CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC. (CELH): what the price requires
At today's price, CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC. (CELH) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~10.8 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CELH
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CELH |
| Company | CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC. |
| Current price | $29.00/sh |
| Composition | North America 96% / Europe 3% / Asia-Pacific 1% / Other 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 6.4% |
| Operating margin today | 9.9% |
| Margin compression implied | -3.5pp |
| Must persist for | 10.8y |
| Multiple paid | 30x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 5, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 69 peers) | 78 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 14% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 4.01x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.79x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.80x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.24x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $29.53 | 0.98x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $21.67 | 1.34x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 26.0x / 29.0x / 32.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $20.52 | 1.41x | yes | P/E 28.41x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 43x), scenarios: 22.7x / 28.4x / 34.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18.51x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $7.23 | 4.01x | yes | BV/sh $4.81, ROE (TTM) 13.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $8.77 | 3.31x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $23.31 | 1.24x | yes | Rev $3.0B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.0x / 2.5x / 3.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $15.05 | 1.93x | yes | EPS $0.43, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.24 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $2.85 | 10.18x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−20%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $9.06 | 3.20x | yes | BV $4.81 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $6.83 | 4.25x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.43 × BVPS $4.81) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $13.71 | 2.12x | yes | EBITDA $0.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $11.67 | 2.49x | yes | FCF $292.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $10.39 | 2.79x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.26B (FCF $0.29B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $13.87 | 2.09x | yes | EPS $0.43 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $4.50 | 6.44x | yes | BV $4.81 × (ROIC 8.0% / WACC 8.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $22.86 | 1.27x | yes | Revenue $2.97B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $16.13 | 1.80x | yes | EPS $0.43 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.65 | 6.24x | yes | EPS $0.43 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $127.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.62x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.50x |
| Interest coverage | 5.3x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
At $30.80 the price pays about 32x company-wide operating income, which the model reads as a bet that operating growth holds near its self-funding ceiling for roughly 12 years. Only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have sustained that pace for even a decade, so the priced-in assumption reads as elevated.
Only the forward-growth methods reach the price (perpetual-growth DCF near $37, discounted-future-market-cap near $31). The asset and earnings-power methods sit far below, partly because trailing operating margin of 7.7% is depressed by acquisition and integration costs even as adjusted EBITDA margin runs near 25%.
The growth is real and acquisition-fueled: Q1 2026 revenue jumped 138% to $782.6 million as Alani Nu and Rockstar were folded in, lifting the U.S. energy-drink share to 20.9%. The question is not whether Celsius is growing; it is whether a 12-year runway and a margin recovery are already fully paid for at this price.
Bull Case
Take the biggest worry head on first: at 32x operating income with a priced-in runway of roughly 12 years, the obvious objection is that this is a fad brand riding a sugar-free wave that will crest. The data argues the other way. Celsius is no longer a single-brand bet. In Q1 2026 its total energy portfolio reached a 20.9% share of U.S. tracked energy drinks, up a full 1,000 basis points from its standalone share a year earlier, and Alani Nu became the number-four energy brand in the country with 70% of its consumers women aged 18 to 44, a demographic the legacy energy category never reached. A company that has captured a fifth of a large, growing category and opened a new consumer segment is not a fad; it is a structural share-taker, and that is what a long runway requires.
The distribution moat is the second leg and it is contractual. Celsius rides the PepsiCo system in the U.S. and Suntory in Europe, building on what the 10-K calls 'the long-term distribution agreement we originally established with Pepsi in August 2022,' expanded on the closing of the Pepsi transactions (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001341766-26-000024). The filing positions the portfolio as 'premium lifestyle beverages designed to fuel active and wellness-oriented consumers,' and the Alani Nu transition into the PepsiCo system is exactly why the brand posted record sales of roughly $368.1 million in the quarter as orders from the largest distributor stepped up. Access to Pepsi's cooler space and route network is a durable advantage a startup brand cannot replicate, and it is the mechanism that turns share gains into shelf permanence.
The third leg is that the reported margin understates the earning power. Trailing operating margin of 7.7% is weighed down by acquisition and integration costs, but adjusted EBITDA margin rose to 25.0% from 21.2% year over year, and the Alani Nu integration is complete with roughly $50 million of annual synergies captured. Net income reached $110.1 million in the quarter and adjusted EPS doubled to $0.41 from $0.18. As one-time deal costs roll off and synergies annualize, GAAP margins should converge toward the adjusted level, which means the static valuation methods that look low today are reading a temporarily depressed earnings base. The balance sheet supports the strategy: net debt is only about 0.6x operating income, so this is a profitable, cash-generative growth company, not a leveraged roll-up. For a buyer who believes the 20.9% U.S. share is a waypoint rather than a ceiling, and that international is the next leg, the elevated multiple is paying for a category leader still early in its expansion.
Bear Case
The structural fragility in this story is concentration, and it runs through a single counterparty. Celsius does not control its own route to market; it depends on PepsiCo, and the 10-K is explicit that its entire U.S. growth machine is built on the Pepsi distribution agreement. That is a moat while the relationship is good and a chokepoint if it sours. Pepsi owns a stake and the shelf, which means pricing, promotional support, and cooler placement are negotiated from a position where the partner has leverage. A distribution relationship that delivers 96% of revenue through North America (per the segment mix) is a concentration that no amount of brand strength fully offsets, because the brand reaches consumers only through that pipe.
The second problem is the gap between the headline growth and what is organic. Q1 2026 revenue rose 138%, but a large part of that came from acquiring Alani Nu and Rockstar, not from the legacy Celsius brand growing 138%. Acquisition-driven growth flatters the comparison and resets the bar: once Alani Nu and Rockstar are in the base, the year-ahead comparisons get much harder, and the market is paying 32x for a 12-year runway as if the acquired growth were repeatable organically. When the integration tailwind fades, the question becomes how fast the combined portfolio grows on its own, and that number is almost certainly far below the headline.
The third risk is that nearly every valuation frame except forward growth says the price is stretched. Earnings Power Value lands near $4, the excess-return and residual-income methods near $7 to $9, the Graham Number near $7, and even the Peter Lynch and PEG reads near $15 to $16, all well below the $30.80 (July 3, 2026) quote. The bull answer is that margins are temporarily depressed, which is fair, but it requires the adjusted-EBITDA margin to hold while competition intensifies. Energy drinks is a brutal category: Monster and Red Bull defend aggressively, private label is encroaching, and consumer loyalty in functional beverages is shallower than the brand narrative suggests. At a price built on a decade-plus of ceiling-rate compounding, any combination of decelerating organic growth, a Pepsi renegotiation, or margin pressure from competitive promotion would pull the price toward the static methods, which sit at roughly half today's level or less.
Valuation
Celsius shows the classic growth-name X-ray: forward-growth methods reach the price and everything else sits well below. The perpetual-growth DCF lands near $37 and the discounted-future-market-cap method near $31, both at or above the $30.80 quote, while the asset and earnings-power frames are far lower: Earnings Power Value near $4, excess-return methods near $7 to $9, the Graham Number near $7. The peer-multiple methods land in between, near $15 to $23. The methods disagree by nearly an order of magnitude; that dispersion, not any single blend, is the finding. Two things distort the static methods downward and deserve naming: trailing operating margin of 7.7% is depressed by acquisition and integration costs against an adjusted EBITDA margin of 25%, and the trailing earnings base predates the full Alani Nu and Rockstar contribution.
Inverting the price, the market is paying about 32x company-wide operating income, which solves to operating growth held near the 25% self-funding ceiling for roughly 12 years, computed at a 12% cost of capital, with each point of cost of capital shortening the tolerable horizon by about 2 years. The historical base rate is the warning: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers sustained this pace for a decade, which is why the priced-in assumption reads as elevated. The valuation case splits cleanly. If you believe the adjusted margin is the real earning power and that 20.9% U.S. share plus international expansion supports years more of growth, the static methods are mispricing a temporarily-depressed base and the price is defensible. If you believe the headline growth is acquisition-flattered and the organic runway is shorter, then the static methods, most of them sitting in the teens or below, are the gravity.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report was the dominant recent catalyst. Revenue jumped 138% to a record $782.6 million, net income reached $110.1 million, adjusted EPS doubled to $0.41 from $0.18, and adjusted EBITDA margin expanded to 25.0% from 21.2%. Alani Nu posted record sales of roughly $368.1 million as it moved into the PepsiCo distribution system, the total portfolio hit 20.9% U.S. energy-drink share (up 1,000 basis points year over year), and management reported the Alani Nu integration complete with about $50 million of annual synergies captured. The next several quarters are the key test of organic growth: with the acquisitions now in the base, the market will watch how fast the combined portfolio grows without the integration tailwind and whether the adjusted margin holds as one-time deal costs roll off.
The forward watch items center on distribution and competition. The expanded PepsiCo partnership in the U.S. and Suntory in Europe are the international growth levers, so European and Asia-Pacific traction (currently a small share of revenue) is the upside catalyst, while any change in the Pepsi relationship is the single largest risk to monitor. On the competitive side, Monster and Red Bull defense, private-label encroachment, and any slowdown in the functional-beverage category would each pressure share and pricing. For a stock priced for a decade-plus of compounding, the catalysts that matter are sustained organic share gains, margin convergence toward the adjusted level, and evidence the international expansion can repeat the U.S. playbook.
Sources: Celsius Q1 2026 revenue jumps 138% to $783M (StockTitan), Celsius record Q1 2026 and Alani Nu/Rockstar acquisitions (Minichart), how investors are reacting to Celsius Q1 results (Simply Wall St), Celsius FY2025 10-K.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Celsius Holdings (consolidated) (reported)
- MNST (Monster Beverage Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …a definitive agreement to acquire GHOST Lifestyle LLC and GHOST Beverages LLC. In addition, Celsius Holdings, Inc. ("CELSIUS") acquired Alani Nutrition LLC ("Alani Nu"). We also compete with companies that are smaller or primarily local in operation. Our products also compete with private-label brands such as those…
- FY2025 10-K: …Bull GmbH, KDP, Molson Coors, Constellation Brands, AB InBev, The Boston Beer Company and The Mark Anthony Group. We also compete with companies that are smaller or primarily national or local in operations, such as CELSIUS, PRIME, C4, Alani Nu, GHOST, ZOA, GORGIE, and others as well as local craft breweries in our…
- COCO (The Vita Coco Company, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: London, with the Singapore and London facilities primarily supporting our International segment and global supply chain. W e believe that these office spaces will be adequate to support our operating needs in the short to mid-term and that we will be able to obtain additional or substitute space, as needed, on…
- FY2025 10-K: …our costs and created significant uncertainty, and could continue to materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows ." for more information. Credit Risk We are exposed to concentration of credit risk from our major customers. As of December 31, 2025, sales to…
- KDP (Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …subsidiaries included in the consolidated financial statements. Definitions of terms used in this Annual Report on Form 10-K are included within the Master Glossary. This Annual Report on Form 10-K refers to some of our owned or licensed trademarks, trade names, and service marks, which are referred to as our brands.…
- FY2025 10-K: …omitted because they are not required or applicable, or the required information is included in the Consolidated Financial Statements or related notes. EXHIBITS See Exhibit Index. 113 Table of Contents EXHIBIT INDEX Incorporated by Reference No. Exhibit Description Form Date of Filing Exhibit Number Footnote 2.1…
- FIZZ (National Beverage Corp.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and are reported elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements. Other segment items include other selling and general administrative costs (primarily consisting of compensation-related and other overhead costs), other income (expense), net which includes interest income and interest expense, and provision for…
- FY2025 10-K: …one year. The Company enters into various agreements with suppliers for the purchase of raw materials, the terms of which may include variable or fixed pricing and minimum purchase quantities. At May 3, 2025, the Company had purchase commitments for raw materials of $ 9.2 million through 2026. At May 3, 2025, the…
- PRMB (Primo Brands Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …which mature on October 31, 2028. Interest is payable semi-annually on April 30 and October 31 of each year. • $ 3.5 million of Original 4.375 % Senior Notes which mature on April 30, 2029. Interest is payable semi-annually on April 30 and October 31 of each year. Debt Covenants The Term Loans contain customary…
- FY2025 10-K: 023, the Company recorded expenses associated with management fees and associated costs under the Former Management Agreements totaling nil , $ 53.4 million and $ 17.8 million respectively which were included in Selling, general and administrative expenses in the Consolidated Statements of Operations. For the years…
- COKE (COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …stores, club stores, convenience stores and drug stores, selling to on-premise locations, where products are typically consumed immediately, such as restaurants, schools, amusement parks and recreational facilities, and selling through other channels such as vending machine outlets. The Company manages its business…
- FY2025 10-K: & Services Company LLC, made as of November 18, 2019, by and between Coca‑Cola Bottlers' Sales & Services Company LLC and Consolidated Beverage Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. Exhibit 10.40 to the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 29, 2019 (File No. 0‑9286). 10.37…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.