CLEAN HARBORS, INC (CLH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $310.71, CLEAN HARBORS, INC (CLH) is priced for +21.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CLH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCLH
CompanyCLEAN HARBORS, INC
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$310.71/sh
CompositionTechnical Services 31% / Industrial Services and Other 22% / Field and Emergency Response Services 16% / Safety-Kleen Environmental Services 22% / Safety-Kleen Oil 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.9%
Operating margin today11.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.3pp
Implied growth21.9%
Multiple paid28x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.03σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)75

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.23x4expensive
Earnings6.75x5expensive
Relative5.80x2expensive
Growth1.39x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$83.003.74xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.0%, WACC 8.4%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$254.471.22xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.2x / 17.2x / 19.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 26.46x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 42x), scenarios: 22.4x / 26.5x / 30.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$80.913.84xyesBV/sh $52.52, ROE (TTM) 14.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$99.343.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$223.831.39xyesRev $6.1B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.7x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$88.563.51xyesEPS $7.38, growth 3% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=11.97 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$46.026.75xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.60B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$102.453.03xyesBV $52.52 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$93.393.33xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.38 × BVPS $52.52) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.13B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$37.928.19xyesFCF $466.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$30.8310.08xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.43B (FCF $0.47B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$95.473.25xyesEPS $7.38 × (8.5 + 2×3.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.5932.40xyesBV $52.52 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 8.4%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.06B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$38.398.09xyesEPS $7.38 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 3.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 5.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$79.783.89xyesEPS $7.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Environmental Servicesoperatingenterprise$5.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Safety-Kleen Sustainability Solutionsoperatingenterprise$884.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.58x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.43x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Sixteen consecutive quarters of year-over-year margin improvement is not a cycle. It is a business changing shape. The Environmental Services segment, which is roughly three-quarters of the company, extended that streak in the first quarter of 2026, and it did so in a quarter management described as weather-affected. Income from operations for the whole company rose 7% to $118.9 million on revenue of $1.46 billion, and net income reached $63.2 million, or $1.19 per diluted share, against $1.09 a year earlier. Nothing in that is dramatic. Steady is the point.

What makes steady possible is that the permits do the competing. The FY2025 annual report is unusually blunt about the mechanism, noting that "extensive environmental regulation applicable to our industry and operations is a barrier to rapid entry of competitors that benefits us". A commercial hazardous waste incinerator takes years of permitting and community process to build, which is why the company can also state that "we operate the largest network of such facilities in North America" and add that "In addition, we operate seven landfills, six of which are able to handle hazardous waste." Regulation is normally a cost line. Here it is the moat.

The customer side of the same law is what makes the revenue sticky. The annual report explains that under federal and state environmental law, "generators of hazardous waste remain liable and responsible for the proper disposal of such waste" even after they hand it to a contractor. A chemical plant cannot outsource the liability, only the handling, so it buys from the operator whose paperwork will survive an inspection twenty years from now. That is why price competition in this corner of waste behaves less like trucking and more like audit.

The growth lever right now is physical. The Kimball, Nebraska incinerator "commenced operations in late 2024 and is expected to be running at full capacity by the end of 2026", and network incineration utilisation ran at 80 percent in the first quarter. Incineration is a fixed-cost business with a high fixed cost base, so the distance between that level and a full plant drops almost entirely to profit. Alongside it, Technical Services revenue grew 5% on demand that management attributed partly to PFAS work, landfill volumes rose 34%, and Field Services grew 7%. PFAS is worth watching precisely because it creates waste streams that must be destroyed rather than stored, and destruction is what this network sells.

Capital allocation supports the thesis rather than fighting it. In May 2026 the company bought Terra Nova Solutions, a Carolinas operator with five permitted sites, for $225 million, expecting $45 million to $50 million of annual revenue and roughly $15 million of adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, which after anticipated synergies it put at a post-synergy multiple of 11.8 times. Buying permitted capacity at low double-digit multiples while the equity trades at roughly thirty times operating profit is arithmetic that works in the buyer's favour. The share count has also drifted down slightly over the past four years rather than up, so that arithmetic is not being handed back through issuance.

Bear Case

The competitive threat here does not come from a hazardous waste specialist. It comes from the two companies that already own North American waste logistics and are walking upstream into it. WM turns a 17.3% operating margin on $25.41 billion of revenue and grew 10.9%; RSG turns 17.4% on $19.13 billion. Clean Harbors, on trailing figures, earns about 10.6%. Those two competitors are not more efficient at burning solvents. They are structurally more profitable businesses with far larger balance sheets, and both have been building environmental-solutions arms aimed squarely at the industrial waste customer Clean Harbors serves. WCN's own annual report lists Clean Harbors by name among the competitors it faces. When companies earning seventeen cents on the revenue dollar decide to buy their way into a market where the incumbent earns ten, the incumbent's acquisition pipeline gets more expensive and its pricing gets tested.

The second exposure is that a tenth of revenue is a commodity business wearing a services label. Safety-Kleen Oil collects used oil and re-refines it into base oil, and the annual report is direct that "Factors such as geopolitical developments, supply and demand imbalances and macroeconomic shifts may contribute to heightened oil price volatility in global oil markets." The first quarter of 2026 shows the mechanism running the right way, with management crediting a late-quarter surge in base oil pricing for the segment's improvement. Spreads that widen on a price surge narrow on a price collapse, and the collection cost side does not move as fast as the sale price side.

Demand underneath the environmental business is more cyclical than the compliance framing suggests. The annual report notes that "General manufacturing customers account for more than thirty percent of the revenues for our Safety-Kleen Environmental revenues, with automotive customers making up less than twenty-five percent." Manufacturing volumes drive waste volumes. Management acknowledged in the same quarter that its Industrial Services business continues to operate in a challenged market, which is what an industrial slowdown looks like before it reaches the disposal network.

Now put the price on top of that. At $303.61 the market is paying roughly thirty times the company's operating profit, and working that backwards, the price embeds operating profit compounding at about 24.7% a year for five years. Clean Harbors has recently grown at close to that rate, so the requirement is not fantastical. It is also not common, since roughly a third of comparable fast-growers held that pace for five years. And every standard valuation frame lands below today's price. The methods that value the company on what it currently earns, capitalised with no growth, sit at roughly a sixth of the price. The book-value methods sit at roughly a third. Even the forward-growth and peer-multiple methods, the two most generous lenses available, land about 1.4 times under it. If the compounding assumption slips, there is no frame underneath to catch the price.

The balance sheet is not the problem, but it is not slack either. Net debt of about 2.88 billion dollars stands at roughly 4.55 times operating profit, or about 6.1 times the same figure after tax. That is manageable for a business with contracted, recurring waste volumes and a stated 2026 expectation of $840 million to $960 million in net cash from operating activities. It is less comfortable if the industrial slowdown deepens while the company keeps buying permitted assets with cash. And the liabilities do not go away when the assets do: the annual report carries "post-closure and remedial liabilities valued at $230.7 million, substantially all of which we assumed in connection with acquisitions", which is the long tail every acquirer in this industry inherits.

Valuation

Roughly thirty times operating profit is where this price starts, and the useful question is what has to be true for it to be reasonable. Inverted, the answer is company-wide operating profit compounding at about 24.7% a year for five years. That figure is close to what Clean Harbors has actually delivered in recent years, which is why it reads as demanding rather than implausible. History is less generous than the company's own record: of comparable fast-growers, only about 36% sustained that pace for five years.

That number is also more fragile than a single figure suggests, and in a specific way. Required growth moves roughly 8.2 percentage points for every one percentage point of change in the discount rate applied to it. A reader deciding whether 24.7% is a lot should hold that in mind: this is an answer sensitive enough to its own discount assumption that treating it as a measurement rather than an estimate would be a mistake.

Where the methods land is the harder fact. Every family sits below the price, which is unusual. Furthest away are the earnings-power methods, with the price sitting about 6.6 times where the earnings-power methods land, and that distance is the arithmetic of a zero-growth perpetuity on free cash flow rather than a judgement about the company. The price sits about 3.2 times where the asset-value methods land. The two most forgiving lenses, forward growth and peer multiples, still leave the price roughly 1.4 times above them, the forward-growth version getting closest because it holds the cash-flow multiple steady for five more years. The pattern is the point: nothing in the standard toolkit reaches this price. What is being paid for sits outside what those frames measure, which for this business means the permit position and the network that goes with it.

Two operational facts anchor the growth side of that argument in something filed rather than assumed. The Kimball incinerator "commenced operations in late 2024 and is expected to be running at full capacity by the end of 2026", and network incineration utilisation was 80% in the first quarter of 2026. Fixed-cost capacity filling up is the single most legible path from today's operating profit toward the growth the price assumes, and unlike a market-share argument it can be checked quarter by quarter.

Solvency sets the boundary underneath. Net debt is about 2.88 billion dollars against gross borrowings a little above that, which is roughly 4.55 times operating profit, or about 6.1 times after tax. Cash on the balance sheet is thin, but the company guides to $840 million to $960 million of net cash from operating activities for 2026 and to adjusted free cash flow of $490 million to $550 million, which is what actually services debt. Share count has edged down about 0.8% a year over the four years to March 2026, so the per-share arithmetic is working slightly for holders rather than against them. The debt is real but it is being carried by cash flow, not refinanced hope, and that distinction is what keeps a demanding growth requirement from also being a solvency question.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 came in ahead of the company's own expectations and, more importantly, changed the guidance. Revenue reached $1.46 billion against $1.43 billion a year earlier, income from operations rose 7% to $118.9 million, and net income was $63.2 million, or $1.19 per diluted share. Management raised the midpoint of full-year 2026 adjusted earnings guidance by $40 million and the midpoint of adjusted free cash flow guidance by $10 million, putting anticipated GAAP net income for the year in a range of $421 million to $472 million and anticipated net cash from operating activities in a range of $840 million to $960 million. Second-quarter adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, the company's own adjusted measure, were guided to grow 5% to 9% year over year.

Segment detail explains where the raise came from. Technical Services revenue grew 5% on disposal and recycling demand including PFAS-related work, Safety-Kleen Environmental Services grew 7% on pricing, Field Services grew 7% helped by a single emergency project worth roughly $10 million, and landfill volumes rose 34% on project activity. The Safety-Kleen Sustainability Solutions segment grew its adjusted earnings measure 17% with a 320-basis-point margin improvement, gathering 53 million gallons of waste oil in the quarter. The offsetting weakness was Industrial Services, which management described as operating in a challenged market.

On May 14, 2026 the company announced the all-cash acquisition of Terra Nova Solutions for 225 million dollars, funded from money already on hand. The Carolinas-based business operates five permitted sites with annual capacity to treat 35 million gallons of wastewater and more than 85 million gallons of solidification, and is expected to contribute $45 million to $50 million of annual revenue and approximately $15 million of adjusted earnings, with $4 million of anticipated synergies after the first full year giving an implied post-synergy multiple of 11.8 times. The two things to watch from here are whether Kimball reaches full utilisation on the stated end-of-2026 schedule and whether Industrial Services stops being the drag it has been.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Environmental Services (reported)

Safety-Kleen Sustainability Solutions (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Clean Harbors first-quarter 2026 results, 8-K filed May 6, 2026 · Clean Harbors press release, 8-K filed May 14, 2026

View the full interactive CLH report on boothcheck