Allegion plc (ALLE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $157.48, Allegion plc (ALLE) is priced for +9.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ALLE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerALLE
CompanyAllegion plc
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$157.48/sh
CompositionProducts 93% / Services and software 7%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Implied growth9.3%
Multiple paid17x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.02σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)36

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.88x5expensive
Earnings2.63x5expensive
Relative2.13x2expensive
Growth0.80x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$228.360.69xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.1%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$196.030.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.5x / 17.5x / 19.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.9x / 18.0x / 21.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$83.731.88xyesBV/sh $24.91, ROE (TTM) 31.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$159.500.99xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$140.491.12xyesRev $4.3B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.1x / 3.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$91.441.72xyesEPS $7.62, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.73 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$59.932.63xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.73B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$128.361.23xyesBV $24.91 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 31.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$65.362.41xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.62 × BVPS $24.91) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.89B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$59.182.66xyesFCF $671.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$55.302.85xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.64B (FCF $0.67B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$123.821.27xyesEPS $7.62 × (8.5 + 2×5.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$14.6910.72xyesBV $24.91 × (ROIC 4.8% / WACC 8.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $4.29B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$62.232.53xyesEPS $7.62 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 8.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$82.381.91xyesEPS $7.62 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Allegion Americasoperatingenterprise$3.2b$896.5m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Allegion Internationaloperatingenterprise$848.5m$76.5m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.31x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.87x
Interest coverage8.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.6%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Only one way of valuing this business reaches the current price of $153.30, and it is the one that credits the future. Book value, normalized earning power and peer multiples all land underneath, several of them a long way underneath. That spread is not an error in the arithmetic. It is the arithmetic reporting what kind of company this is. Allegion carries book value of roughly $24.26 a share because making locks, door closers and exit devices consumes very little invested capital, and any lens anchored on capital employed will read a business like that as expensive no matter how good it is. The spread is the market saying durability is worth more than the balance sheet can show.

The durability has a specific mechanism, and it is not brand loyalty. Allegion employs "specification writers who work with architects, engineers and consultants to help design door openings and security systems to meet end-users' functional, aesthetic and regulatory requirements". Getting written into the drawings at design stage, where fire and life-safety code compliance is decided, is what determines which hardware goes on which opening, and openings get replaced on a building's timescale rather than a purchasing manager's. Sales then flow through a wide intermediary network: the company "sells most of our products and solutions through distribution and retail channels, including specialty distribution". Specification creates the pull, distribution collects it, and neither is easy for a challenger to reproduce quickly.

The economics that follow are what a capital-light moat looks like on the income statement. Cost of goods sold fell to 54.8% of net revenues in 2025, and the Americas segment carried an operating margin of 27.9 percent, well above the consolidated trailing operating margin of about 20.8%. That is the profitability of a business that sets its own price on a small, code-mandated component of a much larger construction budget.

Management is also buying the part of the market that is actually growing. During 2025 the company acquired Gatewise, "a provider of smart access control solutions in the U.S. multifamily marketplace", Waitwhile, a software-as-a-service provider, Lemaar in Australia and Next Door in the United States. The July print showed a significant increase in specification activity across institutional and commercial verticals, which management reads as project momentum over the next twelve to eighteen months. Meanwhile the share count has drifted down about 0.6% a year over the four years to March 2026. None of that is dramatic. Compounding rarely is.

Bear Case

Trade policy is the variable with the most leverage on this thesis, and it is the one the price is least equipped to absorb. The 10-K records that "Throughout 2025, the U.S. government announced tariffs on imports from several countries from which we manufacture and/or import products and components." The company's answer was straightforward: "In 2025, we offset inflation due to tariffs with pricing actions." That works while construction demand is firm. It has no other line of defense, because the filing also states "We do not currently use financial derivatives to hedge against volatility in commodity prices". The entire buffer between an input-cost shock and the operating line is the willingness of contractors and distributors to accept a higher invoice, and that willingness is exactly what disappears when non-residential activity turns.

A second policy channel runs straight to after-tax cash flow. As an Irish-incorporated company operating across many jurisdictions, Allegion sits directly in the path of the global minimum tax rollout, and the 10-K allows that new guidance or legislation "could result in a material increase in our effective tax rate". Nothing in a multiple of operating profit prices a permanent step up in the tax rate. It simply reduces what reaches shareholders, quietly and without a bad quarter to mark the moment.

Now put the demand next to the delivery. At about 18 times operating income, the price requires company-wide operating profit to compound roughly 11.1% a year over a five-year horizon. In 2025 the 10-K attributes consolidated revenue growth to pricing of 3.1 points, volume of 1.0, acquisitions and divestitures of 3.1 more, and currency of 0.6. Read that honestly and roughly half of last year's growth was purchased and a slice was exchange rates. The organic engine ran at a low single-digit pace. Compounding operating profit in the low teens on that base requires either continued margin expansion from an already high level, or an acquisition programme that keeps finding assets at prices that still create value, year after year.

History is not generous about the second part. Only about 52% of companies growing at this pace kept it going across a comparable stretch, and the multiple being paid sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. The company's own recent record supports the rate; what it cannot speak to is the duration, and duration is where the whole premium lives.

The balance sheet is not the risk, which is worth saying plainly. Net debt of about $1.67 billion sits at roughly 2.0 times operating income, and operating profit covers interest 8.4 times. But an acquisition-fed growth model has a claim on that same capacity, and the share count has barely moved, falling only about 0.6% a year over the four years to March 2026. If the deals stop clearing their cost of capital, there is no buyback of consequence underneath to catch the earnings line.

Valuation

At about 18 times operating income, the price requires company-wide operating profit to compound roughly 11.1% a year over a five-year horizon. That rate is close to what Allegion has recently delivered, so the demand is not the pace. It is the persistence: five straight years of low double-digit profit growth from a mature manufacturer of door hardware, in a cycle nobody controls.

The lenses do not agree, and the shape of the disagreement is the useful information. Asset value, normalized earning power and peer-multiple comparison all land below today's level, some of them far below. Only the growth-based cash-flow work reaches it. There is a structural reason for that split rather than an error. Book value is roughly $24.26 a share, so anything anchored on capital employed reads a company that barely uses capital as expensive by construction. A no-growth capitalization of the roughly $682.6 million a year the business currently generates does the same thing from a different direction, because it credits none of the compounding. What is left is a durability premium: the price is a bet on a franchise the static frames cannot represent, not a bet on a number any of them produced.

The company-specific inputs behind that premium are visible in the filings. Cost of goods sold fell to 54.8% of net revenues in 2025, and the Americas segment operated at 27.9 percent margins against a consolidated trailing operating margin near 20.8%. But the 2025 revenue build is the number that constrains the story: pricing added 3.1 points, volume 1.0, acquisitions and divestitures 3.1, and currency 0.6. A durability premium paid on organic compounding has to be underwritten by organic results, and last year roughly half the growth arrived by purchase.

Solvency does not complicate any of this. Net debt of about $1.67 billion runs at roughly 2.0 times operating income, and interest is covered 8.4 times, which is a balance sheet that can fund deals and ride out a construction downturn without a rescue. What it cannot do is manufacture the growth. Strip the acquisitions out of the last two years and the pace the price is paying for has to come from a non-residential building cycle and a slow migration from mechanical to electronic locks, neither of which the company sets the timing on.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results landed on July 23, 2026, and they were strong on the axis that matters. Revenue reached $1,151.5 million, up 12.7% as reported and 6.9% organically, with net earnings per share of $2.15 and an operating margin of 22.1% against 21.5% a year earlier. Organic growth at that level is a different report from the one 2025 produced, when acquisitions carried a large share of the increase.

Management raised the full-year outlook alongside it, to reported revenue growth of 7.5% to 8.5% and organic growth of 3.5% to 4.5%, and lifted its earnings guidance. The composition of the raise is the part worth watching. Americas strength did the work, while the full-year international organic outlook was cut to a low single-digit decline on weakness in the German economy, and the international business was described as recovering sequentially from earlier enterprise resource planning difficulties.

The forward indicator management pointed at is specification activity, which it reported rising across institutional and commercial verticals and reads as project momentum over the next twelve to eighteen months. That is the right leading measure for this business, since specification precedes the order by roughly the length of a design and permitting cycle. It is also the one to hold management to: if specification activity is rising now and organic revenue is not still growing in the middle of 2027, the moat argument loses its cleanest piece of evidence.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Allegion Americas / Allegion International (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Allegion Q2 2026 results, July 2026

View the full interactive ALLE report on boothcheck