SOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC. (SGI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $69.63, SOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC. (SGI) is priced for +17.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SGI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSGI
CompanySOMNIGROUP INTERNATIONAL INC.
Current price$69.63/sh
CompositionDirect 63% / Wholesale 37%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.1%
Operating margin today12.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.0pp
Implied growth17.6%
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.4pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.13σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)70
sustained it ~5 years at this level41%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.20x4expensive
Earnings8.59x5expensive
Relative1.53x2expensive
Growth0.59x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$267.200.26xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$117.530.59xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 14.3x / 17.3x / 20.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.0x / 20.0x / 24.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$26.512.63xyesBV/sh $14.80, ROE (TTM) 16.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$35.021.99xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$101.030.69xyesRev $7.7B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.9x / 2.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$30.002.32xyesEPS $2.50, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=24.81 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$8.118.59xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.72B × (1−24%) / WACC 6.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$35.401.97xyesBV $14.80 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$28.862.41xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.50 × BVPS $14.80) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.23B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.269.59xyesFCF $736.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.0113.90xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.69B (FCF $0.74B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$80.670.86xyesEPS $2.50 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$3.2921.16xyesBV $14.80 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 6.7%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $7.67B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$93.750.74xyesEPS $2.50 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$27.032.58xyesEPS $2.50 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Mattress Firmoperatingenterprise$3.5b$190.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Tempur Sealy North Americaoperatingenterprise$3.7b$553.3m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Tempur Sealy Internationaloperatingenterprise$1.3b$221.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$4.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.55x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.96x
Interest coverage3.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)3.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

SomniGroup's capital allocation tells you what management believes it is building. The company took on roughly $4.7 billion of net debt to buy Mattress Firm, the largest mattress retailer in the country, and folded it into the Tempur and Sealy brand portfolio it already owned. That is a vertical-integration bet: control the manufacturing and own the shelf the product sells from. The early evidence is that the bet is paying back. Management expects the integration to deliver an incremental $40 million of EBITDA in 2026, driven by lifting Tempur Sealy brands and private label to the low 60% range of Mattress Firm's sales. When you own both the factory and the store, every point of mix shift toward your own brands is margin you keep twice.

The combined business has real scale and pricing power. First-quarter revenue reached $1.80 billion with adjusted EBITDA of $296.8 million, and management pointed to improved closing rates in both Tempur and Mattress Firm stores as evidence that customers are not balking at price. The competitive position is widening too: upper-funnel marketing spend for Mattress Firm rose even as overall industry advertising fell, expanding the company's share of voice against weaker competitors. In a discretionary category, the player still spending into a downturn takes share from the players that pull back.

The valuation is the unusual part, and the bull has to own it. At today's $75.11 (June 28, 2026), only the growth-DCF lens reaches the price; the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all read the stock as richly valued. That is the signature of a durable-compounding bet the static frames cannot price: the market is paying for years of integration synergies and brand-led margin expansion that backward-looking methods do not credit. The bull case is that vertical integration plus a premium brand portfolio plus disciplined marketing is exactly the kind of durable moat that earns a premium the static methods structurally miss.

Bear Case

The cycle is the bear case, because mattresses are a deeply discretionary, big-ticket purchase that consumers defer the moment budgets tighten. SomniGroup is priced for durable compounding, but the demand under it rides the housing and consumer-spending cycle, and a unit that today looks like a steady grower can flatten fast when replacement purchases get pushed out. The company is leaning into the cycle with heavier marketing while peers retreat, which builds share but also signals that the industry backdrop is soft enough to make competitors pull back. Buying the largest retailer at the point where the operator chooses to lean in is a timing bet as much as a strategy bet.

The leverage sharpens the cyclical risk. Net debt sits near $4.7 billion, about 5 times operating income, with interest covered only 3.5 times. That is a meaningful debt load for a company whose revenue is tied to discretionary demand. In a strong cycle the leverage amplifies returns; in a weak one it amplifies the downside, because the interest bill does not shrink when mattress sales do. The integration is also still in progress: the company recognized $67.7 million of business-combination charges in the trailing year for the floor-model transition and restructuring, real cash costs that the synergy math has to clear before it shows up as profit.

The valuation leaves no room for the cycle to disappoint. Three of the four method families, asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples, all read the price as richly valued; only the growth-DCF lens reaches it, and it does so by assuming the durable compounding actually materializes. That is the precise definition of a price that requires the bull thesis to be right. The inversion underlines it: the price embeds an assumption rare enough that it sits at the elevated end of what the fundamentals support. If the integration synergies come in light, or if a consumer-spending downturn hits the discretionary mattress purchase the way downturns usually do, the static methods that already call the stock expensive become the operative read, and a levered balance sheet has little cushion to defend the multiple.

Valuation

SomniGroup is priced as a compounder, and the valuation rests almost entirely on that being true. The whole-company operating margin runs about 12.1%, and inverted, today's price requires the business to sustain durable growth for roughly six years against an assumption the model flags as elevated. This is not a value setup; it is a durability premium.

The method families make the bet explicit. Three of the four, the asset-based reads against a book value of $14.80 per share, the earnings-power lens, and the peer-multiple lens, all land below the price, several by a wide margin. Only the growth-DCF family reaches today's level, and it does so by crediting continued high growth and the integration synergies. That pattern, where every static frame says expensive and only the forward-growth frame reaches the price, is the market paying for durable compounding the backward-looking methods structurally cannot capture. The premium is real and visible; the question the buyer answers is whether the compounding earns it. The peer comparison is awkward here because the routed cohort is a mix of specialty-retail and services names rather than direct mattress competitors, so the relative read is best treated as directional rather than precise.

Solvency is where the premium meets its constraint. Net debt near $4.7 billion against trailing operating income is about 5 times, and interest coverage of 3.5 times is adequate but not comfortable for a discretionary-demand business. The leverage came from the Mattress Firm acquisition, and the synergy realization is the path to working it down: the $40 million of incremental 2026 EBITDA and the brand-mix shift are what turn the debt from a risk into a lever. What the buyer underwrites at this price is execution on the integration through a cycle that, for big-ticket discretionary goods, can turn quickly, with a balance sheet that has limited room to absorb a stumble.

Catalysts

SomniGroup's first quarter of 2026 showed the Mattress Firm integration starting to pay. Revenue reached $1.80 billion, net income was $104 million, and adjusted EBITDA came in at $296.8 million. Management framed the year around synergy capture, guiding to an incremental $40 million of EBITDA from the integration, achieved largely by lifting Tempur Sealy brands and private label to the low 60% of Mattress Firm's sales. The trailing year still carried $67.7 million of business-combination charges tied to the floor-model transition and restructuring, the cost side of getting the combined model into shape.

The competitive dynamic is the development to watch. Management cited improved closing rates in both Tempur and Mattress Firm stores as evidence of low price elasticity, and noted that upper-funnel marketing spend for Mattress Firm rose while overall industry advertising fell, expanding share of voice. That share-taking while competitors retreat is the lever the bull thesis depends on. The events that matter from here are the pace of synergy realization in the coming quarters and any read on discretionary mattress demand, since the premium valuation requires the integration to compound through whatever the consumer cycle delivers.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Mattress Firm (reported)

Tempur Sealy North America / Tempur Sealy International (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings, May 2026

View the full interactive SGI report on boothcheck