Toll Brothers, Inc. (TOL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $155.04, Toll Brothers, Inc. (TOL) is priced for -0.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TOL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTOL
CompanyToll Brothers, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical / Homebuilders
Current price$155.04/sh
CompositionNorth - Home sales 15% / Mid-Atlantic - Home sales 13% / South - Home sales 25% / Mountain - Home sales 27% / Pacific - Home sales 19% / Corporate and other - Home sales 0% / North - Land sales and other 0% / Mid-Atlantic - Land sales and other 0% / South - Land sales and other 0% / Mountain - Land sales and other 0% / Pacific - Land sales and other 0% / Corporate and other - Land sales and other 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.3%
Operating margin today14.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.3pp
Implied growth-0.7%
Multiple paid9x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~4.7pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.80σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)15
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and growth-DCF value, while relative-multiple lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.94x5justifies
Earnings1.25x5expensive
Relative1.66x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Growth Families that call it expensive: Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$369.580.42xyesFCF base $1.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$225.520.69xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.4x / 10.4x / 12.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$148.951.04xyesBV/sh $90.67, ROE (TTM) 15.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$188.620.82xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$151.051.03xyesRev $11.0B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$158.640.98xyesEPS $13.22, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.35 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$187.490.83xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.67B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$193.180.80xyesBV $90.67 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$164.230.94xyes√(22.5 × EPS $13.22 × BVPS $90.67) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$113.591.36xyesFCF $1215.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$109.961.41xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.18B (FCF $1.22B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$124.031.25xyesEPS $13.22 × (8.5 + 2×1.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$27.575.62xyesBV $90.67 × (ROIC 2.5% / WACC 8.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $11.05B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$66.102.35xyesEPS $13.22 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 1.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 2.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$142.921.08xyesEPS $13.22 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Mid-Atlanticoperatingenterprise$1.5b$251.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Mountainoperatingenterprise$3.0b$507.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$636.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.50x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.39x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.3%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Toll Brothers is a mature company in the fullest sense, and that is how the numbers ask to be read: not as a growth story, but as a cash-and-discipline story where the questions are what the franchise earns through the cycle and what management does with it. The franchise part is distinctive. This is the only large-scale builder concentrated in luxury, and the license that niche confers shows up in the P&L: second-quarter fiscal 2026 adjusted gross margin of 26.2% beat the company's own guidance by 70 basis points, on homes averaging near $1 million. Among the majors, only PulteGroup's 27.8% gross margin is comparable per its own 10-K; D.R. Horton runs 23.7% and KB Home 18.9%. Affluent buyers, more of whom pay cash or carry small mortgages, are the least rate-hostage demand pool in housing, and management raised full-year delivery, price, and margin guidance in May citing exactly that resilience.

The operating machine is built to protect those economics. The FY2025 10-K describes the deliberate risk management in the land pipeline: the company controls land through options where it "may forfeit deposits on land that we put under control through option arrangements" rather than owning everything outright, and it manages the "extended length of time that it takes to obtain the necessary approvals on a property, complete the land improvements and community amenities, and build and deliver a home" (accession 0000794170-25-000112). Orders are inflecting upward, with net signed contract value up to $2.81 billion and units up 7% year over year in the April quarter even as deliveries lapped a bigger prior-year quarter.

Capital allocation is the quiet compounder. Over the trailing year Toll bought back $676.7M of stock, 52.5% of net income, retiring shares at roughly 11x earnings and 1.7x book, and paid $97.5M in dividends at a payout ratio of just 7.7%, leaving the rest for land and repurchases. Return on equity runs 15.2% with moderate, well-covered leverage. And the strategic backdrop just got a loud endorsement: Berkshire Hathaway agreed on May 31, 2026 to acquire peer builder Taylor Morrison for $72.50 per share in cash, roughly $8.5 billion of enterprise value. When the most patient capital in the market buys a homebuilder outright at a premium, the sector's single-digit-to-low-teens multiples stop looking like a verdict and start looking like an opportunity someone already acted on.

Bear Case

One external variable runs this entire thesis: the interest rate a homebuyer faces, and behind it the affordability math for even affluent households. The company's own risk factors put it plainly, listing costs of materials, labor, "and interest rates. All of these factors can have a negative impact on housing affordability and demand for our homes", and warning that in an inflationary environment it "may be unable to raise the sales prices of our homes at or above the rate of inflation, which could reduce our profit margins" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000794170-25-000112). The luxury buyer is more insulated than the entry-level buyer, not immune; the April quarter's home sales revenue of $2.51 billion was already down from $2.71 billion a year earlier, with the beat coming from margin and mix rather than volume.

The second exposure is what a demand downturn does to the land machine. Toll's model requires paying today for communities that deliver homes years from now, and the filing spells out the asymmetry: if "housing demand in a given market declines below the levels" anticipated, the company forfeits option deposits or carries impaired land. That is the mechanism by which builder earnings fall much faster than housing volumes in a genuine downturn: margins built on cheap land bought early get rebuilt on expensive land bought late, while incentives eat the price umbrella. Today's 14.6% operating margin is a good-cycle number, and the cyclical question is never whether it is real but how much of it survives the next turn.

The price leaves less room than the cheap headline multiple implies. The market pays about 10 times company-wide operating income, which embeds essentially flat operating profit for five years; that is an easy bar in a stable housing market and a hard one across a downturn, since a multi-year demand slump would push operating income well below flat before it recovers. Free cash flow was positive in only three of the last four quarters, a reminder that land spend makes builder cash flow lumpy. None of this indicts the company, whose balance sheet is safe-zone and whose leverage is well covered. It just means a buyer at 11.1x trailing earnings is not getting the discount for free: they are being paid to hold rate risk, land-cycle risk, and the possibility that fiscal 2026's raised guidance marks the cycle's high-water mark rather than its midpoint.

Valuation

Every family of valuation method lands at or above today's price, a pattern that shows up perhaps a few times per hundred large-cap reports. At $149.36 (July 11, 2026), peer-multiple methods read the price at about 0.8x their central estimate and the forward-growth methods at 0.7x, meaning both sit above the market price; the asset-value and earnings-power families essentially ratify it at 1.1x and 1.2x. The trailing numbers behind that: 11.1x earnings against an 18x homebuilder sector median, 10.3x EV/EBITDA against 12x, and 1.7x a book value of $88.51 per share largely composed of land and homes under construction.

What the price asks going forward is modest to the point of pessimism. The market pays about 10 times company-wide operating income, embedding roughly 0.6% annual operating-profit growth for five years, essentially a bet that the business merely treads water. On the separate margin read, the price requires about a 4.7% long-run operating margin from a business earning around 14.6% today, so no part of today's profitability level is being extrapolated. The demonstrated base is $11.05B of trailing revenue, $1.29B of net income, and $1.22B of free cash flow, an 8.5% free cash flow yield, generated at the gross margins the company documents quarter by quarter, most recently 26.2% adjusted in the April quarter. The filing's land-option structure, where deposits rather than owned inventory carry expansion risk (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000794170-25-000112), is part of why the earnings convert to cash this well.

The balance sheet keeps the downside self-contained: leverage is moderate and well covered, the solvency read is safe-zone, and the share count is falling under a buyback that consumed $676.7M in the trailing year against a token 0.7%-yield dividend. The valuation question is not whether the methods support the price; they all do. It is whether trailing homebuilder earnings deserve full credit this deep into a strong pricing cycle, which is the same question Berkshire Hathaway answered in the affirmative for Taylor Morrison in May.

Catalysts

The second-quarter fiscal 2026 report in late May reset the year upward: revenue of $2.5 billion came in about $110 million above the guidance midpoint, EPS of $2.72 beat by $0.18, adjusted gross margin of 26.2% exceeded guidance by 70 basis points, and management raised full-year guidance to 10,400 to 10,700 deliveries at an average price of $985,000 to $1,000,000, with full-year adjusted home sales gross margin guided to 26.10%. The next print, covering the July quarter, is guided to roughly 2,600 to 2,700 deliveries at $965,000 to $985,000 average price; deliveries and margin against those marks are the primary scorecard.

Demand indicators are the leading edge. Net signed contract value rose to $2.81 billion in the April quarter with units up 7% year over year, so the order line has been outrunning the delivery line; whether that persists through the summer selling season, and what incentives it requires, will show up in both contract value and the margin guide. Mortgage-rate direction remains the macro swing factor the company's own risk disclosures identify as the channel into affordability and demand.

The sector M&A backdrop is newly live. Berkshire Hathaway's agreement to acquire Taylor Morrison for $8.5 billion in enterprise value, announced May 31, 2026 with a shareholder vote set for July 22, has put a cash-buyer's valuation marker under the whole builder group. Any read-through in how the market re-rates surviving public builders, or further consolidation interest, operates directly on a stock trading at 11.1x earnings. Alongside that, the pace of Toll's own buyback, $676.7M over the trailing year, remains a per-share compounding catalyst whenever the discount persists.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Mid-Atlantic / Mountain (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 FY2026 earnings release, May 2026 · Q2 FY2026 earnings release · ValueTheMarkets, May 2026 · company press release; CNBC, June 1, 2026 · company press release, May 31, 2026 · Q2 FY2026 earnings release and call, May 2026 · company press release; TipRanks, July 2026

View the full interactive TOL report on boothcheck