Everus Construction Group, Inc. (ECG): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $117.24, Everus Construction Group, Inc. (ECG) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.9 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ECG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerECG
CompanyEverus Construction Group, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$117.24/sh
CompositionCommercial 55% / Institutional 9% / Industrial 8% / Service & other 3% / Renewables 2% / Utility 20% / Transportation 3% / Eliminations -1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.0%
Operating margin today7.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-3.8pp
Must persist for6.9y
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 27.7% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)61

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.18x5expensive
Earnings2.57x5expensive
Relative0.65x2justifies
Growth0.68x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$281.830.42xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$171.170.68xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.8x / 18.8x / 21.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.4x / 18.0x / 21.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14.04x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$53.872.18xyesBV/sh $15.14, ROE (TTM) 32.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$106.891.10xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$170.110.69xyesRev $4.3B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.4x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$174.300.67xyesEPS $4.98, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.67 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$33.463.50xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.23B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$83.261.41xyesBV $15.14 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 32.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$41.192.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.98 × BVPS $15.14) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$45.582.57xyesFCF $250.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$43.742.68xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.24B (FCF $0.25B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$160.690.73xyesEPS $4.98 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.258.85xyesBV $15.14 × (ROIC 7.7% / WACC 8.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $4.27B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$186.750.63xyesEPS $4.98 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$53.842.18xyesEPS $4.98 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
E&M (Electrical & Mechanical)operatingenterprise$2.9b$218.3m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
T&D (Transmission & Distribution)operatingenterprise$848.5m$89.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$117.1m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.45x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.35x
Interest coverage16.8x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The price is making a long-dated claim. At $130.03 the market pays roughly 26 times company-wide operating income, and run backwards that multiple needs the company to hold growth at its self-funding ceiling for something like eleven years. Eleven years is an unusual thing to ask of a construction contractor, an industry that invented the word backlog precisely because visibility runs out. So the fair question is whether the underlying business is behaving anything like that, and at the moment it is running faster.

The March quarter was a record on every line the company tracks. Revenue reached 1.04 billion dollars, up 25.4% from 826.6 million, with electrical and mechanical revenue up 28.8% and transmission and distribution up 10.5%. More interesting than the revenue is the shape of the profit underneath it: gross profit rose 41.3% to 130.7 million, and diluted earnings per share rose 58.3% to $1.14. Profit growing at roughly twice the pace of revenue is not what happens when a contractor simply takes on more work. It is what happens when the work changes.

The 10-K says what changed, in the company's own careful language: "Data center capacity and load growth, as well as other advanced technology growth, creates tremendous opportunities, but also presents risks and challenges for us and our customers." Data centre electrical work is technically demanding, schedule-critical and difficult to staff, which is exactly the combination that lets a contractor price for the risk rather than bid against six competitors on a spreadsheet. That is where the margin expansion is coming from.

Forward visibility supports the trajectory rather than merely hoping for it. Backlog stood at 3.68 billion dollars at March 31, 2026, up 14.0% in a single quarter and 20.4% on the year, against total backlog of 3,228.3 million at the end of 2025 and 2,780.6 million a year before that. The 10-K estimated that 2,587.5 million of the year-end figure would convert to revenue within twelve months. A contractor whose forward book is growing faster than its revenue is one that has more work available than it can currently execute, which is the good version of a capacity problem.

Where the bull case gets its runway is in the cohort. Everus earns a trailing operating margin of 7.3%. FIX, running the same electrical and mechanical playbook, earns 15.7% on 10.135 billion of revenue while growing 38.4%. STRL earns 16.9% on 2.885 billion. IESC earns 11.7% on 3.633 billion, and EME earns 10.1% on 17.747 billion. Everus sits below all four and above the pure infrastructure names, with PWR at 5.7% on 30.121 billion and MYRG at 5.2% on 3.825 billion. The point is not that Everus deserves the top of that range. It is that the top of that range exists, is occupied by companies doing recognisably similar work, and therefore the margin the price is asking for has been earned by somebody rather than imagined.

Capital structure gives management room to keep going. After completing its first acquisition as an independent company on April 2, 2026, buying the North Carolina mechanical contractor SE&M, pro forma net leverage stood at roughly half a year's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, and operating profit covers the interest bill about 13.3 times. The share count has been essentially flat since the separation, drifting up about 0.2% a year, so none of the growth so far has been paid for by diluting the owners.

Bear Case

Everus has only been an independent company since late 2024, and the way it is deploying capital deserves more attention than the backlog headline it is being bought for. The separation from MDU Resources did not arrive debt-free. As the 10-K puts it, "In connection with the Separation, we entered into a five-year senior secured credit agreement, which provides for long-term debt in an aggregate principal amount of up to $525 million." That facility, a term loan plus a revolver, is the war chest, and management has been explicit about the plan for it. On completing the SE&M acquisition the chief executive described it as a first step rather than a one-off. A company trading at roughly 26 times its operating income, buying private contractors that trade at nothing like that, is arbitraging its own multiple. That works beautifully until the multiple stops cooperating, at which point the acquired earnings remain and the currency that bought them does not.

There is a governance detail in the same window. On January 14, 2026, in its first full year as a standalone registrant, the Audit Committee approved dismissing Deloitte & Touche as independent auditor, with the dismissal taking effect on February 25, 2026 once the 2025 audit was complete. The filings record no disagreement, and changing auditors is a legitimate decision. It is still a decision an investor should notice when it happens in year one of a company's separate financial reporting history, alongside an acquisition programme and a set of percentage-of-completion estimates that determine how much revenue gets recognised each quarter.

The deeper problem is who the growth is coming from. In 2025 Everus served roughly 4,000 customers across more than 44,000 projects, and the top ten of them supplied about 43% of total operating revenues of 3.75 billion dollars, with a single customer at roughly 17%. A year earlier those top ten supplied about 33% of 2.85 billion. Revenue grew by nearly a third, and the concentration behind it grew too. At segment level the picture is sharper: two electrical and mechanical customers accounted for approximately 21.1% and 10.4% of that segment's revenues in 2025, and one transmission and distribution customer for approximately 16.0% of its segment. A contractor whose expansion depends on a handful of hyperscale buyers has borrowed those buyers' capital-spending cycle, and that cycle is set in somebody else's boardroom.

Which brings the argument to what the price actually requires. Today's quote needs the current economics held at the self-funding ceiling for around eleven years. Of comparable fast growers, roughly 14% managed that over a ten-year stretch. The company's own filing declines to underwrite even the near term: "Backlog at any given point in time may not accurately represent the revenue or net income that is realized in any period", and more bluntly, "Backlog should not be relied upon as a standalone indicator of future results." The market is extrapolating a decade from a book the company will not extrapolate a year from.

The valuation methods reflect the stretch. The peer-multiple and forward cash-flow approaches reach today's price; the earnings-power approaches, which capitalize what the business currently earns without crediting growth, land at less than a third of it. The zero-growth free-cash-flow calculation works from 229.6 million dollars of free cash flow, and the normalized earnings-power calculation averages operating profit over three years to about 0.19 billion, a window that includes the period before the advanced-technology work arrived. Everything therefore turns on whether the last eighteen months are the new base or the peak of a build cycle.

Finally, note what the market is charging for the risk. The discount rate that falls out of this share's own volatility is about 12.7%, against high single digits for a steadier industrial. The equity market is not treating Everus as a stable compounder. It is treating it as a leveraged bet on a construction cycle, and pricing it at a multiple that only makes sense if it is the former.

Valuation

Start with what the price is committing to, because it is a duration claim rather than a growth-rate claim. At $130.03 the market values the business at roughly 26 times its company-wide operating income, and inverting that produces not a growth number but a length of time: today's economics would need to hold at the ceiling the company can fund from its own cash flow for something like 11.2 years. About 14% of comparable fast growers sustained that over a decade. Duration, not pace, is the demanding part.

The calculation carries an unusually high discount rate, and that is informative rather than technical. The rate applied here is about 12.7%, well above what a steady industrial would attract, because the shares themselves move far more than the market does. A single percentage point of cost of capital moves the assumed span by close to a fifth of its whole length, so the answer is sensitive to how the market's appetite for volatility changes rather than only to how the company performs.

Where the methods disagree is instructive. Peer-multiple approaches and forward cash-flow approaches both reach today's price. Earnings-power approaches land far beneath it, with the price sitting more than three times their central estimate. The mechanics explain the gap without any need for a view. The zero-growth free-cash-flow calculation takes 229.6 million dollars of reported free cash flow and capitalizes it at the cost of equity, crediting nothing to the future. The normalized earnings-power calculation averages operating profit across three years, about 0.19 billion, which necessarily includes the period before data-centre work reshaped the revenue mix. Both are backward-looking by construction. The disagreement between them and the price is a disagreement about whether the trailing window is representative.

Against its cohort, the multiple sits in the upper half of the peer range while the operating margin does not. Everus earns 7.3% on 3.96 billion of trailing revenue. FIX earns 15.7% on 10.135 billion, STRL 16.9% on 2.885 billion, and EME 10.1% on 17.747 billion, while PWR earns 5.7% on 30.121 billion and PRIM 4.9% on 7.486 billion. A reader can hold two facts at once here: Everus is paying a premium multiple on a mid-cohort margin, and the cohort demonstrates that the margin it needs is attainable in this line of work. Which of those matters more is precisely the open question, and the report does not pretend to settle it.

The balance sheet is the least contested part of the picture. Net debt runs about 1.0 times operating profit, operating income covers interest roughly 13.3 times, the company is not consuming cash, and the share count has been close to flat since separation. After the SE&M purchase closed on April 2, 2026, management put pro forma net leverage at roughly half a year of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. That is a structure with room to buy more, which is both the growth mechanism the price is counting on and the reason the acquisition discipline is worth watching closely.

Catalysts

Everus reported record first-quarter results on May 5, 2026 and lifted its outlook on the back of them. Revenue of 1.04 billion dollars was up 25.4%, diluted earnings per share of $1.14 were up 58.3%, and backlog reached 3.68 billion dollars, up 20.4% year over year. Management raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance to a range of 4.3 to 4.4 billion dollars and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation guidance to a range of 345 to 360 million dollars. Second-quarter results are scheduled for release after the close on August 4, 2026, and the number that matters in them is not revenue, which the backlog already implies, but whether the gross margin gain of the March quarter repeats.

The acquisition programme opened on April 2, 2026 with the purchase of SE&M Constructors, SE&M of the Triangle and SECO Rentals, a group founded in 1923 and headquartered in Elm City, North Carolina, that draws roughly 65% of its revenue from mechanical services and works in pharmaceutical, complex industrial and health care end markets. The stated logic is diversification: it moves Everus into the Southeast and away from a revenue mix that has become heavily weighted to a small number of advanced-technology customers. Management framed the transaction as the first of several rather than an isolated deal, so acquisition pace and pricing become recurring items to track rather than a one-time event.

Two governance items sit in the same period. On January 14, 2026 the Audit Committee approved dismissing Deloitte & Touche as independent auditor, effective February 25, 2026 upon completion of the 2025 audit. Shareholders then elected the full slate of eight directors at the annual meeting on May 12, 2026. Separately, Oppenheimer assumed coverage with an Outperform rating and a $185 price target in May 2026, which sits well above the current quote and rests, as the firm's own framing indicates, on the backlog converting at the margins the March quarter demonstrated.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

E&M (Electrical & Mechanical) (reported)

T&D (Transmission & Distribution) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results release, May 5, 2026 · acquisition press release, April 2, 2026 · company 8-K, January 21, 2026, and Form 8-K/A, March 18, 2026 · company results webcast announcement, July 22, 2026 · company 8-K, May 14, 2026 · broker research note, May 2026

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