Allegion plc (ALLE): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $157.48, Allegion plc (ALLE) is priced for +9.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ALLE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ALLE |
| Company | Allegion plc |
| Sector / Industry | Industrials |
| Current price | $157.48/sh |
| Composition | Products 93% / Services and software 7% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Implied growth | 9.3% |
| Multiple paid | 17x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.02σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 36 |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.88x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.63x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.13x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.80x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $228.36 | 0.69x | yes | FCF base $0.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.1%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $196.03 | 0.80x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 15.5x / 17.5x / 19.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.9x / 18.0x / 21.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $83.73 | 1.88x | yes | BV/sh $24.91, ROE (TTM) 31.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $159.50 | 0.99x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $140.49 | 1.12x | yes | Rev $4.3B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.1x / 3.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $91.44 | 1.72x | yes | EPS $7.62, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.73 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $59.93 | 2.63x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.73B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $128.36 | 1.23x | yes | BV $24.91 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 31.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $65.36 | 2.41x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.62 × BVPS $24.91) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.89B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $59.18 | 2.66x | yes | FCF $671.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $55.30 | 2.85x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.64B (FCF $0.67B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $123.82 | 1.27x | yes | EPS $7.62 × (8.5 + 2×5.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $14.69 | 10.72x | yes | BV $24.91 × (ROIC 4.8% / WACC 8.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $4.29B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $62.23 | 2.53x | yes | EPS $7.62 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 8.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $82.38 | 1.91x | yes | EPS $7.62 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Allegion Americas | operating | enterprise | $3.2b | $896.5m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Allegion International | operating | enterprise | $848.5m | $76.5m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.31x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.87x |
| Interest coverage | 8.9x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Allegion's worth is not in its assets: book value is roughly $24.26 a share, because door hardware specified into a building's drawings earns high returns on very little invested capital.
- Trade policy is the external variable with the most leverage on the thesis, and the 10-K is explicit that "Throughout 2025, the U.S. government announced tariffs on imports from several countries from which we manufacture and/or import products and components."
- Second-quarter results on July 23, 2026 raised the full-year outlook on Americas strength, while the full-year international organic outlook was cut to a low single-digit decline on German weakness.
Bull Case
Only one way of valuing this business reaches the current price of $153.30, and it is the one that credits the future. Book value, normalized earning power and peer multiples all land underneath, several of them a long way underneath. That spread is not an error in the arithmetic. It is the arithmetic reporting what kind of company this is. Allegion carries book value of roughly $24.26 a share because making locks, door closers and exit devices consumes very little invested capital, and any lens anchored on capital employed will read a business like that as expensive no matter how good it is. The spread is the market saying durability is worth more than the balance sheet can show.
The durability has a specific mechanism, and it is not brand loyalty. Allegion employs "specification writers who work with architects, engineers and consultants to help design door openings and security systems to meet end-users' functional, aesthetic and regulatory requirements". Getting written into the drawings at design stage, where fire and life-safety code compliance is decided, is what determines which hardware goes on which opening, and openings get replaced on a building's timescale rather than a purchasing manager's. Sales then flow through a wide intermediary network: the company "sells most of our products and solutions through distribution and retail channels, including specialty distribution". Specification creates the pull, distribution collects it, and neither is easy for a challenger to reproduce quickly.
The economics that follow are what a capital-light moat looks like on the income statement. Cost of goods sold fell to 54.8% of net revenues in 2025, and the Americas segment carried an operating margin of 27.9 percent, well above the consolidated trailing operating margin of about 20.8%. That is the profitability of a business that sets its own price on a small, code-mandated component of a much larger construction budget.
Management is also buying the part of the market that is actually growing. During 2025 the company acquired Gatewise, "a provider of smart access control solutions in the U.S. multifamily marketplace", Waitwhile, a software-as-a-service provider, Lemaar in Australia and Next Door in the United States. The July print showed a significant increase in specification activity across institutional and commercial verticals, which management reads as project momentum over the next twelve to eighteen months. Meanwhile the share count has drifted down about 0.6% a year over the four years to March 2026. None of that is dramatic. Compounding rarely is.
Bear Case
Trade policy is the variable with the most leverage on this thesis, and it is the one the price is least equipped to absorb. The 10-K records that "Throughout 2025, the U.S. government announced tariffs on imports from several countries from which we manufacture and/or import products and components." The company's answer was straightforward: "In 2025, we offset inflation due to tariffs with pricing actions." That works while construction demand is firm. It has no other line of defense, because the filing also states "We do not currently use financial derivatives to hedge against volatility in commodity prices". The entire buffer between an input-cost shock and the operating line is the willingness of contractors and distributors to accept a higher invoice, and that willingness is exactly what disappears when non-residential activity turns.
A second policy channel runs straight to after-tax cash flow. As an Irish-incorporated company operating across many jurisdictions, Allegion sits directly in the path of the global minimum tax rollout, and the 10-K allows that new guidance or legislation "could result in a material increase in our effective tax rate". Nothing in a multiple of operating profit prices a permanent step up in the tax rate. It simply reduces what reaches shareholders, quietly and without a bad quarter to mark the moment.
Now put the demand next to the delivery. At about 18 times operating income, the price requires company-wide operating profit to compound roughly 11.1% a year over a five-year horizon. In 2025 the 10-K attributes consolidated revenue growth to pricing of 3.1 points, volume of 1.0, acquisitions and divestitures of 3.1 more, and currency of 0.6. Read that honestly and roughly half of last year's growth was purchased and a slice was exchange rates. The organic engine ran at a low single-digit pace. Compounding operating profit in the low teens on that base requires either continued margin expansion from an already high level, or an acquisition programme that keeps finding assets at prices that still create value, year after year.
History is not generous about the second part. Only about 52% of companies growing at this pace kept it going across a comparable stretch, and the multiple being paid sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. The company's own recent record supports the rate; what it cannot speak to is the duration, and duration is where the whole premium lives.
The balance sheet is not the risk, which is worth saying plainly. Net debt of about $1.67 billion sits at roughly 2.0 times operating income, and operating profit covers interest 8.4 times. But an acquisition-fed growth model has a claim on that same capacity, and the share count has barely moved, falling only about 0.6% a year over the four years to March 2026. If the deals stop clearing their cost of capital, there is no buyback of consequence underneath to catch the earnings line.
Valuation
At about 18 times operating income, the price requires company-wide operating profit to compound roughly 11.1% a year over a five-year horizon. That rate is close to what Allegion has recently delivered, so the demand is not the pace. It is the persistence: five straight years of low double-digit profit growth from a mature manufacturer of door hardware, in a cycle nobody controls.
The lenses do not agree, and the shape of the disagreement is the useful information. Asset value, normalized earning power and peer-multiple comparison all land below today's level, some of them far below. Only the growth-based cash-flow work reaches it. There is a structural reason for that split rather than an error. Book value is roughly $24.26 a share, so anything anchored on capital employed reads a company that barely uses capital as expensive by construction. A no-growth capitalization of the roughly $682.6 million a year the business currently generates does the same thing from a different direction, because it credits none of the compounding. What is left is a durability premium: the price is a bet on a franchise the static frames cannot represent, not a bet on a number any of them produced.
The company-specific inputs behind that premium are visible in the filings. Cost of goods sold fell to 54.8% of net revenues in 2025, and the Americas segment operated at 27.9 percent margins against a consolidated trailing operating margin near 20.8%. But the 2025 revenue build is the number that constrains the story: pricing added 3.1 points, volume 1.0, acquisitions and divestitures 3.1, and currency 0.6. A durability premium paid on organic compounding has to be underwritten by organic results, and last year roughly half the growth arrived by purchase.
Solvency does not complicate any of this. Net debt of about $1.67 billion runs at roughly 2.0 times operating income, and interest is covered 8.4 times, which is a balance sheet that can fund deals and ride out a construction downturn without a rescue. What it cannot do is manufacture the growth. Strip the acquisitions out of the last two years and the pace the price is paying for has to come from a non-residential building cycle and a slow migration from mechanical to electronic locks, neither of which the company sets the timing on.
Catalysts
Second-quarter results landed on July 23, 2026, and they were strong on the axis that matters. Revenue reached $1,151.5 million, up 12.7% as reported and 6.9% organically, with net earnings per share of $2.15 and an operating margin of 22.1% against 21.5% a year earlier. Organic growth at that level is a different report from the one 2025 produced, when acquisitions carried a large share of the increase.
Management raised the full-year outlook alongside it, to reported revenue growth of 7.5% to 8.5% and organic growth of 3.5% to 4.5%, and lifted its earnings guidance. The composition of the raise is the part worth watching. Americas strength did the work, while the full-year international organic outlook was cut to a low single-digit decline on weakness in the German economy, and the international business was described as recovering sequentially from earlier enterprise resource planning difficulties.
The forward indicator management pointed at is specification activity, which it reported rising across institutional and commercial verticals and reads as project momentum over the next twelve to eighteen months. That is the right leading measure for this business, since specification precedes the order by roughly the length of a design and permitting cycle. It is also the one to hold management to: if specification activity is rising now and organic revenue is not still growing in the middle of 2027, the moat argument loses its cleanest piece of evidence.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Allegion Americas / Allegion International (reported)
- ADT (ADT Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …adt:ReceivablesFacilityMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2025-12-31 0001703056 adt:CostOfFundRateCOFMember adt:ReceivablesFacilityMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2025-12-31 0001703056 us-gaap:FederalFundsEffectiveSwapRateMember adt:FirstLienTermLoanBDue2030Member us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31…
- FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:LineOfCreditMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0001703056 adt:StepDownsScenario1Member adt:FirstLienRevolvingCreditFacilityMember us-gaap:LineOfCreditMember 2025-12-31 0001703056 adt:StepDownsScenario2Member adt:FirstLienRevolvingCreditFacilityMember us-gaap:LineOfCreditMember 2025-12-31 0001703056…
- ARLO (ARLO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …is shipped and transfer of control from us to the customer occurs. Our revenue consists of gross revenue, less customer rebates and other channel sales incentives, allowances for estimated sales returns, price protection, and net changes in deferred revenue. A significant portion of our marketing 63 Table of Contents…
- FY2025 10-K: …0001736946 2025 FY false P1M P3Y http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#AccruedLiabilitiesCurrent P3Y P3Y 217 iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares arlo:region arlo:segment arlo:reporting_unit xbrli:pure arlo:consecutiveQuarter 0001736946 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0001736946 2025-06-29 0001736946 2026-02-20 0001736946…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Allegion Q2 2026 results, July 2026