NEWMONT CORPORATION (NEM): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for NEWMONT CORPORATION (NEM) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NEM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NEM |
| Company | NEWMONT CORPORATION |
| Current price | $92.98/sh |
| Composition | Gold Doré 63% / Concentrate and Other 37% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 16.6% |
| Operating margin today | 54.7% |
| Margin compression implied | -38.1pp |
| Multiple paid | 8x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 7, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.30σ |
| cohort percentile (of 76 peers) | 7 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.04x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.98x | 3 | justifies |
| Relative | 1.15x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.68x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $288.08 | 0.32x | yes | FCF base $9.2B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $137.60 | 0.68x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 33.0x / 38.0x / 43.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $80.81 | 1.15x | yes | P/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.01x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $76.00 | 1.22x | yes | BV/sh $32.13, ROE (TTM) 21.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $116.21 | 0.80x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $124.59 | 0.75x | yes | Rev $25.0B, growth 27% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.0x / 4.0x / 4.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $244.35 | 0.38x | yes | EPS $6.98, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.38 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $109.29 | 0.85x | yes | BV $32.13 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 21.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $71.04 | 1.31x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.98 × BVPS $32.13) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $22.24 | 4.18x | yes | EBITDA $2.56B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $95.28 | 0.98x | yes | FCF $9238.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $225.27 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $6.98 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $34.45 | 2.70x | yes | Revenue $24.97B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $261.80 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $6.98 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $75.47 | 1.23x | yes | EPS $6.98 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $3.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.42x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.29x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 8.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
Newmont is the largest gold miner, with revenue split between gold dore at about 63% and concentrate and other metals at 37%. The balance sheet tells the story of the moment: net cash of about $3.7 billion, a 50.8% operating margin, and a return on invested capital above 33%, all riding a record gold-price environment.
At $103.80 (as of June 27, 2026) the price pays only about 9x company-wide operating income, a multiple so low it sits below what even a 5%-per-year operating-profit decline would warrant. Every valuation family supports the price; this reads as a value and asset-supported name, not a growth bet.
The catch is what a 9x multiple on peak margins implies: the market is pricing in eventual mean reversion in the gold price and in the unusually fat margins it produces. Management is leaning the other way, doubling its buyback with a new $6.0 billion authorization after a record free-cash-flow quarter.
Bull Case
The balance sheet is where the bull case begins, because it reveals what management thinks of its own business. Newmont holds about $3.7 billion of net cash and just posted an all-time record quarter for free cash flow at $3.1 billion, and it responded by doubling its share-repurchase program with an additional $6.0 billion authorization after fully executing the prior one, while maintaining its dividend at $0.26 per share. A company that can fund a buyback of that size out of current cash flow, carry net cash, and keep paying a dividend is signaling confidence that the cash generation is durable, not a one-quarter fluke. That is the clearest read on management's own view of value.
The operating results justify the confidence. Q1 2026 net income was $3.3 billion, adjusted EPS was $2.90, and adjusted EBITDA reached $5.2 billion, on production of 1.3 million attributable gold ounces plus silver and copper by-products. Crucially, all-in sustaining cost came in at $1,029 per ounce on a by-product basis, below full-year guidance, so Newmont is producing gold at a wide spread to the prevailing price. A 50.8% operating margin and a 33% return on invested capital are the financial expression of that spread, and they are why every valuation family supports the price.
The valuation gives the bull a low entry bar. At roughly 9x operating income the price sits below what even a modest operating-profit decline would warrant, which means the market is already discounting a softer future. If the gold price merely holds, Newmont throws off enormous cash that flows to buybacks and dividends, shrinking the share count and lifting per-share value without needing any growth. The reserve base supports continuity, with the company directing exploration to discover new resources and convert them into proven and probable reserves around its existing mines (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001164727-26-000010). A cash-rich, low-cost producer at a single-digit multiple, returning capital aggressively, is the value-and-asset-supported setup the methods describe.
Bear Case
The structural truth a Newmont holder would rather not face is that the cheap multiple is not a gift, it is the market pricing in gold-price mean reversion. The 50.8% operating margin and the record free cash flow exist because gold is near record levels, and a 9x multiple on those peak earnings is the market's way of saying it does not believe they last. Newmont does not control the price of its product; its economics are a leveraged play on a commodity that moves with real interest rates, the dollar, and safe-haven demand. If gold retreats, the same low-cost production that looks so profitable today compresses fast, and the multiple that seems cheap is suddenly applied to a much smaller earnings base.
The cost trajectory underlines the risk. While Q1 all-in sustaining cost was a strong $1,029 per ounce, the company's own full-year 2026 AISC guidance is $1,680 per ounce, up from a 2025 actual of $1,339, driven by lower production volumes and higher sustaining capital. Costs rising while volumes are guided flat at 5.3 million ounces means the margin tailwind is at least partly cyclical and partly eroding on the cost side, independent of where gold trades. Mining is a business of depleting assets that must be continually replaced through capital-intensive exploration and development, and rising sustaining capital is the recurring tax on that reality.
The valuation offers less protection than it appears. Yes, every family supports the current price, but they support it using earnings inflated by the gold cycle. The honest framing is that Newmont is cheap on peak earnings and would not look cheap on normalized ones. The aggressive buyback is a double-edged tool: repurchasing shares at a high gold price commits capital at a moment when the underlying earnings may be unsustainable, and if the price later falls, those buybacks will look like they were done at the top. The bear case is not distress, the balance sheet is strong, it is that a commodity producer at peak margins is a value trap in waiting if you mistake cyclical earnings for durable ones.
Valuation
At the current price the market is paying about 9x company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-per-year operating-profit decline would warrant. That is a bound, not a solved point: computed at a cost of capital near 8.6% with 4% terminal growth, the price does not require growth, only that operating profit not fall faster than a modest decline. On its face that is an undemanding bar.
The family pattern is unusual in its breadth of support. The asset-based, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and growth-DCF methods all land at or above the price, and none flags the stock as expensive, which is why the read is value and asset-supported rather than a growth bet. The reverse-DCF range centers at the current price with an acceptable reliability flag. On the numbers as they stand, Newmont looks inexpensive.
The essential caveat is what those numbers are built on. The current 50.8% operating margin and the implied terminal margin reflect a record gold-price environment, so the cheap multiple is cheap relative to peak earnings. Normalize the gold price and the margins toward a mid-cycle level and the same price would imply a higher multiple on lower profit. The valuation is genuinely attractive if gold holds or rises, because the cash flow and capital returns compound from there; it is a mirage if the commodity reverts, because the methods are all anchored to cyclically elevated earnings. The judgment is less about the multiple and more about the gold price you are willing to underwrite.
Catalysts
The most recent print, Q1 2026 (reported late April 2026), was a record: net income of $3.3 billion, adjusted EPS of $2.90, adjusted EBITDA of $5.2 billion, and an all-time quarterly free-cash-flow record of $3.1 billion. Production was 1.3 million attributable gold ounces with silver and copper by-products, and gold all-in sustaining cost was $1,029 per ounce by-product, below full-year guidance. The headline action was doubling the buyback with a new $6.0 billion authorization, alongside a maintained $0.26 dividend.
The forward catalysts are production cadence and cost. Full-year gold production guidance is maintained at 5.3 million ounces, with management expecting slightly lower output in Q2 before volumes improve in the second half, and full-year by-product AISC guided to $1,680 per ounce, up from the 2025 actual on lower volumes and higher sustaining capital. The buyback pace and any portfolio divestitures are the capital-allocation catalysts to watch.
The dominant external catalyst is the gold price itself, which drives margins, cash flow, and the pace of capital return. The watch items are the gold price, the AISC trajectory against the raised guidance, production volumes hitting the 5.3 million-ounce target, and reserve replacement. Sustained gold prices with on-plan production would let the capital-return story compound; a pullback in gold or a cost overrun would expose the cyclicality behind the cheap multiple. Sources: Newmont Q1 2026 results and guidance (newmont.com; stocktitan.net; investing.com; fool.com), April 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Lihir / Cadia +11 more (reported)
- B (BARRICK MINING CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KGC (KINROSS GOLD CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GFI (Gold Fields Limited)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PAAS (Pan American Silver Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HMY (HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AGI (ALAMOS GOLD INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FCX (Freeport-McMoRan Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SCCO (SOUTHERN COPPER CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.