BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (BAC): what the price requires
At today's price, BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (BAC) is priced for 13.7% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-13 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BAC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BAC |
| Company | BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ |
| Current price | $59.38/sh |
| Composition | Consumer Banking 37% / Global Wealth & Investment Management 21% / Global Banking 21% / Global Markets 21% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Elite ROE must persist for | 33.7y before normalizing (held at the 12.4% elite tier) |
| Perpetuity-equivalent ROE | 13.7% |
| Return on equity now | 10.5% |
| ROE gap | +3.2pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.53x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 12.4% ROE ceiling.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.1%; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.77σ |
| cohort percentile (of 119 peers) | 65 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 64% |
| implied end-window share | 1% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.21x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.91x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.74x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.86x | 1 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $37.51 | 1.58x | yes | TBVPS $30.99 × 1.21x (ROE (TTM) 10.5% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.10% allowance/loans → ×0.93) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $47.90 | 1.24x | yes | P/E 10x (sector median), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = sector held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $46.20 | 1.29x | yes | BV/sh $40.53, ROE (TTM) 10.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $49.21 | 1.21x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $68.84 | 0.86x | yes | Rev $116.0B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.1x / 3.8x / 4.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $80.34 | 0.74x | yes | EPS $4.02, growth 20% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.69 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $60.55 | 0.98x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.02 × BVPS $40.53) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $129.71 | 0.46x | yes | EPS $4.02 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $120.52 | 0.49x | yes | EPS $4.02 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 20.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 30.0x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $43.46 | 1.37x | yes | EPS $4.02 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.5% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Bank of America's edge is funding cost: a vast base of low-cost and noninterest-bearing deposits gathered through a coast-to-coast network lets it lend at a spread few rivals can match, and net interest income grew 9% to $15.9 billion on a fully taxable-equivalent basis in the first quarter.
- The biggest sensitivity is the rate path: the bank's earnings swing with where deposit costs and asset yields settle, and management itself flags that interest-rate sensitivity can "behave in a non-linear manner" in larger rate moves.
- What moves the stock next is whether the bank holds its medium-term return target: ROTCE was 16% in the quarter, the low end of its 16% to 18% goal, and management raised full-year net interest income growth guidance to 6% to 8%.
Bull Case
A bank is not valued the way a factory is. It is worth the return it earns on its equity, sustained over time, and that single lens organizes everything else. Bank of America earns a return on equity around 10.6% on a trailing basis and posted a return on tangible common equity of 16% in the first quarter, the lower bound of its medium-term 16% to 18% target. The engine behind that return is the cheapest input in banking: deposits. The bank gathers an enormous pool of low-cost and noninterest-bearing deposits across a network the filing describes as "a coast-to-coast network, including financial centers in 38 states and the District of Columbia", and that funding advantage is the moat. When you borrow from depositors at near zero and lend at a spread, scale compounds the advantage rather than diluting it.
The spread business is working. Net interest income reached $15.9 billion on a fully taxable-equivalent basis in the first quarter, up 9% year over year, with the net interest yield up eight basis points, and management raised full-year net interest income growth guidance to 6% to 8% from 5% to 7%. Average deposits grew $59 billion, or 3%, led by commercial clients. A bank growing its lowest-cost funding while widening its lending spread is the cleanest version of bank profitability, and it explains why first-quarter net income rose to $8.6 billion and earnings per share jumped 25% to $1.11.
The diversification is the second pillar. Bank of America is four businesses: consumer banking, wealth management, global banking, and global markets, and the fourth carried the quarter, with equities trading revenue up 30% to its best quarter in fifteen years. That mix matters because the segments do not all peak together; the trading desks make money in volatile markets while the deposit franchise grinds out spread income in calm ones. Capital is strong and being returned: the CET1 ratio sits at 11.2%, comfortably above regulatory minimums, and the share count has been shrinking about 2.5% a year as buybacks outpace dilution. The buyer is paying about 1.5 times tangible book for a top-tier deposit franchise earning a 16% return on that tangible equity, which is a premium, but a premium for a return that few banks of this size can match.
Bear Case
The advantage that built Bank of America, the cheapest deposits in the business, is the one most exposed to erosion. For years the moat was structural: customers left money in checking accounts earning nothing because moving it was inconvenient. Digital banking and instant transfers have made moving money trivial, and every basis point depositors demand on their balances comes straight out of the lending spread. The bank's own disclosure concedes the fragility, noting that interest-rate sensitivity rests on "low-cost or noninterest-bearing deposits" and that for larger rate scenarios the behavior turns "non-linear" because the assumptions "require a high degree of j"udgment. The trailing return on equity near 10.6% sits below the cost of equity around 10.3% by a thin margin, which means the franchise is earning roughly its cost of capital on a through-the-book basis, not comfortably above it. The 16% ROTCE that bulls cite is the tangible-equity measure; on full book equity the return is far more ordinary.
The priced-in return is the bear's spine. At about 1.5 times book, the price is paying for a return on equity above the elite tier that only the best banks have sustained for decades, while the bank is currently earning roughly 10.5% on book. The market sits in the upper half of the peer group's price-to-book, so the premium has to be defended by sustaining a return Bank of America has not consistently delivered on full equity. Of firms that earned a return this high, only about two-thirds held it for a decade. If the return reverts toward the bank's recent through-cycle level, the price-to-book that supports it compresses, and a multiple compression on a $400-billion-plus franchise is a large absolute move.
Credit is the cyclical risk the current price does not dwell on. The allowance for credit losses is an estimate built on "leading economic indicators, views of internal and third-party economists and industry trends", which is to say it is a forecast, and forecasts of loan losses are systematically too low going into a downturn. Bank of America's loan book spans consumer cards, commercial lending, and commercial real estate, and a credit cycle that lifts charge-offs hits earnings precisely when the rate environment is also turning against the deposit spread. The bank manages this well, but the concentration is structural: it is a leveraged bet on the US consumer and corporate credit, and the price assumes that bet keeps paying at a 16% tangible return through whatever comes next. The moat is real; the question the bear poses is whether digital deposit competition and the next credit cycle quietly narrow it while the price still pays for it widening.
Valuation
A bank's value is read off price-to-book, not an earnings multiple, because what it owns is capital and what matters is the return it earns on that capital. Bank of America trades at roughly 1.5 times tangible book, and inverting that price says the market is paying for a sustained return on equity above the 12.5% elite tier that only the strongest banks have held for decades. The reference point is the bank earning about 10.5% on book recently, with a 16% return on tangible common equity in the most recent quarter. The gap between those two figures, book-equity return versus tangible-equity return, is the whole valuation debate: the price is reasonable on the tangible measure and demanding on the book measure.
The methods land in a way that says the price is supported but not cheap. The tangible-book-value model, which capitalizes the return premium over the cost of equity, lands below the price, while the dividend-discount and excess-return methods land within reach above it, and the peer-multiple read at a 10 times earnings sector multiple sits below the price as well. In plain terms, the asset-and-return-based lenses defend the price and the simple peer-multiple lens calls it full, which is the signature of a quality bank trading at a quality premium rather than a stretched growth bet. The price-to-book sits in the upper half of the peer set, so the premium is real and has to be earned by holding the return.
For a bank, solvency is regulatory capital and payout capacity, not leverage ratios, because deposits are funding rather than corporate debt. On that frame Bank of America is strong: the CET1 ratio is 11.2%, well above regulatory minimums even after capital return drew it down slightly in the quarter, and the share count has declined about 2.5% a year as buybacks outpace dilution. The capacity to return capital while holding capital well above the requirement is the real balance-sheet story. The most decisive point for the valuation is the basis question: at 1.5 times book the buyer is underwriting a tangible-equity return the bank is currently hitting and a book-equity return it is not yet comfortably above, so the bet is on which of those two returns proves durable.
Catalysts
Bank of America's first-quarter 2026 results beat expectations across the board. Net income rose to $8.6 billion on revenue of $30.3 billion, and earnings per share jumped 25% year over year to $1.11, ahead of the roughly $1.00 consensus. The quality of the beat mattered: net interest income grew 9% to $15.9 billion on a fully taxable-equivalent basis, the net interest yield rose eight basis points to 2.07%, and the return on tangible common equity reached 16%, the bottom of the medium-term target range.
The forward signal investors care about is the net interest income guidance. Management raised full-year net interest income growth to 6% to 8%, up from 5% to 7%, a direct statement that the spread engine is expected to keep widening through the year. Average deposits grew $59 billion, or 3%, led by commercial clients, which is the funding base that feeds that guidance. Because net interest income is the largest and most predictable revenue line, the trajectory of that guidance is the cleanest catalyst to track.
The markets businesses added the upside surprise. Equities trading revenue rose 30% to $2.83 billion, the best quarter in fifteen years, a reminder that the trading desks can carry the quarter when volatility is high even as the deposit franchise does the steady work. Capital return continued, with the CET1 ratio at 11.2% after buybacks drew it down 14 basis points, so the next prints to watch are the pace of net interest income growth against the guidance and any turn in credit costs as the loan book moves through the cycle.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Consumer Banking (reported)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WFC (WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- C (Citigroup Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USB (US BANCORP \DE\)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PNC (PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TFC (TRUIST FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Global Wealth & Investment Management (reported)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SCHW (SCHWAB CHARLES CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RJF (RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMP (AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Global Banking (reported)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- C (Citigroup Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WFC (WELLS FARGO & COMPANY/MN)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Global Markets (reported)
- GS (The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MS (MORGAN STANLEY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JPM (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- C (Citigroup Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Bank of America Q1 2026 earnings, April 2026 · company financial data