A. O. Smith Corporation (AOS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $60.38, A. O. Smith Corporation (AOS) is priced for +2.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AOS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAOS
CompanyA. O. Smith Corporation
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$60.38/sh
CompositionNorth America - Water heaters and related parts 64% / North America - Boilers and related parts 7% / North America - Water treatment products 6% / Rest of World - China 18% / Rest of World - All other Rest of World 5% / Inter-segment sales -1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)10.0%
Operating margin today17.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.5pp
Implied growth2.2%
Multiple paid13x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.69σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)30

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.55x5expensive
Earnings1.51x5expensive
Relative0.97x5justifies
Growth1.14x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$53.141.14xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 0% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.6%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$60.880.99xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.7x / 11.7x / 13.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$63.750.95xyesP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$39.051.55xyesBV/sh $13.30, ROE (TTM) 27.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$67.960.89xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$39.471.53xyesRev $3.8B, growth 0% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.2x / 2.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$43.081.40xyesEPS $3.59, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.55 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$40.051.51xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.66B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$58.591.03xyesBV $13.30 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$32.771.84xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.59 × BVPS $13.30) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$62.150.97xyesEBITDA $0.76B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$46.331.30xyesFCF $639.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$45.201.34xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.62B (FCF $0.64B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$37.341.62xyesEPS $3.59 × (8.5 + 2×2.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.666.97xyesBV $13.30 × (ROIC 5.6% / WACC 8.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$68.670.88xyesRevenue $3.80B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$17.953.36xyesEPS $3.59 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 2.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 2.9x
Earnings YieldEarnings$38.811.56xyesEPS $3.59 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$444.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.84x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.67x
Interest coverage31.4x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Mature is the right label for this company, and it should change what a reader looks for. A mature business does not get to grow its way out of a mistake. It has to earn a high return on the plants and brands it already owns, then hand the surplus back. A. O. Smith passes both halves of that test more comfortably than most industrial names its size.

Begin with why the demand is steady. Water heaters fail. When one fails in a basement in February the homeowner replaces it that week, and the decision runs through a plumber or a big-box aisle rather than through anyone's capital budget. That is why North America, about 64% of revenue in water heaters and related parts plus another 7% in boilers, behaves less like construction and more like a recurring household expense with a long interval between payments. The company's own 2026 estimate for that segment is a margin of "approximately 24.0 to 24.5 percent", and the whole-company trailing operating margin of 18.8% puts it alongside Lennox (LII) at 19.7% and Watts Water (WTS) at 19.3%, well clear of Carrier (CARR) at 8.2% or Whirlpool (WHR) at 4.4%. Those last two sell into the same houses. Keeping nearly a fifth of every sales dollar in a business that ships steel tanks is not an accident of the cycle.

Steel is the main input, and the 10-K describes a defence most manufacturers do not have: "A portion of our customers are contractually obligated to accept price changes based on fluctuations in steel prices." That clause carries more weight than its placement suggests. It means a commodity shock arrives as a pricing conversation rather than as a hole in the margin, which is a large part of why the operating margin has stayed where it is through several years of volatile input costs.

The commercial side has a specific and disclosed 2026 tailwind. The filing anticipates "that commercial water heater industry volumes will increase mid-single digits in 2026 after growing approximately five percent in 2025." The driver is a Department of Energy rule that eliminates certain products, and buyers are ordering ahead of it. A bull should be honest that pull-forward demand is demand moved rather than demand created. It is still real volume through real plants at real margin while it lasts, and it lands in a year when the rest of the business is doing very little.

Then the second half of the mature-company test, which is what happens to the cash. Share count has fallen about 3.2% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is buyback deployment showing up in the one place it cannot be dressed up, and in 2025 "our Board of Directors approved adding 5,000,000 shares of common stock to our existing discretionary share repurchase authority." Management has also been buying assets rather than only shrinking the count: Leonard Valve is "projected to contribute approximately $70 million in sales in 2026 in the North America segment."

And the bar the price sets is low. At roughly 12.3 times company-wide operating profit, today's quote embeds operating-profit growth of about 0.4% a year across a five-year stretch. That pace sits inside what the business has recently delivered. The bull case is not that A. O. Smith is about to accelerate. It is that it does not have to.

Bear Case

The uncomfortable fact a holder has to sit with is that a large slice of the revenue base is in a market that keeps getting smaller, and it has been getting smaller long enough that calling it a cycle now takes a certain optimism. Rest of World sales, which are mostly China, were $200.7 million in the first quarter of 2026, down 11%, with China itself off 17% in local currency and management's own full-year view a low-double-digit decline. The 10-K estimates that segment will run at "approximately eight to nine percent" margin in 2026 against a North American business estimated at 24.0 to 24.5 percent. Every point of mix that shifts toward the shrinking end is a point of blended margin, and mix is not something a pricing action fixes.

None of this is an overvaluation argument, and dressing it as one would be dishonest. The price asks for very little: operating-profit growth of roughly 0.4% a year, which sits inside what the business has recently delivered, and the multiple lands in the lower part of its peer range. The bear case is not that the bar is too high. It is that the thing being measured could get smaller. At about 12.3 times company-wide operating profit, an earnings base that shrinks pulls the quote down roughly one for one, because there is no growth assumption in there to cushion the fall. There was barely one to begin with.

Some of 2026's commercial volume is borrowed rather than earned. Management is explicit about the source: "We believe that the 2026 growth will come from the buy ahead of products that will be eliminated as a part of the DOE regulatory change for commercial water heaters". Orders pulled into this year are orders that will not arrive next year. Whatever the commercial line prints in 2026, part of 2027 has already shipped.

The pricing lever itself is a test rather than a solution. North American list prices went up 4% to 7% in mid-May, which is the textbook manufacturer response to input costs. It is also a question about who holds the whip in the channel, and the 10-K is unusually plain on that point: "We cannot assure that we will be able to retain our largest customers. Some of our customers may shift their purchases to our competitors in the future." In a replacement market where the buyer is often a contractor choosing from whatever the distributor stocks, a price increase a competitor declines to follow becomes a share problem rather than a margin win.

Execution has not been spotless either. The FY2025 10-K records an impairment expense of $15.6 million, of which $12.5 million sat in the Rest of World segment, on a disposal group written down to fair value less cost to sell. A company retreating from parts of a market it entered on a growth thesis is a company revising that thesis in public, one write-down at a time.

Valuation

Start with what today's quote is actually asking for. At $60.82 the market pays about 12.3 times company-wide operating profit, and that multiple embeds operating-profit growth of roughly 0.4% a year across a five-year stretch. It is a modest assumption, inside what the business has recently delivered, and set against the wider equipment cohort the multiple sits in the lower part of the range. Whatever else is arguable here, the price is not asking for a miracle.

The methods largely agree with that, and where they disagree they disagree in the expected direction. Peer-multiple approaches land slightly above today's price. The cash-flow approaches land close to it, and it is worth knowing exactly how they get there: the exit-multiple version assumes the market still pays the same EV/EBITDA when the projection ends, held flat rather than compressing, with the bear scenario compressing it and the bull expanding it. The approaches that strip growth out entirely, capitalizing normalized operating profit or free cash flow at the required return, land below the price, which is what those methods do to any company expected to grow at all. Nothing in that spread describes a stretch.

What the price is buying is a two-speed business. The North American side, about 64% of revenue in water heaters and parts with boilers at 7% and water treatment at 6%, is where the money is made, and the 10-K estimates its 2026 margin at "approximately 24.0 to 24.5 percent". The overseas side is estimated at "approximately eight to nine percent". The blended trailing operating margin of 18.8% is the arithmetic of those two, and mix is what moves it. Management entered the year expecting "consolidated sales to be up approximately two to five percent compared to 2025" and trimmed the top of that range after the first quarter.

The balance sheet stays out of the argument, which is itself informative. Net debt of $411.9 million is about 0.57 times operating profit, gross borrowings are $615.8 million against $203.9 million of liquid assets, and operating profit covers the interest bill roughly 40 times over. Nothing here forces a decision at an inconvenient moment.

The estimating record is worth a closing line, because much of the read above rests on management's own numbers. Since 2006 the ledger runs 24 guidance raises against 9 cuts, with 6 reaffirmations, 5 fresh initiations and a single withdrawal. That is a firm which has usually been conservative about what it promises and occasionally wrong about China, and today's quote prices roughly that.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026, reported on April 30, set the tone the stock currently carries. Sales of $946 million were down 2% and earnings per share of $0.85 were down 11%, with China weakness and production problems the named causes, and management cut both its full-year sales growth range and its earnings outlook in the same release. Rest of World sales of $200.7 million fell 11% on continued weakness in the Chinese consumer appliance market.

Two company actions bracket the second half. North American list prices rose 4% to 7% effective mid-May, with the benefit expected to land in the back half of the year. And the Leonard Valve acquisition closed for $470 million, adding $15.9 million of sales and $5.5 million of pre-tax earnings in its first partial quarter. The FY2025 10-K describes the deal as "a compelling strategic fit and a meaningful advancement into our presence in the water management market" and puts its contribution at roughly $70 million of 2026 sales in the North America segment.

The next scheduled event is the second-quarter report on July 30, 2026. Two things inside it matter more than the headline. Whether the mid-May price increases show through in North American margin against the company's own 24.0 to 24.5 percent estimate for the year, and whether the Chinese decline is still tracking the low-double-digit full-year path management described in April.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

A. O. Smith Q1 2026 results release, April 30, 2026 · A. O. Smith Q1 2026 earnings call, April 30, 2026 · A. O. Smith conference call announcement, investor relations

View the full interactive AOS report on boothcheck