COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY (CL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $89.82, COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY (CL) is priced for +1.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCL
CompanyCOLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$89.82/sh
CompositionOral, Personal and Home Care 77% / Pet Nutrition 23%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.9%
Operating margin today14.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.0pp
Implied growth1.7%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.04σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)57

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.86x3expensive
Earnings2.47x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.14x4expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$107.950.83xyesFCF base $4.0B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.4%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$92.320.97xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.7x / 20.7x / 22.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 25.94x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 35x), scenarios: 21.8x / 25.9x / 30.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$8.7810.23xyesStage 1: -29% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$27.643.25xyesBV/sh $0.30, ROE (TTM) 863.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1796.400.05xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$69.081.30xyesRev $21.0B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.9x / 3.4x / 3.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$32.122.80xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $3.56B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$48.381.86xyesBV $0.30 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 863.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$4.1121.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.53 × BVPS $0.30) — Graham's conservative floor (excluded from median)
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $3.77B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$44.232.03xyesFCF $3858.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$41.812.15xyesSBC-adj FCF $3.68B (FCF $3.86B − SBC $0.18B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.1242.37xyesEPS $2.53 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.41219.07xyesBV $0.30 × (ROIC 11.5% / WACC 8.4%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $21.05B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$27.353.28xyesEPS $2.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Oral, Personal and Home Care - North Americaoperatingenterprise$4.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Oral, Personal and Home Care - Latin Americaoperatingenterprise$4.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Oral, Personal and Home Care - Europeoperatingenterprise$3.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Oral, Personal and Home Care - Asia Pacificoperatingenterprise$2.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Oral, Personal and Home Care - Africa/Eurasiaoperatingenterprise$1.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Pet Nutritionoperatingenterprise$4.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$7.5b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.16x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.39x
Interest coverage12.3x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Volumes are falling. That is the fact a bull here has to answer before anything else, and the filing does not soften it: in North America during 2025, volume declined 1.4% and selling prices declined 0.2%, leaving organic sales in the region down 1.6%. Company-wide organic sales rose 1.4%, and the Oral, Personal and Home Care segment got there on net selling price increases of 1.8% against volume declines of 0.3%. A consumer business growing by charging more for the same tubes is telling you something about its demand.

What that account leaves out is what is doing the charging. The 10-K states that the company's "share of the global toothpaste market was 41.3% for the full year 2025", and that Oral Care, Personal Care and Home Care contributed 44%, 17% and 16% of worldwide net sales respectively. Four in ten tubes of toothpaste sold anywhere on earth. That is not a brand position built in a decade or reproducible with a marketing budget, and the ability to raise price nearly two points in a soft year is the visible output of it. Pricing power is easiest to see when volumes are hard, which is precisely when it matters.

The second engine is the one people forget is here. Pet Nutrition is 23% of the business, and it is not a sleepy annex. Operating profit at Hill's rose 10% in 2025 to 1,064 million dollars, reaching 23.1% of that segment's net sales and gaining 160 basis points of margin, driven by gross profit expansion. Pet food has structural characteristics household cleaners do not: veterinary-recommended diets are prescribed rather than browsed, and owners trade down slowly on an animal's health. A quarter of this company is compounding in a category with better demographics than toothpaste.

Set the profitability against the cohort and the picture sharpens. Trailing operating margin runs at 20.4% here. PG earns 23.2% on revenue of 86.72 billion dollars, but CHD converts at 17.3%, KVUE at 17.2%, EL at 2.9% and COTY at negative 0.4%. This is a top-quartile converter in a category where most participants are not, and it does it on a revenue base of 20.80 billion dollars, roughly a quarter of PG's, which means the margin is coming from category concentration rather than from scale alone.

Capital allocation closes the argument. The board authorized repurchases of up to 5 billion dollars under a 2025 program, and in the fourth quarter of 2025 the company bought 5,089,081 shares at an average of 78.54 dollars. The share count has fallen about 1.2% a year over the four years to March 2026. For a business throwing off cash it cannot reinvest at high returns, retiring stock is the honest use of it, and a shrinking denominator quietly converts flat profit into rising profit per share.

Bear Case

The methods do not agree about this company, and the shape of the disagreement is the bear case. Comparisons against peer multiples land well below today's price. The earnings-power approaches, which capitalize today's cash generation at the cost of capital and credit it with no growth at all, land further below still. Only the cash-flow methods reach the price, and it is worth being specific about how they get there. The perpetual-growth version starts from 3.8 billion dollars of free cash flow and carries a four percent rate straight through into the terminal value. That is the whole argument. Pay this price and you are paying for four percent compounding, forever, from a business whose organic sales rose by less than a point and a half last year and whose volumes went backwards.

The conservative methods are probably the more honest read, because the thing they refuse to credit is exactly the thing showing signs of wear. Global toothpaste share fell 0.4 points in 2025 to 41.3%. That is one year and a small number, and a 41% share is still enormous. But share in a mature category is the moat made visible, and moats that erode do so in fractions of a point per year for a long time before anyone calls it erosion.

The pressure has an identifiable source, and the company names it. The 10-K warns that under weaker conditions consumers may "reduce consumption or discretionary spending and/or change their purchasing patterns by foregoing purchasing certain of our products or by switching to \"private label,\" or lower-priced product offerings." It also flags the other side of the same squeeze: "the consolidation of retail customers globally may further increase our concentration risk." Fewer, larger retailers negotiating against a branded supplier whose volumes are already declining is not a favourable negotiating table, and private label is the credible threat those retailers hold.

North America is where both forces show up first, and it is where the numbers are worst. Regional organic sales fell 1.6% in 2025, driven by the United States, with volume down 1.4% and price down 0.2%. Price going backwards in the home market is a different signal from price rising elsewhere. It suggests the pricing lever is not uniformly available, and the segment carrying most of the company's revenue is the one where it is jammed.

What holds the price up is a durability premium, and durability premiums are the most fragile thing in a consumer franchise because they are unwritten. The inversion of today's price is undemanding on its face, requiring roughly flat to slightly declining operating profit over the next five years, but it credits a terminal value that keeps compounding beyond that window. That terminal assumption is the same thing the static methods decline to pay for. If the market stops crediting it, nothing about the current year's earnings needs to change for the multiple to compress toward what the peer-multiple and earnings-power lenses support. The balance sheet will not force that outcome, with interest covered 15.7 times over and no cash burn, but a strong balance sheet has never prevented a re-rating.

Valuation

About 18x company-wide operating income is what the market pays here, and inverting it produces a bar that surprises people who expect a premium consumer name to be demanding. The price implies company-wide operating growth of roughly negative 0.7% a year over five years.

Read that carefully, because it is easy to misread as cheap. It is computed at a 7.3% cost of capital, and it moves fast with that input: each additional percentage point of cost of capital shifts the implied growth requirement by about 6.9 percentage points. The low bar in the near term is possible only because the calculation carries a terminal value beyond the five-year window. The next five years are not what this price is paying for. The decade after them is.

That is why the methods split the way they do. Only the cash-flow approaches reach the price, and they do it by projecting a four percent growth rate into perpetuity from a free cash flow base of 3.8 billion dollars. The peer-multiple lens puts the price about 55% above where it lands, and the earnings-power methods, which capitalize current profit with no growth credited at all, put it about 155% above where they land. When the static frames land far below and only the forward-looking ones reach, the premium being paid is for durability rather than for growth. Nobody is underwriting an acceleration here. They are underwriting permanence.

The operating evidence for permanence is real but not unqualified. Trailing operating margin sits at 20.4%, which is where this business converts revenue better than most of its cohort: CHD at 17.3%, KVUE at 17.2%, EL at 2.9%. Against PG at 23.2% it is a step behind. And against the peer multiple range the price sits in the lower half, which is the part that keeps this from being a straightforward overvaluation story. The market is already paying less per unit of these economics than it pays across the group.

Two filing-sourced inputs anchor the durability question rather than the arithmetic. Global toothpaste share was 41.3% in 2025 and manual toothbrush share was 32.4%, up 0.4 points, per the 10-K; Hill's Pet Nutrition delivered operating profit of 1,064 million dollars at 23.1% of its net sales. Those are the two positions the terminal value rests on, and they are moving in opposite directions.

On the balance sheet, coverage is the number that matters. Interest is covered 15.7 times over, the company is not burning cash, and the 10-K reports access to unused domestic and foreign lines of credit of 3,641 million dollars at the end of 2025, with recent issuance including 600 million euros of ten-year senior notes at a 3.25% fixed coupon. Borrowing costs at that level are what a franchise credit gets, and they are the reason the buyback can run at 5 billion dollars of authorization while the dividend keeps rising. The downside here is a multiple question, not a survival question.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results land on July 31, 2026, with the webcast scheduled a week ahead on July 23, 2026. The first quarter was reported on May 1, 2026, and management held its organic sales and earnings guidance unchanged on that call. Holding guidance in a year when volumes are negative is itself a statement: it says the pricing and cost programs are expected to cover the gap. The July print is the first real test of that.

The analyst community has been marking targets higher through July, and the spread between them is more interesting than any single number. Wells Fargo moved to 95 dollars from 92 on July 8 at Equal Weight and Piper Sandler to 96 dollars from 92 on July 9 at Overweight; on July 16 UBS went to 106 dollars from 100 at Buy, JPMorgan to 104 dollars from 96 at Overweight and Citi to 110 dollars from 105 at Buy; on July 24 Barclays moved to 87 dollars from 80 at Equal Weight. A range that wide across houses looking at the same filings is the durability argument being priced in public: the high end credits the franchise indefinitely, the low end does not.

On capital return, the board declared a quarterly dividend of 53 cents a share on June 11, 2026, payable August 14, 2026. That sits alongside the repurchase authorization of up to 5 billion dollars the board approved under its 2025 program. For a business generating far more cash than it can reinvest at its own returns, the pace of buyback execution in the next two prints is a cleaner signal about management's own read on the price than anything said on the call.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Oral, Personal and Home Care - North America / Oral, Personal and Home Care - Latin America +4 more (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company earnings webcast announcement, July 23, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K · Q1 2026 earnings call, May 1, 2026 · broker research notes, July 8 to July 24, 2026 · company dividend declaration, June 11, 2026

View the full interactive CL report on boothcheck