SOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC. (SGI): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $69.63, SOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC. (SGI) is priced for +17.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SGI
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | SGI |
| Company | SOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC. |
| Current price | $69.63/sh |
| Composition | Direct 63% / Wholesale 37% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.1% |
| Operating margin today | 12.1% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -9.0pp |
| Implied growth | 17.6% |
| Multiple paid | 23x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.13σ |
| cohort percentile (of 214 peers) | 70 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 41% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.20x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 8.59x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.53x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.59x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $267.20 | 0.26x | yes | FCF base $0.8B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $117.53 | 0.59x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 14.3x / 17.3x / 20.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.0x / 20.0x / 24.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $26.51 | 2.63x | yes | BV/sh $14.80, ROE (TTM) 16.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $35.02 | 1.99x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $101.03 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $7.7B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.9x / 2.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $30.00 | 2.32x | yes | EPS $2.50, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=24.81 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $8.11 | 8.59x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.72B × (1−24%) / WACC 6.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $35.40 | 1.97x | yes | BV $14.80 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $28.86 | 2.41x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.50 × BVPS $14.80) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $1.23B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.26 | 9.59x | yes | FCF $736.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $5.01 | 13.90x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.69B (FCF $0.74B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $80.67 | 0.86x | yes | EPS $2.50 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $3.29 | 21.16x | yes | BV $14.80 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 6.7%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $7.67B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $93.75 | 0.74x | yes | EPS $2.50 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $27.03 | 2.58x | yes | EPS $2.50 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mattress Firm | operating | enterprise | $3.5b | $190.8m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Tempur Sealy North America | operating | enterprise | $3.7b | $553.3m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Tempur Sealy International | operating | enterprise | $1.3b | $221.2m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $4.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 6.55x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 4.96x |
| Interest coverage | 3.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 3.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- SomniGroup pairs the Tempur and Sealy brand portfolio with Mattress Firm, the largest U.S. mattress retailer, a vertical-integration play targeting $40 million of incremental EBITDA synergies in 2026 by lifting its own brands toward the low 60% of Mattress Firm sales.
- The defining risk is cyclical: mattresses are a big-ticket discretionary purchase, and the company carries roughly $4.7 billion of net debt at about 5 times operating income, so a consumer downturn hits a levered balance sheet.
- Watch the integration synergy realization and brand-mix shift at Mattress Firm against the discretionary demand cycle, since only continued growth justifies a price the static valuation methods all read as rich.
Bull Case
SomniGroup's capital allocation tells you what management believes it is building. The company took on roughly $4.7 billion of net debt to buy Mattress Firm, the largest mattress retailer in the country, and folded it into the Tempur and Sealy brand portfolio it already owned. That is a vertical-integration bet: control the manufacturing and own the shelf the product sells from. The early evidence is that the bet is paying back. Management expects the integration to deliver an incremental $40 million of EBITDA in 2026, driven by lifting Tempur Sealy brands and private label to the low 60% range of Mattress Firm's sales. When you own both the factory and the store, every point of mix shift toward your own brands is margin you keep twice.
The combined business has real scale and pricing power. First-quarter revenue reached $1.80 billion with adjusted EBITDA of $296.8 million, and management pointed to improved closing rates in both Tempur and Mattress Firm stores as evidence that customers are not balking at price. The competitive position is widening too: upper-funnel marketing spend for Mattress Firm rose even as overall industry advertising fell, expanding the company's share of voice against weaker competitors. In a discretionary category, the player still spending into a downturn takes share from the players that pull back.
The valuation is the unusual part, and the bull has to own it. At today's $75.11 (June 28, 2026), only the growth-DCF lens reaches the price; the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all read the stock as richly valued. That is the signature of a durable-compounding bet the static frames cannot price: the market is paying for years of integration synergies and brand-led margin expansion that backward-looking methods do not credit. The bull case is that vertical integration plus a premium brand portfolio plus disciplined marketing is exactly the kind of durable moat that earns a premium the static methods structurally miss.
Bear Case
The cycle is the bear case, because mattresses are a deeply discretionary, big-ticket purchase that consumers defer the moment budgets tighten. SomniGroup is priced for durable compounding, but the demand under it rides the housing and consumer-spending cycle, and a unit that today looks like a steady grower can flatten fast when replacement purchases get pushed out. The company is leaning into the cycle with heavier marketing while peers retreat, which builds share but also signals that the industry backdrop is soft enough to make competitors pull back. Buying the largest retailer at the point where the operator chooses to lean in is a timing bet as much as a strategy bet.
The leverage sharpens the cyclical risk. Net debt sits near $4.7 billion, about 5 times operating income, with interest covered only 3.5 times. That is a meaningful debt load for a company whose revenue is tied to discretionary demand. In a strong cycle the leverage amplifies returns; in a weak one it amplifies the downside, because the interest bill does not shrink when mattress sales do. The integration is also still in progress: the company recognized $67.7 million of business-combination charges in the trailing year for the floor-model transition and restructuring, real cash costs that the synergy math has to clear before it shows up as profit.
The valuation leaves no room for the cycle to disappoint. Three of the four method families, asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples, all read the price as richly valued; only the growth-DCF lens reaches it, and it does so by assuming the durable compounding actually materializes. That is the precise definition of a price that requires the bull thesis to be right. The inversion underlines it: the price embeds an assumption rare enough that it sits at the elevated end of what the fundamentals support. If the integration synergies come in light, or if a consumer-spending downturn hits the discretionary mattress purchase the way downturns usually do, the static methods that already call the stock expensive become the operative read, and a levered balance sheet has little cushion to defend the multiple.
Valuation
SomniGroup is priced as a compounder, and the valuation rests almost entirely on that being true. The whole-company operating margin runs about 12.1%, and inverted, today's price requires the business to sustain durable growth for roughly six years against an assumption the model flags as elevated. This is not a value setup; it is a durability premium.
The method families make the bet explicit. Three of the four, the asset-based reads against a book value of $14.80 per share, the earnings-power lens, and the peer-multiple lens, all land below the price, several by a wide margin. Only the growth-DCF family reaches today's level, and it does so by crediting continued high growth and the integration synergies. That pattern, where every static frame says expensive and only the forward-growth frame reaches the price, is the market paying for durable compounding the backward-looking methods structurally cannot capture. The premium is real and visible; the question the buyer answers is whether the compounding earns it. The peer comparison is awkward here because the routed cohort is a mix of specialty-retail and services names rather than direct mattress competitors, so the relative read is best treated as directional rather than precise.
Solvency is where the premium meets its constraint. Net debt near $4.7 billion against trailing operating income is about 5 times, and interest coverage of 3.5 times is adequate but not comfortable for a discretionary-demand business. The leverage came from the Mattress Firm acquisition, and the synergy realization is the path to working it down: the $40 million of incremental 2026 EBITDA and the brand-mix shift are what turn the debt from a risk into a lever. What the buyer underwrites at this price is execution on the integration through a cycle that, for big-ticket discretionary goods, can turn quickly, with a balance sheet that has limited room to absorb a stumble.
Catalysts
SomniGroup's first quarter of 2026 showed the Mattress Firm integration starting to pay. Revenue reached $1.80 billion, net income was $104 million, and adjusted EBITDA came in at $296.8 million. Management framed the year around synergy capture, guiding to an incremental $40 million of EBITDA from the integration, achieved largely by lifting Tempur Sealy brands and private label to the low 60% of Mattress Firm's sales. The trailing year still carried $67.7 million of business-combination charges tied to the floor-model transition and restructuring, the cost side of getting the combined model into shape.
The competitive dynamic is the development to watch. Management cited improved closing rates in both Tempur and Mattress Firm stores as evidence of low price elasticity, and noted that upper-funnel marketing spend for Mattress Firm rose while overall industry advertising fell, expanding share of voice. That share-taking while competitors retreat is the lever the bull thesis depends on. The events that matter from here are the pace of synergy realization in the coming quarters and any read on discretionary mattress demand, since the premium valuation requires the integration to compound through whatever the consumer cycle delivers.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Mattress Firm (reported)
- W (WAYFAIR INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …offer a range of supplemental media services in support of a seamless selling experience for suppliers. We also believe providing superior customer service is key to delighting our customers. Our global customer service locations are staffed with over 2,000 full-time highly-trained sales and service employees,…
- FY2025 10-K: …reflecting the many supplier participants on our platform and a differentiated and robust merchandising experience. For items shipped from our CastleGate warehouses, we are able to deliver many products to a majority of the U.S. population in two days or less. We give customers inspirational content and an engaging…
- RH (RH)
- FY2025 10-K: …We offer a white glove home delivery service for our larger merchandise and furniture categories, where third-party personnel deliver smaller items to the location of our customers' choice. We believe we have dramatically enhanced the customer experience while reducing return rates, damages and deliveries per order…
- FY2025 10-K: …practices, wage and hour claims, claims of intellectual property infringement, including with respect to trademarks and trade dress, claims asserting unfair competition and unfair business practices, claims with respect to our collection and sale of reproduction products, and consumer class action claims relating to…
- WSM (WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …the impacts of the customer pull back in furniture during the first half of the year as a result of the brand's high percentage of its assortment in the furniture category, partially offset by strength from new product introductions across categories including furniture, decorative accessories and seasonal textiles.…
- FY2025 10-K: …of the additional week, decreased $39.1 million or 0.5%, with company comp decline of 1.6%. This decrease was driven by customer hesitancy towards furniture purchases, partially offset by strength in our non-furniture and seasonal assortments. From a channel perspective, the company comp decline of 1.6% was driven by…
- LZB (LA-Z-BOY INCORPORATED)
- FY2025 10-K: Upholstered Furniture - Includes revenue for upholstered furniture, such as recliners, sofas, loveseats, chairs, sectionals, modulars, and ottomans. This revenue includes sales to La-Z-Boy Furniture Galleries ® stores (including company-owned stores), operators of La-Z-Boy Comfort Studio ® and branded space locations,…
- FY2025 10-K: …locations, England Custom Comfort Center locations, major dealers, and a wide cross-section of other independent retailers. • Corporate and Other . Corporate and Other includes the shared costs for corporate functions, including human resources, information technology, finance and accounting, and legal, in addition…
Tempur Sealy North America / Tempur Sealy International (reported)
- LEG (LEGGETT & PLATT INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …which ranged between 84% and 86% over the last three years. Our international operations are principally located in Europe, China, Canada, and Mexico. Our products in these foreign locations primarily consist of: Europe • Innersprings, specialty foam, and finished mattresses • Lumbar and seat suspension systems for…
- FY2025 10-K: 2-31 0000058492 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:IntersubsegmentEliminationsMember leg:SpecializedProductsMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000058492 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:IntersubsegmentEliminationsMember leg:FurnitureFlooringAndTextileProductsMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000058492…
- LZB (LA-Z-BOY INCORPORATED)
- FY2025 10-K: …be relatively consistent with fiscal 2025, we anticipate higher overall product costs as a result of geopolitical uncertainties around trade policy and tariffs. 5 Table of Contents Tariff Exposure In fiscal 2025, approximately 90% of the upholstered units sold in North America were produced in the United States. Of…
- FY2025 10-K: …since April 2023 • Senior Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer from January 2021 to April 2023 • Head of Brand Marketing, Licensing and Creative Studios - North American Region of Whirlpool Corporation, a manufacturer and marketer of home appliances, from April 2016 to January 2021 Rebecca M. Reeder, age 55 •…
- MHK (MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …mhk:LaminateandWoodMember mhk:GlobalCeramicSegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000851968 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember mhk:LaminateandWoodMember mhk:FlooringNASegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000851968 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember mhk:LaminateandWoodMember mhk:FlooringROWSegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31…
- FY2025 10-K: …2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000851968 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember mhk:AssetWriteDownsAndGainsOnDisposalsMember mhk:GlobalCeramicSegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000851968 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:EmployeeSeveranceMember mhk:GlobalCeramicSegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000851968…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings, May 2026