Cintas Corporation (CTAS): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $204.18, Cintas Corporation (CTAS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CTAS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CTAS |
| Company | Cintas Corporation |
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical |
| Current price | $204.18/sh |
| Composition | Uniform Rental and Facility Services 77% / First Aid and Safety Services 12% / Fire Protection Services 8% / Uniform Direct Sales 3% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 14.0% |
| Operating margin today | 23.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -9.0pp |
| Must persist for | 5.6y |
| Multiple paid | 33x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 27.6% self-funding ceiling.
How unusual the bet is: high (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +2.39σ |
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 90 |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.18x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.90x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.01x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 2.08x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $58.82 | 3.47x | yes | FCF base $1.9B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $110.87 | 1.84x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 29.8x / 31.8x / 33.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 28.05x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 42x), scenarios: 23.4x / 28.1x / 32.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 19.33x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $52.35 | 3.90x | yes | BV/sh $11.97, ROE (TTM) 40.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $122.17 | 1.67x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $97.94 | 2.08x | yes | Rev $11.0B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.2x / 7.4x / 8.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $86.63 | 2.36x | yes | EPS $7.22, growth 11% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.73 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $21.44 | 9.52x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $82.98 | 2.46x | yes | BV $11.97 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 40.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $44.09 | 4.63x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.22 × BVPS $11.97) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $2.66B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $41.63 | 4.90x | yes | FCF $1793.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $38.18 | 5.35x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.67B (FCF $1.79B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $188.40 | 1.08x | yes | EPS $7.22 × (8.5 + 2×11.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $9.31 | 21.93x | yes | BV $11.97 × (ROIC 7.0% / WACC 9.0%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $11.03B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $122.57 | 1.67x | yes | EPS $7.22 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 11.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 17.0x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $78.05 | 2.62x | yes | EPS $7.22 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uniform Rental and Facility Services | operating | enterprise | $8.0b | $1.9b operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| First Aid and Safety Services | operating | enterprise | $1.2b | $294.7m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.23x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.98x |
| Interest coverage | 24.2x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- About 95% of revenue arrives as route servicing fees, collected stop by stop at more than one million customer locations, with no single customer accounting for more than one percent of the total.
- The price capitalizes the business at roughly 33 dollars of enterprise value for every dollar of operating profit, a level that needs operating income to compound at close to the 28% pace its own returns on capital can fund, and to hold that for about six years, against organic growth running near 8% today.
- The rental operation, 77.1% of fiscal 2025 revenue, grew 7.3% organically in the three months ended February 28, 2026; the next quarterly print is where any change in that pace shows up first.
Bull Case
Look first at how the company pays for its own growth. Cintas runs a continental route network, buys garments, trucks and washing plants, and funds nearly all of it out of the cash the routes throw off. The latest quarterly filing states that "As of May 31, 2025, there was no commercial paper outstanding and no borrowings on our Existing Credit Agreement", against a revolving facility with capacity of $2.0 billion. Standard & Poor's carries the long-term debt at A- and Moody's at A3, both with stable outlooks. Operating profit covers interest about 24 times over. A business that expands at high single digits while leaving its committed credit untouched is not straining to grow.
The engine underneath is simpler than the four-segment descriptor suggests. The 10-K puts it in one line: "Approximately 95% of the Company's revenue is derived from fees for route servicing of Uniform Rental and Facility Services, First Aid and Safety Services and Fire Protection Services customers, performed by a Cintas employee-partner, at the customer's location of business". Someone shows up on a schedule, swaps clean garments for dirty ones, restocks a first aid cabinet, checks a fire extinguisher, and leaves an invoice. The value is not in any one of those tasks. It is in the density of the route: once a truck is already stopping at a building every week, the cost of adding the second and third service to that stop is close to nothing, and a competitor who wants the business has to build the whole route to win one customer on it.
Density of that kind requires customers, and the filing counts them: over one million businesses served, with "no individual customer accounting for greater than one percent of Cintas' total revenue". That is an unusual shape for a services company. There is no renewal cliff, no single contract whose loss shows up in a quarter, and no counterparty with the leverage to demand price concessions.
The cross-sell is showing up in the numbers rather than in management's ambitions for it. Uniform Rental and Facility Services was 77.1% of fiscal 2025 revenue against 77.8% the year before, while First Aid and Safety Services moved to 11.8% from 11.1%. Revenue outside the rental segment rose 10.9% to $2,364.1 million. Profitability inside each segment rose with the mix. Of the rental operation the 10-K reports that "Income before income taxes as a percent of revenue was 23.5% compared to 22.2% in fiscal 2024", and it reports the same measure for First Aid and Safety Services "at 24.2%, increased from 22.4% in fiscal 2024". The faster-growing segment is now the more profitable one, which is the opposite of what usually happens when a company buys its growth.
Set that against the cohort and the gap is stark. UNF grew revenue 1.4% on $2.5 billion and earns an operating margin of 5.8%. VSTS, spun out of ARMK as a pure-play uniform rental business, saw revenue fall 0.8% and posted a negative profit margin. ARMK earns an operating margin of 4.3% on $19.4 billion of revenue, and ABM earns 3.5% on $9.1 billion. Cintas earns a trailing operating margin of 23.2%. Same trucks, same garments, same labor market. The spread is what route density and scale actually purchase, and it has widened while the closest comparables have gone sideways.
Bear Case
Organic growth is the number to hold onto, because everything else is measured against it. For the nine months ended February 28, 2026, total organic revenue growth was 8.2%, and the rental segment, more than three quarters of the business, grew 7.5% organically. For a mature route business competing against companies whose revenue is flat or shrinking, that is a genuinely good result. It is also nowhere near what the price is asking for.
At today's price the market pays about 33 dollars of enterprise value for each dollar of operating profit. To make that arithmetic hold, operating income has to compound at close to 28% a year, the fastest pace the company's own returns on capital could finance, and stay there for roughly six years before decelerating. The company has never run at anything like that rate, and only about a quarter of comparable fast growers have sustained such a pace for that long. The multiple itself sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. This is not a valuation that leaves room for a normal year.
Which raises the question of what would compress the spread rather than the multiple. The 10-K's own risk language names the pressure points: "labor, regulations regarding the classification of employees and/or their eligibility for overtime wages, higher material costs for items such as fabrics and textiles, the inability to obtain insurance coverage at cost-effective rates, higher interest rates, inflation, new or expanded tariffs and other measures that could restrict international trade". Fuel is called out separately, with the filing noting that "The price of fuel and energy needed to run our vehicles and equipment is unpredictable and fluctuates based on events outside of our control". A 23.2% operating margin in a business of trucks, drivers, industrial laundries and imported textiles is not a natural resting state. It is the product of density, pricing discipline and scale, all three of which are continuously tested by input costs the company does not set.
The demand side has its own quiet sensitivity. Route revenue is billed per stop and per garment, so it tracks how many people the customer actually has working, not how many contracts are signed. Employment at those one million locations is the variable that moves the top line without anyone cancelling anything, and it is entirely outside the company's control. The multi-year contract structure that protects against churn does not protect against a customer with fewer people in uniform.
The last problem is that no standard method reaches this price. Not the asset-value lens, not the peer multiples, not the earnings-power methods that capitalize today's cash generation, and not even the forward-growth methods built to credit compounding. The cash-flow model that lands nearest only manages it by assuming the exit multiple applied six years out is precisely the one the market pays now, and even that assumption leaves it short. When the requirement is compounding at 28% for six years and the delivered pace is 8%, the gap does not close by the company doing slightly better. It closes by the multiple coming down.
Valuation
Start with what the price assumes, because here it is unusually specific. Enterprise value works out to roughly 33 dollars for every dollar of trailing operating profit. Inverted at a 9.1% cost of capital with a 4% terminal growth rate, that multiple resolves to one demand: operating income compounding at close to 28% a year, the ceiling its own returns on capital can finance, sustained for about six years. Each percentage point shaved off that growth rate adds roughly a year and a half to the time the price needs. The assumption is not fragile at the margin. It is fragile in both directions at once, on pace and on duration.
What the company delivers is a trailing operating margin of 23.2% on revenue near $11.0 billion, with organic growth in the high single digits. Those are excellent numbers for the business. They are not 28% numbers.
The methods agree with each other in an uncomfortable way. Every family lands under the price. The price runs about five times what the earnings-power methods reach, which capitalize what the company earns today and credit no growth at all. It sits about 3.3 times above the asset-value methods and about 2.4 times above the peer-multiple methods. Even the forward-growth family, the one designed to give compounding its due, reaches only about half the price. When the growth-oriented methods and the value-oriented methods both land short, the disagreement is no longer between frames. The price is simply outside all of them, and the entire distance is a bet on duration that no standard frame encodes.
Cohort position sharpens rather than softens that. UNF trades as the closest pure comparable and earns 5.8% operating margins on 1.4% revenue growth; ARMK earns 4.3% and ABM 3.5%. VSTS, the pure-play spinout, is losing money at the net line on shrinking revenue. Cintas earns roughly four times the operating margin of the best of them and grows faster besides, so a premium is warranted on any reading. The question the multiple raises is not whether the business deserves a premium. It is whether it deserves one priced at the top of its distribution and beyond the upper quartile of the whole cohort.
The balance sheet is the one place the price is not stretched. Operating profit covers interest about 24 times over, the company is not consuming cash, and both rating agencies hold it in the single-A band with stable outlooks. That removes the financing risk from the equation entirely. It does nothing to shorten the six years of high-rate compounding the price has already spent.
Catalysts
Fourth-quarter fiscal 2026 results landed on July 15, 2026 and came in ahead of expectations, enough for BofA to upgrade the stock to Buy on the print. Several other brokers raised targets in the days that followed, and management issued guidance for fiscal 2027 alongside the release. The reaction was uniformly constructive, which is worth noting mainly because it tells you the operating result was not the source of any recent debate about the stock.
The filed detail from earlier in the year shows where the growth is coming from. In the three months ended February 28, 2026, Uniform Rental and Facility Services revenue rose 7.7% to $2,177.5 million, with 7.3% of that organic, and the company attributed its gross margin improvement to "a favorable sales mix and strategic sourcing initiatives". Across the nine months, total organic revenue growth was 8.2%, with acquisitions adding 0.7% and currency 0.1%. That is a business compounding on its own operations rather than on deals, which matters for how durable the pace is.
The next quarterly report is the first read on whether fiscal 2027 tracks the guidance, and the specific line to watch is organic growth in the rental segment. Acquisitions and currency can flatter a headline number; the organic rate is where a change in customer employment levels or in pricing power would show up before it reached the margin.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Uniform Rental and Facility Services (reported)
- UNF (UNIFIRST CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …safety training, to a variety of manufacturers, retailers and service companies. We serve businesses of all sizes across multiple industries and sectors. We provide our products and services to over 300,000 customer locations in the U.S., Canada and Europe. U.S. GAAP establishes standards for reporting information…
- FY2025 10-K: …Solutions and Other. Refer to Item 1, " Business " and Note 15, " Segment Reporting " to our Consolidated Financial Statements for our disclosure of segment information. We have recast certain prior period segment results to conform with the current presentation. The Uniform & Facility Service Solutions segment…
- ARMK (Aramark)
- FY2025 10-K: …and distribution of our Aramark Uniform and Career Apparel ("Uniform") segment into an independent publicly traded company, Vestis Corporation ("Vestis"). The separation of our Uniform segment was structured as a tax free spin-off, which occurred by way of a pro rata distribution to Aramark stockholders. Each of the…
- FY2025 10-K: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS Details of "Income from Discontinued Operations, net of tax" are as follows (in thousands): Fiscal Year Ended September 29, 2023 Revenue $ 2,770,645 Costs and Expenses: Cost of services provided (exclusive of depreciation and amortization) 2,263,133 Depreciation and amortization 136,505 Selling…
- ABM (ABM INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED)
- FY2025 10-K: …support services to airlines and airports, including parking and transportation management, janitorial and maintenance services, passenger assistance, catering logistics, aircraft cabin maintenance, and transportation solutions. We typically provide services to clients in this segment under master services…
- FY2025 10-K: …or airplane cabins cleaned). Hourly In hourly arrangements, the client is billed a fixed hourly rate for each labor hour provided. Management Reimbursement Under these parking arrangements, we manage a parking facility for a management fee and pass through the revenue and expenses associated with the facility to the…
First Aid and Safety Services (reported)
- UNF (UNIFIRST CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …information systems, engineering, materials management, manufacturing planning, finance, budgeting, human resources, other general and administrative costs and interest expense. First Aid & Safety Solutions: We renamed our First Aid reporting segment as the First Aid & Safety Solutions reporting segment to better…
- FY2025 10-K: …segment consolidates the former U.S. and Canadian Rental and Cleaning, MFG and Corporate segments and includes our cleanroom solutions, which was previously part of the Specialty Garments reporting segment. The Uniform & Facility Service Solutions reporting segment designs, manufactures, purchases, rents, cleans,…
- VSTS (Vestis Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …sense of team and belonging among employees, project a professional image and enhance brand awareness. • Our uniforms are reusable and can be assigned to another employee (rather than being discarded) when employees transition to new opportunities. • We offer a variety of specialty garments that help customers: ◦…
- FY2025 10-K: …in the demand for our services and products not being specifically linked to the cyclical nature of any one sector. The vast majority of our customers are served under multi-year contracts. While customers are not required to make an up-front investment for their rental uniforms or other rented merchandise, a rental…
- ARMK (Aramark)
- FY2025 10-K: …hospitals and senior living), our clients provide us with a captive customer base through their on-site employees, students and patients. At sports, entertainment and recreational facilities, our clients attract patrons to their site, usually for specific events such as sporting events, concerts and conventions. We…
- FY2025 10-K: …under the SEC rules. These rules require supplemental explanation and reconciliation, which is provided elsewhere in this Annual Report. Overview We are a leading global provider of food and facilities services to education, healthcare, business & industry and sports, leisure & corrections clients. Our largest market…
- ABM (ABM INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED)
- FY2025 10-K: …support services to airlines and airports, including parking and transportation management, janitorial and maintenance services, passenger assistance, catering logistics, aircraft cabin maintenance, and transportation solutions. We typically provide services to clients in this segment under master services…
- FY2025 10-K: …abm:BusinessAndIndustryMember 2024-11-01 2025-10-31 0000771497 abm:FacilityServiceLineAviationServicesMember abm:ManufacturingAndDistributionMember 2024-11-01 2025-10-31 0000771497 abm:FacilityServiceLineAviationServicesMember abm:AviationMember 2024-11-01 2025-10-31 0000771497…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
broker notes, July 2026 · broker notes and company earnings release, July 2026 · FY2026 third-quarter 10-Q