Seagate Technology Holdings plc (STX): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $829.41, Seagate Technology Holdings plc (STX) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.9 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/STX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | STX |
| Company | Seagate Technology Holdings plc |
| Sector / Industry | Technology |
| Current price | $829.41/sh |
| Composition | OEMs 81% / Distributors 13% / Retailers 6% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Must persist for | 5.9y |
| Multiple paid | 61x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 50% self-funding ceiling.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.17σ |
| cohort percentile (of 188 peers) | 91 |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 4.19x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 8.07x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.25x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.81x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $661.59 | 1.25x | yes | FCF base $3.2B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $1140.92 | 0.73x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 56.5x / 59.5x / 62.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $492.88 | 1.68x | yes | P/E 43.06x (blended: static sector reference 28x + trailing (TTM) 78x), scenarios: 34.4x / 43.1x / 51.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 31.86x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $114.65 | 7.23x | yes | BV/sh $4.88, ROE (TTM) 217.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $4070.03 | 0.20x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $1028.54 | 0.81x | yes | Rev $11.0B, growth 29% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $368.90 | 2.25x | yes | EPS $10.54, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.23 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $60.04 | 13.81x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.47B × (1−13%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $197.94 | 4.19x | yes | BV $4.88 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 217.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $34.03 | 24.37x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $10.54 × BVPS $4.88) — Graham's conservative floor (excluded from median) |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $269.67 | 3.08x | yes | EBITDA $3.17B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $102.77 | 8.07x | yes | FCF $2412.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $92.26 | 8.99x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.19B (FCF $2.41B − SBC $0.22B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $340.09 | 2.44x | yes | EPS $10.54 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $11.26 | 73.66x | yes | BV $4.88 × (ROIC 20.9% / WACC 9.1%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $294.61 | 2.82x | yes | Revenue $11.01B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $395.25 | 2.10x | yes | EPS $10.54 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $113.95 | 7.28x | yes | EPS $10.54 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.03x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.89x |
| Interest coverage | 10.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.8% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Seagate has flipped from commodity cyclical to allocation-constrained AI supplier: fiscal third-quarter revenue rose 44 percent year over year with record gross margin near 47 percent, and management says nearline drive capacity is largely spoken for through calendar 2027.
- At $909.84 (July 10, 2026) the market is paying about 110 times operating income, a multiple at the very top of the peer distribution that embeds growth near the fastest self-fundable pace for roughly a dozen years; only about 7 percent of comparable fast-growers sustained that for even ten.
- The fiscal fourth-quarter report in late July, guided to roughly $3.45 billion of revenue and about $5.00 of non-GAAP EPS, is the next test of whether the HAMR-driven ramp keeps outrunning a price that already assumes it.
Bull Case
What the standard valuation arithmetic misses about Seagate is that the thing being valued changed identity. Every backward-looking model prices a hard-drive maker: cyclical, price-taking, structurally besieged by flash. The business actually operating in 2026 is one of two suppliers of a suddenly scarce input to AI infrastructure, mass-capacity storage, selling drives that are allocated rather than sold, with nearline capacity largely committed through calendar 2027. When a commodity vendor becomes a capacity-constrained oligopolist mid-cycle, trailing multiples measure the corpse of the old business, not the economics of the new one. The fiscal third quarter showed the new economics plainly: revenue up 44 percent year over year, gross margin at a record near 47 percent, and nearly a billion dollars of free cash flow in a single quarter.
The technological moat under that shift is HAMR. Seagate's Mozaic heat-assisted platform raises areal density, which lowers cost per terabyte on the dimension hyperscalers actually buy, and the 10-K frames the company's differentiation across "capacity, performance, product quality, reliability, price, form factor, interface, power consumption efficiency", with power efficiency increasingly decisive in data centers rationing every watt toward GPUs. Hard drives still store the cold and warm data lakes AI training feeds on at a fraction of flash's cost per terabyte, and the filing's own description of fiscal 2025, "supply and demand remained well balanced... supporting a healthy pricing environment", has since tightened into outright allocation. Management raised its long-term revenue growth target from low-to-mid-teens to at least 20 percent annually.
The financial model converts scarcity into cash unusually well. Operating margin runs about 28 percent on the current basis, net debt is under one year of operating income with interest covered more than ten times, and the drive industry's consolidation to effectively two scaled players means capacity discipline, the thing that always broke this industry, is now structurally easier to maintain. The bear will say the multiple already prices years of this; that is true and it is the real debate. But the bull's core claim is narrower and stronger: demand visibility through 2027 is contracted, the HAMR cost curve is proprietary, and the cash is arriving now, not in a projection.
Bear Case
Put the valuation approaches side by side and notice which ones have to be wrong for the price to be right. The cash-flow-yield lens says trailing free cash flow of $2.4 billion capitalized without growth supports about a ninth of today's price. Normalized earnings power across five years supports about a fifteenth. Peer multiples, even blending today's elevated trailing 88x earnings with a 28x sector median, read the price at roughly two and a half times what they defend. The only frames that reach $909.84 are the forward-growth ones, and the exit-multiple version gets there by holding today's roughly 67x EV/EBITDA flat for seven years. When the honest conservative methods and the price disagree by factors of nine and fifteen, the price is not being supported by valuation at all; it is being supported by a story about the future, and the conservative methods are the record of what happens when storage stories end.
The engine's decomposition of the price makes the requirement explicit: about 110 times operating income, implying growth held near the 36.6 percent self-funding ceiling for roughly twelve years. Only about 7 percent of comparable fast-growers sustained that pace for even ten years, and Seagate's own filing catalogs the ways this industry has broken before: flash economics keep improving, with "SSDs that offer increased competition with our lower capacity, smaller form factor HDDs and a declining trend in demand for HDDs in our legacy markets", and the HAMR transition itself carries qualification risk, since development or production cycles "longer than anticipated" could cost sales and share. A decade-plus of ceiling-rate compounding leaves no quarters to spare for a qualification slip, a NAND price collapse that moves the flash crossover point, or an AI capex digestion year.
And the customer structure guarantees the cycle will eventually reassert itself. The 10-K concedes results are "highly dependent on cloud, enterprise" demand: a handful of hyperscalers whose storage purchasing has always come in violent waves. Today they are locking allocation through 2027; the same concentration means that when they digest, they digest simultaneously, and an allocation-constrained supplier becomes an inventory-burdened one in two quarters. The balance sheet would survive that easily. The multiple would not: at 19 times sales for a business whose five-year average operating income is a fifteenth of what the price capitalizes, mean reversion in either demand or sentiment does the work of any operational failure. This is the top of the peer distribution pricing perfection in an industry whose defining historical feature is that perfection never lasted.
Valuation
Today's $909.84 (July 10, 2026) capitalizes Seagate at about 110 times operating income, which resolves into an assumption of operating growth held near its self-funding ceiling, around 36 percent a year, for roughly twelve years. Three context points calibrate that bet. The near-term pace is within what the company has recently delivered, so the requirement is not about next quarter. The multiple sits at the very top of the storage peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. And of comparable fast-growers historically, only about 7 percent sustained this level for ten years. The priced-in assumption is high: a demanding bet on continued execution, in the block's own characterization.
The method families arrange themselves in a perfect gradient of time horizon. The forward-growth family is the only one that reaches the price, its median essentially at par, though its base case requires today's roughly 67x EV/EBITDA to hold for seven years. Peer multiples read the price about two and a half times above what they defend (a 45.9x blended earnings multiple against the trailing 88x). The earnings-power and cash-yield lenses land at eight to fifteen times below the price, because trailing free cash flow of $2.4 billion is a 1.2 percent yield on a $208 billion market cap, and five-year normalized operating income reflects the pre-AI storage cycle. Two measurement bases deserve one bridging clause: the trailing EDGAR-basis operating income runs well above the record basis the 110x header prices, reflecting how fast the ramp is moving through the statements; on either basis the multiple is extraordinary. The spread across families is the finding: this is a durability premium the static frames structurally cannot reach, and the market is paying it knowingly.
What has to be true is specific and checkable. Revenue must compound at the raised target of at least 20 percent annually, gross margins must hold near the record 47 percent the third quarter printed, and the nearline allocation extending through calendar 2027 must convert into contracted revenue rather than cancellable enthusiasm. Solvency is a non-issue and cuts bullish: net debt of $2.8 billion is about 0.9 times pre-tax operating income on the EDGAR basis, interest coverage runs 10.5 times, and the company generates rather than consumes cash, though the share count has drifted up 0.8 percent a year rather than shrinking. The decisive variable is duration: every year the AI storage cycle runs hot is a year the growth family's read stays reachable, and the first flat hyperscaler order book re-prices the stock toward frames that currently sit far below it.
Catalysts
The fiscal fourth-quarter report in late July arrives pre-framed by guidance of roughly $3.45 billion in revenue, plus or minus $100 million, and non-GAAP EPS of about $5.00, plus or minus $0.20. The third quarter beat on both lines with revenue up 44 percent year over year and record gross margin near 47 percent, and the stock has traded as a momentum vehicle around each print. Beyond the headline, the reads that matter are gross-margin trajectory (the record level is the multiple's foundation) and any extension of allocation commitments beyond calendar 2027.
HAMR execution milestones are the standing catalyst stream: qualification progress for Mozaic-based drives across additional hyperscaler customers, capacity-point increases per platter generation, and the rollout of HAMR products into consumer, gaming, and professional lines that management flagged this spring. Each successful qualification tightens the cost-per-terabyte gap against both Western Digital and the flash alternative; any slip in cycle time is the specific risk the 10-K itself flags for advanced technology transitions.
The macro channel is hyperscaler capex. Nearline demand visibility through 2027 rests on AI data-center buildouts continuing at their announced pace, so cloud providers' quarterly capex guidance functions as Seagate's leading indicator, in both directions. Watch also NAND pricing: a sharp flash price decline moves the SSD-versus-HDD crossover point in the cold-storage tiers where Seagate's volume lives. Sell-side long-term models were rebuilt around management's raised growth target of at least 20 percent annual revenue growth this spring; the revision cycle around the July print will show whether the street keeps underwriting the new slope.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- WDC (WESTERN DIGITAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …in Milpitas, California associated with the Flash business. The Company received net proceeds of $ 191 million in cash and recorded a gain of $ 85 million on the sale. 67 Table of Contents WESTERN DIGITAL CORPORATION NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - (Continued) Note 4. Segment Reporting, Disaggregated…
- FY2025 10-K: …competition from other companies that produce alternative storage technologies such as flash memory, particularly in our legacy markets where we participate with our lower capacity, smaller form factor HDDs. Flash-based solutions also target our larger addressable market, i.e., Cloud. The storage market has in the…
- SNDK (Sandisk Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …between supply and demand in the storage market, including the effects of new fab capacity, macroeconomic factors and geopolitical tensions, including tariffs or trade restrictions, business conditions, technology transitions and other actions taken by us or our competitors. The storage market has in the past…
- FY2025 10-K: …our margins and financial performance. Increases in the price of our products in response to increased costs may adversely impact demand for those products in the U.S., which could also negatively impact our performance and financial results. Future trade policies and regulations in the U.S. and other countries, the…
- NTAP (NetApp, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to newer ones, delays or decisions to postpone the transition could lead to non-renewal of new offerings, impacting our ability to manage and forecast customer churn and expansion rates. Additionally, uncertainties related to the price-performance of new products compared to competitors, competitors' responses to our…
- FY2025 10-K: …highly competitive, fragmented, and characterized by rapidly changing technology. We face competition from many companies, including established public companies, newer public companies with a strong focus on flash storage, and new market entrants targeting opportunities in GenAI and application data management for…
- MU (Micron Technology, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …projections of the demand environment. Throughout 2024, we experienced substantial improvements in pricing and margins due to improving market conditions as compared to 2023. Increasing demand growth, driven in part by deployment of AI and mostly normal customer inventories, combined with industry-wide supply…
- FY2025 10-K: …competition and DRAM and NAND oversupply due to significant investment in the semiconductor industry, including by the Chinese government and various state-owned or affiliated entities, such as CXMT and YMTC. In addition, the May 2023 decision by China's Cyberspace Administration (the "CAC") that critical information…
- SMCI (SUPER MICRO COMPUTER, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …The year-over-year decrease of 2.7% in gross margin percentage was primarily due to our strategy to offer competitive pricing to gain market share, increased competition and a change in product and customer mix. Fiscal Year 2024 Compared with Fiscal Year 2023 The year-over-year increase in cost of sales was primarily…
- FY2025 10-K: …the risk of inventory write-downs. Competition The market for our products is highly competitive, rapidly evolving and subject to new technological developments, changing customer needs and new product introductions. We compete primarily with large vendors of x86-based general purpose servers and components. In…
- HPE (HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …Competition We have a broad technology portfolio of enterprise IT infrastructure products, solutions, and services, including our aaS offerings, and these offerings encounter strong competition. We compete primarily on the basis of technology, innovation, performance, price, quality, reliability, brand, reputation,…
- FY2025 10-K: …related to stock-based compensation. Segment Information Hewlett Packard Enterprise's organizational structure is based on a number of factors that the Chief Operating Decision Maker, who is the Chief Executive Officer, uses to evaluate, view, and run our business operations, which include, but are not limited to,…
- IBM (INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …revenue percent change for Strategy and Technology and Intelligent Operations. These changes did not impact our Consolidated Financial Statements or our reportable segments. The following table presents each reportable segment's revenue and gross margin results, followed by an analysis of the 2025 versus 2024…
- FY2025 10-K: …33.1 % 32.1 % 1.0 pts. Software gross profit margin of 83.5 percent in 2025 decreased 0.2 points compared to the prior year. Segment profit of $9,920 million increased 14.2 percent and segment profit margin of 33.1 percent increased 1.0 points compared to the prior year. The year-to-year increases in segment profit…
- HPQ (HP INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …enablement. Competition We encounter strong competition in all areas of our business activity. We compete on the basis of technology, innovation, performance, price, quality, reliability, brand, reputation, distribution, range of products and services, ease of use of our products, account relationships, customer…
- FY2025 10-K: , Lenovo Group Limited, Logitech International S.A., Microsoft Corporation, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Toshiba Corporation. In certain geographies, we also experience competition from local companies and from generically-branded or "white box" manufacturers. Our competitive advantages include our broad product…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company FQ3 2026 results and commentary, April 2026 · company FQ4 2026 guidance · company FQ3 2026 commentary, April 2026 · company FQ3 2026 results · company commentary via Trefis, April 2026 · company long-term model update, April 2026 · company FQ4 2026 guidance, April 2026 · company FQ3 2026 results coverage · FQ3 2026 commentary · Trefis and Simply Wall St coverage, April-May 2026