Citigroup Inc (C): what the price requires
At today's price, Citigroup Inc (C) is priced for 12.6% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/C
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | C |
| Company | Citigroup Inc |
| Current price | $140.07/sh |
| Composition | Services 26% / Markets 27% / Banking 10% / Wealth 11% / U.S. Personal Banking 26% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Elite ROE must persist for | 25.1y before normalizing (held at the 12.4% elite tier) |
| Perpetuity-equivalent ROE | 12.6% |
| Return on equity now | 6.9% |
| ROE gap | +5.7pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.27x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.7% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 12.4% ROE ceiling.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~10.7%; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +2.32σ |
| cohort percentile (of 119 peers) | 40 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 68% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple value, while asset-based lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.69x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.24x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.19x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.33x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $46.90 | 2.99x | yes | TBVPS $101.42 × 0.46x (ROE (TTM) 6.7% / CoE 9.3%, g=4.4% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 2.63% allowance/loans → ×0.92) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $100.63 | 1.39x | yes | P/E 12.47x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 18x), scenarios: 10.5x / 12.5x / 14.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $83.03 | 1.69x | yes | BV/sh $113.98, ROE (TTM) 6.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $70.06 | 2.00x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $104.93 | 1.33x | yes | Rev $85.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.1x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $117.35 | 1.19x | yes | EPS $6.99, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.09 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $133.89 | 1.05x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.99 × BVPS $113.98) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $225.54 | 0.62x | yes | EPS $6.99 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $176.03 | 0.80x | yes | EPS $6.99 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $75.57 | 1.85x | yes | EPS $6.99 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.1% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Citigroup is the cheapest of the big U.S. banks for a reason and a thesis at once: it trades around 1.4 times tangible book value while earning a trailing return on tangible common equity well below its peers, so the entire bet is whether returns close that gap.
- The first quarter of 2026 showed the gap closing fast, with a 13.1% ROTCE and revenue up 14% year over year, though management's own full-year ROTCE guidance of 10% to 11% says the quarter ran ahead of the sustainable run-rate.
- The biggest risk is execution on the multiyear transformation that Citi's regulators are watching; the company has set a path toward 11% to 13% returns in 2027 to 2028, and the price already credits a chunk of that improvement.
Bull Case
The trajectory is the bull case, and it turned visibly in early 2026. Citigroup earned a 13.1% return on tangible common equity in the first quarter, on revenue of $24.6 billion that grew 14% year over year, with net income of $5.8 billion. For a bank that has spent years earning a return in the high single digits, a quarter at 13.1% is the proof point the whole turnaround rests on. Management guides the full year to a 10% to 11% return, which says the quarter benefited from a strong Markets environment and is above the sustainable level, but even the guided range is a meaningful step up from where the trailing return has been, and it is the direction that matters for a re-rating off a below-book price.
The engine behind the improvement is the part of Citi that is genuinely differentiated: its global transaction services franchise inside the Services segment. The 10-K describes Treasury and Trade Solutions revenues of $14.5 billion, up 6%, with the broader Services segment growing revenues and non-interest income on "higher deposit and loan volumes". This is the move-money-for-multinationals business that no domestic peer can replicate at Citi's global footprint, it earns high returns on capital, and it is the reason the company can credibly target double-digit returns even while its consumer and other businesses lag. A bank's value is the return it earns on its capital, and Citi's best businesses earn well above the firm-wide average.
Capital return amplifies the math because the stock trades below tangible book. In 2024 Citi returned "a total of $6.7 billion of capital to common shareholders in the form of $4.2 billion in dividends and $2.5 billion in share repurchases", and the pace has accelerated sharply since: $6.3 billion of buybacks in the first quarter of 2026 alone, against a fresh $30 billion repurchase authorization unveiled at the May 2026 investor day. When a bank buys back stock below tangible book value, each repurchased share lifts tangible book per share for everyone who remains, so the buyback is accretive in a way it would not be for a peer trading at two times book. Citi has returned more than $40 billion of capital since 2022, and a 12.7% CET1 ratio leaves a buffer of roughly 110 basis points above the requirement to keep doing it.
Bear Case
The bear case starts with what the capital-return story conveniently understates: the returns being distributed are still mediocre, and the price has begun paying for returns Citi has not earned. At today's price, roughly 1.4 times tangible book, the market is pricing a return on equity beyond the 12.5% tier that only elite banks sustain, while the company has recently earned a trailing return closer to 7%. The first quarter's 13.1% was a single strong period; management's own full-year guidance of 10% to 11% is the honest run-rate, and that figure still sits at or below most large-bank peers. Buying the stock here means underwriting that the guided returns not only arrive but keep climbing toward the 11% to 13% that management has pencilled in for 2027 and 2028, which is a forecast, not a result.
The execution risk is structural and supervised, which is what makes it a governance concern rather than ordinary business risk. Citi's own filing frames its "multiyear transformation, including the remediation of its" controls and data infrastructure as a central, ongoing obligation, and notes that its regulators wield "broad powers and discretion under their prudential and supervisory authority" including consent orders, business restrictions, and limitations on dividends. A bank operating under active regulatory remediation faces a real possibility that capital return is throttled if the transformation falls behind, which would remove the single most reliable lever the bull case depends on. The cost and duration of that remediation also weigh directly on the efficiency ratio, which management targets near 60%, high for a bank aspiring to elite returns.
The peer comparison sharpens the discomfort. Citi sits in the lower half of its peer group on price-to-book, alongside names like Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNC, and Truist, and the discount is the market's verdict on a decade of underperformance. The optimistic read is that the discount is the opportunity; the bearish read is that the discount is correct, because a bank earning a 7% trailing return on equity against a cost of equity near 9% is destroying value on each marginal dollar of capital until the returns genuinely turn. Even some of the bank's own investors pushed for a "more aspirational" medium-term target than management offered, and at least one major analyst called the near-term return goal "underwhelming." If the returns stall in the low double digits rather than marching to the mid-teens path management has sketched, the price-to-book the stock supports compresses, and the re-rating that the current price assumes runs in reverse.
Valuation
A bank is worth the return it earns on its capital, so Citi's price is read off tangible book value, not an earnings multiple, and on that basis the price is making a clear statement. At about $143 (as of June 27, 2026) against tangible book of roughly $101 per share, the stock trades near 1.4 times tangible book, and inverting that says the market is pricing a sustained return on equity beyond the roughly 12.5% level that only the best banks hold for decades. The trouble is the starting point: the trailing return on equity has been near 7%, so the price is not extrapolating the recent average, it is betting on the improvement management has promised.
The first quarter complicates the read in the bull's favor, and the two figures have to be reconciled rather than blended. The trailing return that the price is measured against is near 7%, but the first quarter of 2026 annualized to a 13.1% return on tangible common equity, and the full-year guide is 10% to 11%. Those are different bases over different windows, and the gap between them is precisely the turnaround in motion: the trailing figure carries the weaker recent history, while the forward quarters reflect the franchise as it is being repositioned. The static valuation methods that value Citi on its current book value and earnings power land below the price, which is the mathematical way of saying the price already credits the forward returns rather than the trailing ones.
Solvency for a bank is regulatory capital and payout capacity, not leverage or cash burn, and here Citi is on firm ground. Its CET1 ratio of 12.7% sits about 110 basis points above the regulatory requirement, which is the headroom that funds the dividend and the $30 billion buyback authorization. The repurchase is the most concrete value lever in the story precisely because the stock is below tangible book: every share bought back below book lifts tangible book per share for the remaining holders, so the capital return compounds the equity value even before returns improve. What a buyer at this price underwrites is straightforward to state: that a bank trading at a discount to peers earns its way to the returns that would justify trading in line with them, and that the regulators let it keep returning capital while it does.
Catalysts
The clearest catalyst is the quarter-by-quarter path of returns against guidance. Citigroup guided full-year 2026 return on tangible common equity to 10% to 11%, with net interest income excluding Markets projected to grow 5% to 6% on mid-single-digit loan and deposit growth, and an efficiency ratio targeted near 60%. The first quarter's 13.1% return ran ahead of that range on Markets strength, so the swing factor for the rest of the year is whether the core franchise holds the guided pace without the Markets tailwind. Each print is a referendum on the turnaround.
The May 2026 investor day reset the longer arc. Management unveiled a $30 billion share repurchase program and set a 2027 to 2028 return target of 11% to 13%, with a stated path toward 14% to 15% over the medium term, after returning more than $40 billion of capital to shareholders since 2022. The buyback is the mechanical catalyst given the below-book price, and the multiyear return targets are the fundamental one. Analyst reaction was mixed, with some calling the near-term goal underwhelming and others pushing for a more aspirational medium-term target, and published price targets have reached into the $160 area.
The risk-side catalyst to watch is regulatory. Citi's transformation and the remediation of its controls remain under active supervisory oversight, and any development that constrains capital return or raises the cost of the remediation would hit the part of the thesis the price most depends on.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Services (reported)
- STT (STATE STREET CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BK (THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTRS (NORTHERN TRUST CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BAC (BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Markets (reported)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BAC (BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Banking (reported)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JEF (Jefferies Financial Group Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EVR (EVERCORE INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LAZ (Lazard, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PJT (PJT Partners Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HLI (Houlihan Lokey, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Wealth (reported)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RJF (RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LPLA (LPL Financial Holdings Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SCHW (SCHWAB CHARLES CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMP (AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
U.S. Personal Banking (reported)
- BAC (BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WFC (WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COF (CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SYF (Synchrony Financial)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USB (US BANCORP \DE\)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Citigroup Q1 2026 earnings release, April 14, 2026 · Citigroup investor day, May 2026