AptarGroup, Inc (ATR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $132.99, AptarGroup, Inc (ATR) is priced for +8.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ATR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerATR
CompanyAptarGroup, Inc
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$132.99/sh
CompositionPharma 46% / Beauty 35% / Closures 19%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.3%
Operating margin today12.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-3.8pp
Implied growth8.9%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.34σ
cohort percentile (of 78 peers)64

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.85x5expensive
Earnings2.49x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.24x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$107.291.24xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$131.101.01xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.5x / 13.5x / 15.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$61.642.16xyesBV/sh $41.34, ROE (TTM) 13.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$74.521.78xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$106.881.24xyesRev $3.9B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.8x / 2.1x / 2.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$55.302.40xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.46B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$77.041.73xyesBV $41.34 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$71.721.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.53 × BVPS $41.34) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$51.662.57xyesFCF $310.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$44.722.97xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.27B (FCF $0.31B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$4.6328.72xyesEPS $5.53 × (8.5 + 2×-4.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$16.298.16xyesBV $41.34 × (ROIC 3.6% / WACC 9.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.93B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$59.782.22xyesEPS $5.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Pharmaoperatingenterprise$1.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Beautyoperatingenterprise$1.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Closuresoperatingenterprise$730.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$952.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.61x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.00x
Interest coverage7.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Mature is the correct label for AptarGroup, and it should change how the numbers are read. Nobody is waiting on a new end market here. What a business of this age can still do is charge for something narrow and genuinely hard to replace, and the Pharma segment is precisely that. The 10-K describes it as proprietary "dispensing systems, drug delivery systems, sealing solutions and services to the prescription drug, consumer health care, injectables, active material science solutions and digital health markets". Those are not containers. They are components that sit inside a regulatory submission.

The switching cost falls straight out of that fact. Aptar says it works "for years modifying our dispensing device to work in connection with a customer's drug formulation", and that it then receives royalties from customers based on their sales of the finished product. A drug company that swaps its inhaler valve or its syringe plunger is not changing a supplier. It is reopening a filing with a regulator. That asymmetry is why 46% of revenue sits in Pharma and why the growth keeps landing there: injectables sales rose 20% in the first quarter of 2026 on demand for elastomeric components used in GLP-1 therapies, biologics and antithrombotics.

Mix is doing quiet work on profitability. The trailing operating margin is 13.2%. Set that against the cohort and the ladder is visible: GPK earns a 7.0% operating margin, PKG 11.7%, CCK 12.2%, and WST, the one peer whose business is primarily pharmaceutical containment, earns 20.3%. Aptar sits in the middle of that ladder because it is roughly half a pharma company and roughly half a consumer packaging company. Every point of mix shift toward Pharma moves it up the rungs, and the shift is happening without a strategic pivot, simply because that is where the volume is growing. The company's own 2025 discussion attributes core sales growth to "Strong product volume growth in our Pharma and Closures segments along with increased tooling sales, mainly in our Beauty segment".

Beauty deserves more credit than its reputation for cyclicality suggests. The 10-K puts it at 35% of net sales while it holds 32% of total assets, so it consumes slightly less capital than its revenue share implies. That is a useful shape for a segment whose job is to fund the other one.

The balance sheet is not in the way. Net debt runs just under 950 million dollars, which is 1.89 times operating profit, and operating profit covers interest roughly 9.5 times over. The company is not burning cash, and share count has drifted down about 0.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. None of that is dramatic. It is the profile of a business that can keep buying small bolt-on assets and retiring a little stock without ever having to ask anyone's permission.

Bear Case

Start with geography, because it is the variable with the most leverage and the least attention. The company's own filing places the majority of its worldwide production outside the United States. Its risk disclosure then names the obvious consequence, listing among the things that could move results "significant tariffs and other restrictions on foreign imports imposed by the U.S. and related countermeasures are taken by impacted foreign countries". A manufacturer that makes abroad and sells globally is exposed twice, once to the tariff itself and once to the currency the receipts arrive in. The second-quarter outlook rests on a specific euro-to-dollar rate, which tells you how tightly reported earnings are wired to something management does not control.

Input costs sit on the same side of the ledger. The 10-K warns that "Raw material costs may continue to increase in the coming years due to market fluctuation and the use of PCR resin", and recycled resin is not an optional input when customers are writing sustainability targets into their own supply contracts. Aptar also flags that its revenue and results "may suffer upon the bankruptcy, insolvency or other credit failure of our customers", which for a supplier to beauty brands is a live rather than theoretical concern.

Now the part the quote actually rests on. Today's price pays about 19 times company-wide operating income, and to make that arithmetic work operating profit has to compound at roughly 7.7% a year across a five-year stage before settling to a slower terminal pace. The rate itself is not exotic. Aptar has managed something close to it. What the price needs is the run: five consecutive years with no destocking cycle in Beauty, no resin spike that outpaces pass-through, no year where a large customer reformulates. Against that, the 10-K reports that "core sales, which exclude acquisitions and changes in foreign currency rates, increased by 2% in 2025 compared to 2024". The distance between that underlying pace and the compounding the quote embeds gets bridged by acquisitions and mix, and both are choices rather than certainties.

That bridge costs money, and the balance sheet shows where it went. Long-term obligations grew by roughly two-thirds over the course of 2025. The 10-K notes that "On July 2, 2024, we entered into a term loan with a syndicate of banks (the "Term Loan"). The Term Loan matures in July 2027." Nothing about that is alarming on its own. It does mean the deal engine has already drawn on capacity, and the cheapest bolt-ons tend to get bought first. The royalty streams carry their own clock too: the filing states that these contracts "typically have a set expiration date" and that a failure to renew or replace them would show up in revenue.

If the durability read is wrong, the fall is not to a slightly lower multiple. The methods that value what Aptar earns right now, crediting no growth at all, sit a very long way beneath the current price, and the earnings-power group in particular is more than five times the distance the peer-multiple group shows. Almost the entire quote above the no-growth valuations is therefore a bet on continuation. The margin evidence gives that bet a hurdle: WST, the peer with genuinely pharma-grade economics, earns a 20.3% operating margin while Aptar earns 13.2%. Buyers are paying for a pharma-company outcome and receiving, so far, a hybrid one.

Valuation

Nineteen times company-wide operating income is what the current quote costs, and the assumption embedded in it is specific rather than vague. Working the price backwards, operating profit has to compound at roughly 7.7% a year over a five-year stage, then fade to a slower terminal rate, for the arithmetic to close. Against Aptar's own recent record that rate is not a stretch. The stretch is duration: the price needs the pace held, year after year, without an interruption.

The methods disagree in a way that is easy to read once grouped. Only the forward-growth methods reach today's quote, sitting about 19% under it. The peer-multiple methods sit about 26% under. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize a normalized five-year average of operating profit at the cost of capital and credit no growth whatsoever, sit about 141% under. That spread is the information. Buyers are not paying for the profit stream as it stands today; they are paying for its continuation, and no static method can price continuation because static methods do not assume any.

The one method that actually touches the quote deserves to be understood on its own terms. It projects six years of cash flow and then values everything after that by applying a cash-profit multiple to the final year, holding today's multiple unchanged in the base case and flexing it either side for the low and high runs. Holding it unchanged is a choice, not a finding. If the market ever decides a hybrid pharma-and-beauty converter belongs nearer the packaging end of its cohort, that terminal assumption travels with it, and the only method that reaches the price stops reaching it.

Cohort position sharpens rather than resolves the question. Aptar's trailing operating margin of 13.2% is comfortably above the commodity converters, with GPK at a 7.0% operating margin, PKG at 11.7% and CCK at 12.2%, and comfortably below WST at 20.3%. The filing supports the reason for that midpoint: Pharma carries 46% of revenue, Beauty 35% of net sales against 32% of total assets, and Closures the rest. A company built half from regulated drug-delivery components and half from consumer packaging will earn a blended margin, and the market is currently setting the price as though the blend were resolving toward the drug-delivery end.

The balance sheet neither adds much risk nor removes much. Net debt runs just under 950 million dollars, or 1.89 times operating profit, with interest covered roughly 9.5 times and no cash burn. Share count has fallen about 0.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. That is a capital structure with room to absorb a bad year. What it cannot absorb is a re-rating, because the distance between today's quote and the no-growth valuations is not a solvency question. It is a question about how long good things last.

Catalysts

The most recent print, delivered April 30, 2026, was a revenue beat with an earnings complication underneath it. First-quarter revenue came in at $982.87 million against a consensus near $955.95 million, up 10.8% year on year, while the company's own adjusted earnings measure of $1.19 per share cleared the $1.15 consensus but fell 8% against the prior year on a constant-currency basis. Volume and price are moving in one direction, translation and cost in the other. That tension is the thing to track across the next two prints.

Guidance for the second quarter of 2026 sits in a range of $1.32 to $1.40 on the same adjusted basis, assuming an effective tax rate of 22.5% to 24.5% and a 1.18 euro-to-dollar exchange rate. The currency assumption is doing real work in that range, which is why a euro move of any size is a legitimate reason to revisit the number rather than a rounding detail.

On the product side, Aptar Pharma announced on July 17, 2026 an integrated system-level testing and performance package for injectable drug delivery, aimed initially at partner pre-filled syringe platforms that use its rigid needle shields and PremiumCoat elastomeric plungers, including for highly viscous biologics. The commercial logic is straightforward. The earlier a customer can see how an assembled system behaves with their molecule, the earlier Aptar's components get locked into the submission. It will not move a quarter. It is the mechanism by which the injectables growth already reported keeps compounding.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Pharma (reported)

Beauty (reported)

Closures (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Aptar Q1 2026 earnings release, April 30, 2026 · Aptar Q2 2026 guidance issued with Q1 2026 results, April 30, 2026 · Aptar Pharma press release, July 17, 2026

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