Ford Motor Co (F): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for Ford Motor Co (F) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/F
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | F |
| Company | Ford Motor Co |
| Current price | $13.86/sh |
| Composition | Automotive 80% / Auto Financing 20% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 0.9% |
| Operating margin today | 2.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -1.7pp |
| Multiple paid | 5x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.69σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 3 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.67x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 0.20x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.35x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 2.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=8)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $25.76 | 0.54x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 18.3x / 20.3x / 22.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $69.96 | 0.20x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $1.71 | 8.10x | yes | DPS $0.60, g=-19.0% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $0.54 | 25.66x | yes | Stage 1: -55% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual (excluded from median) |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $9.20 | 1.51x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $9.20, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $8.28 | 1.67x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $9.20, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $10.23 | 1.35x | yes | Rev $189.9B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 1385.50x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.43B × (1−12%) / WACC 2.8% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 1385.50x | yes | EBITDA $8.85B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1385.50x | yes | FCF $9546.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1385.50x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $9.05B (FCF $9.55B − SBC $0.50B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $4.17 | 3.32x | yes | BV $9.20 × (ROIC 1.3% / WACC 2.8%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $69.96 | 0.20x | yes | Revenue $189.86B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $29.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -7.16x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -6.27x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 3.9x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Ford is valued on a segment basis anchored to Ford Pro, its commercial-vehicle and fleet-services arm, because that is where the durable earnings sit; at $14.05 the price implies roughly 18.8% segment operating growth, and the reverse-DCF band of about $13.56 to $15.10 puts the price within range.
The valuation lens you pick decides the verdict: the relative-multiple family reaches the price (peers GM and Stellantis trade at similarly low multiples), while asset-based and earnings-power methods say expensive, partly because trailing operating profit on the EDGAR basis is negative.
The single biggest analytical caution is the operating-income measurement, where the EDGAR trailing figure (about minus $7.2 billion) and the record basis (about plus $5.7 billion) diverge by more than 180%; the cleaner anchor is management's full-year guidance of $8.5 to $10.5 billion adjusted EBIT and $5 to $6 billion adjusted free cash flow, set against ongoing Model e losses of $4 to $4.5 billion.
Bull Case
Start with the fear, because it is the loudest part of the Ford story. The bear says Ford is a low-margin, capital-hungry legacy automaker bleeding billions on electric vehicles, exposed to tariffs and recalls, with earnings that swing with the economic cycle. Each piece is real: Model e (the EV business) is still guided to lose $4 to $4.5 billion this year, the company is recalling about 1.4 million older F-150 trucks over a gearshift defect, and a recent quarter's profit was flattered by a one-time tariff refund. The question the bull has to answer is whether the underlying business actually supports the price once you strip the noise out.
It largely does, and the reason is Ford Pro. Ford reports three automotive units plus Ford Credit, and Ford Pro is the commercial-vehicle and fleet-services arm, selling internal-combustion, hybrid, and electric vehicles and layering on digital services like telematics and charging to maintain those fleets (accession 0000037996-25-000013). That is a higher-margin, stickier, recurring-revenue business bolted onto the truck franchise, and the inversion anchors Ford's valuation on it. The priced-in math solves off Ford Pro because that is where the durable earnings sit, not the volatile EV unit the bear fixates on.
The headline numbers underneath are sturdier than the narrative. First-quarter 2026 revenue was $43.3 billion, up 6%, with adjusted EBIT of $3.5 billion at an 8.1% margin, and full-year guidance was raised to $8.5 to $10.5 billion of adjusted EBIT plus $5 to $6 billion of adjusted free cash flow. At $14.05 (June 27, 2026) the price implies operating growth of roughly 18.8% on the segment basis, which the model reads as within range because only about 3% of comparable cohort members historically cleared that bar, yet the relative-multiple family still reaches the price. A truck-and-fleet franchise generating multi-billion-dollar free cash flow, valued mostly on its commercial arm, is a different and more defensible bet than the EV-loss caricature suggests.
Bear Case
The fragility in Ford sits in the capital structure and in how cyclical the operating profit really is. Look at the operating-income measurement disagreement first: the EDGAR trailing read is deeply negative at about minus $7.2 billion while the record basis reads about plus $5.7 billion, a divergence of more than 180%. That is not a rounding difference, it is the signature of a business whose reported profit swings violently with one-time items, EV write-downs, warranty and recall charges, and tariff effects. When the through-cycle operating margin is hard to even pin down, the years-to-repay and coverage lenses cannot be computed honestly, which is exactly what the solvency note flags. A bet on Ford is a bet you can underwrite an earnings stream that the accounting itself struggles to hold still.
The recall and EV economics are the live stress scenarios. The 1.4-million-truck F-150 recall is a direct warranty cost against the very franchise that carries the company, and Model e is still guided to lose $4 to $4.5 billion this year even as EV sales fell about 70% year over year in the first quarter. Losing billions on a shrinking product line is the worst combination: cash out the door with no volume leverage to recover it. Ford also flagged about $1 billion of incremental commodity cost (aluminum) for the year, and the recent EBIT beat leaned on a $1.3 billion one-time tariff refund the company had not even received yet. Strip the refund and the run-rate is thinner than the headline.
Then there is the structure of the bet itself. The valuation is anchored on Ford Pro at a steep discount rate (the inversion uses a roughly 21.7% WACC on that segment, reflecting how risky the cash flows are judged to be), and the asset-based family says the stock is expensive even so. Ford Credit adds a finance company's balance sheet to an industrial one, and the dividend models flag the payout as stretched relative to the underlying cash generation. The relative-multiple family reaches the price only because peers like GM and Stellantis trade at similarly low multiples; that is the cohort agreeing the whole industry deserves a low multiple, not a signal that Ford is cheap within it. In an auto downturn, the combination of cyclical EBIT, EV cash burn, recall exposure, and a finance arm is the classic way a low multiple gets cheaper still.
Valuation
Ford is valued on a segment basis, anchored to Ford Pro, because that commercial-vehicle and fleet-services unit is where the durable earnings sit and the other automotive units (Ford Blue, Ford Model e) and Ford Credit are too volatile or too finance-like to price cleanly on a single operating multiple. At $14.05 the price implies operating growth of roughly 18.8% a year on that anchored segment, solved at a high discount rate near 21.7% that reflects how risky the cash flows are judged to be.
The method families disagree in a telling pattern. The relative-multiple family reaches the price, with relative valuation landing near $70 on a peer-multiple basis, because GM and Stellantis trade at similarly depressed multiples and the cohort collectively earns a low rating. The asset-based family says expensive, with the excess-return models near $8 to $9, and the earnings-power family is effectively unusable here because trailing operating profit on the EDGAR basis is negative. The dividend models also flag the payout as high relative to underlying generation. So the bull lens is the peer-multiple one; the bear lens is the asset and earnings-power one.
The honest read: this is a cyclical industrial priced like a cyclical industrial, with most of the value resting on the commercial franchise and the market already applying an auto-sector discount. The biggest analytical hazard is the operating-income measurement itself, where the EDGAR trailing figure (about minus $7.2 billion) and the record basis (about plus $5.7 billion) diverge by more than 180%, so any multiple you compute depends heavily on which base you use and on normalizing out one-time items like the $1.3 billion tariff refund and EV write-downs. Full-year guidance of $8.5 to $10.5 billion adjusted EBIT and $5 to $6 billion adjusted free cash flow is the cleaner anchor for what the business throws off; the question the price asks is whether that holds through the next cycle turn.
Catalysts
The defining recent catalyst was the first-quarter 2026 print (reported late April 2026): revenue of $43.3 billion, up 6% and ahead of expectations, with adjusted EBIT of $3.5 billion at an 8.1% margin, up from 2.5% a year earlier. The result included a roughly $1.3 billion one-time tariff refund benefit that flattered the margin, so the underlying run-rate is lower than the headline (CNBC, StocksToTrade).
Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to adjusted EBIT of $8.5 to $10.5 billion (from $8 to $10 billion) and guided to $5 to $6 billion of adjusted free cash flow. Model e narrowed its quarterly loss to $777 million from $849 million, but EV sales fell about 70% year over year, and full-year Model e losses of $4 to $4.5 billion remain in the guide. Ford also flagged about $1 billion of incremental aluminum commodity cost for the year (CNBC, TipRanks).
Two near-term items are worth watching. Ford is recalling about 1.4 million 2015 to 2017 F-150 trucks over a gearshift problem that can trigger sudden downshifts, a direct warranty cost against the core franchise. And the tariff backdrop is unresolved: the one-time refund was tied to about $160 billion in potential refunds after the levies were ruled illegal, but Ford had not yet received its share, so the timing and magnitude of that cash remain open. The next quarterly print and any movement on the tariff refund are the clearest catalysts ahead (StocksToTrade, CNBC).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Ford Blue / Ford Model e / Ford Pro (reported)
- GM (GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RIVN (Rivian Automotive, Inc. / DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LCID (Lucid Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Ford Credit (reported)
- ALLY (Ally Financial Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COF (CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SYF (Synchrony Financial)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OMF (ONEMAIN HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.