WHIRLPOOL CORP /DE/ (WHR): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers WHIRLPOOL CORP /DE/ (WHR) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WHR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerWHR
CompanyWHIRLPOOL CORP /DE/
Current price$45.14/sh
CompositionLaundry 28% / Refrigeration 31% / Cooking 24% / Dishwashing 8% / Spare parts and warranties 4% / Other 6%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.0%
Operating margin today4.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.4pp
Multiple paid12x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.1% sits below it).

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~1.1%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.32σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)23
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.51x5expensive
Earnings1.42x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.01x4expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 3.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$88.430.51xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.4B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.3x / 18.0x / 20.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowth$76.200.59xyesDPS $3.58, g=4.3% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$4.839.35xyesStage 1: -48% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$27.521.64xyesBV/sh $58.53, ROE (TTM) 4.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$17.992.51xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$31.411.44xyesRev $15.2B, growth -4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.2x / 0.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$149.870.30xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.60B × (1−21%) / WACC 3.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$15.472.92xyesBV $58.53 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$62.330.72xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.95 × BVPS $58.53) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.03B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.4718.28xyesEPS $2.95 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$2.4518.42xyesBV $58.53 × (ROIC 0.1% / WACC 3.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $15.18B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$31.891.42xyesEPS $2.95 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
MDA North Americaoperatingenterprise$10.2b$499.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
MDA Latin Americaoperatingenterprise$3.3b$201.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
SDA Globaloperatingenterprise$1.1b$177.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)11.03x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)8.71x
Interest coverage2.0x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Valuing an appliance maker means understanding that it is a housing-cycle business wearing a consumer-brand label, and Whirlpool is at the painful end of that cycle right now. That framing is also where the bull case starts, because the cyclical trough is when a durable franchise looks cheapest. The company makes major appliances across laundry, refrigeration, cooking and dishwashing, categories with strong brand recognition and a large replacement market that does not disappear in a downturn, only defers. The valuation reflects the trough: the price is supported by the earnings-power, peer-multiple and cash-flow methods, several of which land well above it, while only the asset-value lens reads it as expensive. In plain terms, against normalized earnings and where peers trade, the stock looks cheap.

The most distinctive structural development is a tariff regime that, unusually, works in Whirlpool's favor. Section 232 changes now impose a 25% duty on imported home appliances, which structurally advantages Whirlpool's high level of U.S. manufacturing. For a company that builds much of its product domestically, a tariff wall against foreign competitors is a genuine competitive tailwind, and Whirlpool is pressing the advantage with pricing: its largest price increase in over a decade, more than 10%, followed by an additional 4% in July. If demand stabilizes, that pricing flows to margin against a domestic cost base that the tariffs make relatively more competitive.

The defensive moves management is making are the right ones for the moment. Suspending the dividend to preserve capital and prioritize debt repayment is a hard but rational decision that protects the balance sheet through the downturn rather than defending a payout the cash flow no longer supports. A company that cuts its dividend to deleverage is choosing survival and future flexibility over short-term income, and for a cyclical at the bottom, that is the disciplined choice. The bull case is a cheap, branded cyclical with a tariff tailwind and management taking the steps to carry it through to the recovery.

Bear Case

The advantage Whirlpool has long relied on, scale and brand in a market it helped define, is being chipped away from several directions at once, and the first quarter showed the erosion in the numbers. North American major appliance revenue fell 7.5% to $2.24 billion, total revenue dropped roughly 10% to $3.27 billion, and the company swung to a GAAP net loss of $85 million from a profit a year earlier. A branded leader that cannot hold revenue or stay profitable through a demand dip is showing that its pricing power has limits, and the cause is partly structural: the company's customer base is large, sophisticated trade customers who have many choices and demand competitive products and prices. When a handful of big retailers control access to the shelf, they hold the leverage, and that caps how much of a price increase actually sticks.

The tariff story the bull case celebrates has a darker side the company spells out itself. While tariffs protect domestic manufacturing, the same trade actions have increased the cost of certain raw materials and components, raising the cost of products sold, and have led foreign competitors to pre-load finished-product inventories ahead of the duties. Pre-loaded foreign inventory means discounted competing product flooding the market just as Whirlpool tries to raise prices, undercutting the very pricing strategy the tariffs were supposed to enable. The company also faces the risk of more aggressive customs enforcement and evolving tariff guidance that could disrupt its mitigation plans. The competitive position is being squeezed between higher input costs and discounted imports.

The balance sheet is where the erosion becomes dangerous. Net debt of roughly $5.9 billion sits at nearly nine times trailing operating income, with operating earnings covering interest only about twice. That is a heavy load for a company whose earnings just turned negative, and it is precisely why the dividend had to be suspended. The guidance cut tells the story: full-year ongoing EPS was slashed to $3.00 to $3.50 from about $6.23, roughly halving the earnings outlook in response to rapid macro deterioration. The bull and the bear agree the stock is cheap on normalized earnings and the tariff helps the domestic base. They disagree on whether a highly levered cyclical with eroding pricing power and a halved earnings outlook is a value opportunity or a value trap whose cheap multiple is measured against earnings that keep falling.

Valuation

Whirlpool is a cyclical at a trough, and the price has to be read with that in mind, because the current operating margin near 4% is depressed and the company posted a GAAP loss in the quarter. At $38.85 (June 28, 2026) the price embeds a partial recovery in appliance demand and margins toward a mid-cycle level, but the recent guidance cut shows how far the near-term outlook has fallen.

The method families split the way a stressed cyclical's do. The earnings-power and peer-multiple methods, along with several cash-flow approaches, land above the price, because they measure it against normalized or peer earnings rather than the current trough; the relative-valuation method in particular reads the stock as cheap. The asset-value methods are the dissenters, landing below the price, which reflects how thin the equity cushion looks against the debt load. The split says the same thing the headline does: on normalized earnings the stock is cheap, but on the current balance sheet and trough profitability it is anything but safe. The cheapness is real only if the earnings recover; if they do not, the apparent discount is measured against a number that is still falling.

Solvency is the decisive consideration here, not an afterthought. Net debt of roughly $5.9 billion at nearly nine times trailing operating income, with interest covered only about twice, is a load that turns an earnings dip into a genuine balance-sheet problem, and the dividend suspension is the direct evidence that management sees the constraint as binding. For a levered cyclical, the question is not just what the business earns at mid-cycle but whether it can service its debt through the trough, and that is why the value methods showing the stock as cheap have to be weighed against the real risk in the capital structure. The decisive judgment is whether appliance demand recovers and the price increases stick before the leverage forces further defensive action. If they do, the normalized-earnings methods are right. If demand stays weak and discounted imports undercut the pricing, the leverage makes the downside steeper than the cheap multiple suggests.

Catalysts

The first-quarter 2026 report was a clearly negative catalyst on three fronts: an earnings miss, a guidance cut, and a dividend suspension. Revenue fell roughly 10% to $3.27 billion, the company swung to a GAAP net loss of $85 million, and North American major appliance revenue dropped 7.5% to $2.24 billion. Management cited rapid deterioration of the macro environment since late February, cut full-year ongoing EPS guidance to $3.00 to $3.50 from about $6.23, and lowered the full-year EBIT margin outlook to about 4%. The dividend was suspended starting the second quarter to preserve capital and prioritize debt repayment.

The forward catalysts are pricing realization, tariffs, and housing demand. Whirlpool implemented its largest price increase in over a decade, more than 10%, with an additional 4% planned for July, so whether those increases hold against discounted foreign inventory is the key margin question for coming quarters. The Section 232 tariff at 25% on imported appliances is a structural support for the domestic base, but its net effect depends on raw-material cost inflation and competitor pre-loading. The macro variables with the most leverage are housing turnover and interest rates, which drive appliance demand, and the trajectory of debt reduction now that the dividend is redirected to it. The next earnings report is the event that shows whether pricing is sticking and whether the demand contraction is stabilizing.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

MDA North America / MDA Latin America / SDA Global (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · FY2025 10-K, accession 0000106640-26-000009

View the full interactive WHR report on boothcheck