CBRE GROUP, INC. (CBRE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $150.82, CBRE GROUP, INC. (CBRE) is priced for +24.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CBRE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCBRE
CompanyCBRE GROUP, INC.
Sector / IndustryReal Estate
Current price$150.82/sh
CompositionFacilities management 51% / Property management 6% / Project management 19% / Advisory leasing 11% / Advisory sales 5% / Valuation 2% / Other portfolio services 1% / Commercial mortgage origination (Topic 606) 1% / Loan servicing (Topic 606) 0% / Investment management 1% / Development services (Topic 606) 1% / Commercial mortgage origination (Out of Scope of Topic 606) 1% / Loan servicing (Out of Scope of Topic 606) 1% / Development services (Out of Scope of Topic 606) 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.8%
Operating margin today4.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.7pp
Implied growth24.1%
Multiple paid26x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.49σ
cohort percentile (of 72 peers)46

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.40x4expensive
Earnings2.14x3expensive
Relative1.69x3expensive
Growth0.93x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$88.601.70xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 15% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$198.220.76xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 17.4x / 19.4x / 21.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 28.9x / 35.0x / 41.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$48.573.11xyesBV/sh $29.00, ROE (TTM) 15.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$62.082.43xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$162.980.93xyesRev $43.6B, growth 15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$81.541.85xyesFFO/share $6.51, growth 13% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median), PEG=2.68 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$22.846.60xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.57B × (1−22%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$63.422.38xyesBV $29.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$65.182.31xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $6.51 × BVPS $29.00) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.72B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$3.8738.97xyesFCF $938.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.0115082.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.77B (FCF $0.94B − SBC $0.16B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$183.050.82xyesFFO/share $6.51 × (8.5 + 2×12.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.8026.00xyesBV $29.00 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 8.2%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $43.64B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$122.311.23xyesFFO/share $6.51 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.5% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median)) → PE 18.8x
Earnings YieldEarnings$70.382.14xyesFFO/share $6.51 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$89.101.69xyesFFO/share $6.51 × 13.7x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=79); FFO $1.89B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 290M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Advisory Servicesoperatingenterprise$8.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Building Operations & Experienceoperatingenterprise$23.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Project Managementoperatingenterprise$7.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Real Estate Investmentsoperatingenterprise$879.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$6.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.40x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.45x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.8%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Revenue rose 19% in the first quarter of 2026 and net income nearly doubled. Those two numbers do not usually travel together, and the gap between them is the whole bull case. Consolidated net income came to $318 million on revenue of $10.5 billion, against $163 million on $8.9 billion in the same quarter of 2025, per the FY2026 10-Q. On a business converting roughly four cents of every revenue dollar into operating profit, a revenue increase that outruns cost growth does not add to earnings. It multiplies them.

The mix behind that growth is the part worth understanding. The company built a Building Operations & Experience segment in 2025, stating in its FY2025 10-K that it was established to unify our building operations, workplace experience and property management capabilities across all property types. In the March quarter that segment grew revenue 20.4%, with the 10-Q attributing it to double-digit increases in facilities management, critical infrastructure and property management. Running someone else's buildings is contract revenue. It arrives whether or not anyone is buying or leasing space that quarter, which is a very different animal from a brokerage commission.

The quieter compounder inside the company is loan servicing. The 10-K notes that in the last seven years, we have organically grown our loan servicing revenue at a low-double digit compound annual growth rate, and it says organically, meaning without buying it. A servicing book is an annuity: the fee arrives every month for the life of the loan, the balance turns over slowly, and the cost to service the next loan is lower than the last one.

Cash conversion has followed. Operating activities produced $1,559 million of cash during 2025 per the 10-K, and management reported free cash flow of nearly $1.7 billion on a trailing twelve-month basis alongside first-quarter results. Some of that has gone into the share count, which has fallen about 3.1% a year over the last four years. Buying back stock in a services business is not empire-building; it is the cheapest acquisition available when the alternative is paying up for another regional brokerage.

Against the cohort, the growth is real rather than borrowed. NMRK grew 21.6% over its trailing year and JLL 11.2%, while CWK managed 10.4%; CBRE's 19% first-quarter pace sits at the top of that range, and it came with net income more than doubling rather than with margin sacrifice. In an industry where everyone earns roughly the same thin margin, the operator adding revenue fastest is compounding the fastest, and scale in facilities management is genuinely self-reinforcing: the more buildings you already run, the cheaper the next portfolio is to absorb.

Bear Case

JLL, Cushman & Wakefield and Newmark are pursuing exactly the same mandates, with exactly the same pitch, and the numbers show how little separates them. JLL earns a 4.42% operating margin on $26.76 billion of revenue; CWK earns 4.42% on $10.54 billion; NMRK earns 8.01% on $3.48 billion while growing 21.6%. CBRE earns 4.2%. When four firms competing for the same business all land within a couple of points of each other, that is not a coincidence and it is not a moat. It is a commodity service industry where the product walks out of the building every evening. The FY2025 10-K concedes the shape of it, warning of global competitors across all of our business lines and the geographies that we serve and that further industry consolidation, fragmentation or innovation could lead to significant future competition.

The demand side is not under the company's control either. The filing states plainly that the revenues in all of our businesses are dependent to some extent on the overall volume of activity (and pricing) in the commercial real estate market, and that the capital markets, development and loan servicing lines are sensitive to credit cost and availability as well as financial liquidity. It also names the specific way clients cut: client actions to restrain project spending and reduce outsourced staffing levels. Facilities contracts look durable until a tenant decides to run half as many square feet.

Which brings the price into it. At roughly 30 times operating income, the market is asking for company-wide operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for about 5.7 years. That is not an impossible rate; the company has recently delivered comparable growth. The stretch is the duration. Of comparable fast-growers, only about 27% sustained that pace across a similar stretch, and the priced-in assumption reads as elevated against what the fundamentals comfortably support. The thin margin is what makes the arithmetic unforgiving in reverse: if revenue growth stalls at a 4.2% operating margin, operating profit does not flatten, it falls, because the cost base does not shrink as fast as a transactional revenue line does.

The balance sheet carries real weight for a services firm. On a funded-debt basis net debt runs about 4 times operating profit, roughly 6.5 billion dollars against 8.2 billion dollars of gross borrowings. Count the operating lease obligations that come with occupying offices in hundreds of markets and the net obligation is closer to 8.9 billion dollars. In April the company priced 750 million dollars of 5.250% senior notes due 2036, using about 737 million dollars of proceeds to repay commercial paper. Terming out short-term borrowing is prudent housekeeping. It also fixes a higher cost for a decade.

The floor under the downside is thin but real. The company holds about 864 million dollars of equity stakes outside the operating businesses, roughly 2% of the equity market value. That is the boundary if the operating thesis impairs, and it is worth naming precisely because it is small: at this price, essentially all the value being bought is the forward earnings of a cyclical services business, with almost nothing sitting behind it on the balance sheet.

Valuation

A services business converting 4.2% of revenue into operating profit is priced on volume, not on profitability, and that framing explains almost everything about where the methods land. Today's price works out to about 30 times operating income, which implies company-wide operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 5.7 years. Treat the number as directional; it comes from one solve under fixed assumptions. What it says is that the market is extrapolating the current expansion for most of a decade, and only about 27% of comparable fast-growers have carried a pace like that across a comparable stretch.

The methods split along a line that makes sense for the business model. The price sits roughly 129% above where the asset-value approaches come out and about 103% above the earnings-power lens that capitalizes current profit with no growth credited. Book value per share is $28.69, which for a company whose productive assets are client contracts, a servicing book and about a hundred thousand employees tells you very little; a balance sheet cannot hold the value of a facilities management relationship. The peer-multiple approaches land essentially level with the quote, and the forward cash flow approaches land above it. So the price is defended by the lenses that credit continued growth and unsupported by the lenses that do not, which is the ordinary signature of a growth-priced compounder rather than a mispricing in either direction.

The concrete version of what has to be true sits in the margin. Operating margin runs 4.2%, and this is not a company-specific shortfall: JLL is at 4.42% and CWK at 4.42% on their own reported figures. Margin expansion is therefore not the lever the price is betting on. Volume is. Annual revenue of roughly 42.2 billion dollars has to keep compounding, and the first quarter delivered exactly that, with revenue of $10.5 billion against $8.9 billion. The question the report cannot settle is whether a transaction-sensitive business sustains that pace for that long, because the answer depends on credit conditions the filing itself says the company does not control.

Leverage bounds it. Net debt runs about 4 times operating profit on the funded-borrowing build, and closer to a fifth more than that once the operating leases behind hundreds of offices are counted; either way the company is not over-borrowed, but it is not cash-rich either. Free cash flow of nearly $1.7 billion on a trailing basis and a share count falling about 3.1% a year say the cash is real and is being returned. Outside the operating businesses sit about 864 million dollars of equity stakes, close to 2% of the market value, which is the only part of this price that does not depend on next year's transaction volume.

Catalysts

The July print lands first. Second-quarter results are scheduled for release around 6:55 a.m. Eastern on July 29, 2026. It follows a first quarter that beat hard: revenue of $10.53 billion, up 19% year over year, GAAP earnings per share of $1.07 against roughly half that a year earlier, and a raised full-year 2026 outlook for the company's own core earnings measure of $7.60 to $7.80 a share. Because that core measure excludes items the reported figure carries, the two are not interchangeable and the guidance range should be read on its own basis.

Two commercial developments are worth tracking because they extend the business into revenue that does not depend on leasing volume. In April the company launched a LevelUp training program with Meta to build a pipeline of fiber technicians for U.S. data center construction, and in June it unified its Asia-Pacific flexible-workspace portfolio under the Industrious brand, reporting global expansion of 58% since acquiring the business in 2025. Data center construction labor and flexible workspace are both structurally growing categories, and both attach to the project management and building operations lines rather than to brokerage.

Capital deployment has stayed active on both sides of the balance sheet. The company priced 750 million dollars of 5.250% senior notes due 2036 in April, applying roughly 737 million dollars to repay commercial paper. On the investment side, its Accelerate infrastructure vehicle passed $1.25 billion in equity commitments across more than 400 sites in May, and in July the firm arranged over $150 million of commercial property-assessed clean energy financing for amphitheater projects in Oklahoma and Texas. None of these individually moves a $41.4 billion company. Together they show where management is choosing to add capacity.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Advisory Services (reported)

Building Operations & Experience (reported)

Project Management (reported)

Real Estate Investments (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, June 29, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, April 23, 2026 · company announcement, April 27, 2026 · company announcements, April 20 and June 16, 2026 · company announcements, May 7 and July 9, 2026

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