National Beverage Corp. (FIZZ): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for National Beverage Corp. (FIZZ) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FIZZ
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FIZZ |
| Company | National Beverage Corp. |
| Current price | $31.00/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 6.6% |
| Operating margin today | 20.0% |
| Margin compression implied | -13.4pp |
| Multiple paid | 11x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-0.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.48σ |
| cohort percentile (of 69 peers) | 13 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.43x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.44x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.73x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.31x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $23.71 | 1.31x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.0%, WACC 9.0%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $29.28 | 1.06x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 8.5x / 10.5x / 12.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $42.65 | 0.73x | yes | P/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.6x / 22.0x / 25.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $21.71 | 1.43x | yes | BV/sh $6.31, ROE (TTM) 31.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $42.05 | 0.74x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $20.56 | 1.51x | yes | Rev $1.2B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.0x / 2.4x / 2.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $69.08 | 0.45x | yes | EPS $2.00, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.45 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $21.33 | 1.45x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $33.40 | 0.93x | yes | BV $6.31 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 31.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $16.85 | 1.84x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.00 × BVPS $6.31) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $40.63 | 0.76x | yes | EBITDA $0.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $20.90 | 1.48x | yes | FCF $165.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $64.53 | 0.48x | yes | EPS $2.00 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $6.54 | 4.74x | yes | BV $6.31 × (ROIC 9.3% / WACC 9.0%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $25.57 | 1.21x | yes | Revenue $1.20B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $75.00 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $2.00 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $21.62 | 1.43x | yes | EPS $2.00 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $349.5m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.98x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -1.52x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
Beverage brands are valued on margin and brand staying power, not on assets, and National Beverage screens well on that lens: a 32% return on equity, $314 million of cash and almost no debt, and a 37% gross margin. The capital-light economics are genuinely attractive.
The problem is growth. Revenue has flattened, with Q3 fiscal 2026 net sales of $265 million essentially even with the prior year, and the price implies the market expects roughly no growth at all from here.
No valuation method reaches the current $36 price. Even the friendliest reads land in the low-to-mid $40s only after assuming a multiple re-rating, while the no-growth methods sit near $21, so the stock is priced richly against a stalling top line.
Bull Case
The right lens for National Beverage is the one used for any branded beverage company: margin quality and the durability of the brand, not the balance sheet, because a beverage maker owns recipes and shelf relationships more than it owns hard assets. On that lens FIZZ is unusually clean. It earns about 32% on equity, holds $314 million in cash against roughly $63 million of debt, and runs a 37% gross margin, the signature of a company with real pricing power in its core LaCroix sparkling-water franchise. The 10-K describes a distribution machine that uses vending and glass-door coolers as marketing tools and reaches take-home, convenience, and food-service channels (accession 0001437749-25-022007), the kind of entrenched shelf presence that newer brands cannot replicate quickly.
The recent results show the brand defending its economics even when volume is soft. In Q3 fiscal 2026 net sales were roughly flat at $265 million, but gross margin still improved 60 basis points and EPS rose 5% to $0.44, and management noted January shipments up 7% despite a disrupting winter storm. A company that can grow earnings on flat revenue by managing price and mix is converting brand strength into profit rather than chasing volume at any cost.
The capital returns are the underappreciated part of the story. National Beverage carries no meaningful debt and has paid twelve special dividends over the past twenty years, returning $16.53 per share, more than $1.5 billion, to holders. The founder-led structure prioritizes cash generation over empire-building, and the cash pile gives optionality for another special dividend. For a buyer who values a high-margin, debt-free brand throwing off cash, the stock is a defensive holding with periodic windfalls rather than a growth bet.
Bear Case
The advantage that built this company is eroding, and the erosion is the whole bear case. LaCroix was the brand that defined the modern sparkling-water category, but that first-mover edge invited every large beverage company and every private-label program to flood the same shelves. The 10-K is candid that its products compete with many varieties of liquid refreshment, including water products, soft drinks, juices, and energy and sports drinks, and that its competitive position varies by market (accession 0001437749-25-022007). In plain terms, sparkling water is no longer a niche FIZZ owns; it is a commodity category contested by companies with far deeper marketing budgets and distribution muscle. The evidence is in the top line: revenue has gone flat, with Q3 fiscal 2026 sales of $265 million essentially even with the prior year, and the price itself implies the market expects no growth, roughly a 1% decline, baked in.
The valuation gives the eroding moat no benefit of the doubt and yet still looks expensive. This is the rare case where no valuation family reaches the price: the no-growth earnings-power method lands at $21, the FCF-yield method at $21, the perpetual-growth DCF at $24, and even the relative method at $43 only by assuming a sector multiple the stalling growth does not earn. A single-brand company facing intensifying competition, priced above every standard method, is the definition of a stock leaning on reputation rather than fundamentals.
The structure compounds the risk. National Beverage is tightly controlled by its founder, who is both chairman and chief executive, which limits the accountability and the takeover optionality that might otherwise put a floor under a value name. The special dividends are welcome but unpredictable, timed at management's discretion, so they cannot be relied on as a yield. With revenue concentrated in one category that competitors are actively commoditizing, flat volumes, and a premium multiple, the path of least resistance is multiple compression toward where the methods say the business is actually worth.
Valuation
The valuation here is unusual because no method reaches the price. Inverting the $36 price implies the market is paying about 14x operating income for a business whose own growth solves to roughly negative 1%, which is the framework's way of saying the price needs no growth and yet still sits above the no-growth value. That is a contradiction the methods flag directly.
The model X-ray is uniformly below the price. The earnings-power method lands at $21, the FCF-yield method at $21, the earnings-yield method at $22, the perpetual-growth DCF at $24, the simple excess-return method at $22, and the Graham number at $17. The friendlier reads still fall short or require optimism: the relative method at $43 and the two-stage excess-return method at $42 assume a sector multiple and an ROE fade the stalling growth does not support, and the exit-multiple DCF lands at $33, below the price.
The band runs from about $45 at the low end to $52 at the base and $70 at the high, but that band carries low confidence and sits oddly above several of the individual methods, so the method cluster near $28 is the more honest guide. The characterization is blunt: the price is a bet beyond what any standard frame supports. The deciding variable is whether the brand can reaccelerate volume against the competition, because at flat revenue the high-margin, cash-rich quality is already in the price and then some.
Catalysts
Q3 fiscal 2026, reported in mid-March, was the most recent data point and it captured the tension. Net sales were roughly flat at $265 million, but gross margin improved 60 basis points and EPS rose 5% to $0.44, with January shipments up 7% despite winter storm disruption. Quarter-end cash grew to $314 million on $136 million of operating cash flow. The next print is the test of whether the volume softness is weather and timing or a deeper demand problem in the core sparkling-water line.
The special dividend is the most concrete catalyst for the stock. National Beverage has paid twelve special dividends over twenty years, the cash balance keeps building, and the company carries almost no debt, so another special distribution is the kind of event that periodically rewards holders. Timing is entirely at management's discretion, which makes it a watch-item rather than a scheduled payout.
The competitive backdrop is the slow-moving but decisive factor. As large beverage companies and private label keep expanding sparkling-water offerings, the trajectory of LaCroix volume and shelf share is what determines whether the flat revenue stabilizes or declines. The founder-controlled structure means there is little prospect of an outside catalyst such as a takeover, so the story rests on organic brand performance and the cash returns. Sentiment is muted, fitting a richly priced name with a stalling top line.
Sources: stocktitan.net (Q3 FY26 8-K), minichart.com.sg (Q3 FY26 results), finance.yahoo.com (Q1 FY26 record sales), stockanalysis.com (FIZZ overview).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- COCO (The Vita Coco Company, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …greater financial resources than ours. We also compete with a number of natural, organic, and functional food and beverage producers. We and these competing brands and products compete for limited retail, and foodservice customers and consumers. In our market, competition is based on, among other things, brand equity…
- FY2025 10-K: …retailers due to their extensive brand portfolios than we do. These factors may allow our competitors to derive greater net sales and profits from their existing customer base, acquire customers at lower costs or respond more quickly than we can to new or emerging technologies and changes in consumer preferences or…
- COKE (COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …competition may result in lower than expected net pricing of the Company's products. The Company's ability to gain or maintain the Company's share of sales or gross margins may be limited by the actions of the Company's competitors, which may have advantages in setting prices due to lower raw material costs.…
- FY2025 10-K: …of the fiscal year, as sales of our products are typically correlated with warmer weather. We believe that we and other manufacturers from whom we purchase finished products have adequate production capacity to meet sales demand for sparkling and still beverages during these peak periods. See "Item 2. Properties" for…
- MNST (Monster Beverage Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …Bull GmbH, KDP, Molson Coors, Constellation Brands, AB InBev, The Boston Beer Company and The Mark Anthony Group. We also compete with companies that are smaller or primarily national or local in operations, such as CELSIUS, PRIME, C4, Alani Nu, GHOST, ZOA, GORGIE, and others as well as local craft breweries in our…
- FY2025 10-K: …Strategic Brands segment primarily generates net operating revenues by selling "concentrates" and/or "beverage bases" to authorized bottling and canning operations. Such bottlers generally combine the concentrates and/or beverage bases with sweeteners, water and other ingredients to produce ready-to-drink packaged…
- CELH (CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …our future revenues and profitability. 18 The increasing number of competitive products and limited availability of shelf and cooler space in retail outlets may limit our ability to maintain or expand our market presence. Competitors may engage in aggressive marketing, offer price discounts or pursue false or…
- FY2025 10-K: …Our products compete with all liquid refreshments and with products of certain competitors that are much larger, some of which have significantly greater financial resources, such as Monster Beverage Corporation, Red Bull GmbH, The Coca-Cola Company, Pepsi, Keurig Dr Pepper Inc., Nestlé S.A., BlueTriton Brands,…
- KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: Financial Statements for additional information on the JDE Peet's Acquisition and related transactions. On August 25, 2025, we announced our intention to separate our beverage and coffee portfolios into two independent, publicly traded companies, which will allow for more tailored growth strategies, operating models,…
- FY2025 10-K: …their route-to-market, reducing prices, or increasing promotional activities. We also compete with various smaller or regional companies and private label manufacturers, which may be more innovative, better able to bring new products to market, and better able to quickly serve niche markets. Additionally, we compete…
- BF-A (Brown-Forman Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BF-B (Brown-Forman Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …competing products. If the buying power of these large retail customers continues to increase, it could negatively affect our financial results. Further, while we believe we have sufficient scale to succeed relative to our major competitors, we nevertheless face a risk that continuing consolidation of large beverage…
- FY2025 10-K: …to distribute our brands, generally under fixed-term distribution contracts. In Canada, we sell our products to provincial governments. We believe that our customer relationships are good and that our exposure to concentrations of credit risk is limited due to the diverse geographic areas covered by our operations…
- SAM (THE BOSTON BEER COMPANY, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …significantly greater resources than the Company. This competitive environment may affect the Company's overall performance within the Beyond beer and Traditional beer categories. As the market continues to consolidate, the Company believes that companies that are well-positioned in terms of brand equity, marketing…
- FY2025 10-K: Company anticipates competition will remain strong as existing beverage companies continue adding more SKUs and styles. The potential for growth in the sales of flavored malt beverages, hard seltzers, domestic beers, imported beers and spirits RTDs is expected to increase the competition in the market for Beyond beer…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.