Cintas Corporation (CTAS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $204.18, Cintas Corporation (CTAS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CTAS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCTAS
CompanyCintas Corporation
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$204.18/sh
CompositionUniform Rental and Facility Services 77% / First Aid and Safety Services 12% / Fire Protection Services 8% / Uniform Direct Sales 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)14.0%
Operating margin today23.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.0pp
Must persist for5.6y
Multiple paid33x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 27.6% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: high (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+2.39σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)90

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.18x4expensive
Earnings4.90x5expensive
Relative2.01x2expensive
Growth2.08x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$58.823.47xyesFCF base $1.9B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$110.871.84xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 29.8x / 31.8x / 33.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 28.05x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 42x), scenarios: 23.4x / 28.1x / 32.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 19.33x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$52.353.90xyesBV/sh $11.97, ROE (TTM) 40.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$122.171.67xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$97.942.08xyesRev $11.0B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.2x / 7.4x / 8.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$86.632.36xyesEPS $7.22, growth 11% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.73 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$21.449.52xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$82.982.46xyesBV $11.97 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 40.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$44.094.63xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.22 × BVPS $11.97) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.66B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$41.634.90xyesFCF $1793.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$38.185.35xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.67B (FCF $1.79B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$188.401.08xyesEPS $7.22 × (8.5 + 2×11.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.3121.93xyesBV $11.97 × (ROIC 7.0% / WACC 9.0%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $11.03B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$122.571.67xyesEPS $7.22 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 11.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 17.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$78.052.62xyesEPS $7.22 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Uniform Rental and Facility Servicesoperatingenterprise$8.0b$1.9b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
First Aid and Safety Servicesoperatingenterprise$1.2b$294.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.5b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.23x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.98x
Interest coverage24.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Look first at how the company pays for its own growth. Cintas runs a continental route network, buys garments, trucks and washing plants, and funds nearly all of it out of the cash the routes throw off. The latest quarterly filing states that "As of May 31, 2025, there was no commercial paper outstanding and no borrowings on our Existing Credit Agreement", against a revolving facility with capacity of $2.0 billion. Standard & Poor's carries the long-term debt at A- and Moody's at A3, both with stable outlooks. Operating profit covers interest about 24 times over. A business that expands at high single digits while leaving its committed credit untouched is not straining to grow.

The engine underneath is simpler than the four-segment descriptor suggests. The 10-K puts it in one line: "Approximately 95% of the Company's revenue is derived from fees for route servicing of Uniform Rental and Facility Services, First Aid and Safety Services and Fire Protection Services customers, performed by a Cintas employee-partner, at the customer's location of business". Someone shows up on a schedule, swaps clean garments for dirty ones, restocks a first aid cabinet, checks a fire extinguisher, and leaves an invoice. The value is not in any one of those tasks. It is in the density of the route: once a truck is already stopping at a building every week, the cost of adding the second and third service to that stop is close to nothing, and a competitor who wants the business has to build the whole route to win one customer on it.

Density of that kind requires customers, and the filing counts them: over one million businesses served, with "no individual customer accounting for greater than one percent of Cintas' total revenue". That is an unusual shape for a services company. There is no renewal cliff, no single contract whose loss shows up in a quarter, and no counterparty with the leverage to demand price concessions.

The cross-sell is showing up in the numbers rather than in management's ambitions for it. Uniform Rental and Facility Services was 77.1% of fiscal 2025 revenue against 77.8% the year before, while First Aid and Safety Services moved to 11.8% from 11.1%. Revenue outside the rental segment rose 10.9% to $2,364.1 million. Profitability inside each segment rose with the mix. Of the rental operation the 10-K reports that "Income before income taxes as a percent of revenue was 23.5% compared to 22.2% in fiscal 2024", and it reports the same measure for First Aid and Safety Services "at 24.2%, increased from 22.4% in fiscal 2024". The faster-growing segment is now the more profitable one, which is the opposite of what usually happens when a company buys its growth.

Set that against the cohort and the gap is stark. UNF grew revenue 1.4% on $2.5 billion and earns an operating margin of 5.8%. VSTS, spun out of ARMK as a pure-play uniform rental business, saw revenue fall 0.8% and posted a negative profit margin. ARMK earns an operating margin of 4.3% on $19.4 billion of revenue, and ABM earns 3.5% on $9.1 billion. Cintas earns a trailing operating margin of 23.2%. Same trucks, same garments, same labor market. The spread is what route density and scale actually purchase, and it has widened while the closest comparables have gone sideways.

Bear Case

Organic growth is the number to hold onto, because everything else is measured against it. For the nine months ended February 28, 2026, total organic revenue growth was 8.2%, and the rental segment, more than three quarters of the business, grew 7.5% organically. For a mature route business competing against companies whose revenue is flat or shrinking, that is a genuinely good result. It is also nowhere near what the price is asking for.

At today's price the market pays about 33 dollars of enterprise value for each dollar of operating profit. To make that arithmetic hold, operating income has to compound at close to 28% a year, the fastest pace the company's own returns on capital could finance, and stay there for roughly six years before decelerating. The company has never run at anything like that rate, and only about a quarter of comparable fast growers have sustained such a pace for that long. The multiple itself sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. This is not a valuation that leaves room for a normal year.

Which raises the question of what would compress the spread rather than the multiple. The 10-K's own risk language names the pressure points: "labor, regulations regarding the classification of employees and/or their eligibility for overtime wages, higher material costs for items such as fabrics and textiles, the inability to obtain insurance coverage at cost-effective rates, higher interest rates, inflation, new or expanded tariffs and other measures that could restrict international trade". Fuel is called out separately, with the filing noting that "The price of fuel and energy needed to run our vehicles and equipment is unpredictable and fluctuates based on events outside of our control". A 23.2% operating margin in a business of trucks, drivers, industrial laundries and imported textiles is not a natural resting state. It is the product of density, pricing discipline and scale, all three of which are continuously tested by input costs the company does not set.

The demand side has its own quiet sensitivity. Route revenue is billed per stop and per garment, so it tracks how many people the customer actually has working, not how many contracts are signed. Employment at those one million locations is the variable that moves the top line without anyone cancelling anything, and it is entirely outside the company's control. The multi-year contract structure that protects against churn does not protect against a customer with fewer people in uniform.

The last problem is that no standard method reaches this price. Not the asset-value lens, not the peer multiples, not the earnings-power methods that capitalize today's cash generation, and not even the forward-growth methods built to credit compounding. The cash-flow model that lands nearest only manages it by assuming the exit multiple applied six years out is precisely the one the market pays now, and even that assumption leaves it short. When the requirement is compounding at 28% for six years and the delivered pace is 8%, the gap does not close by the company doing slightly better. It closes by the multiple coming down.

Valuation

Start with what the price assumes, because here it is unusually specific. Enterprise value works out to roughly 33 dollars for every dollar of trailing operating profit. Inverted at a 9.1% cost of capital with a 4% terminal growth rate, that multiple resolves to one demand: operating income compounding at close to 28% a year, the ceiling its own returns on capital can finance, sustained for about six years. Each percentage point shaved off that growth rate adds roughly a year and a half to the time the price needs. The assumption is not fragile at the margin. It is fragile in both directions at once, on pace and on duration.

What the company delivers is a trailing operating margin of 23.2% on revenue near $11.0 billion, with organic growth in the high single digits. Those are excellent numbers for the business. They are not 28% numbers.

The methods agree with each other in an uncomfortable way. Every family lands under the price. The price runs about five times what the earnings-power methods reach, which capitalize what the company earns today and credit no growth at all. It sits about 3.3 times above the asset-value methods and about 2.4 times above the peer-multiple methods. Even the forward-growth family, the one designed to give compounding its due, reaches only about half the price. When the growth-oriented methods and the value-oriented methods both land short, the disagreement is no longer between frames. The price is simply outside all of them, and the entire distance is a bet on duration that no standard frame encodes.

Cohort position sharpens rather than softens that. UNF trades as the closest pure comparable and earns 5.8% operating margins on 1.4% revenue growth; ARMK earns 4.3% and ABM 3.5%. VSTS, the pure-play spinout, is losing money at the net line on shrinking revenue. Cintas earns roughly four times the operating margin of the best of them and grows faster besides, so a premium is warranted on any reading. The question the multiple raises is not whether the business deserves a premium. It is whether it deserves one priced at the top of its distribution and beyond the upper quartile of the whole cohort.

The balance sheet is the one place the price is not stretched. Operating profit covers interest about 24 times over, the company is not consuming cash, and both rating agencies hold it in the single-A band with stable outlooks. That removes the financing risk from the equation entirely. It does nothing to shorten the six years of high-rate compounding the price has already spent.

Catalysts

Fourth-quarter fiscal 2026 results landed on July 15, 2026 and came in ahead of expectations, enough for BofA to upgrade the stock to Buy on the print. Several other brokers raised targets in the days that followed, and management issued guidance for fiscal 2027 alongside the release. The reaction was uniformly constructive, which is worth noting mainly because it tells you the operating result was not the source of any recent debate about the stock.

The filed detail from earlier in the year shows where the growth is coming from. In the three months ended February 28, 2026, Uniform Rental and Facility Services revenue rose 7.7% to $2,177.5 million, with 7.3% of that organic, and the company attributed its gross margin improvement to "a favorable sales mix and strategic sourcing initiatives". Across the nine months, total organic revenue growth was 8.2%, with acquisitions adding 0.7% and currency 0.1%. That is a business compounding on its own operations rather than on deals, which matters for how durable the pace is.

The next quarterly report is the first read on whether fiscal 2027 tracks the guidance, and the specific line to watch is organic growth in the rental segment. Acquisitions and currency can flatter a headline number; the organic rate is where a change in customer employment levels or in pricing power would show up before it reached the margin.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Uniform Rental and Facility Services (reported)

First Aid and Safety Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

broker notes, July 2026 · broker notes and company earnings release, July 2026 · FY2026 third-quarter 10-Q

View the full interactive CTAS report on boothcheck