AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION (AVY): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $177.75, AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION (AVY) is priced for +5.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AVY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAVY
CompanyAVERY DENNISON CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$177.75/sh
CompositionLabels, graphics and reflectives 60% / Performance materials 6% / Other (Materials Group) 2% / Apparel and other 20% / Identification Solutions and Vestcom 11%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.7%
Operating margin today10.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-3.7pp
Implied growth5.5%
Multiple paid18x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 78 peers)62

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.51x4expensive
Earnings1.69x4expensive
Relative2.84x2expensive
Growth1.02x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$181.520.98xyesFCF base $0.9B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.9%, WACC 9.0%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$174.231.02xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 39.4x / 41.4x / 43.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 11.8x / 14.0x / 16.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.6x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$97.491.82xyesBV/sh $30.08, ROE (TTM) 30.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$181.140.98xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$126.771.40xyesRev $9.0B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.5x / 1.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$106.561.67xyesEPS $8.88, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.70 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$148.651.20xyesBV $30.08 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 30.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$77.522.29xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.88 × BVPS $30.08) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$118.801.50xyesFCF $872.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$115.151.54xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.85B (FCF $0.87B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$96.981.83xyesEPS $8.88 × (8.5 + 2×2.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $9.01B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$44.404.00xyesEPS $8.88 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 2.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 3.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$96.001.85xyesEPS $8.88 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Materials Groupoperatingenterprise$6.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Solutions Groupoperatingenterprise$2.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.5b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.36x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.75x
Interest coverage6.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.9%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Companies filed under basic materials are usually valued the way you value a mill: against replacement cost, mid-cycle spreads, and the capital it takes to keep the plant running. Avery Dennison sits inside that classification and refuses to behave like it. Roughly $9.0 billion of annual revenue becomes $957.7 million of operating profit on a book equity base of $29.88 a share, which is about 30% earned on what shareholders have put in. The comparable set does not look like that. PPG converts about 12.8% of sales into operating profit, KMB 14.1%, PKG 11.7%, AVNT 9.1%, and every one of them carries the heavy asset base that goes with those businesses. This is a converter and a formulator, not a mill, and the difference lives in the denominator rather than the numerator.

The filing makes the barrier argument itself, without hedging: We believe that entry of competitors into the field of pressure-sensitive adhesives and materials is limited by technical knowledge and capital requirements. That is not a claim about brand. It is a claim about coating lines, adhesive chemistry, and the qualification a label converter has to run before it will change supplier on a product already in the market. The company expensed $137 million in 2025 on research and development pointed at exactly that. For a business this size, that is a steady and unspectacular investment in remaining awkward to replace.

The revenue mix is also more varied than the sector label suggests. Labels, graphics and reflectives account for about 60% of the business, apparel and related products another 20%, and identification solutions roughly 11%, a line the filing describes as tickets, tags, labels (including RFID inlays), as well as related equipment, services and supplies. Three customer bases, three cycles. And Approximately 40% of our net sales in 2025 originated in emerging markets, which is where label volume grows fastest, because label volume tracks the packaged-goods economy rather than the industrial one.

Now the bar the price actually sets, which is the part most likely to surprise. Today's quote pays about 17 times company-wide operating income, and reading that backwards produces a requirement of roughly 2.4% annual growth in operating profit over a five-year stretch. Avery Dennison's own recent record averages nearer 4%. Finding a business that earns 30% on its book while the market asks it to grow more slowly than it has been growing is not a common arrangement, and it is the bull thesis in a single sentence.

Capital allocation says management reads it the same way. The board lifted the quarterly dividend about 6% to $1.00 a share in April 2026, the share count has come down about 1.9% a year over the four years to March 2026, and debt gets retired rather than perpetually rolled: the company repaid our $300 million of senior notes at maturity using cash flows from operations in August 2024. Interest is covered 7.2 times. None of this is dramatic. Compounding rarely is.

Bear Case

Here is the fact a holder has to sit with. The piece of Avery Dennison that carries the growth narrative, the intelligent-label platform built on RFID, accounted for roughly $0.9 billion of enterprise-wide sales in 2025 and declined low single digits year over year, with logistics down low double digits while apparel and general retail managed only low single-digit gains. The premium in this price is being paid for an adoption curve that is currently pointing down. That may turn out to be a pause. It is not, at the moment, growth.

The core business carries a structural exposure the classification does advertise, and it is real. In the filing's own words, our sales and profitability depend upon the availability and cost of raw materials and energy, which may be subject to significant price fluctuations, and our ability to control or offset increases in raw material and labor costs. Paper, film and adhesive chemistry go in one end; the recovery of those costs is negotiated with a customer base that keeps getting larger. The company is blunt about that too: Further consolidation may increase pressure from customers for us to lower our selling prices. A converter squeezed between commodity inputs it does not set and buyers who are consolidating has both ends of its profitability decided by somebody else.

Demand is lumpier than a label business sounds, as well. The company notes it is exposed to changes in customer order patterns, meaning inventory decisions taken by its customers rather than by end consumers, which is the mechanism that makes a de-stocking cycle land harder on a supplier than on the market it serves. Across the comparable set that cycle is plainly visible: CE's revenue fell 5.5% year over year, EMN's 7.7%, SLVM's 11.0%, and GPK's was flat. Nothing in this industry is currently pulling anyone along.

Then the arithmetic, which cuts differently than it first looks. The price requires only about 2.4% annual growth in operating profit over a five-year stretch, and that seems undemanding. It seems undemanding because of what the calculation charges for waiting. Move the required return by one percentage point and the growth the price needs moves by roughly 6.8 points. So the real exposure at this price is a rate, not a business. The methods that charge a higher return for waiting say so without ambiguity: the price sits about 38% above where the asset-value methods land, roughly 53% above the earnings-power methods, and about 62% above the peer-multiple methods. Only the forward-growth methods reach it.

The balance sheet is not the problem, and the bear does itself no credit pretending otherwise. Net debt near 3.52 billion dollars is 3.67 times operating profit, interest is covered 7.2 times, cash is not being burned, and both notes and shares are being retired. What that does is remove leverage as a third variable, which leaves the bear exactly where it started: a premium paid for a platform that shrank last year, resting on arithmetic that makes the premium look modest only because of an assumption about the cost of money.

Valuation

The most useful number here is also the easiest to misread. At $160.94 the market pays about 17 times company-wide operating income, and reading that multiple backwards gives a requirement of roughly 2.4% annual growth in operating profit over a five-year stretch. Measured against a company whose own recent record averages nearer 4%, that is a low bar. The interesting question is what makes it low.

What makes it low is the rate. The calculation charges just under 8% for the wait and lets growth settle at 4% after the explicit period, and it is remarkably sensitive to the first of those: one percentage point added to the required return moves the growth the price needs by about 6.8 points. Change nothing whatever about the business and charge a tenth instead for waiting, and a modest requirement becomes a demanding one. A buyer at this price takes a view on Avery Dennison and, intentionally or not, a view on the cost of money.

The methods that charge more for waiting say exactly what you would expect them to. The price sits about 38% above where the asset-value methods land, roughly 53% above the earnings-power methods, and about 62% above the peer-multiple methods. Only the forward-growth methods reach it, and one of those gets there by holding today's operating multiple flat through the projection, which is closer to assuming the answer than testing it. The pattern is a durability premium, and its source is not mysterious: static frames are built to value a book, and this book is small relative to what it earns.

That deserves its own beat, because the asset-value methods disagree with each other more sharply than they disagree with the price. The one that credits the current return on equity and lets it decay gradually lands close to today's quote. The one that converges that return to the cost of equity straight away lands far beneath it. Both are looking at the same 30% return on a book of $29.88 a share. They differ only on how long a company can go on earning it, and that, rather than any multiple, is the real argument about this company.

Among its comparables the profit per sales dollar is upper-half rather than exceptional. PPG converts about 12.8% of sales into operating profit and KMB 14.1%, both ahead of Avery Dennison's 10.8%; PKG runs 11.7%, AVNT 9.1%, GPK 7.0%, SLVM 5.8%. So the distinguishing feature is not what the company earns per dollar of sales. It is how little capital it ties up to earn it, and that is precisely the thing a peer-multiple comparison on sales or earnings cannot see.

The balance sheet supports the position without doing the work. Net debt near 3.52 billion dollars stands at 3.67 times operating profit, interest is covered 7.2 times, and both borrowings and shares have been coming down: the company repaid our $300 million of senior notes at maturity using cash flows from operations in August 2024, and the following March retired a €500 million maturity with the proceeds of a fresh issue. The share count has fallen about 1.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. What that combination buys is time, which is the only thing a balance sheet can buy for a thesis that needs a growth platform to turn back up.

Catalysts

The next dated event arrives at the end of July. Avery Dennison releases second-quarter 2026 results on the morning of July 30, 2026, with a management call later the same day, and has already guided second-quarter 2026 reported earnings of $2.21 to $2.31 a share.

The first quarter set the baseline for that print. Net sales came to about $2.3 billion, up 7.0% as reported and up 1.1% organically once currency and acquisitions are stripped out, with reported earnings of $2.18 a share. The two halves moved in opposite directions: Materials Group sold roughly $1.6 billion, while Solutions Group sold $649 million, down 2.8% as reported and down 0.9% organically. Solutions Group is the smaller half and the one that matters more to the argument, because it houses the intelligent-label platform.

Two things in the July release will move the thesis further than the headline will. The first is whether the intelligent-label line stops shrinking. At roughly $0.9 billion of enterprise-wide sales in 2025 it is not large enough to swing the consolidated total by itself, but it is what the premium in the price is being paid for, and a second year of decline is a different fact from one. The second is the pace of capital return. The board raised the quarterly payout about 6% to $1.00 a share in April 2026, and a company lifting a dividend while it retires stock is making a fairly clear statement about where it expects the cash to go.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Materials Group (reported)

Solutions Group (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Avery Dennison Q1 2026 financial review, April 28, 2026 · Avery Dennison Q1 2026 earnings release, April 28, 2026 · Avery Dennison press release, April 30, 2026 · Avery Dennison Q1 2026 results, April 28, 2026

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