RELIANCE, INC. (RS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $420.90, RELIANCE, INC. (RS) is priced for +16.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerRS
CompanyRELIANCE, INC.
Current price$420.91/sh
CompositionUnited States 94% / Foreign Countries 6%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.5%
Operating margin today7.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.0pp
Implied growth16.4%
Multiple paid21x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.1pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.36σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)48
sustained it ~5 years at this level42%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.29x5expensive
Earnings2.54x5expensive
Relative1.47x5expensive
Growth0.95x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$354.491.19xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.5%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$529.300.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.1x / 17.1x / 19.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$317.231.33xyesP/E 20.77x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 27x), scenarios: 17.3x / 20.8x / 24.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$167.192.52xyesBV/sh $137.05, ROE (TTM) 11.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$183.922.29xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$443.320.95xyesRev $14.8B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.5x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$184.082.29xyesEPS $15.34, growth 10% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.77 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$313.761.34xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.67B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$187.192.25xyesBV $137.05 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.3%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$217.491.94xyes√(22.5 × EPS $15.34 × BVPS $137.05) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$285.521.47xyesEBITDA $1.38B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$93.084.52xyesFCF $612.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$81.295.18xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.56B (FCF $0.61B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$361.501.16xyesEPS $15.34 × (8.5 + 2×9.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$50.558.33xyesBV $137.05 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 8.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$713.610.59xyesRevenue $14.84B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$225.711.86xyesEPS $15.34 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$165.842.54xyesEPS $15.34 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Metals Service Centers Segmentoperatingenterprise14.3B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.72x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.31x
Interest coverage18.6x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.6%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

What the standard valuation lenses miss about Reliance is that it is built to make money when its own industry is shrinking. The company is a metals distributor, and the filing argues plainly that "metals service centers are generally less susceptible to market cycles than metals producers" because the distributor sets prices off replacement cost and carries inventory it can manage down in a downturn. Q1 2026 proved the point: tons sold reached a record 1,672.7 thousand, up 9.4% sequentially and 2.7% year over year, even as the broader industry shipped less. Gaining share while the market contracts is the signature of a distributor whose service, not its metal, is the product.

The moat is small orders and speed, repeated across thousands of customers. The filing credits its "focus on small order sizes and customer service, including inventory availability and quick turnaround" for industry-leading operating results, and notes its market share was only about 17% in 2025, which it frames as room to keep taking share. A fragmented customer base buying small, urgent orders is sticky in a way a commodity producer's volume is not, and it lets Reliance hold a healthier gross margin than a mill. Q1 2026 non-GAAP FIFO gross margin was 30.1%, the kind of spread a pure producer cannot sustain.

The capital story is where Reliance separates from a typical cyclical. The balance sheet is conservative, net debt about 1.3 times operating income with interest covered nearly 19 times, and the company is buying back stock aggressively, retiring about 4.6% of shares a year. Q1 2026 net income grew to $264.9 million and diluted EPS rose to $5.10, beating management's $4.50 to $4.70 guidance, and the company guided Q2 to higher tons and prices. Strong cash generation, a clean balance sheet, and a steady reduction in the share count is a compounding machine the market does not have to re-rate to reward.

Bear Case

The methods disagree about Reliance in a way that frames the bear case honestly: the conservative lenses say the price is rich, and they are usually the more reliable read for a cyclical. The asset-value methods land roughly two times below the price and the earnings-power methods more than two times below; only the forward-growth methods reach it. For a distributor whose earnings rise and fall with metal prices, paying a multiple that only the growth methods can justify means betting the recent strength persists, and metal-price strength is precisely the thing history says reverts.

The filing names the dependency without flinching. "Metals prices are volatile", it states, driven by production capacity, raw-material availability, demand, tariffs, and import levels, and it warns the company "operate[s] in an industry that is subject to cyclical fluctuations" where a downturn in customers' industries hits profitability and cash flow. A 7.5% operating margin is thin enough that a swing in pricing or volume moves earnings sharply, and the record tons and 30% gross margin that powered Q1 reflect a favorable pricing environment, not a permanent setting. The bear does not have to predict a crash; it only has to note that the price requires roughly 12% annual operating growth to persist, and metal cycles do not deliver smooth lines.

The offset, and it is a genuine one, is the balance sheet. Net debt of about $1.44 billion is only 1.3 times operating income with interest covered nearly 19 times, so a cyclical air pocket would not threaten solvency, and the heavy buyback would actually retire more shares at a lower price. That is the calibration: this is not a fragile business, and the bear is not a distress story. It is that paying a growth-justified multiple for a counter-cyclical but still cyclical distributor leaves the upside thin and the downside tied to a metal-price cycle the company cannot control.

Valuation

At about 18 times operating income, the price embeds company-wide operating growth of roughly 12% a year for five years, a pace within what Reliance has recently delivered and one that about half of comparable companies have sustained five years. Against a current operating margin of 7.5%, that is a within-range bet rather than a stretch on the rate, and the real question is durability: distributor margins are healthier than a mill's but still ride the metal-price cycle, so the bet is that the favorable pricing that lifted recent results does not fully give back.

The methods sort the way they do for a quality cyclical trading on a premium. The asset-value, earnings-power, and peer-multiple families all read the price as expensive, several landing well below it, while only the forward-growth methods reach it. That spread is the market crediting Reliance's record of taking share and compounding through cycles, a durability the static frames structurally cannot price. The peer group is the right one here, other distributors rather than metal producers, and on that basis Reliance earns its premium through service economics and capital discipline rather than commodity exposure.

Solvency is the anchor under the whole story and it is unusually strong for a cyclical. Net debt of about $1.44 billion is roughly 1.3 times operating income with interest covered nearly 19 times, and the share count has fallen about 4.6% a year, real buyback deployment that compounds the per-share math regardless of the multiple. The decisive variable is not the balance sheet, which can carry any plausible downturn; it is metal pricing and volume, because at a growth-justified multiple the return leans on the cycle staying constructive rather than on a re-rating.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 was a beat-and-raise quarter. Net sales rose 15.5% to $4.03 billion on higher volumes and pricing, pretax income grew 33.2% to $349.5 million, and diluted EPS of $5.10 came in well above management's $4.50 to $4.70 guidance. The operational standout was volume: record tons sold of 1,672.7 thousand, up 9.4% sequentially and 2.7% year over year, outperforming an industry that shipped less, with non-GAAP FIFO gross margin of 30.1%.

The guidance pointed higher. For Q2 2026 the company expects tons sold up 1.0% to 3.0% sequentially and average selling price per ton up 1.5% to 3.5%, and guided non-GAAP diluted EPS of $5.15 to $5.35, including $0.54 per share of LIFO expense. Rising volume and rising price guided together is the combination that drives operating leverage in a thin-margin distribution model.

What to watch is whether the favorable pricing and share gains hold as the metals cycle moves, since both volume and average selling price feed directly into a 7.5% operating margin that swings on small changes. Continued share gains and stable pricing would be the upside; a reversal in metal prices is the most direct risk. The next tons-and-price print, alongside the pace of buybacks, is what moves the story.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Metals Service Centers Segment (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Reliance Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026

View the full interactive RS report on boothcheck