DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. (XRAY): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. (XRAY) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/XRAY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerXRAY
CompanyDENTSPLY SIRONA Inc.
Current price$13.77/sh
CompositionConnected Technology Solutions 28% / Essential Dental Solutions 40% / Orthodontic and Implant Solutions 23% / Wellspect Healthcare 9%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.6%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)14.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.6pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)-14.1%
Multiple paid10x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.4% sits below it).

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-4.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.45σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.21x2expensive
Earnings—0—
Relative—0—
Growth—0—

Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=2)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00—noFCF base $0.1B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 5.4%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00—noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowth$0.5923.34xyesDPS $0.64, g=-47.6% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$-7.91—noStage 1: -200% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$6.592.09xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $6.59, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$5.932.32xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $6.59, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$8.561.61xnoRev $3.7B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00—noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings——no—
Residual IncomeAsset——no—
Graham NumberAsset——no—
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——no—
FCF YieldEarnings$0.011377.00xyesFCF $104.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.011377.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.07B (FCF $0.10B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings——no—
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset——no—
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $3.68B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative——no—
Earnings YieldEarnings——no—
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Connected Technology Solutionsoperatingenterprise$1.0b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Essential Dental Solutionsoperatingenterprise$1.5b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Orthodontic and Implant Solutionsoperatingenterprise$850.0m—withheldunresolved no unit value
Wellspect Healthcareoperatingenterprise$325.0m—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.61x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.43x
Interest coverage5.6x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.1%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 14.2%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Strip away the headline and look at what the price is actually saying. At about $10, the market values Dentsply Sirona at roughly 9 times its through-the-cycle operating income, using its own normalized margins on current revenue rather than the trough. That is a multiple so low it sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. The price, in other words, is not pricing a turnaround; it is pricing continued shrinkage. For a company with a recurring consumables base, a large installed base of imaging equipment, and a global dental franchise, that is a demanding amount of pessimism to embed, and it is the bull case in a single observation: the bar is on the floor.

The business underneath the depressed numbers is more durable than the share price implies. A dental practice that buys a Dentsply Sirona imaging system or implant platform keeps buying the consumables and components that go with it, which gives the company a recurring revenue stream tied to the installed base rather than to new-equipment cycles. The cohort it sits in, dental and medical-device peers such as Envista, Becton Dickinson, and Baxter, is valued on that kind of razor-and-blade economics, and on the relative-multiple lens Dentsply Sirona screens as deeply cheap against them. The recent damage is concentrated and identifiable: much of it traces to the wind-down of the Byte direct-to-consumer aligner business and to impairment charges, both of which are one-time in nature rather than a permanent erosion of the core dental franchise.

The turnaround has a plan and a funding source. New leadership is executing a 24-month Return-to-Growth program centered on customer focus, faster innovation, and better execution, with management explicitly arguing the recovery is "not market dependent" and instead driven by self-help. The company completed its 2024 restructuring and "implemented a new restructuring plan in 2026" targeting $120 million in annual savings, and it is redirecting capital: cutting the dividend to pay down debt and buy back stock, and lifting investment in clinical education and R&D toward roughly 5% of sales. Buying back shares at a single-digit price, if the operating inflection arrives, retires a large share of the earnings base cheaply. The bull case does not require growth heroics; it requires the declines to stop, and the price is paying almost nothing for that.

Bear Case

Watch what management is doing with the cash, because it tells you how stretched the situation is. The company is eliminating its dividend to fund debt repayment and share repurchases. A dividend cut at a company this size is not a routine capital-allocation tweak; it is a signal that the balance sheet and the cash flow no longer comfortably support the payout, the debt, and the reinvestment all at once. The decision is defensible, even prudent, but it reframes the equity from an income holding into a pure turnaround bet, and turnaround bets in a structurally challenged business fail often enough to demand caution.

The operating decline is real and not yet finished. Fourth-quarter 2025 net sales fell 10.6% with organic sales down 10.7%, and the company reported a GAAP net loss of $430 million for the quarter. The losses are not purely accounting: the 10-K describes impairments driven by "a weaker trend in sales volumes, particularly in North America" and asset charges tied to "significant reductions in revenue forecasts." When a company writes down assets because it has lowered its own forecasts, the impairment is the rear-view confirmation of a forward problem. Guidance for 2026 still embeds operational sales declines of 1% to 3%, so even the plan assumes the business shrinks again before it grows, and the promised inflection to positive U.S. growth is a fourth-quarter event the company has to earn print by print.

The leverage is the amplifier. Net debt of roughly $2.3 billion sits at about 4.4 times mid-cycle operating income, with interest coverage near 5.6 times on normalized earnings, but those are mid-cycle figures; on the depressed trailing results the cushion is thinner. Reading across the valuation families, the static methods are mixed: the asset-based and growth-DCF lenses call the price expensive against the depressed and declining fundamentals, and only the peer-multiple lens says it is cheap. That is the honest tension in a value name like this. The price is low because the methods that extrapolate the current trajectory cannot justify even today's modest level. If the Return-to-Growth plan slips, the cheapness is a trap rather than an opportunity, and the dividend is already gone as a floor.

Valuation

Trailing earnings here are misleading because the cycle and one-time charges have depressed them, so the right anchor is the company's own through-the-cycle margins applied to current revenue. On that basis the market is paying about 9 times mid-cycle operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would warrant. This is a bound, not a solved growth rate: the price is pricing in continued erosion, and the question for the buyer is simply whether the decline stops short of what the multiple already assumes.

The valuation families disagree in the way they typically do for a beaten-down name. The peer-multiple lens reads the price as deeply cheap against dental and device peers, while the asset-based and growth-DCF methods, which extrapolate the recent, declining fundamentals, call it expensive. That split is the whole valuation story: relative to comparable installed-base businesses Dentsply Sirona screens cheap, but relative to its own recent trajectory the price still looks rich because the trajectory points down. Resolving the disagreement requires a view on execution, which is exactly what the Return-to-Growth plan is meant to supply.

Solvency is the constraint that decides whether this is value or trap. Net debt of about $2.3 billion is roughly 4.4 times mid-cycle operating income, and interest coverage near 5.6 times on normalized earnings is adequate, but the trailing results carry a GAAP loss, so the comfort depends on the margin recovery arriving. That dependency is precisely why management eliminated the dividend to prioritize debt paydown, and why the $120 million restructuring program and the redirected R&D and education spending matter. The downside is a leveraged business whose cash flow has not yet stabilized; the offset is a price already discounting that risk heavily.

Catalysts

The fourth-quarter 2025 report, released in late February 2026, was the reset. Net sales of $905 million fell 10.6%, organic sales dropped 10.7% including a 6.0% drag from the winding-down Byte business, and the company posted a GAAP net loss of $430 million driven by impairments and the cost of exiting that direct-to-consumer line. The Byte unwind is a known, finite headwind, so the comparisons should ease as it laps out of the base.

The forward story is the turnaround plan and its capital-allocation pivot. Management guided 2026 sales to $3.5 to $3.6 billion with operational declines of 1% to 3%, expects positive sequential momentum in the second half, and is targeting U.S. growth turning positive by the fourth quarter, framing the recovery as execution-driven rather than market-dependent. The funding for it is the eliminated dividend, redirected toward debt repayment and buybacks, alongside a restructuring program aimed at $120 million in annual savings and a roughly 50% increase in clinical education spending.

The events most likely to move the thesis are the quarterly organic-sales prints against the 1% to 3% decline guidance, the first sign of the targeted U.S. inflection, and any progress on debt paydown now that the dividend cash is being redeployed. Because the plan runs 24 months, the early-2026 quarters are about stabilization, with the proof of the turnaround landing in the back half of the year.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Connected Technology Solutions / Essential Dental Solutions / Orthodontic and Implant Solutions (reported)

Wellspect Healthcare (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Dentsply Sirona Q4 2025 results, February 2026 · Dentsply Sirona 2026 guidance

View the full interactive XRAY report on boothcheck