YETI Holdings, Inc. (YETI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $52.49, YETI Holdings, Inc. (YETI) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.9 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/YETI

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.9 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~16.4%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

Solvency

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

• YETI is a premium outdoor brand spanning drinkware, coolers, and equipment, and its edge is a direct-to-consumer channel the 10-K says gives "our customers the highest level of bran"d experience, with international sales surging 25% in the fourth quarter of 2025 to reach 23% of the total.
• The defining risk is tariffs and supply-chain cost: management expects tariffs to be roughly a $0.35 per-share headwind in 2026, the same as 2025, and the company depends on third-party contract manufacturers it warns it must "procure our products from" reliably.
• What to watch is the brand's geographic re-acceleration against capital return: YETI repurchased 8.2 million shares for about $297.6 million in 2025 and raised its buyback authorization to roughly $998 million, while guiding to double-digit earnings growth in 2026.

Bull Case

YETI has reached the stage where a brand built in one country and one product category has to prove it travels, and the recent results say it does. The company started as coolers, became a drinkware phenomenon, and is now exporting both, with international sales surging 25% in the fourth quarter of 2025 to reach 23% of total revenue, led by Europe and Australia. That matters for the stage of the story: the U.S. drinkware market is mature and competitive, so the next leg of growth depends on geography and category breadth, and both are working. A brand that can grow at 25% in markets where it is still establishing itself has a longer runway than its domestic numbers alone suggest.

The channel is the moat. The 10-K describes how YETI's control over its direct-to-consumer channel lets it "understand consumer behavior and preferences, and offer exclusive products, content, and customization capabilities," giving customers "the highest level of bran"d experience. Selling directly, rather than only through wholesalers, captures the full retail margin and the customer data, and it lets YETI choose retail partners "that have an image and approach that are consistent with" the brand. That selectivity is how a premium brand protects its pricing power; it does not chase distribution at the expense of positioning. The result is a business that earns high margins because customers pay up for the brand, not because it sells cheaply.

The capital discipline rounds out the case. YETI returned nearly $300 million to shareholders in 2025, repurchasing 8.2 million shares for about $297.6 million, and raised its total buyback authorization to roughly $998 million in 2026. The balance sheet is light, with net debt of just $75 million against operating income above $200 million, so the buyback is funded from cash generation rather than leverage. Management has guided to double-digit earnings growth for 2026 even while absorbing the tariff cost, which implies the combination of international growth, category expansion, and a shrinking share count can outrun the headwinds. The Street has warmed to that view, with price targets raised toward the high-$60s on improving sales trends.

Bear Case

The external variable with the most leverage on YETI is trade policy, and it is squeezing the part of the business that makes the brand worth owning: the margin. Management expects tariffs to cost roughly $0.35 per share in 2026, the same drag as 2025, with gross margin compressed by an estimated 230 to 310 basis points from higher import duties. A premium brand's whole proposition is that customers pay up and the company keeps the spread; when tariffs eat 200-plus basis points of that spread, the company faces a choice between raising prices into a discretionary category and absorbing the cost, and neither is free. The supply-chain shift away from China toward Thailand and Vietnam reduces the single-country concentration, but it does not eliminate the import-duty exposure, and it has its own execution and cost.

The supply chain itself is a structural dependency the company does not control. YETI does not manufacture its own products; it relies on third-party contract manufacturers, and the 10-K stacks the risks plainly, warning that failure to "procure our products from our third-party contract manufacturers and deliver merchandise" on time would harm the business, that an inability to "obtain raw materials could harm our business," and that global logistics disruptions "might affect the timely and effective procurement" of products. A brand that designs and markets but outsources production is only as reliable as its factories and freight, and in a tariff-disrupted trade environment that chain is under more strain than usual.

The demand side carries the cyclical risk. YETI sells discretionary, premium-priced goods, and the 10-K acknowledges the possibility of "a resistance to paying for premium products, particularly in international markets" as the company pushes into new geographies. A cooler or a tumbler is a postponable purchase when household budgets tighten, and the brand competes in a cohort of consumer-durables names where fashion and discretionary cycles have humbled premium positioning before. The valuation leaves little room for any of this to go wrong: at about 26 times operating income, only the forward-growth method reaches the price, with the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all below it, and the price embeds growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 11 years, a persistence only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have achieved. If international growth cools or tariffs worsen, the premium has a long way to unwind.

Valuation

At the current price the market pays about 26 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 11 years. The near-term pace is within what YETI has recently delivered, so the demanding part is the duration, and history sets the bar high: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have sustained this level for a decade. The label the read carries is elevated, above what the fundamentals comfortably support, meaning the price is underwriting a long stretch of continued compounding rather than a single strong year.

The pattern across the valuation families is a durability premium. The asset-based, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all sit below the price, calling it richly valued, and only the forward-growth method reaches it. That is the market saying it will pay for a brand and a growth runway the static methods, which value the business on what it has already earned, cannot frame. For a premium consumer brand the framing is reasonable, because the value is partly in the intangible brand equity that does not show up on the balance sheet, but it does mean the price depends on the brand continuing to command its premium and the international expansion delivering.

Solvency is not the concern. Net debt of about $75 million is under half a year of operating income, the balance sheet is light, and the company is funding buybacks and the supply-chain transition out of cash flow. The real risk variable is the margin, which the tariffs are actively compressing, and the demand durability of a discretionary premium product. The downside here is not financial distress; it is multiple compression if growth normalizes or if the tariff and brand-resistance risks bite, against a price that only the most optimistic valuation lens currently justifies.

Catalysts

The fourth-quarter and full-year 2025 results, reported in February 2026, showed the international engine carrying the quarter. Revenue grew 5% year over year to $583.7 million, ahead of expectations, with growth driven by international markets, specifically Europe and Australia, and by the Drinkware and Coolers & Equipment categories; international sales surged 25% and reached 23% of the total. The result confirmed that the next leg of growth is geographic, which is the cleanest forward signal for the brand.

Tariffs and the supply-chain transformation are the dominant 2026 storyline. Management expects tariffs to be roughly a $0.35 per-share headwind in 2026, the same as 2025, and gross margin contracted by an estimated 230 to 310 basis points from higher duties. In response, the company has shifted major production away from China toward Thailand and Vietnam to build long-term resilience. For 2026 management raised its earnings-growth target into the mid-teens range while absorbing those costs, and continued to prioritize buybacks alongside the supply-chain optimization.

Capital return and sentiment are the other catalysts. YETI repurchased 8.2 million shares for about $297.6 million in 2025 and raised its total buyback authorization to roughly $998 million in 2026, while a management transition was also flagged at the quarter. Analysts carry a constructive view with a median price target around $53 and recent moves higher toward the high-$60s on improving sales trends. The events most likely to move the thesis are the international growth rate, any change in the tariff environment, and the cadence of buybacks against the margin pressure.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

• NWL (NEWELL BRANDS INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …operating income, defined as net sales minus cost of products sold, segment SG&A (including share-based compensation at target for operating segment employees) and other segment costs. Segment SG&A includes an allocation of center-led corporate functions including the bonus for such corporate functions based on…
• FY2025 10-K: …strong bargaining power and consolidation of the Company's customers; • supply chain and operational disruptions in the markets in which we operate, including as a result of geopolitical and macroeconomic conditions and any global military conflicts including those between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East; •…
• GOLF (Acushnet Holdings Corp.)
• FY2025 10-K: $1.7 million in selling expense, partially offset by a decrease of $1.0 million in advertising and promotion expenses. These operating expense changes include the impact of the $2.6 million benefit recognized during the year ended December 31, 2024 related to the PTO Policy Change. Golf Gear Segment Net sales in our…
• FY2025 10-K: …golfers, who are avid and skill‑biased, prioritize performance and commit the time, effort and money to improve their game. We believe that dedicated golfers are generally the most consistent purchasers of golf products, as we believe they are the most discerning and most likely to invest in premium performance…
• CALY (Callaway Golf Company)
• FY2025 10-K: …and accessories business, the Callaway soft goods business and the OGIO business, which consists of golf apparel and accessories (including golf bags), and storage gear for sport and personal use. This segment also includes royalties from licensing of our trademarks and service marks for various soft goods products.…
• FY2025 10-K: …brand names. The golf ball business, in particular, includes one competitor with an estimated U.S. market share of over 50%. New product introductions, price reductions, consignment sales, extended payment terms, "closeouts," including closeouts of products that were recently commercially successful, and significant…
• PTON (Peloton Interactive, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …information is presented in the same manner that the chief operating decision maker ("CODM"), the Chief Executive Officer and President, reviews the operating results in assessing performance and allocating resources. The CODM reviews consolidated revenue and gross profit for both of the reportable segments,…
• FY2025 10-K: …and services, which could lead to lower revenue or increased costs, or both; • increases in marketing, sales, and other operating expenses; • short-term expenditures and initiatives we may undertake in furtherance of long-term cost savings, including the Restructuring Plans; • our reliance on third-party delivery and…
• BC (Brunswick Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: …us in all product groups. In each product area, competitors range in size from large, highly-diversified companies to small, single-product businesses. We also indirectly compete with businesses that offer alternative leisure products or activities. The following summarizes our competitive position in each segment:…
• FY2025 10-K: …for evaluating product pricing and cost structure, to assess the performance of each segment by comparing the results with one another, and in the compensation of certain employees. Segment operating earnings do not include the expenses of corporate administration, impairments or gains on the sale of equity…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.