WYNN RESORTS LTD (WYNN): what the price requires
At today's price, WYNN RESORTS LTD (WYNN) is priced for +3.9% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WYNN
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | WYNN |
| Company | WYNN RESORTS LTD |
| Current price | $96.91/sh |
| Composition | Casino 62% / Rooms 16% / Food and beverage 15% / Entertainment, retail and other 8% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 5.0% |
| Operating margin today | 15.8% |
| Margin compression implied | -10.8pp |
| Implied growth | 3.9% |
| Multiple paid | 18x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 6, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.9%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.17σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 51 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple value, while asset-based lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.99x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.86x | 1 | justifies |
| Relative | 1.13x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=7)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $108.82 | 0.89x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 10.3x / 12.3x / 14.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $80.25 | 1.21x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $39.06 | 2.48x | yes | BV/sh $5.00, ROE (TTM) 72.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $168.82 | 0.57x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $66.46 | 1.46x | no | Rev $7.3B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.4x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $122.15 | 0.79x | no | EPS $3.49, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.77 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $8.96 | 10.82x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.63B × (1−6%) / WACC 4.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $64.91 | 1.49x | yes | BV $5.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 72.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $19.81 | 4.89x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.49 × BVPS $5.00) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $92.27 | 1.05x | yes | EBITDA $1.76B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 9691.00x | yes | FCF $692.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 9691.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.59B (FCF $0.69B − SBC $0.10B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $112.61 | 0.86x | yes | EPS $3.49 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.33 | 41.59x | yes | BV $5.00 × (ROIC 2.2% / WACC 4.7%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $175.68 | 0.55x | no | Revenue $7.29B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $130.88 | 0.74x | no | EPS $3.49 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $37.73 | 2.57x | no | EPS $3.49 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $9.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.94x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 8.38x |
| Interest coverage | 1.8x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
At $105.56 the price sits above some valuation methods and below others. The relative-multiple model lands near $87 and the EV/EBITDA model near $92, so the price carries a premium to peer multiples, while the inversion reads it as within range at about 19x operating income.
The operating story is a recovery firing on two engines. Q1 2026 revenue rose 9% to $1.86 billion, Las Vegas EBITDA margin hit 35%, and Wynn Palace in Macau saw mass drop up 19% and handle up 32% as the premium segment recovered.
The overhang is leverage and a development bet. Net debt is about $9.4 billion with interest coverage near 1.8x, and the company is funding its share of the Wynn Al Marjan resort in the UAE, due to open in 2027.
Bull Case
Where the price sits against the methods tells you this is a recovery bet, not a bubble. Against the $105.56 (June 28, 2026) quote, the relative-multiple model lands near $87 and the EV/EBITDA-relative model near $92, so the stock trades at a premium to peer multiples but not an extreme one, and the inversion characterizes the priced-in assumption as within range: about 19x operating income implying roughly 6.2% operating growth a year, a pace the company has recently delivered. The free-cash-flow and book-anchored models look distorted because Wynn's book value is tiny and its trailing return on equity is enormous at 72%, the artifact of a leveraged, asset-heavy operator. The honest read of the spread is a quality casino franchise priced for continued recovery, supported by earnings-power and peer-multiple value.
The operating momentum is real and geographically balanced. Q1 2026 revenue rose 9.2% to $1.86 billion, beating expectations. Las Vegas delivered $661.9 million of revenue, up nearly 6%, with adjusted property EBITDA of $232.5 million at a 35.1% margin, casino revenue up more than 9%, and revenue per available room up nearly 10% on a 12% increase in room rates. Macau generated $989.2 million of combined revenue with adjusted property EBITDA of $279.4 million, and at Wynn Palace mass drop rose 19% and handle grew 32%, reflecting the recovery of the premium-mass and VIP segments that are Wynn's specialty. The filing describes the Macau operations within a gaming-tax framework tied to gross gaming revenue (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001174922-26-000013), and the higher-end focus is exactly where the Macau recovery is strongest.
The growth option is the UAE. Wynn Al Marjan Island, the first integrated resort in the United Arab Emirates, continues to progress toward a 2027 opening, with remaining cash commitments of $350 million to $450 million for the company's 40% pro-rata share. A first-mover position in a brand-new gaming market with no direct competition is a genuine long-term catalyst that the static models cannot value. The company pays a $0.25 quarterly dividend and has been shrinking its share count, and analysts carry a Strong Buy consensus with average targets well above the current price, in the $120 to $145 range, on the combination of the Macau recovery, Las Vegas strength, and the UAE optionality.
Bear Case
The competitive threat is concentrated in Macau, where Wynn earns the majority of its revenue and where the rivals are formidable. Las Vegas Sands, Galaxy, MGM, Melco, and SJM all operate in the same small enclave under the same concession regime, and each has been investing in non-gaming attractions to win the premium-mass visitor that drives margins. The filing is blunt that the casino-resort and hotel industry is highly competitive, that increased competition could result in a loss of business, and that its Las Vegas operations also face increasing competition (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001174922-26-000013). Wynn's Macau revenue depends on a gaming concession and on Chinese consumer demand and travel policy, both of which sit outside the company's control; a slowdown in the Chinese economy, a tightening of visa or junket rules, or an aggressive capacity expansion by a competitor would pressure the segment that carries the company.
The leverage magnifies every one of those risks. Net debt sits near $9.4 billion against trailing operating income, putting leverage above 8x, and interest coverage is just 1.8x. A casino operator covering its interest less than two times is fragile: a downturn in Macau or Las Vegas gaming volumes would squeeze the cash available to service debt while the company is simultaneously funding the UAE development. The filing details a stack of term loans and notes maturing across 2027 and 2030 (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001174922-26-000013), so refinancing risk is real if credit conditions tighten.
The UAE bet is capital at risk for a payoff years away. Wynn Al Marjan is a multi-billion-dollar first-of-its-kind project, and the company is monitoring the broader Gulf-region situation while taking precautions for its team on the ground, an acknowledgment of geopolitical and execution risk. A new market with no precedent carries demand uncertainty, regulatory development, and construction risk, and the $350 million to $450 million of remaining commitments is cash that cannot reduce leverage in the meantime. The price already trades at a premium to peer multiples, so if Macau competition intensifies, the Chinese consumer weakens, or the UAE timeline slips, a leveraged operator priced for a smooth recovery has meaningful downside, and the Q1 EPS already came in just below estimates despite the revenue beat.
Valuation
The price reads against operating income and peer multiples here, since the book-anchored models are distorted by a tiny equity base. Against the $105.56 quote, the relative-multiple model lands near $87 (a blended sector and trailing P/E), the EV/EBITDA-relative model near $92, and the two-stage excess-return model near $169, while the simple excess-return model lands near $39 and the Graham number near $20. The free-cash-flow models return near-zero figures from a data quirk tied to the leverage and should be set aside. The blended X-ray estimate sits near $87. So the price carries a premium to the relative-multiple and EV/EBITDA lenses, which is why asset-based says expensive while earnings-power and peer-multiple value support it.
Inverting the price gives a moderate assumption. At about 19x company-wide operating income, the price implies operating growth of roughly 6.2% a year for five years, discounted at an 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth, where each percentage point of cost moves the implied growth about seven points. That implied pace is within what the company has recently delivered, which is why the overall characterization is within range; the multiple sits in the upper half of the peer range, so it is not cheap relative to casino peers.
The practical read is a leveraged, high-quality casino operator trading at a premium peer multiple, priced for a continued Macau and Las Vegas recovery. The UAE resort is upside the operating multiples do not capture, and analyst targets well above the price, $120 to $145, lean on that optionality plus market-share gains. The reverse-DCF is more conservative, crediting only the demonstrated recovery. The leverage means the equity is a geared play on gaming volumes: it amplifies the upside if the recovery continues and the downside if it stalls.
Catalysts
The May Q1 2026 report was the recent catalyst: revenue up 9.2% to $1.86 billion beat expectations, though EPS of $1.25 came in just below the $1.26 estimate. Las Vegas posted a 35% EBITDA margin and Wynn Palace in Macau saw mass drop up 19% and handle up 32%. The next earnings report is the key test of whether the Macau premium-segment recovery and Las Vegas strength continue, since the valuation is priced for the recovery to persist.
Macau monthly gaming revenue is a frequent catalyst in its own right; the market rose 6.7% in May 2026, a positive read for the segment that drives most of Wynn's revenue. Watch Wynn's Macau market share, which analysts expect to gain given its higher-end focus. The Wynn Al Marjan Island resort in the UAE is the long-term catalyst: construction progress and any firming of the 2027 opening timeline would validate the first-mover optionality, while a delay or cost overrun would weigh on the stock. Capital return continues through the $0.25 quarterly dividend and buybacks. The chief risks to the timeline are intensifying Macau competition, a slowdown in the Chinese consumer or travel policy, the high leverage that magnifies any downturn, and execution risk on the UAE project. Analysts hold a Strong Buy consensus with targets well above the current price.
Sources: Wynn Resorts Q1 2026 8-K press release (SEC); BettorsInsider: Wynn Q1 2026 revenue $1.86B, Wynn Palace surges; IAG: Wynn Macau 1Q26 revenue up 14%; Public.com: WYNN analyst forecast; GuruFocus: Macau gaming revenue rises 6.7% in May.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Wynn Palace / Wynn Macau +2 more (reported)
- LVS (LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MGM (MGM Resorts International)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CZR (CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MLCO (MELCO RESORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RRR (RED ROCK RESORTS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BYD (BOYD GAMING CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PENN (PENN Entertainment, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MAR (MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.