DOLLAR GENERAL CORP (DG): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers DOLLAR GENERAL CORP (DG) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDG
CompanyDOLLAR GENERAL CORP
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$122.89/sh
CompositionConsumables 82% / Seasonal 10% / Home products 5% / Apparel 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid17x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 6% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.7% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.82σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)42

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.44x5expensive
Earnings2.16x5expensive
Relative0.46x5justifies
Growth0.91x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$218.790.56xyesFCF base $2.0B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$134.540.91xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.7x / 11.7x / 13.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$168.710.73xyesP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.4x / 22.0x / 25.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$83.471.47xyesBV/sh $42.10, ROE (TTM) 18.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$116.071.06xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$93.071.32xyesRev $43.6B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$269.150.46xyesEPS $7.69, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.45 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$56.952.16xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.56B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$114.861.07xyesBV $42.10 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 18.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$85.351.44xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.69 × BVPS $42.10) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$159.450.77xyesEBITDA $3.52B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$34.293.58xyesFCF $2010.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$29.414.18xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.91B (FCF $2.01B − SBC $0.10B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$248.130.50xyesEPS $7.69 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$14.448.51xyesBV $42.10 × (ROIC 2.5% / WACC 7.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$395.600.31xyesRevenue $43.64B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$288.380.43xyesEPS $7.69 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$83.141.48xyesEPS $7.69 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Discount retail (single reportable segment)operatingenterprise40.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.61x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.22x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.7%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

For a retailer that leases nearly everything it trades out of, the balance sheet is mostly a lease schedule, and that is the right place to start. Funded borrowings come to about $4.58 billion gross, or roughly $3.22 billion after the cash on hand. Bring the stores themselves into the count and the shape changes: on a lease-inclusive basis total obligations run nearer $16.56 billion. The 10-K puts a term on them, a weighted-average 9.1 years remaining at a weighted-average discount rate of 4.6%, and notes that "Many of our stores typically carry a primary lease term of up to 15 years with multiple renewal options." The renewal options are the point. A lease that reaches term is a cost that can be shrunk; owned real estate is a decision you live with.

That flexibility bought time, and the time has been used. In the year to January 2026 gross profit rose 9.0% and gross margin gained 107 basis points to 30.7% of net sales, driven mainly by lower shrink. Shrink is the trade's word for inventory that leaves the store without being paid for, and pushing it down is unglamorous work that lands straight in profit. Net sales grew 5.2% over the same year on same-store sales of 3.0%.

The store estate is being worked over rather than simply extended. During 2025 the company opened 589 stores, remodelled 2,000 through one programme and 2,254 through another, relocated 47 and closed 290. Across three years the base grew by 1,789 stores, roughly 9%, while 8,143 locations, about 43% of the estate, were remodelled or relocated. The 2026 plan calls for around 450 new United States stores against roughly 4,270 remodels or relocations, funded from capital spending the company puts at $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion. Far more refurbishment than expansion is a company choosing to make the boxes it already has more productive.

The durability underneath all of it is genuinely unusual. The filing records that "We have achieved positive same-store sales growth each year since 1990, with the exception of 2021", a run that spans several recessions and two generations of competitors. The mix is why. Four fifths of sales are consumables, and management is explicit that these "tend to have lower gross margins" while serving as "key drivers of net sales and customer traffic". Selling cheap staples to a customer who has to buy them regardless is not a high-margin business. It is a stubbornly repeatable one, and a trailing return on equity near 17.7% says the model still converts.

Bear Case

The competitors that should worry a holder here are the small ones. FIVE grew revenue 25.9% and earns an 11.0% operating margin. OLLI grew 16.7% at 11.4%, on a gross margin of 40.7%. DLTR grew 9.4% at 8.8%. Dollar General grew at a mid single-digit pace and converts roughly 5.2% at the operating line. Every one of those rivals takes more profit out of each dollar of sales, and every one is adding square footage faster. This is not an incumbent being disrupted by technology. It is one being outgrown by people selling a slightly different basket at a better margin.

The mix explains the gap, and the company names it without being asked. Consumables "tend to have lower gross margins" while non-consumables "tend to have higher gross margins" and are "key drivers of more profitable sales growth and average transaction amount." Four fifths of this basket sits in the low-margin half of that sentence. In the first quarter of the current year consumables also grew more slowly than the rest, about 3% against seasonal up 6.0% and apparel up 6.7% off far smaller bases. Shifting the mix takes years of merchandising, and it works against the very traffic that consumables generate.

The obligation the equity actually carries is the store base itself. On a lease-inclusive basis total obligations sit near $16.56 billion, against funded borrowings of about $4.58 billion, and the annual cost is right there in the accounts: operating lease cost of $1.99 billion in 2025 against $1.89 billion in 2024. That is very nearly as much going out in rent each year as the company earns from operating after paying it, with a 9.1-year weighted-average term still to run. Rent does not fall when sales do.

Reinvestment absorbs most of what is left. Capital spending of $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion is planned for 2026 against trailing operating profit near $2.24 billion, so the bulk of the profit is going back into the same estate rather than to owners. The share count has fallen only about 0.9% a year over the past four years, which is the honest measure of how much is genuinely spare after rent, remodels and openings. A retailer operating on a margin this thin has very little distance between a soft quarter and a warning.

The bull deserves the concession that the repair is real, and gross margin up 107 basis points on lower shrink is not a presentational trick. The answer is that this is a recovery inside a business whose ceiling is set by what a consumables basket can earn, and the peer group is already demonstrating what a better mix converts. That is the problem the price has to solve, and no amount of remodelling changes what is in the trolley.

Valuation

Two things are true about this price at once, and they point in opposite directions. Measured against peer multiples, the shares sit well below where those approaches land, and the forward cash-flow routes reach past the price as well. Measured against what the company earns right now with no growth credited at all, the price sits at roughly twice the level the earnings-power methods reach. The asset lens falls in between, with the price about 47% above where the book-value methods come out. That configuration is the ordinary signature of a business the market expects to recover: inexpensive against multiples, expensive against a frozen snapshot of today's profit.

Placement inside the group makes the tension concrete. DLTR earns an 8.8% operating margin on $19.75 billion of revenue growing 9.4%. FIVE earns 11.0% on revenue growing 25.9%, and OLLI 11.4% on revenue growing 16.7%. At the other end, TGT converts 4.5% on $106.4 billion and BJ 3.7% on $22.0 billion. Dollar General's roughly 5.2% operating margin on about $43.1 billion of revenue puts it alongside the second pair on profitability and with neither pair on growth. The multiple the market pays sits in the upper half of that range, which is compensation for the store count and the staple demand rather than for the returns earned on capital.

There is a reading of the price that says decline is already assumed: on a whole-company basis the quote sits below the level that even a 5% annual fall in operating profit would warrant, computed at a 6% cost of capital. That reading rests on a low discount rate and moves a long way when the rate moves, so it belongs in the file as one input rather than as the argument.

What is measurable is the return on capital employed by the owners. Book value stands near $39.91 a share against the $117.20 quote, and trailing return on equity runs about 17.7%. A business earning that on its book, in a category whose demand barely notices a recession, is not cheap at nearly three times book and is not obviously dear either. The real question the multiple asks is whether 17.7% is the through-cycle number or the high point of a recovery from a bad two years.

The obligations set the ceiling on all of it. Funded borrowings stand near $4.58 billion gross and about $3.22 billion after cash. Counted with the store leases, the figure runs closer to $16.56 billion, and the rent behind it, $1.99 billion during 2025, is close to what the company earns from operating once it has been paid. The equity is a claim on that difference, and the difference is narrower than the store count makes it look.

Catalysts

First-quarter results landed on June 2, 2026. Net sales came to $10,787.0 million, up 3.4%, with gross profit of $3,410.5 million; consumables, four fifths of the basket, grew about 3%, while seasonal rose 6.0% and apparel 6.7% off much smaller bases. Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 27, 2026.

The spending plan for the year is already on the record: roughly 450 new stores in the United States, about 10 more in Mexico, and approximately 4,270 remodels or relocations, funded out of capital expenditure the company projects at $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion. Two named remodel programmes carry most of that work. This is where the gross margin recovery either extends or stalls, and the annual result will turn on it more than on the store-opening count.

For holders the dividend runs $2.36 a share, a yield near 2%, with the most recent ex-dividend date on July 7, 2026. Sell-side positioning has been drifting gently the other way, with Evercore ISI trimming its target in early July while keeping the stock in coverage. Repurchases have been light, taking the share count down about 0.9% a year across four years, so the income and the store-productivity programme, rather than buybacks, are what this equity currently pays for.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Discount retail (single reportable segment) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 10-K · Q1 10-Q, 13 weeks ended May 1, 2026 · company Form 8-K, filed June 2, 2026 · company earnings calendar · dividend declaration, ex-dividend July 7, 2026 · analyst note reported July 2026

View the full interactive DG report on boothcheck