reports that "approximately $3.3 billion remained available for repurchases as of October 31, 2025". A company retiring stock while revenue expands at the pace this one has is telling you it thinks the shares are worth more than the projects it could fund with the same cash. That is a claim management is making with cash rather than with slides, and it is the kind of claim that gets tested rather than argued.

The other allocation decision was subtraction. AppLovin sold its Apps business, the mobile game studios that once supplied its own advertising inventory, and kept the engine. The FY2025 10-K records that "For the period from the closing date through December 31, 2025, the Company recognized $19.0 million in revenue related to Tripledot and its subsidiaries' use of the Company's advertising solutions". The buyer became a customer. What is left is a toll road rather than a content owner, and a toll road does not have to guess which game will be a hit.

The economics of that decision show up immediately in the margin. Trailing operating income of $4.32 billion on a 76.2% operating margin is not a figure the advertising sector produces. TTD, the largest independent buy-side platform in the peer set, ran a 20.3% operating margin on $2.97 billion of revenue. DV managed 11.5% on $764 million, and MGNI 14.8% on $723 million. The difference is structural rather than managerial: the FY2025 10-K describes Axon Ads Manager as "powered by our Axon AI advertising recommendation engine and matches advertiser demand with publisher supply through auctions at vast scale and at microsecond-level speeds", and an auction that clears itself needs very few people once it works.

The next act is distribution rather than technology. Access to Axon moved from a closed arrangement, where advertisers were onboarded by hand, to a public self-serve platform launched in June 2026. That change is what turns a system serving a manageable list of large mobile advertisers into one that any merchant can join without speaking to anyone. If the engine works as well for a shoe retailer as it does for a mobile game, the addressable pool is a different order of magnitude. That conditional is the bet, and the company has been candid that it is the strategy rather than an experiment.

Bear Case

A 76.2% operating margin is not a normal number, and the honest position is that nobody yet knows whether it describes a new mechanism or the top of a cycle. Advertising is the first line a chief financial officer cuts and the last one restored. What makes this particular margin worth interrogating is that no comparable company earns anything near it: TTD ran 20.3% at the operating line on $2.97 billion of revenue, MGNI 14.8% on $723 million, DV 11.5% on $764 million, and ZETA essentially nothing at 0.2% on $1.44 billion. Either AppLovin has found something the entire rest of the sector missed, or the current level includes a component that does not persist. Both readings are available from the same data, and the price only works under the first.

There is no contractual floor beneath any of it. The fiscal 2026 first-quarter filing states that "Substantially all of the Company's contracts with customers are cancelable at any time", and the FY2025 10-K adds that "We generally do not have long-term agreements with our clients". Advertisers stay because the returns are better than the alternative, and they leave the day that stops being true, with no notice period to slow the exit. Revenue that arrives without a contract is not lower quality by itself. It is simply revenue with no lag between a change in performance and a change in the number.

Capacity is being added by the largest companies in the world, and several of them sit on both sides of the relationship. The FY2025 10-K names competitors that "include Meta, Google, Amazon, and Unity Software as well as various private companies, several of which are also our partners and clients", and observes that clients who are also competitors may choose to build their own offering instead. The cost side is already moving: in the March 2026 quarter, cost of revenue rose $52.0 million, or 34%, driven mainly by $39.9 million more spent operating the network infrastructure behind the engine. An auction powered by inference is not a fixed-cost business at the margin, and that is the line to watch if the moat is being defended rather than merely enjoyed.

What the shares assume follows directly. At about 31 times trailing operating income, the level requires operating profit to compound at the 50% ceiling the business could fund from its own cash flows and to hold there for roughly 5.4 years before fading. The rate itself sits inside what the company has recently delivered, so the demand is not the pace. It is the persistence. Only about 25% of comparable fast climbers held that rate over a stretch that long, and the arithmetic is sensitive: a single percentage point on the required return moves the horizon by about 0.5 years. Should the margin drift toward even the top of the peer cohort rather than four times it, there is no version of this multiple that survives the trip.

Valuation

Two numbers frame everything here. The trailing operating margin is 76.2%, and the shares carry about 31 times trailing operating income. Those figures pull in opposite directions: the first says the business is extraordinary, the second says the market already knows. What the level demands, specifically, is that operating profit compound at the 50% pace this business could fund without outside money, and stay there for roughly 5.4 years before settling. The calculation runs at a 14% cost of capital, which is where a business with no customer contracts and a two-year-old margin structure belongs.

The rate is not the stretch. Against its own record, the pace embedded in the shares sits inside what the company has recently delivered. Duration is the stretch: only about 25% of comparable fast climbers sustained that rate across a stretch of 5.4 years. The whole calculation is also sensitive in a way worth naming, because each additional percentage point of required return shortens the implied horizon by roughly 0.5 years. Change the discount rate assumption modestly and the answer moves a lot.

The methods divide along a familiar line. Peer multiples and the discounted cash-flow approaches both reach the price, the cash-flow methods comfortably past it. With no growth credited at all, the price sits about 3.0 times above the earnings-power methods. That gap is the shape of a durability question rather than an accounting one: capitalize this year's profit at no growth and you get a far smaller number, which is simply another way of saying that essentially all of the value here is in the years after this one.

Cohort position is where the argument gets concrete. Against TTD at a 20.3% operating margin on $2.97 billion of revenue, DV at 11.5% on $764 million, and ZETA at 0.2% on $1.44 billion, AppLovin's profitability is not a variation on the sector; it is a different business model wearing the sector's label. Geography adds a second layer, with the United States producing about 52% of revenue and the rest of the world 48%, so the demand base is not a bet on one advertising market. Neither observation resolves the multiple. Both explain why the usual comparisons return an answer that looks wrong in either direction.

The balance sheet does not constrain anything. Net debt runs about 1.08 billion dollars against trailing operating income of $4.32 billion, interest is covered nearly 21 times over, and the share count has been falling rather than rising. For most companies at this multiple the downside scenario involves a financing problem. Here it does not: the risk is entirely on the income statement, in whether a margin no competitor has matched turns out to be a moat or a moment.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are due after the U.S. close on August 5, 2026, with a management webinar at 5:00 p.m. Eastern hosted by co-founder and chief executive Adam Foroughi and chief financial officer Matthew Stumpf. The Q2 2026 consensus for diluted earnings per share stands at $3.72, against $2.26 in the same quarter a year earlier.

The base the quarter builds on is unusually strong. First-quarter 2026 revenue came in at $1.84 billion, up 59% from a year earlier and 11% from the preceding quarter, and the company guided second-quarter revenue to a range of $1.915 billion to $1.945 billion. Sequential figures matter more than annual ones in a business with no contracted backlog, because they are the earliest visible sign of whether advertiser spending is still compounding or has flattened.

The single development to track past the quarter is distribution. Self-serve access to the Axon platform went public in June 2026, ending the previous arrangement in which advertisers were brought on individually. That is the mechanism by which the company intends to reach merchants outside mobile gaming, and it is the first change in years that alters who can buy from AppLovin rather than how well the engine performs for those already buying. The August print is the first that will carry any of it.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

AppLovin (single segment - advertising) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, July 2026 · AppLovin FY2025 Form 10-K · company commentary, first-quarter 2026 results, May 2026 · company announcement, July 1, 2026 · analyst consensus, July 2026 · AppLovin first-quarter 2026 results and outlook, May 2026

View the full interactive APP report on boothcheck