Monster Beverage Corp (MNST): what the price requires
At today's price, Monster Beverage Corp (MNST) is priced for +28.5% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-13 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MNST
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MNST |
| Company | Monster Beverage Corp |
| Current price | $97.20/sh |
| Composition | Monster Energy Drinks 93% / Strategic Brands 6% / Alcohol Brands 2% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 9.5% |
| Operating margin today | 30.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -21.1pp |
| Implied growth | 28.5% |
| Multiple paid | 36x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.2pp.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.26σ |
| cohort percentile (of 69 peers) | 86 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 30% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.69x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.18x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 5.46x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.88x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=13)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $75.73 | 1.28x | yes | FCF base $2.4B, growth 18% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.3%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $117.53 | 0.83x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 34.0x / 36.0x / 38.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $17.80 | 5.46x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $22.23 | 4.37x | yes | BV/sh $8.83, ROE (TTM) 23.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $35.21 | 2.76x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $110.08 | 0.88x | yes | Rev $8.8B, growth 18% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 8.9x / 10.9x / 12.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $19.94 | 4.87x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.02B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $32.39 | 3.00x | yes | BV $8.83 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 23.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $39.01 | 2.49x | yes | EBITDA $2.61B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $24.73 | 3.93x | yes | FCF $2071.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $23.27 | 4.18x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.94B (FCF $2.07B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $7.91 | 12.29x | yes | BV $8.83 × (ROIC 8.3% / WACC 9.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $17.80 | 5.46x | yes | Revenue $8.79B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $2.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.40x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -1.07x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Monster Beverage is essentially a pure-play energy-drink company, with the Monster Energy segment making up the bulk of sales, distributed in approximately "158 countries and territories worldwide" largely through the Coca-Cola system, and earning a near-30% operating margin.
- The trajectory is the story: first-quarter net sales rose 26.9% to $2.35 billion, operating income grew 28.1% to $730 million, and international sales jumped 44.9% to reach about 45% of the total.
- The biggest risk is the combination of a premium price and rising competition: the stock trades at the top of its peer multiple range while well-funded rivals like Celsius and Prime contest the category, and input costs are pressuring the gross margin.
Bull Case
The earnings trajectory is the clearest argument, because everything about it is pointing up and accelerating. First-quarter net sales rose 26.9% to $2.35 billion, operating income grew 28.1% to $730 million, and earnings per share climbed 27.6% to $0.58, beating estimates. The growth was led by the core Monster Energy segment, up 27.6%, but the standout was international: sales outside the United States jumped 44.9% to $1.06 billion, now about 45% of the total. When the biggest part of the business grows in the high twenties and the international half grows in the forties, the company is compounding from two engines at once.
The economics behind that growth are exceptional. Monster runs a near-30% operating margin, earns a return on equity above 23%, and converts revenue to cash so efficiently that it holds a net cash position of nearly $2.8 billion with almost no debt. An energy drink is a simple product with an addictive consumption pattern and a strong brand, which is the recipe for high margins and recurring purchases. The company funds its growth entirely from internal cash and still has the firepower to buy back stock, with the board just authorizing an additional $500 million repurchase.
The distribution moat is the durable advantage. Monster's products reach approximately "158 countries and territories worldwide," and the brands move through the Coca-Cola bottling and distribution system, one of the most extensive beverage networks on earth. That partnership is hard for a challenger to replicate: signing up the global Coca-Cola system took Monster years and a strategic relationship, and it gives the company shelf placement and cold-box access in markets where a newer rival has to build distribution from scratch. The bull case is that Monster is a high-margin, net-cash, globally distributed brand still growing in the high twenties with a long international runway, and that the premium multiple reflects a genuine compounder the static valuation lenses cannot frame.
Bear Case
The bear case begins with what the price requires, because the assumption is steep. At $91.35 (as of June 27, 2026) the market is paying about thirty-four times operating income, a multiple at the very top of the beverage peer distribution, and that price embeds roughly 27% annual operating growth sustained for five years. Monster is delivering that pace right now, so the rate is not the leap; the duration is. Only about 32% of comparable fast-growers have held such growth even five years, and the energy-drink category is more contested today than at any point in Monster's history. The price is paying for the rare outcome in a market that is getting harder, not easier.
The competition is named and well-funded. Monster's own 10-K lists the field: it competes with "Red Bull GmbH, KDP, Molson Coors, Constellation Brands, AB InBev, The Boston Beer Company and The Mark Anthony Group," and crucially with newer entrants "such as CELSIUS, PRIME, C4, Alani Nu, GHO"ST. These are not fringe players: Celsius and Prime have taken meaningful shelf space and consumer attention, particularly among younger and health-oriented drinkers, the exact demographic energy drinks chase. The company also faces "competition from new entrants in the energy drink, energy shot, beer and beyond beer categories." A premium multiple assumes Monster keeps winning; the competitive set assumes it has to fight harder for every point of share.
The margin is already showing the strain. First-quarter gross margin fell to 55.0% from 56.5%, pressured by geographic mix, higher aluminum can costs, and elevated freight. As Monster grows internationally, the mix shifts toward lower-margin geographies, and input costs are outside its control. A company priced for 27% growth at peak margins has two ways to disappoint: the growth decelerates as competition bites, or the margin compresses as costs and mix erode it, and a high price magnifies either outcome. The balance sheet is a fortress, net cash and no debt, so this is not a solvency story. It is a valuation-and-competition story: a wonderful business priced as if its best, most contested years are guaranteed to repeat for the rest of the decade.
Valuation
The bet in the price is demanding but, unusually, matched by the current run-rate. At $91.35 the market pays about thirty-four times trailing operating income, which inverts to roughly 27% annual operating growth held for five years. Monster grew operating income 28% last quarter, so the implied rate is close to what it is delivering. The stretch is the duration and the fact that the multiple sits at the very top of the beverage peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile, with only about 32% of comparable fast-growers having sustained such a pace for five years.
The methods make the shape of the bet explicit: only the growth-based cash-flow lens reaches the price, while asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples all read the stock as richly valued. This is the durability-premium pattern. The static frames capitalize today's profit and cannot price the franchise value of a globally distributed, high-margin brand still compounding in the high twenties, so they land far below the price. The premium is the optionality on continued growth, isolated where an investor can weigh it. The peer-multiple lens is the most stretched, placing fair value far under the price, which is the market's way of saying Monster trades at a premium to every other beverage company precisely because investors believe its growth and margin profile justify it.
Solvency is a strength that takes the downside-survival question off the table. Monster holds nearly $2.8 billion of net cash, carries almost no debt, and generates more than $2 billion of free cash flow a year, enough to fund growth and buy back stock at the same time. The share count is falling about 2% a year through repurchases, which compounds per-share value on top of the operating growth. The decisive question for the valuation is therefore not the balance sheet, which is pristine, but durability against competition: whether Monster can hold its growth rate and its near-30% margin against Celsius, Prime, and the rest of a crowded field long enough to justify a top-of-peer multiple. At this price, the business has to keep executing at its best, and the cost of a slowdown is steep.
Catalysts
Monster Beverage's first-quarter 2026 results were strong across the board and the stock responded. Net sales rose 26.9% to $2.35 billion, beating estimates by roughly 9%, operating income grew 28.1% to $730 million, and EPS climbed 27.6% to $0.58, ahead of the $0.53 forecast. The core Monster Energy segment grew 27.6%, and international sales surged 44.9% to $1.06 billion, now about 45% of the total. The board approved an additional $500 million share-repurchase program alongside the results.
The forward picture balances momentum against two pressures. The growth catalysts are continued international expansion through the Coca-Cola distribution system, new product launches across the energy and beyond-beer categories, and the early alcohol-brand initiatives. The watch items on the other side are margin and competition: first-quarter gross margin slipped to 55.0% from 56.5% on higher aluminum can and freight costs and geographic mix, and the energy-drink category faces intensifying pressure from well-funded entrants like Celsius and Prime. The most important things to track are the trajectory of international growth, whether pricing actions can offset input-cost inflation to stabilize gross margin, and Monster's market-share trend against the newer competitors.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Monster Energy Drinks (reported)
- CELH (CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FIZZ (National Beverage Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COKE (COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CCEP (COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KO (COCA COLA CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Strategic Brands (reported)
- CELH (CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FIZZ (National Beverage Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KO (COCA COLA CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CCEP (COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Alcohol Brands (reported)
- SAM (THE BOSTON BEER COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TAP (MOLSON COORS BEVERAGE CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BUD (Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- STZ (CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Other (reported)
- KO (COCA COLA CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MDLZ (Mondelez International, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HSY (HERSHEY CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKC (McCORMICK & COMPANY, INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CPB (THE CAMPBELL'S COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GIS (GENERAL MILLS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- INGR (INGREDION INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Monster Q1 2026 results, 2026 · Monster FY2025 10-K