WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN (WFC): what the price requires
At today's price, WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN (WFC) is priced for 14.3% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WFC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | WFC |
| Company | WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN |
| Current price | $87.42/sh |
| Composition | Consumer Banking and Lending 44% / Commercial Banking 14% / Corporate and Investment Banking 23% / Wealth and Investment Management 19% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Price-to-book | 1.64x |
| Return on equity now | 12.3% |
The implied return on book is non-physical at this price-to-book and is suppressed as misleading. The price sits beyond a 12.4% return on equity sustained for 40 years and is not resolvable as a sustainable-ROE point. The rarity read below is the honest signal.
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 12.4% ROE ceiling.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.6%; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: extreme
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.66σ |
| cohort percentile (of 119 peers) | 72 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 62% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.02x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.83x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.82x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.34x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $82.94 | 1.05x | yes | TBVPS $49.21 × 1.69x (ROE (TTM) 12.2% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $72.50 | 1.21x | yes | P/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.4x / 10.0x / 11.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $75.24 | 1.16x | yes | BV/sh $57.22, ROE (TTM) 12.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $85.73 | 1.02x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $65.03 | 1.34x | yes | Rev $85.0B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.7x / 3.2x / 3.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $106.25 | 0.82x | yes | EPS $6.47, growth 16% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.76 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $91.27 | 0.96x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.47 × BVPS $57.22) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $208.77 | 0.42x | yes | EPS $6.47 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $159.38 | 0.55x | yes | EPS $6.47 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 24.6x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $69.95 | 1.25x | yes | EPS $6.47 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.3% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Wells Fargo just entered a new phase: the Federal Reserve removed the asset cap in June 2025 that had frozen its balance sheet since 2018, letting it grow loans, deposits and markets balances for the first time in years.
- The biggest risk is the credit and rate cycle a bank cannot control: return on equity reached 12.2% in the first quarter, but that profitability rides on net interest income and on a $14.3 billion allowance for credit losses that has to prove adequate if the economy turns.
- What to watch is whether the freed balance sheet translates into growth: management held 2026 net interest income guidance at roughly $50 billion and returned $4 billion to shareholders through buybacks in the quarter.
Bull Case
The right way to frame Wells Fargo today is by its stage, because the company just moved from one phase of its life to another. For seven years it operated under a Federal Reserve asset cap, a regulatory penalty that prohibited it from growing its balance sheet, imposed after its accounts scandal. In June 2025 the Fed removed that cap. A bank that could not grow its loans, deposits, securities or markets balances since 2018 can now do all of those things, and that single regulatory change reframes the entire investment case from a cleanup story to a growth story. The mature, deposit-rich franchise that spent years constrained is now free to deploy its balance sheet, and that is the lens through which the recent numbers should be read.
The profitability the bank produced even while capped shows what the franchise can earn. First-quarter net income was $5.3 billion, or $1.60 per diluted share, on revenue of $21.4 billion, and net interest income rose 5% to $12.1 billion. The profitability metrics that matter for a bank moved in the right direction: return on equity reached 12.2% from 11.5%, and return on tangible common equity reached 14.5% from 13.6%. A return on tangible common equity above 14% is solid for a bank of this scale, and it was earned with the growth engine still warming up. The deposit base is the franchise's real asset, with average deposits growing, led by low-cost noninterest-bearing deposits, which is the cheapest funding a bank can have.
Capital strength gives management the room to reward shareholders while it grows. The common equity tier 1 ratio stood at 10.3%, comfortably above requirements, and the bank returned $4 billion to shareholders in the quarter through 46.3 million shares of repurchases. A bank trading near book value that earns a mid-teens return on tangible equity, buys back stock, and has just had its growth handcuffs removed is a different proposition than one still under a cloud. Management held 2026 net interest income guidance at roughly $50 billion, and the upside case is that the freed balance sheet pushes that figure higher over time as the bank grows into its new latitude.
Bear Case
The variable with the most leverage over Wells Fargo, and the one entirely outside management's control, is the credit and interest-rate cycle. A bank's profitability is largely a bet on the economy: net interest income depends on the level and shape of rates, and earnings depend on credit losses staying contained. Wells Fargo carries a $14.3 billion allowance for credit losses, a reserve set against loans it expects to go bad, and that allowance is an estimate. The bank's filings note declines in its commercial real estate and residential mortgage portfolios, and commercial real estate, particularly office, is exactly the kind of exposure that can deteriorate faster than reserves anticipate in a downturn. The 12.2% return on equity is a good-times number; a credit cycle that forces the bank to build reserves would compress it quickly, and the price, which is supported by methods grounded in current earnings, would have less to stand on.
The regulatory history is the second concern, and it is specific to this bank. The asset cap was removed, but it existed for seven years because of governance and control failures, and a large, complex bank that ran afoul of its regulator once carries a higher baseline of regulatory risk than peers. The freedom to grow is also the freedom to make mistakes at scale, and the market will watch closely whether the bank grows prudently or chases volume now that it can. Newly unconstrained growth in lending, if pursued aggressively into a softening economy, is precisely how banks accumulate the loans that become the next cycle's losses.
The valuation tempers how much of this is already priced. Unlike many names, Wells Fargo's price is broadly supported by the value methods: the asset-based and earnings-power lenses land right around the price, and the relative-valuation method reads it as reasonable against peer earnings. This is not an expensive stock on its current numbers. That cuts against an overvaluation bear case but sharpens a different one: at roughly 1.5 times book and a price that already credits a healthy return on equity, the upside requires the growth story to deliver, while the downside from a credit cycle is real and not fully discounted. The bull and the bear agree the asset cap removal is a genuine positive and the returns are solid. They disagree on whether a bank's earnings, which rise and fall with the credit cycle, deserve to be extrapolated from a benign environment, or whether the next downturn resets the math.
Valuation
A bank is worth the return it earns on its capital, so Wells Fargo's price is best read off price-to-book against its return on equity, not off an operating multiple. At $82.24 the units trade around 1.5 times book value, against a tangible book value per share near $49 and a trailing return on equity of 12.2% on a cost of equity around 9.3%. A bank earning a return meaningfully above its cost of equity deserves to trade above book, and the premium here is consistent with the returns the franchise is producing rather than stretched beyond them.
The method families line up the way a reasonably valued bank's do. The dedicated bank model, which prices tangible book at a multiple driven by the spread of return over cost of equity, lands essentially at the price. The asset-based excess-return methods land right around it, and the relative-valuation method, applying a sector-median earnings multiple, lands modestly below the price. Only the forward-growth method reads the price as somewhat demanding, which is the lens that would have to assume the newly freed balance sheet drives faster growth than history. The pattern is that of a value-and-quality name: most of the methods support the price on current earnings, and the question is growth, not a gap to close. Several earnings-based methods that anchor on the bank's mid-teens EPS growth even read the price as cheap, reflecting the profitability the franchise is now producing.
The solvency frame for a bank is regulatory capital and payout capacity, not corporate leverage. Deposits are funding, not debt, and a bank does not burn cash in the way an industrial does. On that frame Wells Fargo is strong: a common equity tier 1 ratio of 10.3% leaves capital above requirements, and the bank is returning capital through buybacks while sustaining a mid-teens return on tangible common equity. The decisive judgment for the value is not any single method's number; it is whether the removal of the asset cap lets the bank grow earnings faster than its constrained past, against the ever-present risk that a credit cycle resets the return on equity the price is built on.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report was the catalyst, set against the larger structural event of the prior year. Net income of $5.3 billion, or $1.60 per diluted share, came on revenue of $21.4 billion up 6%, with net interest income up 5% to $12.1 billion, return on equity of 12.2%, and return on tangible common equity of 14.5%. The bank returned $4 billion to shareholders through 46.3 million shares of repurchases and held 2026 net interest income guidance at roughly $50 billion with noninterest expense guidance unchanged at $55.7 billion. The defining backdrop is the June 2025 removal of the Federal Reserve asset cap, which for the first time since 2018 lets the bank grow its balance sheet.
The forward catalysts are growth and the rate environment. Now that the asset cap is gone, the pace of loan, deposit and markets-balance growth is the metric that will show whether the structural unlock is translating into earnings, and net interest income against the $50 billion guide is the headline number each quarter. The external variables with the most leverage are interest rates, which drive net interest income, and the credit cycle, which determines whether the allowance for credit losses proves adequate. Commercial real estate trends, especially office, are the credit exposure to watch. The next earnings report is the event that shows whether the freed balance sheet is starting to drive growth and whether credit is holding.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Consumer Banking and Lending (reported)
- BAC (BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USB (US BANCORP \DE\)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PNC (PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TFC (TRUIST FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- C (Citigroup Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COF (CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Commercial Banking (reported)
- PNC (PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USB (US BANCORP \DE\)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TFC (TRUIST FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FITB (Fifth Third Bancorp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KEY (KEYCORP /NEW/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MTB (M&T BANK CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CFG (CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP INC/RI)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Corporate and Investment Banking (reported)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BAC (BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- C (Citigroup Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JEF (Jefferies Financial Group Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Wealth and Investment Management (reported)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SCHW (SCHWAB CHARLES CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RJF (RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMP (AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LPLA (LPL Financial Holdings Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTRS (NORTHERN TRUST CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BK (THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026; FY2025 10-K, accession 0000072971-26-000133 · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · FY2025 10-K, accession 0000072971-26-000133