CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC. (CELH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $30.74, CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC. (CELH) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~16.0 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-07.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CELH

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

Bullet Takeaways

• A company named after one drink now sells three, with the annual report describing a lineup that "primarily consists of energy drinks offered under the CELSIUS ® , Alani Nu ® and Rockstar ® brands", two of which arrived by acquisition rather than by building.
• The distribution that made the growth possible is also the concentration a holder carries, because the same annual report names the Pepsi partnership as "generating a substantial portion of our sales and accounts receivable", and 96% of revenue comes from North America alone.
• Operating margin ran 7.7% over the twelve months through March 2026, against 29.3% at MNST on far larger volumes, and the gap between those two figures is the whole question the price is waiting on.

Bull Case

Only one family of valuation method reaches this price. The forward-growth models land essentially on it. The asset-value family sits roughly four times below where the price trades, the earnings-power family about 2.8 times below, and even the peer-multiple family reads the price near 1.8 times its own central estimate. That spread is not a contradiction. It is a description of what a buyer is actually purchasing here, which is a portfolio that has been assembled but not yet run at the economics the category is capable of producing.

Start with what has already happened, because it is unusual. Revenue for the year ended December 2025 came to approximately $2,515.3 million, "an increase of $1,159.6 million or 85.5%, from $1,355.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024". Very few consumer businesses of this size nearly double in a single year, and this one did it by buying Alani Nu and Rockstar and folding both into a distribution system it already had.

That distribution system is the structural piece. The company built on an arrangement it originally established with Pepsi in August 2022, and the current version runs long: upfront payments received from prior distributors sit on the balance sheet as deferred revenue "being amortized over the approximate 17-year term of the agreement". A seventeen-year commitment from the largest beverage distribution network in the country is not a contract a challenger brand normally gets, and it is the reason shelf presence for three brands can be managed as one negotiation rather than three.

The margin case is not speculative, because the cohort already demonstrates it. MNST earns a 29.3% operating margin on $8.79B of revenue. KDP earns 20.8% on $16.94B. FIZZ, a fraction of the size, earns 19.5%. COCO earns 19.1% on $706.0M while growing 26.1%. Every mature operator in this category converts revenue to operating profit at two to four times the rate this company currently manages. The bull argument is not that Celsius invents an unprecedented margin. It is that it collects the ordinary one, once the acquisitions stop costing money to integrate and start contributing scale to a supply chain buying aluminium and freight for three brands instead of one. Management booked $737.0 million of goodwill on the Alani Nu purchase specifically for "anticipated revenue synergies, combined distribution capabilities and operational and administrative cost efficiencies", which is the same thesis stated in accounting language.

The balance sheet gives that thesis time to work. Liquid assets of 549.2 million dollars sit against borrowings of 676.2 million, leaving a net position barely above half a year of operating profit, and operating income covers the interest bill about 3.7 times over. The company is not burning cash. It repriced its term borrowing twice in under a year, most recently cutting the applicable rate by another 0.25% and repaying the prior loan in full with no prepayment penalty. Lenders do not offer better terms to businesses they are worried about.

Bear Case

Energy drinks are a category that expands until it does not, and the shelf is where that gets decided. The annual report is direct about it: "The increasing number of competitive products and limited availability of shelf and cooler space in retail outlets may limit our ability to maintain or expand our market presence." The list of who is competing for that cooler door includes "Monster Beverage Corporation, Red Bull GmbH, The Coca-Cola Company, Pepsi, Keurig Dr Pepper Inc., Nestlé S.A." among others. Several of those companies can lose money in this category for years without noticing.

Which makes the composition of recent growth the load-bearing question. Revenue nearly doubled last year, but the flagship brand itself is now going backwards: CELSIUS-brand revenue fell approximately 11.7% in the second quarter of 2026 against the same period a year earlier, which management attributed to increased trade and promotional investment, shipment timing, softness in the club channel, and its own SKU optimisation work. Growth that arrives by purchase and decline that arrives organically are not the same signal, and a buyer paying a growth price needs to be clear about which one is being extrapolated.

The price makes that extrapolation explicit. Today's quote values the business near 33 times the operating income it produced in the twelve months through March 2026, and sustaining that requires operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly twelve years. Of comparable fast-growers, only about 14% sustained a pace like that even a decade. The multiple sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. Three of the four reference checks behind that read had usable data and there is no read on the company's own history, so the conclusion is a directional one rather than a measured one, which makes it a weaker claim rather than a milder one.

Then there is the customer. The annual report describes the Pepsi partnership as central to distribution and commercialisation while "generating a substantial portion of our sales and accounts receivable", and separately notes that upfront payments received from Pepsi are "contractually restricted" and "designated solely to satisfy termination payments to certain former Alani Nu distributors". Concentration of this kind rarely fails loudly. It fails as a slow renegotiation of terms, on the day the distributor decides its own brands need that truck space more.

Integration is the third exposure, and the filing does not pretend otherwise: "the integration of Alani Nu and Rockstar requires the alignment of different brand cultures, marketing approaches and operational models. If we are unable to successfully differentiate our brands, preserve their individual strengths or integrate their operations and teams without disruption, our growth potential could be" impaired. Three brands in one portfolio can share a supply chain. They also compete for the same cooler door, the same promotional dollar, and in a good number of cases the same consumer.

Borrowings sharpen all of it. The company carries 676.2 million dollars of gross borrowings, and the 10-Q states that "A one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate would raise our annual interest expense by approximately $6.8 million, based on outstanding balances under the Term Loan Facility as of March 31, 2026." That is manageable against current operating profit. It is considerably less manageable in a year where promotional spending is rising, the flagship brand is contracting, and the growth the price requires has to come from somewhere.

Valuation

The market is paying about 33 times the operating income this business earned in the twelve months through March 2026. Run that backwards and it implies company-wide operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling of 25% for something like twelve years, computed at a 12.1% cost of capital. Each percentage point of growth shifts that horizon by a little over two years, so the exact figure matters less than its order of magnitude, which is long.

Two of the reference points make that horizon look demanding. The multiple sits at the very top of the peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. And of the comparable fast-growers on record, only about 14% held a pace like that for roughly a decade. A third reference, the company's own history, returns nothing usable, so this is a three-legged read rather than a four-legged one and should be weighted accordingly.

The methods split cleanly. Asset-based approaches land roughly four times under the price. Earnings-power approaches, which capitalise what the business currently earns without crediting growth, land about 2.8 times under it. The peer-multiple family lands near 1.8 times under. Only the forward-growth family arrives at the price, and it does so on assumptions worth naming: the perpetual-growth model runs 25% expansion off the free cash flow the business generates now, and the exit-multiple version holds today's EV/EBITDA unchanged to the far end of its projection. That is the shape of the bet. Every lens that reads the business as it currently stands reads the price as ahead of it, and the single lens that does reach the price gets there on the premise that present terms simply hold.

Here is the concrete version. The business converted 7.7% of revenue into operating profit over that twelve-month period, on 2.97 billion dollars of sales. MNST converts 29.3% on $8.79B, KDP 20.8% on $16.94B, COKE 13.3% on $7.49B. The margin ordinary operators in this category achieve is roughly three times what this one currently achieves, which is precisely why the growth methods can reach the price: they are crediting a convergence the trailing numbers have not yet shown. Whether that convergence arrives is the entire investment question, and no valuation method resolves it.

The balance sheet is not the constraint. Borrowings net of liquid assets amount to 0.56 times operating profit, and operating income covers the interest bill about 3.7 times over. The share count has grown about 2.6% a year since March 2022, which is dilution rather than return, though modest against what the acquisitions bought. What that solvency position does is buy time. What it cannot do is manufacture the margin the price is waiting for.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results landed on August 6, 2026 and split in two directions. Revenue reached approximately $817.9 million against $739.3 million a year earlier, growth of 10.6%, with Alani Nu contributing roughly $364.4 million and Rockstar Energy roughly $66.5 million. Gross margin, however, fell to 48.1% from 51.5%, which management attributed to higher promotional and incentive activity as a share of revenue and to channel mix. Selling, general and administrative spending was essentially flat in dollars at approximately $237.6 million, which on a larger revenue base moved it to 29.0% of sales from 32.2%.

The operational item worth tracking is the flagship. CELSIUS-brand revenue declined approximately 11.7% year over year in the quarter, and management framed the response as an optimisation project aimed at improving assortment productivity and returning that brand to growth. Alongside it, the company reported that its portfolio contributed about 30% of the zero-sugar U.S. energy category's $640 million of growth in the quarter, citing Circana data through June 28, 2026. Those two facts point opposite ways, and reconciling them is what the next several prints are for.

Capital allocation moved as well. The company repurchased approximately $100.4 million of its own shares during the quarter. Separately, on July 15, 2026 it entered a second refinancing amendment to its credit agreement, repaying the existing term loan in full with proceeds from a new $694.75 million term loan carrying a rate 0.25% lower, with a further 0.25% reduction available should the company achieve certain corporate credit ratings. A ratings-linked step-down is a small item on its own; it is also a stated intention to obtain a rating, which would be new.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Celsius Holdings (consolidated) (reported)

• MNST (Monster Beverage Corp)
• FY2025 10-K: …a definitive agreement to acquire GHOST Lifestyle LLC and GHOST Beverages LLC. In addition, Celsius Holdings, Inc. ("CELSIUS") acquired Alani Nutrition LLC ("Alani Nu"). We also compete with companies that are smaller or primarily local in operation. Our products also compete with private-label brands such as those…
• FY2025 10-K: …Bull GmbH, KDP, Molson Coors, Constellation Brands, AB InBev, The Boston Beer Company and The Mark Anthony Group. We also compete with companies that are smaller or primarily national or local in operations, such as CELSIUS, PRIME, C4, Alani Nu, GHOST, ZOA, GORGIE, and others as well as local craft breweries in our…
• COCO (The Vita Coco Company, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: London, with the Singapore and London facilities primarily supporting our International segment and global supply chain. W e believe that these office spaces will be adequate to support our operating needs in the short to mid-term and that we will be able to obtain additional or substitute space, as needed, on…
• FY2025 10-K: …our costs and created significant uncertainty, and could continue to materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows ." for more information. Credit Risk We are exposed to concentration of credit risk from our major customers. As of December 31, 2025, sales to…
• KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …subsidiaries included in the consolidated financial statements. Definitions of terms used in this Annual Report on Form 10-K are included within the Master Glossary. This Annual Report on Form 10-K refers to some of our owned or licensed trademarks, trade names, and service marks, which are referred to as our brands.…
• FY2025 10-K: …omitted because they are not required or applicable, or the required information is included in the Consolidated Financial Statements or related notes. EXHIBITS See Exhibit Index. 113 Table of Contents EXHIBIT INDEX Incorporated by Reference No. Exhibit Description Form Date of Filing Exhibit Number Footnote 2.1…
• FIZZ (National Beverage Corp.)
• FY2025 10-K: …and are reported elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements. Other segment items include other selling and general administrative costs (primarily consisting of compensation-related and other overhead costs), other income (expense), net which includes interest income and interest expense, and provision for…
• FY2025 10-K: …one year. The Company enters into various agreements with suppliers for the purchase of raw materials, the terms of which may include variable or fixed pricing and minimum purchase quantities. At May 3, 2025, the Company had purchase commitments for raw materials of $ 9.2 million through 2026. At May 3, 2025, the…
• PRMB (Primo Brands Corp)
• FY2025 10-K: …which mature on October 31, 2028. Interest is payable semi-annually on April 30 and October 31 of each year. • $ 3.5 million of Original 4.375 % Senior Notes which mature on April 30, 2029. Interest is payable semi-annually on April 30 and October 31 of each year. Debt Covenants The Term Loans contain customary…
• FY2025 10-K: 023, the Company recorded expenses associated with management fees and associated costs under the Former Management Agreements totaling nil , $ 53.4 million and $ 17.8 million respectively which were included in Selling, general and administrative expenses in the Consolidated Statements of Operations. For the years…
• COKE (COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …stores, club stores, convenience stores and drug stores, selling to on-premise locations, where products are typically consumed immediately, such as restaurants, schools, amusement parks and recreational facilities, and selling through other channels such as vending machine outlets. The Company manages its business…
• FY2025 10-K: & Services Company LLC, made as of November 18, 2019, by and between Coca‑Cola Bottlers' Sales & Services Company LLC and Consolidated Beverage Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. Exhibit 10.40 to the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 29, 2019 (File No. 0‑9286). 10.37…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.