C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC. (CHRW): what the price requires
At today's price, C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC. (CHRW) is priced for +23.7% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CHRW
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CHRW |
| Company | C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC. |
| Current price | $196.64/sh |
| Composition | Transportation and logistics services 91% / Sourcing 9% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | segment |
| Implied growth | 23.7% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.5% cost of capital with 5% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~9.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 79 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 32% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.02x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.40x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.68x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.96x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $55.23 | 3.56x | yes | FCF base $0.9B, growth -7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.9%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $162.86 | 1.21x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 26.2x / 28.2x / 30.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $116.88 | 1.68x | yes | P/E 24.52x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 40x), scenarios: 20.7x / 24.5x / 28.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.87x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $53.51 | 3.67x | yes | BV/sh $14.08, ROE (TTM) 35.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $111.53 | 1.76x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $100.43 | 1.96x | yes | Rev $16.2B, growth -7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.5x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $109.26 | 1.80x | yes | EPS $4.94, growth 22% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.80 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $57.87 | 3.40x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.86B × (1−12%) / WACC 8.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $83.44 | 2.36x | yes | BV $14.08 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 35.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $39.56 | 4.97x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.94 × BVPS $14.08) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $76.56 | 2.57x | yes | EBITDA $0.90B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $64.35 | 3.06x | yes | FCF $857.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $56.74 | 3.47x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.77B (FCF $0.86B − SBC $0.09B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $159.40 | 1.23x | yes | EPS $4.94 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $7.67 | 25.64x | yes | BV $14.08 × (ROIC 4.9% / WACC 8.9%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $334.66 | 0.59x | yes | Revenue $16.20B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $163.88 | 1.20x | yes | EPS $4.94 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 22.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 33.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $53.41 | 3.68x | yes | EPS $4.94 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.2b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.70x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.50x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- C.H. Robinson is an asset-light freight broker, so its real economics live in the spread between what shippers pay and what carriers charge, not in the $16 billion of gross revenue. That makes gross-revenue multiples misleading and operating leverage the variable that matters.
- The price at $184.92 sits above every valuation family. Earnings power value lands at $58, peer multiples in the $76 to $113 range, and even the friendliest growth method at $155. The reverse-DCF reads the implied bet as elevated, requiring roughly 22% operating-income growth.
- The company is delivering margin and EPS gains in a weak freight market: Q1 2026 net income rose 8.8% and adjusted EPS grew 15% on cost control and productivity, with management reaffirming a $6 EPS target assuming no market growth.
Bull Case
Valuing a freight broker is its own discipline, and C.H. Robinson is the clearest example of why. The company does not own trucks or ships; it sits between shippers and carriers, and its breadth of value-added services spans supply-chain consulting, customs brokerage, analytics, project logistics, and cargo insurance alongside the core transportation match (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001043277-26-000009). The $16 billion of gross revenue that flows through it is mostly pass-through carrier cost. The number that matters is the spread, the adjusted gross profit, and the operating margin on it. Read that way, Robinson is a high-return, low-capital business: trailing return on equity is about 35% on a book value per share of only $14.08, and the share count is shrinking about 2.2% a year.
The bull case is that the company is proving it can grow the spread even when freight volumes are flat to down. Q1 2026 net income rose 8.8% to $147.2 million and adjusted EPS grew 15%, driven by cost control and productivity rather than market growth. The filing shows the pricing discipline behind it: average truckload linehaul price excluding fuel rose about 2.5% in 2025 on advanced dynamic pricing, while average linehaul cost per mile rose only about 2.0% on disciplined costing (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001043277-26-000009). Widening the gap between price and cost is exactly how an asset-light broker compounds earnings without needing volume, and management reaffirmed a $6 EPS target for 2026 with no market growth assumed.
The operating leverage is the real prize. When the freight cycle turns and volumes recover, a broker that has stripped cost and improved pricing during the downturn drops a large share of incremental gross profit to the bottom line. The DCF exit-multiple method, the closest to the price at $154.79, and the Ben Graham formula at $159.40 both credit that earnings power. With NAST revenue growing 2.8% on firmer truckload and LTL pricing amid tightening capacity, the early signs of a cyclical pricing recovery are appearing while the cost base stays lean. A buyer at $184.92 is paying for that operating leverage to convert a freight upcycle into outsized earnings.
Bear Case
The methods disagree here, and the disagreement says the price is leaning on the single most optimistic frame while the grounded ones sit far below. Anchor on current economics and the picture is sobering: earnings power value lands at $58.01, the zero-growth FCF-yield read at $64.35, the Graham number at $39.56, and EV/EBITDA relative at $76.56, all a fraction of the $184.92 price (June 27, 2026). The conservative methods are the more honest read because they do not require the freight cycle to cooperate.
The reverse-DCF puts a number on the optimism: the price implies roughly 22% operating-income growth, which the model flags as elevated and outside the company's normal range, with the cohort and fade checks both tripped. That is the crux. Robinson's reported earnings growth in Q1 came largely from cost cuts and a lower tax rate, not from volume or spread expansion driven by a recovering market. Adjusted gross profit actually declined about 12% in the quarter, and global forwarding revenue fell 14.2% on weaker ocean and air demand. Cost-driven earnings growth has a floor; you cannot cut your way to 22% compounding indefinitely, and the price assumes something closer to that.
The structural risk is that freight brokerage is cyclical and competitive, and the spread compresses when capacity loosens. Robinson's truckload contracts generally carry no specific volume commitments (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001043277-26-000009), so shippers can shift business as the market turns, and digital brokers continue to pressure the take rate. The asset-based methods reflect the thin equity base directly: ROIC-justified P/B reads $7.68 because returns on the small book are not the same as returns on the enterprise the market is paying for. A 22%-growth assumption on a business whose recent gains came from cost discipline, in a sector where the spread is the first thing to compress in a downturn, is a demanding bet at this price.
Valuation
C.H. Robinson's valuation X-ray is uniformly below the $184.92 price, which is the signal that the quote is a forward bet rather than a statement about current economics. The earnings-power family is lowest, with earnings power value at $58.01 and the FCF-yield capitalization at $64.35. The asset frames are low too, with the simple excess-return at $53.51 and the Graham number at $39.56, both depressed because book value per share is only $14.08 for an asset-light business. Peer multiples sit in the middle, relative valuation at $113.34 and EV/EBITDA relative at $76.56.
The reverse-DCF quantifies the gap: the price implies roughly 22% operating-income growth, characterized as elevated, with both the cohort and fade rarity checks tripped. In plain terms, the market is paying for a growth rate that sits above what comparable companies sustain and above what the company's own normalized history supports. The one method that exceeds the price, P/Sales-sector at $334.66, is meaningless here because applying a sales multiple to a broker's pass-through gross revenue vastly overstates the economics; it is exactly the trap the asset-light model creates.
The honest synthesis is that Robinson is a high-quality, high-return broker priced for a strong freight recovery and continued double-digit earnings growth. The bet a buyer makes at $184.92 is that the operating leverage of an asset-light broker, combined with pricing discipline and cost control, compounds earnings at a pace the conservative methods do not credit. If the freight cycle turns up sharply, the growth methods are vindicated. If the recent cost-driven gains plateau, the earnings-power frames in the $50s to $70s are the more honest anchor.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report on April 29 was the most recent catalyst: total revenue of $4.0 billion down 0.8%, but net income up 8.8% to $147.2 million and adjusted EPS up 15%, with operating margin expanding on cost control. Management reaffirmed its $6 EPS target for 2026 assuming no market growth, leaning on double-digit productivity gains weighted to the second half. The next quarterly print is the test of whether the productivity story delivers as promised.
The forward watch items are sector-specific. First, the freight cycle: Q1 showed North American surface transportation pricing firming on tightening carrier capacity, with truckload volume down about 3.5% but LTL up about 2%, so the swing factor is whether capacity discipline drives a durable pricing recovery. Second, the spread, the adjusted gross profit that declined about 12% in the quarter, since that is the real economic line for a broker and its direction matters more than gross revenue. Third, global forwarding, where revenue fell 14.2% on weak ocean and air demand, a drag that needs to stabilize. On capital allocation, the company increased buybacks during the quarter, and the pace of repurchases on a shrinking share count is the lever that supports per-share earnings while the market recovers.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
NAST (North American Surface Transportation) (reported)
- RXO (RXO, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LSTR (LANDSTAR SYSTEM, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JBHT (J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HUBG (HUB GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- XPO (XPO, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SNDR (Schneider National, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Global Forwarding (reported)
- EXPD (EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UPS (United Parcel Service, Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FDX (FedEx Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HUBG (HUB GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.