AECOM (ACM): what the price requires
At today's price, AECOM (ACM) is priced for -2.5% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ACM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ACM |
| Company | AECOM |
| Current price | $68.49/sh |
| Composition | Cost reimbursable 38% / Guaranteed maximum price 37% / Fixed price 25% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 2.3% |
| Operating margin today | 6.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -4.3pp |
| Implied growth | -2.5% |
| Multiple paid | 11x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.2pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.45σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 8 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.62x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.75x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.68x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.44x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $42.49 | 1.61x | yes | FCF base $0.4B, growth -0% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 9.0%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $67.44 | 1.02x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.1x / 8.1x / 10.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $84.70 | 0.81x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $42.30 | 1.62x | yes | BV/sh $17.57, ROE (TTM) 22.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $65.33 | 1.05x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $47.58 | 1.44x | yes | Rev $16.0B, growth -0% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $71.32 | 0.96x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.83B × (1−12%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $61.07 | 1.12x | yes | BV $17.57 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 22.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $38.91 | 1.76x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.83 × BVPS $17.57) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $100.45 | 0.68x | yes | EBITDA $1.05B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $36.97 | 1.85x | yes | FCF $410.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $31.83 | 2.15x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.35B (FCF $0.41B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $3.21 | 21.34x | yes | EPS $3.83 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $21.94 | 3.12x | yes | BV $17.57 × (ROIC 11.3% / WACC 9.0%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $309.24 | 0.22x | yes | Revenue $15.99B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $41.41 | 1.65x | yes | EPS $3.83 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.06x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.81x |
| Interest coverage | 5.7x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- AECOM is an asset-light engineering and consulting firm whose product is expertise, not equipment, and the tell is the returns: it earns a trailing return on equity above 22% on a book value of only about $17.57 a share, because the value lives in its people and its backlog rather than on the balance sheet.
- The defining risk is the demand cycle behind that backlog: the company states plainly that demand for its services "is cyclical and vulnerable to sudden economic downturns and reductions in government and private industry spending", and a large share of revenue ultimately depends on public infrastructure budgets.
- Watch backlog and pipeline conversion against fiscal 2026 guidance of $4.25 to $4.86 EPS, because a record backlog only matters if it turns into billed revenue at stable margins.
Bull Case
The counterintuitive thing about AECOM is that the methods which value it on its assets are looking at the wrong asset. The balance sheet shows a book value of only about $17.57 a share, yet the company earns a trailing return on equity above 22%. A 22% return on a thin equity base is not a fluke of leverage; it is the signature of a business whose real capital is intellectual, the engineers, the client relationships, and the contracted backlog, none of which sit on the balance sheet at anything like their economic worth. That is why a price several times book value can still be reasonable: you are not buying the building, you are buying the franchise that wins the next decade of infrastructure work.
The substance of that franchise is visibility. AECOM reports record backlog, and backlog in this business is contracted future revenue: the company explains that it includes in backlog "revenue we expect to record in the future where we have been awarded" the work. A growing, record backlog with double-digit pipeline growth means the revenue line for the next several years is unusually well-sighted for a services firm, and it is concentrated in the parts of the economy with the most durable spending, transportation, water, environmental remediation, and government modernization. The selection to continue serving the Department of Homeland Security on critical-infrastructure modernization is the kind of long-cycle, re-competing government relationship that compounds.
The third leg is a clean, shareholder-friendly financial model. Net debt of about $1.85 billion sits at under two times operating income, interest is covered roughly five times, the company pays a dividend and has been retiring stock, the share count is down about 2.4% a year. An asset-light firm converting high returns on a small equity base into free cash flow, then returning that cash, compounds per-share value without needing to plow capital back into plant. The bull case is that AECOM is a high-return, low-capital franchise with a record contracted backlog, and the valuation methods that anchor on its tangible book systematically undervalue exactly the kind of business it is.
Bear Case
The bear case begins with the cycle the backlog cannot fully insulate. AECOM tells investors directly that demand for its services "is cyclical and vulnerable to sudden economic downturns and reductions in government and private industry spending." Backlog is reassuring but it is not a guarantee of revenue at a given margin: much of it carries client-discretionary options and not-to-exceed ceilings, and the company calculates backlog to include amounts only "to the extent of the remaining estimated amount" on such contracts. When public budgets tighten, projects get deferred, scopes shrink, and the conversion of backlog into billed, profitable revenue slows. A firm whose top line depends heavily on government infrastructure spending is a firm whose growth is set in legislatures as much as in boardrooms.
The second risk is in how the work is priced. A quarter of revenue comes from fixed-price contracts, where AECOM bears the cost of overruns, and the rest spans guaranteed-maximum-price and cost-reimbursable structures. The filing's auditors single out "Revenue Recognition - Contract cost and claim recovery estimates" as a critical audit matter, which is the formal way of saying that judging how profitable a long project will be requires estimates that can prove wrong. On thin engineering-services margins, an operating margin near 6.3%, a few mis-estimated large projects can absorb a meaningful share of a year's profit, and the cost is concentrated in exactly the fixed-price work that looks most attractive when it is bid.
The valuation leaves modest room for those risks. At the current price the static methods that value the company on its assets and on normalized earnings power both say it is fully to richly valued; only the peer-multiple lens comfortably reaches the price. The market is paying about 11 times company-wide operating income, and while that is not demanding in the abstract, it embeds continued record backlog converting at stable margins. Leverage is moderate rather than dangerous, but in a services firm there is no hard-asset floor under the equity if the cycle turns: the value is the people and the contracts, and both can walk or be deferred. The bear does not require a collapse, only a normal infrastructure-spending pause, for the price to look like it paid peak-cycle economics for a business whose cycle had not yet turned.
Valuation
Inverted on operating income, AECOM looks undemanding rather than stretched. At $68.82 (June 27, 2026) the market is paying about 11 times company-wide operating income, a multiple that implies operating profit going roughly nowhere, about negative 2% a year over the next five years. The price is not asking the business to grow; it is asking it to hold roughly flat. For a firm reporting record backlog and double-digit pipeline growth, that is a low bar, and it is the heart of the constructive read.
The families of methods split along the line you would expect for an asset-light, high-return services firm. The asset-value methods anchor on a book value of about $17.57 a share and call the stock expensive, but that is precisely the lens that misreads a business whose capital is its people: the same book base produces a 22% return on equity, so book value understates the franchise. The earnings-power method, capitalizing normalized operating income with no growth, lands near the price, and the peer-multiple lens, applying the professional-services cohort's multiples, comfortably reaches it. So the honest summary is that the methods grounded in earnings and peers support the price, while the methods grounded in tangible assets do not, and for this kind of company the earnings-and-peers reading is the relevant one.
Solvency is sound and bounds the downside reasonably. Net debt of about $1.85 billion sits at under two times operating income, with interest covered roughly five times, the company is not burning cash, and it both pays a dividend and buys back stock. There is no hard-asset floor under a consulting firm, so the real downside protection is the recurring, contracted nature of the backlog and the diversity of clients rather than a liquidation value. The price rests on that backlog continuing to convert at current margins; the methods say the bet is reasonable so long as the infrastructure-spending cycle does not turn against it.
Catalysts
The headline catalyst is a guidance raise built on backlog. AECOM increased its fiscal 2026 outlook on the strength of record backlog and double-digit pipeline growth, guiding net income from continuing operations of $617 million to $696 million and EPS of $4.25 to $4.86. Because backlog is contracted future revenue, a record reading is the most direct forward signal this kind of business produces, and the raise reflects management's confidence that the conversion is on track.
The project wins point to where the growth comes from. AECOM was selected to continue providing architecture and engineering services to the Department of Homeland Security for critical-infrastructure modernization, a long-cycle government relationship, and it joined a UK consortium with Type One Energy and Tokamak Energy to pursue a private-sector-led fusion power plant project, a smaller but optionality-rich engagement in an emerging energy market. The first is the steady core of the business; the second is the kind of frontier infrastructure work that keeps the pipeline diversified.
Sentiment is favorable, with the covering analysts leaning Buy to Strong Buy and average targets set above the current price. The events that matter from here are the quarterly backlog and pipeline prints and the margin on converted work, because the valuation rests on record backlog turning into billed revenue at stable margins, and any slip in government or private infrastructure spending would show up first in the pipeline figures.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
AECOM Capital (reported)
- TTEK (TETRA TECH, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …firms by weighing the quality, innovation and timeliness of the firm's service versus its cost to determine which firm offers the best value. Our competitors vary depending on end markets and clients, and often we may only compete with a portion of a firm. We believe that our principal competitors include the…
- FY2025 10-K: …on revenue, net of subcontractor costs, improved approximately 50 basis points to 14.3% in fiscal 2025 37 compared to 13.8% in fiscal 2024. The improved operating margin was primarily due to our continued focus on high-end consulting services and improved project execution. FINANCIAL CONDITION, LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL…
- J (JACOBS SOLUTIONS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …the world including technology, consulting and engineering firms. Typically, no single company or companies dominate the markets in which we provide services, and often we partner with our competitors or other companies to jointly pursue projects. AECOM, Tetra Tech, WSP, Arcadis, Bechtel, Arup, Endava, Exponent, Mott…
- FY2025 10-K: …and other transactions to maximize long-term value by continuing to reshape our portfolio to higher value solutions and accelerating profitable growth strategy. The Company has recently made the following acquisitions, strategic investments and divestitures: Page 6 • On September 27, 2024, Jacobs completed the…
- FLR (FLUOR CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …of liquidity and maximization of yield. These investments may include money market funds, bank deposits placed with highly-rated financial institutions, repurchase agreements that are fully collateralized by U.S. Government-related securities, high-grade commercial paper and high quality short-term and medium-term…
- FY2025 10-K: …joint ventures or other teaming arrangements. Typically, we prefer to enter into these arrangements with companies with whom we have worked previously. These arrangements are generally made to strengthen our market position or technical skills, or where the size, scale or location of the project directs the use of…
- KBR (KBR, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …order within our Mission Technology Solutions segment. This increase was offset primarily by changes in the primary components of our working capital. The primary components of our working capital accounts are accounts receivable, contract assets, accounts payable and contract liabilities. In fiscal 2025, the…
- FY2025 10-K: …2023-01-01 2023-12-29 0001357615 us-gaap:VariableInterestEntityNotPrimaryBeneficiaryMember kbr:AffinityProjectMember 2026-01-02 0001357615 us-gaap:VariableInterestEntityNotPrimaryBeneficiaryMember kbr:AspireDefenceProjectMember 2026-01-02 0001357615 us-gaap:VariableInterestEntityNotPrimaryBeneficiaryMember…
- FCN (FTI CONSULTING, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …false 2025 FY 0000887936 P2Y http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#RestructuringAndRelatedCostIncurredCost P2Y http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#AccountsPayableAndAccruedLiabilitiesCurrent http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#AccountsPayableAndAccruedLiabilitiesCurrent iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares fcn:segment…
- FY2025 10-K: …was primarily due to higher forgivable loan issuances, compensation and income tax payments, which was partially offset by an increase in cash collections. Days sales outstanding ("DSO") was 88 days at December 31, 2025 and 97 days at December 31, 2024. Free Cash Flow was an inflow of $93.6 million and $360.2 million…
- BAH (BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON HOLDING CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …by the federal tax authorities. The Company is currently under federal audit by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for fiscal years 2016, 2017 and 2019-2021. The other jurisdictions currently open or under examination are not considered to be material. It is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome or the timing…
- FY2025 10-K: …including financial services, health and life sciences, energy, and technology. Financial and Other Highlights During fiscal 2025, the Company generated year over year revenue growth of 12%, primarily driven by strong demand for our solutions, outcomes, and services, as well as an increase in headcount to meet that…
- G (GENPACT LIMITED)
- FY2025 10-K: …operations ("AOI"). The CODM uses both revenue and AOI to review the monthly and quarterly performance of the Company's operating segments. The CODM uses AOI, which is gross margin and G&A expenditures, to assess capacity for investments in each segment, including sales capacity, delivery resources, offerings and…
- FY2025 10-K: …by entering into the 2022 Credit Agreement on December 13, 2022. The term loan and revolving credit facility under the 2022 Credit Agreement expire on December 13, 2027. Borrowings under the 2022 Credit Agreement bear interest at a rate equal to, at the election of the Company, either Adjusted Term SOFR (which is the…
- IT (Gartner, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …common stock. The Board authorized incremental share repurchases of up to an aggregate additional $5.8 billion of the Company's common stock from February 2021 to September 2025. The Board also authorized incremental share repurchases of up to an additional $500 million in January 2026. The Company adopted its share…
- FY2025 10-K: …entities to start capitalizing software costs when (1) management has authorized and committed to funding the software project and (2) it is probable that the project will be completed and the software will be used to perform the function intended. The amendments are effective for annual periods with fiscal years…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company FY2026 guidance, 2026 · company announcements, 2026 · analyst consensus, 2026