LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (LTM): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (LTM) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LTM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LTM |
| Company | LATAM Airlines Group S.A. |
| Current price | $57.65/sh |
| Composition | Passengers 88% / Cargo 12% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 5.0% |
| Operating margin today | 16.4% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -11.4pp |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.06σ |
| cohort percentile (of 221 peers) | 5 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.07x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.08x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.40x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.59x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $311.95 | 0.18x | yes | FCF base $2.3B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $118.26 | 0.49x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 5.9x / 8.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $107.92 | 0.53x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.4x / 18.0x / 21.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 9.54x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $72.84 | 0.79x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $53.70 | 1.07x | yes | BV/sh $4.57, ROE (TTM) 108.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $430.64 | 0.13x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $83.65 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $14.3B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $158.80 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $4.95, growth 32% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.36 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 5765.00x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.55B × (1−10%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $90.98 | 0.63x | yes | BV $4.57 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 108.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $22.56 | 2.56x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.95 × BVPS $4.57) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $142.54 | 0.40x | yes | EBITDA $4.07B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $48.68 | 1.18x | yes | FCF $1961.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $159.85 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $4.95 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $13.74 | 4.20x | yes | BV $4.57 × (ROIC 25.7% / WACC 8.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $121.03 | 0.48x | yes | Revenue $14.27B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $185.77 | 0.31x | yes | EPS $4.95 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $53.56 | 1.08x | yes | EPS $4.95 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $5.9b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.81x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.54x |
| Interest coverage | 3.2x |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- LATAM emerged from restructuring as the dominant South American airline group with a rebuilt cost structure, posting a record 31.7% adjusted EBITDA margin and net leverage down to 1.3 times in the first quarter of 2026.
- The biggest risk is a margin reset from fuel or currency: management has warned that rising jet-fuel prices will weigh on results from the second quarter, and the price embeds the favorable margin environment continuing.
- Watch fuel costs and regional demand: the price is supported only by the relative and growth methods, so the bet depends on the post-restructuring margins and premium-travel strength persisting through the cycle.
Bull Case
The reflex objection to any airline is that it is a capital-destroying business that periodically goes bankrupt, and LATAM did exactly that, emerging from Chapter 11 restructuring only a few years ago. That history is precisely why the bull case is stronger than the skepticism allows: the restructuring stripped out debt, renegotiated fleet costs, and left a leaner carrier that is now generating returns most airlines never reach. First-quarter 2026 net income jumped 62% to $576 million on revenue up 21.7% to $4.15 billion, with an adjusted EBITDA margin of 31.7%. A 30%-plus EBITDA margin is extraordinary for a network airline, and it reflects a cost structure rebuilt from the ground up rather than the bloated one that went into bankruptcy.
The competitive position in its home region is the durable part. LATAM is the largest airline group in South America, with the dominant networks in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, plus the international long-haul connections that tie the region to North America and Europe. That scale is genuinely hard to replicate: building a comparable hub-and-spoke network across multiple countries with the slot positions, brand, and loyalty base LATAM holds would take years and enormous capital. In the first quarter the airline grew capacity 10.4%, carried nearly 23 million passengers, and held a load factor of 85.3%, evidence the network is filling planes profitably as it expands.
The balance sheet is the part that has genuinely changed. Net leverage fell to 1.3 times in the quarter, an unusually conservative figure for an airline, and the company is generating real free cash flow, roughly $2 billion on a trailing basis. The restructuring converted a debt-laden carrier into one with a manageable balance sheet and the capacity to return capital, and the stock now pays a dividend. The relative-multiple and growth methods support the price precisely because the market is beginning to credit a post-restructuring airline that combines regional dominance, record margins, and a deleveraged balance sheet, a combination LATAM did not have in its prior life.
Bear Case
The price depends on a specific narrative holding: that the post-restructuring margin and the premium-demand strength persist through a cycle, and the most fragile assumption in that story is fuel. Jet fuel is an airline's largest variable cost, it is set in global markets the company cannot control, and management has already warned that a sharp rise in jet-fuel prices is expected to weigh on results beginning in the second quarter. The record 31.7% EBITDA margin was earned in a favorable fuel environment; a sustained spike compresses it directly, and the current price embeds the strong-margin environment continuing rather than reverting toward the lower margins airlines typically earn through a full cycle.
The second fragile assumption is the macro and currency backdrop of the markets LATAM serves. The company earns much of its revenue in South American currencies while a large share of its costs, fuel, aircraft leases, and dollar-denominated debt, are in US dollars. A depreciation of the Brazilian real or Chilean peso, or a regional recession that softens travel demand, hits revenue and the dollar value of earnings at the same time. These are the economies most exposed to commodity cycles, capital-flow reversals, and political volatility, and the premium-segment demand that drove the recent quarter is the first thing to soften when the regional consumer weakens.
The valuation already reflects a lot of good news, which is the bear's quantitative point. The asset-based and earnings-power methods read the stock as expensive; only the relative-multiple and forward-growth lenses justify the price. That means the buyer is paying for continued growth and sustained margins, not for the trailing asset base or a conservative earnings capitalization. The balance sheet is genuinely improved, with net leverage at 1.3 times, so solvency is not the near-term concern it once was. But airlines are perennially one external shock, fuel, currency, a demand recession, away from a sharp margin reset, and a company that recently sat in bankruptcy court is the one investors should be most disciplined about not over-paying for at the top of a strong-demand, low-fuel window. The narrative of a permanently transformed airline is plausible, but it is a narrative, and the price is treating it as settled.
Valuation
Two of the four valuation families justify the price and two say it is expensive, and that split is the right starting point. The relative-multiple and forward-growth methods support the current level, while the asset-based and earnings-power methods read it as rich. The asset and trailing-earnings methods are partly distorted here: LATAM's book equity is thin after the restructuring wiped out the prior capital structure, which inflates return-on-equity figures and makes book-value methods unreliable. The more telling read is that the price is supported by the lenses that credit the airline's current cash generation and growth, not by the static balance-sheet measures.
The inversion frames the bet modestly, which is informative. At today's price the embedded assumption is roughly low-single-digit operating-profit growth, not an aggressive ramp, against current margins. That is a reasonable-sounding bar, but it quietly assumes the record margin holds, which is the real question for a cyclical airline. The forward-growth methods reach the price by crediting continued capacity growth and premium demand at something near recent profitability; the trailing EBITDA of about $4 billion at a 30%-plus margin is the engine. The decisive variable is margin durability, because the price is paying for the post-restructuring cost structure and demand strength to persist, and fuel and currency are the two forces most likely to test it.
Solvency is the dimension that has most improved and it bounds the downside meaningfully. Net leverage of 1.3 times is conservative for an airline, the company generates roughly $2 billion of free cash flow, and interest coverage, while not generous, is adequate at current earnings. The restructuring left a balance sheet that can absorb a fuel or demand shock far better than the pre-bankruptcy version could. That resilience is real and is part of why the growth methods support the price. The risk the valuation carries is not insolvency but a margin reset: if fuel rises as management has warned or the regional economy softens, the earnings that justify the price compress, and the static methods that already call the stock expensive become the frame that matters.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report on May 6 was a record. Revenue rose 21.7% year over year to $4.15 billion and net income climbed 62% to $576 million, with earnings per share of $2.01 well ahead of the roughly $1.38 consensus. The adjusted EBITDA margin reached 31.7% and net leverage fell to 1.3 times even as fuel costs rose, while the airline grew capacity 10.4%, carried nearly 23 million passengers, and held a load factor of 85.3%.
The forward signal carried a caution. Management replaced its full-year guidance with focused metrics given fuel-price volatility, projecting adjusted EBITDA of $3.8 to $4.2 billion, and warned that a sharp rise in jet-fuel prices is expected to weigh on results beginning in the second quarter. Analyst sentiment is constructive, with four Buy ratings and one Hold. The catalysts that matter are the trajectory of jet-fuel prices, which directly drives the margin the price depends on, and South American travel demand and currency trends, since a softening regional economy would pressure both volumes and the dollar value of earnings.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- BTSG (BrightSpring Health Services, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: (1) Other direct costs primarily includes direct labor costs, delivery costs, insurance, and depreciation and amortization expense that relates to revenue-generating assets. (2) Segment selling, general, and administrative expenses includes indirect labor costs, depreciation and amortization, insurance, rent, lease,…
- FY2025 10-K: …owners of skilled nursing facilities are entering the facility-based pharmacy market, particularly in areas of their geographic concentration. We also compete in the large and highly fragmented hospice, infusion, and specialty pharmacy markets. Failure to compete effectively could have a material adverse effect on…
- ES (EVERSOURCE ENERGY)
- FY2025 10-K: …while lowering costs. Implementation of FERC's goals may expose us to competition for construction of transmission projects, which could result in being exposed to cost caps or a reduced ROE in order to win a project bid, additional regulatory considerations and potential delay with respect to future transmission…
- FY2025 10-K: …investments in our system including upgrades or retrofits to meet enhanced design criteria, which can incur additional costs over conventional solutions. We rely on third-party suppliers for equipment, materials, and services and we outsource certain business functions to third-party suppliers and service providers,…
- LVS (LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …the approval of our stockholders, including the adoption of amendments to our articles of incorporation and the approval of a merger or sale of substantially all of our assets. The concentration of ownership may also delay, defer or even prevent a change in control of our company and may make some transactions more…
- FY2025 10-K: …which are also expensed as incurred. Advertising Costs Costs for advertising are expensed the first time the advertising takes place or as incurred. Advertising costs are primarily included in "General and administrative" expenses in the accompanying consolidated statements of operations and were $ 36 million, $ 34…
- RYAAY (RYAAY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OSCR (Oscar Health, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …distribution and servicing costs, premium taxes, exchange fees, other taxes and fees, employee-related expenses, costs of software and hardware, stock-based compensation, the impact of quota share reinsurance, and other administrative costs. Other Expenses (Income) Other expenses (income) consists primarily of…
- FY2025 10-K: …and other laws and regulations. Our employees are able to view their total compensation package, including their salary band and leveling, which helps employees understand their pay and encourages proactive conversation between managers and employees. We believe our Employee Resource Groups ("ERGs") are another…
- ETR (ENTERGY CORP /DE/)
- FY2025 10-K: …Other Business Activities Entergy's non-utility operations business includes the ownership of interests in non-nuclear power plants that sell the electric power produced by those plants to wholesale customers. Entergy's non-utility operations business also provides decommissioning-related services to nuclear power…
- FY2025 10-K: …of cash flows enables Entergy to strengthen its balance sheet, which reduces borrowing costs and supports affordability for customers • Target performance was set to equal 14.6%, which was believed to be a reasonable stretch goal because it exceeded the projected Adjusted FFO/Debt Ratio forecast as reflected in…
- WMB (WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …maintenance expenses increased primarily due to operating costs of the assets acquired at the Transmission, Power & Gulf and West segments, as well as upstream operations at Other, and higher electricity and fuel primarily in the Northeast G&P segment (substantially offset by higher Service revenues discussed above),…
- FY2025 10-K: …primarily due to an unfavorable change in Net unrealized gain (loss) from commodity derivative instruments and lower Commodity margins . Commodity margins decreased $64 million primarily due to: • A $44 million decrease in natural gas marketing margins including $35 million of lower natural gas transportation…
- VG (VENTURE GLOBAL, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …values-led culture position Venture Global well to compete and thrive against this diverse competitive landscape. 31 Table of contents We are subject to market-based price competition, reflecting supply and demand market pricing dynamics, with respect to revenue associated with any sales of our commissioning cargos…
- FY2025 10-K: …LNG sales. Additionally, excess LNG produced by our projects above the nameplate capacity that is sold to VG Commodities or otherwise can, to the extent not previously committed to third parties, be resold to third party customers at our discretion under short-, medium-, or long-term contracts, including on a forward…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
LATAM Q1 FY2026 results, May 2026 · LATAM Q1 FY2026 guidance, May 2026