EQUIFAX INC (EFX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $194.35, EQUIFAX INC (EFX) is priced for +23.8% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EFX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerEFX
CompanyEQUIFAX INC
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$194.35/sh
CompositionWorkforce Solutions 43% / U.S. Information Solutions 34% / International 23%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)13.0%
Operating margin today17.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.9pp
Implied growth23.8%
Multiple paid25x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.40σ

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.81x5expensive
Earnings3.43x5expensive
Relative2.21x2expensive
Growth0.80x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$293.110.66xyesFCF base $1.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$243.290.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.8x / 14.8x / 16.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18.31x (blended: static sector reference 12x + trailing (TTM) 33x), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.3x / 21.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$63.613.06xyesBV/sh $37.28, ROE (TTM) 15.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$82.052.37xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$172.331.13xyesRev $6.4B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.0x / 3.5x / 4.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$73.452.65xyesEPS $5.69, growth 13% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.56 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$41.654.67xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.08B × (1−28%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$83.592.33xyesBV $37.28 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$69.092.81xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.69 × BVPS $37.28) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$56.593.43xyesFCF $1105.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$48.104.04xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.01B (FCF $1.10B − SBC $0.09B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$163.651.19xyesEPS $5.69 × (8.5 + 2×12.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.4516.97xyesBV $37.28 × (ROIC 2.3% / WACC 7.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.44B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$110.171.76xyesEPS $5.69 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 19.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$61.513.16xyesEPS $5.69 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Workforce Solutionsoperatingenterprise$2.6b$1.1b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
U.S. Information Solutionsoperatingenterprise$2.1b$475.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$6.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)7.67x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.52x
Interest coverage5.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Take the bear's best card first. Equifax tells investors, in its own annual report, that it expects U.S. mortgage credit activity in 2026 to be below the levels of activity seen in 2025. Mortgage is the single most cyclical input into this business, and a credit bureau whose largest end market is shrinking should be shrinking with it. That is the fear, and it is a reasonable one.

The June quarter says otherwise. U.S. mortgage revenue rose 25% year over year, and inside the credit bureau segment mortgage revenue rose 40%, with management noting the growth came despite higher mortgage rates through the quarter. The mechanism is visible in the older disclosure too, where revenue growth is attributed to higher mortgage related online services due to product pricing and new products rather than to volume. When a company can grow a line by pricing and product content while the underlying transaction count falls, it is not really a cyclical revenue line. It is a toll that gets renegotiated upward.

The profit engine underneath that is a business most people do not think of as a credit bureau at all. Workforce Solutions holds payroll records contributed by employers, and it sells verification of income and employment to lenders, government agencies and recruiters. The filing describes it as the segment enabling customers to verify income, employment, educational history, criminal justice data and related records. The economics are the tell: in the June quarter Workforce Solutions produced 705.4 million dollars of revenue at a 44.9% operating margin, while the U.S. credit bureau produced 611.6 million dollars at 22.5% and the international business 383.1 million dollars at 12.1%. Nearly half of what the largest segment sells drops to operating profit. That is the number that explains the share price.

Nor is the payroll database standing still. Government contract wins and renewals signed in the first half of 2026 totaled about 300 million dollars of annual contract value, which management expects to benefit 2027 and later rather than the current year. Verification revenue grew 7% in the quarter with what the company described as high double digit growth in talent and consumer lending applications. A records database becomes more valuable as more employers contribute to it and more institutions are required to check it, and neither of those trends reverses easily.

The segment margins also put the peer comparison in a different light. Against the data and analytics cohort, Equifax's consolidated operating margin near 17.8% looks thin: VRSK runs about 44.0% on revenue of 3.1023 billion dollars, MCO about 43.5% on 7.873 billion, SPGI about 43.9% on 15.730 billion. But those companies do not carry three segments with a large unallocated corporate layer sitting above them. Workforce Solutions on its own, at 44.9%, sits right alongside them. The bull argument is that as the faster-growing, higher-margin segment takes a bigger share of the whole, the consolidated number moves toward the segment number rather than the reverse.

Capital allocation supports the same direction. In the June quarter the company returned 366 million dollars to shareholders, repurchasing 1.8 million shares, about 1% of those outstanding, for 300 million dollars and paying 66 million dollars in dividends, while signing a 750 million dollar agreement for the fastest-growing credit bureau in Mexico. Buying data assets in a market where the credit file is still being built is the same trade Equifax made decades ago at home, at a much smaller price.

Bear Case

Equifax is priced as though it were one of the great data franchises, and in one segment it is. The problem is that the company you actually buy is not that segment. It is that segment plus a mid-margin domestic credit bureau, plus an international business earning 12.1% operating margins, plus a corporate overhead layer that consumes several hundred million dollars a year before anything reaches the shareholder. The trailing consolidated operating margin comes to about 17.8%. That is roughly where TRU lands, at 17.9% on revenue of 4.7263 billion dollars, and nowhere near VRSK at 44.0% or MCO at 43.5%. The multiple, however, is not priced anywhere near TRU's kind of business.

Work the price backwards and the requirement is specific. At roughly 24 times operating profit, the price embeds something close to 21.6% annual growth in operating income sustained for five years. Keep that approximate; it is one solve under fixed assumptions, and a percentage point of change in the cost of capital moves it by around seven points. But the direction is not in doubt, and neither is the rarity. That multiple sits at the very top of its peer group, well beyond the upper quartile, and of the companies that once ran at that rate, only about a third were still doing so five years later. Revenue guidance for the full year implies growth of roughly 10.5% to 11.6%. Operating profit has to grow at roughly twice that rate for half a decade for the arithmetic to close.

The moat is thinner than the margin suggests, and the strongest evidence is the company's own words. Its annual report states that competition in the Verification Services business, the revenue engine inside its most profitable segment, is highly competitive with low barriers to entry. It also warns that We also compete with several of our third-party data suppliers and intellectual property providers, and that if key data sources withdraw, the products lose their input. A payroll records database is only defensible while employers keep contributing and while no one else assembles the same file. Payroll processors sit closer to that data than Equifax does.

Regulation is the second structural pressure and it points one way. The bureau operates under the Fair Credit Reporting Act with the CFPB holding what the filing calls broad authority over its business, and it flags that compliance costs and exposure could increase materially if the CFPB or other regulators enact new regulations, change existing regulations, modify through supervision or enforcement past regulatory guidance. The company also concedes that demand may fall to the extent the availability of free or less expensive consumer information increases. Data that consumers can get for nothing is difficult to keep selling at a premium.

The 2017 breach is not just history either. The filing discloses that as a result of a prior material cybersecurity incident it lost certain key certifications which caused certain customers and business partners to stop or pause doing business with us, and legal and regulatory accruals connected to that incident still run through the reconciliation between reported and adjusted earnings. For a company whose product is trust in a file about strangers, that is a recurring cost rather than a closed chapter.

The balance sheet does not leave much slack for a stumble. Net debt runs about 6.2 billion dollars against operating profit that covers the interest bill roughly 5.1 times over. That is serviceable rather than comfortable, particularly with 750 million dollars committed to an acquisition and buybacks running at 300 million dollars a quarter. Reported profitability is going the wrong way in the meantime: net income attributable to Equifax fell 4% in the June quarter to 183.9 million dollars, even as revenue rose 11%. Growth that does not reach the bottom line is exactly what a price requiring 21.6% compounding cannot afford.

Valuation

The price works backwards into a single demanding sentence. At about 24 times operating profit, today's quote assumes operating income compounds at roughly 21.6% a year for five years. Treat that as approximate rather than measured; it is one solve, and moving the cost of capital by a percentage point shifts the implied rate by something like seven points. Even allowing for that, the requirement is unusual. The multiple sits at the very top of its peer group, past the upper quartile, and among companies that have grown at that pace, only about 35% kept it up for five years.

The methods split cleanly around that assumption. Only the forward-growth approaches reach the price. Peer multiples land about 38% below it, the asset-value approaches about 149% below, and the earnings-power approaches about 190% below. That is the signature of a durability premium: nothing anchored to today's balance sheet or today's earnings can reach the quote, and the only frames that can are the ones that credit years of compounding in advance. The premium is not a flaw in the static methods. It is the thing being bought.

Where the argument gets concrete is the distance between segment profitability and company profitability. In the June quarter Workforce Solutions ran a 44.9% operating margin, the U.S. bureau 22.5%, and the international business 12.1%. Consolidated, trailing operating margin is about 17.8%, because a large unallocated corporate expense sits above all three. So the "what has to be true" is not that any segment becomes more profitable. It is that revenue compounds fast enough, and the fastest-growing segment takes enough share of the mix, that the gap between 44.9% and 17.8% narrows. Full-year revenue guidance of 6.710 to 6.780 billion dollars implies roughly 10.5% to 11.6% growth. Operating profit has to move at about double that pace.

Against the cohort, the puzzle is the same one from the other side. VRSK earns about 44.0% operating margins on revenue of 3.1023 billion dollars, MCO about 43.5% on 7.873 billion, SPGI about 43.9% on 15.730 billion, and FICO about 50.4% on 2.2558 billion. Equifax's consolidated margin sits with TRU at the bottom of that list. The price does not.

Leverage bounds how long the market will wait. Net debt runs about 6.2 billion dollars, with operating profit covering the interest bill about 5.1 times over, and the company has committed 750 million dollars to an acquisition expected to close late in 2026 while repurchasing shares at roughly 300 million dollars a quarter. The share count has drifted down about 0.6% a year over four years, so buybacks are offsetting issuance and a little more rather than transforming the per-share arithmetic. The number that decides this valuation is not on the balance sheet at all. It is whether payroll records keep compounding at a rate the rest of the company cannot.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results, reported July 21, 2026, gave the bull case its strongest recent evidence and the bear case its clearest one. Revenue reached 1,700.1 million dollars, up 11%, with U.S. mortgage revenue up 25% and credit bureau mortgage revenue up 40%. Net income attributable to Equifax fell 4% to 183.9 million dollars over the same span, so the growth did not reach the reported bottom line. Both facts came from the same release.

Guidance sets the near-term bar. The company pointed to third-quarter revenue of 1.680 to 1.710 billion dollars and full-year revenue of 6.710 to 6.780 billion dollars, with full-year adjusted earnings per share, the company's own supplemental measure, guided to a range of 8.39 to 8.69 dollars. Management also doubled its 2026 to 2028 cost reduction target from artificial intelligence deployment to 150 million dollars. That target is a margin story rather than a revenue one, and it lands in exactly the corporate expense layer that separates segment profitability from company profitability.

Two structural items are dated. Equifax signed a definitive agreement to buy Círculo de Crédito, described as the fastest growing credit bureau in Mexico, for an enterprise value of 750 million dollars, with closing expected in the fourth quarter of 2026. And in Workforce Solutions, government contract wins and renewals signed during the first half of 2026 came to about 300 million dollars of annual contract value, which management expects to benefit 2027 and beyond rather than the current year. Those contracts are the closest thing to visible forward revenue this business discloses, and they are the reason the segment's growth rate matters more than any single quarter's mortgage print.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Workforce Solutions (reported)

U.S. Information Solutions (reported)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 earnings release, July 21, 2026

View the full interactive EFX report on boothcheck