Matson, Inc. (MATX): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $199.87, Matson, Inc. (MATX) is priced for +8.8% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MATX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MATX |
| Company | Matson, Inc. |
| Current price | $199.87/sh |
| Composition | Ocean Transportation services 81% / Terminal and other related services 0% / Fuel sales 0% / Transportation Brokerage and Freight Forwarding services 16% / Warehousing services 1% / Supply Chain Management services 1% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 8.2% |
| Operating margin today | 14.4% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -6.2pp |
| Implied growth | 8.8% |
| Multiple paid | 14x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.27σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple value, while earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.22x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.05x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.92x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.65x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $55.88 | 3.58x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth -4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.3%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $183.28 | 1.09x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 12.1x / 14.1x / 16.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $226.02 | 0.88x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $151.60 | 1.32x | yes | BV/sh $89.22, ROE (TTM) 15.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $195.14 | 1.02x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $120.94 | 1.65x | yes | Rev $3.3B, growth -4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $259.27 | 0.77x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.78B × (1−17%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $198.93 | 1.00x | yes | BV $89.22 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $164.50 | 1.22x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $13.48 × BVPS $89.22) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $182.43 | 1.10x | yes | EBITDA $0.48B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $49.41 | 4.05x | yes | FCF $199.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $41.49 | 4.82x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.20B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $11.30 | 17.69x | yes | EPS $13.48 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $16.37 | 12.21x | yes | BV $89.22 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 8.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $217.01 | 0.92x | yes | Revenue $3.32B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $145.73 | 1.37x | yes | EPS $13.48 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $290.7m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.73x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.61x |
| Interest coverage | 71.5x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -7.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Two different businesses sit inside Matson. The Jones Act domestic trades to Hawaii and Alaska are a protected, steady franchise; the expedited China service is high-margin but volatile, and it is normalizing from a boom.
Q1 2026 showed the swing: net income fell to $56.6 million from $72.3 million as China volumes dropped 9.5%, yet management raised full-year guidance on stronger expected China demand through peak season.
The balance sheet is conservative but a capex cycle is coming. Net debt is just $291 million with interest coverage above 70 times, while three new vessels are due in 2027 and 2028, with construction largely funded by a dedicated Capital Construction Fund.
Bull Case
Lead with the obvious risk: Matson's recent earnings have leaned heavily on its expedited China service, and that lane is cyclical and politically exposed. China container volumes fell 9.5% year over year in Q1 2026, ocean transportation operating income dropped to $54.6 million from $73.6 million, and total net income fell to $56.6 million from $72.3 million. If the worry is that the China boom is over and Matson reverts to a low-growth domestic shipper, that worry is grounded in the quarter's numbers. The question is whether the data actually supports a permanent reset or a normal cyclical breath.
The data points to normalization, not collapse, and management leaned into that read by raising guidance. Despite the soft quarter, Matson expects 2026 ocean transportation and consolidated operating income to modestly exceed 2025, with the ocean segment now guided roughly $20 million above the $98.6 million it posted in 2025, crediting improving yields on Shanghai sailings and stronger China trade lanes. A more stable Transpacific environment helped, following the US-China trade deal and a suspension of port entry fees, and the February 2026 Supreme Court action that halted collection of certain tariffs reduced uncertainty. The seasonal pattern the company describes in its 10-K is intact: in the China trade, "volume demand is generally stronger in the second and third" quarters (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-020944), so a soft pre-Lunar-New-Year first quarter is normal.
The domestic franchise is the durable floor under the volatile China lane. Matson's Hawaii and Alaska trades are protected by the Jones Act, which requires goods moved between US ports to travel on US-built, US-flagged, US-crewed vessels. The 10-K spells out the moat's value by describing the threat to it: if the Jones Act were "invalidated, substantially amended or waived," competitors could enter "the Hawaii or Alaska markets with lower operating costs by utilizing their ability to acquire and operate foreign-flagged and foreign-built vessels" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-020944). That barrier is why the domestic business is steady and high-return. Pair a protected domestic base with a high-margin China optionality, a 14.4% operating margin, interest coverage above 70 times, and a buyback that has retired roughly a third of the shares since 2021, and the China softness looks like a cyclical dip in an otherwise well-defended compounder.
Bear Case
The structural fragility here is not leverage, where Matson is conservative, it is the concentration of profit in a single volatile, exogenous lane and the capital cycle now arriving on top of it. A large share of recent operating income has come from the expedited China service, a business whose economics depend on Transpacific freight rates, e-commerce demand, and US-China trade policy, none of which Matson controls. The Q1 2026 print showed how fast it swings: China volumes down 9.5%, ocean transportation operating income down 25%, and Transpacific West Coast spot rates falling 14% over a recent four-week stretch. A company whose earnings rise and fall with a politically charged trade lane is structurally exposed in a way a clean balance sheet does not fix.
The capital cycle compounds the timing risk. Matson is building three new Aloha-class vessels, with the 10-K confirming "expected delivery dates during the first quarter 2027, the third quarter 2027 and the second quarter 2028" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-020944), against total new-vessel construction spending around $400 million plus other capex of $150 million to $170 million and roughly $45 million of dry-docking. Even though about 92% of remaining milestone payments are covered by the Capital Construction Fund, a major fleet investment landing as the China lane normalizes means free cash flow is committed to steel at exactly the moment the high-margin revenue stream is cooling. That is the classic shipping trap: spend into the peak, deliver into the trough.
The valuation leaves little room for the cyclicality. At $191.35 (June 27, 2026) the earnings-power and growth-DCF families both read the stock as expensive, with only asset-based and relative-multiple support, and the blended X-ray figure sits near $176.8, below the price. The priced-in assumption is about 13.3% operating-income growth, a demanding bar for a business whose largest profit engine just shrank and whose domestic trades grow slowly. The 10-K is candid that earnings "have tended to follow a similar pattern, offset by periodic vessel dry-docking and other episodic cost factors, which can lead to earnings variability" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-020944). The buyback that has supported per-share value relies on the China lane's cash; if that lane stays soft while the capex bill comes due, the support thins and the cyclicality shows through.
Valuation
Matson is valued as a steady shipper with a cyclical kicker, and the methods split on whether the kicker is durable. Against the $191.35 price, the asset-based and relative-multiple families support the price, while the earnings-power and growth-DCF families read it as expensive, and the blended X-ray figure across five methods lands near $176.8, modestly below the quote. The priced-in characterization is within range and value and asset-supported rather than a growth bet, which fits an asset-heavy ocean carrier whose tangible fleet anchors the value.
The priced-in math is the tension. The embedded assumption is roughly 13.3% operating-income growth against a current operating margin of 14.4% and an implied terminal margin near 8.3%. That 13.3% growth bar is demanding for a company whose China lane, the recent growth driver, just contracted, and it is the assumption that the earnings-power method declines to underwrite. The valuation leans on the asset base and peer multiples rather than on aggressive forward growth; the filings confirm the asset quality and the Jones Act protection that supports the domestic trades (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-020944).
The balance sheet is a genuine strength. Net debt of about $291 million sits at well under one times operating income, and interest coverage above 70 times is exceptional, so there is no solvency concern even with the coming fleet capex, much of which the Capital Construction Fund covers. The honest read is that the price is full but not stretched: asset value and peer comparisons hold it up, but the growth assumption embedded in it requires the China lane to recover, which management's raised guidance bets on. An investor here is underwriting that the protected domestic franchise plus a recovering China service justifies a price slightly above the blended methods, with the conservative balance sheet and aggressive buyback as the cushions and the China cyclicality and capex cycle as the risks.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 results (reported April 2026) were soft but accompanied by a guidance raise. Net income fell to $56.6 million, or $1.85 per diluted share, on revenue of $757.8 million, down from $72.3 million and $782.0 million a year earlier, as China container volumes dropped 9.5% ahead of Lunar New Year and ocean transportation operating income fell to $54.6 million from $73.6 million. Despite the weak quarter, management raised full-year 2026 guidance, now expecting ocean transportation operating income roughly $20 million above the $98.6 million posted in 2025, driven by improving Shanghai yields and stronger China trade lanes. The trajectory of China demand through the second and third quarter peak season is the key near-term catalyst.
Trade policy is the dominant external catalyst. The US-China trade deal announced October 30, 2025 reduced Transpacific uncertainty, including a one-year suspension of port entry fees from November 10 and reduced tariffs, and in February 2026 the Supreme Court struck down key elements of certain tariffs, with US Customs halting collection effective February 24, 2026. A more stable trade environment supports the China service; renewed tariff escalation or a demand slowdown is the main downside, with near-term fuel cost headwinds from the Iran conflict also flagged by management.
The capital cycle and buyback are the structural items to watch. Three new Aloha-class vessels are due in Q1 2027, Q3 2027, and Q2 2028, with about 92% of remaining milestone payments covered by the Capital Construction Fund, against roughly $400 million of vessel construction and $150 million to $170 million of other capex in the plan. On capital return, Matson repurchased about 0.4 million shares for $54.4 million in Q1 and added 3.0 million shares to its program through December 2029, having retired roughly 33% of shares since 2021. The catalysts that would re-rate the stock are a confirmed China peak-season recovery and continued buybacks; the risk is a soft China lane colliding with the vessel capex bill.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- DAC (DANAOS CORPORATION)
- FY2025 20-F: …and Senior Notes and our ability to refinance our financing agreements. In such an event, we could be unable to service our debt and other obligations. We depend upon a limited number of customers for a large part of our revenues. The loss of these customers or further concentration of these customers through…
- FY2025 20-F: …and may reduce the overall demand for chartered-in tonnage. In addition, liner companies have progressively increased the proportion of their total fleet capacity that is directly owned rather than chartered-in from independent tonnage providers. This trend, if it continues, could reduce the pool of available charter…
- CMRE (COSTAMARE INC.)
- FY2025 20-F: …can be more difficult to employ them on profitable time charters, particularly during periods of decreased demand in the charter market. Accordingly, we may find it difficult to continue to find profitable employment for our vessels as they age. 15 Table of Contents We face substantial competition from a number of…
- FY2025 20-F: …competition in both sectors. Participants in the container shipping industry include "liner" shipping companies, which operate container shipping services and own containerships, containership owners, often known as "charter owners", who own containerships and charter them out to liner companies, and shippers who…
- GSL (Global Ship Lease, Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …presented for each category of participating common shares under the two-class method. (w) Risks Associated with Concentration The Company is exposed to certain concentration risks that may adversely affect the Company's financial position in the near term: (i) The Company derives its revenue from liner companies…
- FY2025 20-F: 4 Table of Contents We will face substantial competition in expanding our business from a number of companies. Many of these competitors may have greater financial resources and a lower cost of capital than us, may operate larger fleets, may have been established for longer, and may be able to offer better charter…
- KEX (KIRBY CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …Website 4 BUSINESS AND PROPERTY 4 MARINE TRANSPORTATION 5 Marine Transportation Industry Fundamentals 6 Inland Tank Barge Industry 6 Coastal Tank Barge Industry 7 Competition in the Tank Barge Industry 7 Products Transported 8 Demand Drivers in the Tank Barge Industry 8 Marine Transportation Operations 9 Contracts…
- FY2025 10-K: …and services operating margin for 2025 was 9.2% compared to 8.0% for 2024. Outlook Overall, the Company expects to deliver improved financial results in 2026. In KMT, barge utilization and customer demand remain stable. In KDS, growth in the power generation market is expected to offset softness in oil and gas…
- SFL (SFL Corporation Ltd.)
- FY2025 20-F: …are self-propelled, and can therefore easily move between geographic areas. Jack-up drilling rigs are not self-propelled, but it is common to move these assets over long distances on heavy-lift vessels. Therefore, the markets and competition for these rigs are effectively world-wide. Competition for charters in all…
- FY2025 20-F: …the international shipping and offshore drilling industries, types, sizes, sophistication and ages of vessels and drilling rigs, supply and demand for vessels and drilling rigs, availability of or developments in other modes of transportation, competition from other shipping companies, cost of newbuildings,…
- NCLH (NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS LTD.)
- FY2025 10-K: …providers, theme parks and packaged travel experiences. Competition within the cruise industry is driven by factors such as pricing, itinerary and destination offerings, ship features, service levels, marketing and travel advisor relationships. Competitive actions, including changes in pricing, capacity, deployment…
- FY2025 10-K: …specialty dining, Wi-Fi, valet laundry, gratuities and more. Seasonality Our operations are seasonal and results for interim periods are not necessarily indicative of the results for the entire fiscal year. Historically, demand for cruises has been strongest during the Northern Hemisphere's summer months, which has…
- RCL (ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD)
- FY2025 10-K: 2019 to 2025 is partly driven by lack of cruise supply and itineraries in China. Competition We compete within the global vacation industry primarily with a number of cruise lines as well as land-based vacation alternatives for consumers' leisure time. These include resorts (including all-inclusive resorts), hotels,…
- FY2025 10-K: …as products and services provided. Our Chairman and Chief Executive Officer has been identified as the chief operating decision-maker ("CODM"), and is responsible for carrying out the functions of allocating resources and assessing performance. The CODM uses Operating Income (Loss) to assess performance and allocate…
- SBLK (STAR BULK CARRIERS CORP.)
- FY2025 20-F: · management of our accounting system and records and financial reporting; · administration of the legal and regulatory requirements affecting our business and assets; and · management of the relationships with our service providers and customers. The principal factors that affect our profitability, cash flows and…
- FY2025 20-F: …and varies according to their supply and demand. We compete with other owners of dry bulk carriers in the Newcastlemax, Capesize, Post Panamax, Kamsarmax, Panamax, Ultramax and Supramax size sectors. Ownership of dry bulk carriers is highly fragmented. We compete for charters on the basis of price, vessel location,…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.