DARLING INGREDIENTS INC. (DAR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $57.78, DARLING INGREDIENTS INC. (DAR) is priced for +20.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DAR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDAR
CompanyDARLING INGREDIENTS INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$57.78/sh
CompositionFats 29% / Used cooking oil 7% / Proteins 23% / Bakery 3% / Other rendering 5% / Food ingredients 20% / Bioenergy 10% / Other 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.5%
Operating margin today7.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.0pp
Implied growth20.4%
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.4pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.20σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)59
sustained it ~5 years at this level39%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset5.80x5expensive
Earnings1.59x5expensive
Relative2.30x2expensive
Growth0.59x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$270.650.21xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.6%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$97.960.59xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.7x / 13.7x / 15.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 27.9x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 42x), scenarios: 23.2x / 27.9x / 32.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$14.993.85xyesBV/sh $30.28, ROE (TTM) 4.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$9.965.80xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$50.521.14xyesRev $6.3B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.5x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$16.563.49xyesEPS $1.38, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=33.35 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$26.022.22xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.73B × (1−22%) / WACC 6.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$8.926.48xyesBV $30.28 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.0%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$30.661.88xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.38 × BVPS $30.28) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.99B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$38.421.50xyesFCF $963.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$36.231.59xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.93B (FCF $0.96B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$44.531.30xyesEPS $1.38 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.896.50xyesBV $30.28 × (ROIC 1.9% / WACC 6.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.31B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$51.751.12xyesEPS $1.38 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$14.923.87xyesEPS $1.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Feed Ingredientsoperatingenterprise$4.0b$215.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Food Ingredientsoperatingenterprise$1.5b$151.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Fuel Ingredientsoperatingenterprise$600.8m$3.4m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$4.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)10.89x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)8.50x
Interest coverage2.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most informative thing about this balance sheet is what management did not have to do with it. In fiscal 2025 one of the three segments went to almost nothing: Fuel Ingredients operating income, which carries the company's half of its renewable diesel venture, came in at $3.4 million, down $193.8 million or 98.3% on the year. A hole that size at a levered company usually produces an equity raise, a covenant amendment, or both. Neither happened. Interest expense went the other way, falling to $222.3 million in fiscal 2025 from $253.9 million a year earlier as borrowings came down. The company kept buying its own stock through the worst of it, 1,042,253 shares for about $34.7 million, leaving roughly 460.3 million dollars of the authorization unspent.

What absorbed the blow is the part of the business nobody writes about. Feed Ingredients produced $215.2 million of segment operating income and Food Ingredients $151.8 million, the latter up $7.1 million or 4.9% on higher volumes. This is rendering: collecting by-products from meat processors and used cooking oil from restaurants, then converting them into fats, proteins and gelatin. It is unglamorous, it prices off commodity spreads, and it is the reason a near-total collapse in the fuel line stayed an earnings event rather than becoming a solvency one.

Then the fuel line turned, and it turned hard. In the quarter ended April 4, 2026, equity in net income of Diamond Green Diesel was $107.4 million against a $30.5 million loss in the same quarter a year earlier, carrying total operating income to $226.8 million from $28.4 million. Net sales reached $1,550.8 million against $1,380.6 million, and sales to the venture itself, which buys Darling's fats as feedstock, ran $248.7 million against $218.0 million. The structure that makes the fuel line so violent on the way down works identically on the way back.

That structure is the actual bull case, and it hides in plain sight because the venture is carried as an investment rather than consolidated line by line. Darling collects the feedstock, sells a large share of it to a plant it half owns, and then books half of what that plant earns converting it. The 10-K describes the venture as formed to convert animal fats, recycled greases, used cooking oil, inedible corn oil, soybean oil, or other feedstocks into fuel. Very few companies own both ends of that chain. When the spread between waste fats and renewable diesel widens, this one gets paid on the raw material and then paid again on the conversion.

Bear Case

Line the valuation approaches up and they disagree, and the disagreement is the whole argument. The ones that reach today's price are the ones that project cash flows forward and credit growth for getting there. The ones that value the business on what it has already earned do not reach it: the price sits roughly 70% above where the earnings-power approaches land, and further above the book-value approaches than that. Peer multiples come closest and still sit under the price. When the only lenses that support a number are the lenses extrapolating forward, the price is a bet on durability, and the conservative lenses tend to be the more honest read of a company whose earnings just demonstrated they are not durable.

The evidence sits in the company's own account of fiscal 2025. Fuel Ingredients operating income fell 98.3% to $3.4 million, and the 10-K attributes it to an industry that experienced a significant change in the regulatory environment including issues related to the change from the blenders tax credit (BTC) to the producers tax credit (PTC) in the United States and tariffs on imported feedstocks, leading to a reduction in incentives and a decrease in margins. It goes on to note that the market mechanisms designed to counterbalance these challenges, including RINs, created through the RFS and state LCFS programs have been slow to react. None of that describes an operating failure. All of it sits outside management's control, and none of the underlying policy has since become more predictable.

Set against that, what the price asks for is not modest. It requires operating profit to compound at the fastest rate the business could fund out of its own cash flow, and to hold that rate for roughly six years. Of the companies that have grown that quickly, only about a third sustained it that long. The multiple this price implies sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well past the upper quartile rather than anywhere near the middle of it. A top-of-range multiple attached to a six-year run at full pace is the specific combination the bear is pointing at, and last fiscal year is the reason it is worth pointing at.

The balance sheet does not leave much space for a second bad year. Net borrowings run about ten times operating profit, and operating profit covered interest less than twice over across the trailing period. That interest was $222.3 million in fiscal 2025, a fixed claim sitting against an earnings stream that just proved it can drop by nearly $200 million inside twelve months. The 10-K is blunt about where the exposure lives, stating that The DGD Joint Venture subjects us to a number of risks and that the company's share of it rests on our equity in net income of the DGD Joint Venture, which is based on our 50% interest. The offsetting fact is real: roughly 2.4 billion dollars of value sits in equity stakes held outside the operating business, about a quarter of the market capitalization, and that bounds how far this can fall. It bounds the downside; it does not make the fuel line predictable.

Valuation

Today's price asks the business to grow operating profit at the fastest rate it could fund internally and to keep that up for roughly six years. That is the assumption sitting inside the quote. Of the companies that have grown at that pace, only about a third held it for that long, and the multiple implied here sits at the very top of its peer distribution rather than in the middle of it. The read is sensitive to the discount rate: a single percentage point on the cost of capital moves the required run by about a year and a half, so six years is the shape of the assumption, not a measurement of it.

The methods arrange themselves the way they usually do around a price like that. Approaches that discount future cash flows reach it. Approaches that capitalize what has already been earned do not, with the price sitting about 70% above where the earnings-power methods land. Peer multiples land nearest, just below. The book-value approaches land furthest away, which for a company carrying $30.28 of equity per share is arithmetic rather than opinion, since the shares change hands for roughly twice that. The distance between those families is the premium being paid for what happens next in renewable fuels, and nothing else.

Which input decides who is right is not in dispute. Darling holds a 50% interest in Diamond Green Diesel alongside Valero, and its share of that venture's results runs through the income statement above the operating line rather than below it, so the venture moves the operating number directly. In fiscal 2025 that contribution went to essentially nothing, taking Fuel Ingredients segment operating income to $3.4 million, a fall of 98.3%. In the quarter ended April 4, 2026 it came back, reaching $107.4 million against a $30.5 million loss, lifting operating income to $226.8 million from $28.4 million. Two consecutive readings that far apart are not noise around a trend. For this company they are the trend.

Solvency is where the volatility gets expensive. Net borrowings sit at about ten times operating profit and the trailing period covered interest less than twice over, though interest expense itself has been falling, to $222.3 million in fiscal 2025 from $253.9 million. Roughly 2.4 billion dollars of value sits in stakes held outside the operating business, about a quarter of the market capitalization, which puts a boundary under the downside. It does not make the fuel line steady, and the fuel line is what sets the price.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results arrive July 30, 2026, and the setup for them is unusual. The March quarter, reported April 30, 2026, was the inflection: equity in net income of Diamond Green Diesel of $107.4 million against a $30.5 million loss a year earlier, total operating income of $226.8 million against $28.4 million, and net sales of $1,550.8 million against $1,380.6 million. One quarter does not establish that the producers-credit regime works for this business the way the blenders credit did. Two consecutive quarters would start to.

The company laid out its own version of what comes next at an investor day on May 11, 2026, with the presentation furnished to the SEC that day, pointing at renewable fuels and collagen as the two places growth is meant to come from. The collagen side produced a dated item shortly after: on June 2, 2026 the Rousselot health brand announced a US patent covering Nextida GC, a collagen peptide composition aimed at blood glucose regulation. That is a small item against a company this size, and it is the kind of item that decides whether the food ingredients line grows at commodity rates or better.

One near-term decision is scheduled rather than speculative. The repurchase authorization, refreshed on June 21, 2024 at $500.0 million, runs to August 13, 2026 with roughly 460.3 million dollars unused, and no shares were bought under it in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025. With the fuel line recovering and the expiry weeks away, whether that capacity gets used, extended, or allowed to lapse is a direct statement about where management thinks the balance sheet should be pointed.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed May 8, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K, filed March 3, 2026 · company investor day materials furnished on Form 8-K, May 11, 2026 · company announcement, June 2, 2026

View the full interactive DAR report on boothcheck