Western Union CO (WU): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers Western Union CO (WU) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WU
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | WU |
| Company | Western Union CO |
| Current price | $7.26/sh |
| Composition | Consumer Money Transfers (revenues from contracts with customers) 84% / Consumer Services (revenues from contracts with customers) 12% / Other revenues (investment income on settlement assets, FX hedges, other) 4% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 10.0% |
| Operating margin today | 15.9% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -5.9pp |
| Multiple paid | 6x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.9% sits below it).
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.17σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.53x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.55x | 5 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.38x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.87x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $39.75 | 0.18x | yes | FCF base $0.6B, growth -2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 5.1%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $16.88 | 0.43x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 5.9x / 7.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $17.45 | 0.42x | yes | P/E 14.3x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 6x), scenarios: 12.2x / 14.3x / 16.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10.78x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $1.23 | 5.90x | yes | Stage 1: -48% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $13.63 | 0.53x | yes | BV/sh $2.92, ROE (TTM) 43.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $33.70 | 0.22x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $5.51 | 1.32x | yes | Rev $4.0B, growth -2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $45.44 | 0.16x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.82B × (1−20%) / WACC 5.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $21.76 | 0.33x | yes | BV $2.92 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 43.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $8.98 | 0.81x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.23 × BVPS $2.92) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $23.98 | 0.30x | yes | EBITDA $0.65B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $14.42 | 0.50x | yes | FCF $565.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $13.00 | 0.56x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.52B (FCF $0.57B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.03 | 7.04x | yes | EPS $1.23 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.44 | 2.97x | yes | BV $2.92 × (ROIC 4.2% / WACC 5.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $19.31 | 0.38x | yes | Revenue $4.04B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $13.30 | 0.55x | yes | EPS $1.23 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.44x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.77x |
| Interest coverage | 4.3x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The price sits below almost every valuation method. At $7.13 the stock trades around 6x operating income, a multiple so low it is below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would justify, and the blended model estimate sits near $17.
The market is pricing terminal decline, and the recent quarter pushed back a little. US remittance transactions turned slightly positive for the first time in a year, and the Branded Digital business grew transactions 21%, though total adjusted revenue still fell about 1%.
The company throws off real cash, about $463 million of free cash flow, funds a roughly 13% dividend yield, and shrinks its share count 5% a year. The bet is whether the cash-machine outlasts the fintech disruption long enough to reward the discount.
Bull Case
Start with how far the price sits below the valuation methods, because the gap is the entire bull case. At $7.13 (June 28, 2026) Western Union trades around 6x company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price is below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would warrant. Every valuation family lands above the price: the relative-multiple model near $19, the earnings-power value near $41, the simple excess-return model near $15, and the free-cash-flow yield near $11. The blended estimate sits near $17, more than double the quote. When the price is below the asset, earnings-power, relative-multiple, and growth lenses all at once, the market is not debating the growth rate; it is pricing terminal decline, and any outcome short of that is upside.
The cash economics are the reason the discount could pay. Western Union generated about $463 million of free cash flow on roughly $4 billion of revenue, earns a 17% operating margin, and returns capital aggressively: the dividend yields roughly 13% at the current price, and the share count has been shrinking about 5% a year through buybacks. A business buying back 5% of itself annually while paying a double-digit yield does not need growth to reward shareholders; it needs only to stop declining. The trailing return on equity near 48% is inflated by a small book value, but it reflects how little capital the franchise needs to run.
The recent quarter offered the first sign of stabilization in years. Management reported that US remittance transactions turned slightly positive for the first time since the prior year, and the Branded Digital business, the company's app and online channel, grew transactions 21%, helped by new relationships in the Middle East. The filing breaks out Branded Digital as a five-region segment focused on online and mobile money transfer, with branded-digital adjusted revenue growing in the recent periods (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-061340). The company also set full-year guidance for 5% to 8% GAAP revenue growth and $1.50 to $1.60 of GAAP EPS, and it is pursuing a stablecoin strategy, USDPT for settlement, a Digital Asset Network, and a consumer Stable Card, that could turn its 400,000-location network into a relevant payout rail. If digital stabilizes the franchise, a 6x multiple is far too cheap.
Bear Case
The reason the stock is this cheap is competitive disruption, and the disruptors are specific and well-funded. Wise, Remitly, and a wave of neobanks have built digital-first money-transfer products that undercut Western Union on price and beat it on user experience, particularly among the younger immigrant customers who are the future of the remittance market. MoneyGram and Ria compete on the same corridors, and banks, card networks, and card-based payment providers all take a slice. The filing names exactly this field, citing competition from global and niche corridor money-transfer providers, US and international banks, card associations, and card-based payments providers (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-061340). Western Union earns part of its revenue on the spread between the exchange rate it sets and the market rate (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-061340), and that pricing power erodes every time a cheaper digital competitor wins a corridor.
The trend in the numbers is the bear's strongest evidence. Total adjusted revenue still fell about 1% in the recent quarter despite the digital growth, and Q1 EPS of $0.25 missed the $0.41 estimate badly. The legacy retail-agent business, which still carries most of the revenue, keeps shrinking, and the 21% digital transaction growth is off a small base that does not yet offset the retail decline. The market is right that this is a business in secular contraction; the question is only the pace, and the pace has been negative for years.
The stablecoin pivot is more hope than proof, and it competes directly with the same fintechs. Launching a settlement coin and a consumer card is a sensible defensive move, but stablecoin remittance is a crowded, fast-moving field, and Western Union is a follower, not a leader, in digital assets. Meanwhile the balance sheet carries net debt of about $1.7 billion against trailing operating income, with interest coverage near 4.8x, so the company cannot lever up much further to fund the transition. The roughly 13% dividend yield is a warning as much as an attraction: the market is signaling it does not believe the payout is durable if revenue keeps falling. A value trap is exactly this, a cheap stock that stays cheap because the underlying business keeps deteriorating, and Western Union fits the profile until the revenue line actually turns.
Valuation
The defining feature is that the price sits below nearly every valuation method, the opposite of an expensive stock. Against the $7.13 quote, the relative-multiple model lands near $19, the earnings-power value near $41, the simple excess-return model near $15, the free-cash-flow yield near $11, and the EV/EBITDA-relative model near $27. The blended X-ray estimate sits near $17. Only the two-stage dividend-discount model, which extrapolates a steep decline, and the discounted-future-market-cap model land near or below the price. The premium-by-family readings are all well under 1.0, the model's way of saying the price is below every family's central estimate.
Inverting the price returns a bound, not a point. At about 6x company-wide operating income, the price is below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would warrant, solved at a 7% cost of capital. The honest statement is that the market is pricing sustained contraction, not stability or growth. For reference the near-term operating pace is within what the company has recently delivered, so the price is assuming the recent decline not only continues but accelerates. The reverse-engineered fair value collapses to the current price, which is the model's way of saying the discount is doing all the work.
The practical read is a deep-value, cash-generative business priced for terminal decline. This is the classic value-versus-trap question: if revenue stabilizes, as the recent quarter hints, the methods say the stock is worth multiples of the price; if the decline resumes, the cheap multiple is justified and the high dividend yield is at risk. The double-digit yield and 5%-a-year buyback mean a holder is paid to wait, but only if the business does not keep shrinking.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report was the recent catalyst and it was mixed: EPS of $0.25 missed the $0.41 estimate and adjusted revenue fell about 1%, but management flagged the first slightly positive US remittance transaction trend in a year and 21% Branded Digital transaction growth. The company guided to 5% to 8% GAAP revenue growth and $1.50 to $1.60 of GAAP EPS for the year. The next earnings report is the pivotal test: the whole thesis hinges on whether digital growth finally offsets the retail decline and turns total revenue positive on a sustained basis.
The stablecoin rollout is the catalyst with the most optionality. Management outlined a three-phase plan, launching USDPT for internal settlement, enabling digital-asset wallet companies to use Western Union for payouts, and introducing a consumer Stable Card, with the Digital Asset Network and Stable Card targeted to launch in select countries this year. Concrete milestones there could change the narrative from decline to reinvention. Capital return is the steady support: a roughly 13% dividend yield, a $0.235 quarterly payout, and ongoing buybacks shrinking the share count. The chief risks to the timeline are continued share loss to Wise, Remitly, and other digital competitors, a deterioration that pressures the dividend, and the possibility that the stablecoin effort arrives too late in a crowded field. The market's median target near $9 sits above the current price but reflects deep skepticism, with more Sell ratings than Buys.
Sources: GuruFocus: WU Q1 2026 earnings call highlights; MarketBeat: Western Union Q1 2026 earnings report; Western Union $0.235 quarterly dividend (IR); Public.com: WU analyst forecast; Seeking Alpha: WU secular issue and competition.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- RELY (Remitly Global, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …The Company's CODM is regularly provided results comparing actual performance against budgeted targets and prior periods. This measure aligns with how resources are managed and allocated within the Company's one operating segment business. Significant Segment Expenses On a regular basis, the Company's CODM is…
- FY2025 10-K: …with respect to the delivery and use of our offerings which may result in data theft and/or misappropriation; • the adoption or retention of more entrenched or rival services in the international regions where we compete; • our ability to control costs, including our operating expenses; • the amount and timing of…
- PAYO (Payoneer Global Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …increase our operating costs, or otherwise materially adversely affect our business. Given uncertainty around these rules, we could experience discriminatory or anticompetitive practices that could impede both our and our merchants' growth, increase our costs or materially adversely affect our business. If buyers or…
- FY2025 10-K: …of our customer acquisition infrastructure. Our ability to acquire new customers could be materially harmed if we are unable to access these ecosystems, or enter into or maintain these relationships on terms that are commercially reasonable to us, or at all. In addition, to the extent we renew our existing…
- FLYW (FLYWIRE CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …to retain and compensate Invoiced and StudyLink employees in connection with integration of the business. Net Margin, EBITDA Margin, and Adjusted EBITDA Margin: Year Ended December 31, (in millions) 2025 2024 Revenue (A) $ 623.0 $ 492.1 Revenue less ancillary services (B) $ 603.1 $ 474.2 Net income (C) $ 13.5 $ 2.9…
- FY2025 10-K: …any transaction or other strategic alternative we may pursue will achieve the anticipated cost savings, operating efficiencies or have a positive impact on our results of operations or financial condition. We expect our revenue mix to vary over time, which could affect our gross profit, gross margin and results of…
- CPAY (Corpay, Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …Payments competitors are able to operationalize and scale certain decentralized payment technologies quicker like cryptocurrencies. Competitors in the Lodging Payments solutions include travel agencies, online lodging discounters, internal corporate procurement and travel resources and independent lodging and…
- FY2025 10-K: …net. • Acquisitions -Since 2002, we have completed over 100 acquisitions of companies and commercial account portfolios. Acquisitions have been an important part of our growth strategy, and it is our intention to continue to seek opportunities to increase our customer base and diversify our service offering through…
- WEX (WEX Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …experiencing financial difficulties may be granted and are generally limited to extending the time to pay, placing a customer on a payment plan, or granting waivers of late fees. There were no material concessions to customers experiencing financial difficulties during either 2025 or 2024. Operating Expenses The…
- FY2025 10-K: …Any of the above could materially affect our business, financial condition, and operating results. We operate in a highly competitive business environment. Such competition could adversely affect the fees we receive, our revenues and margins, and our ability to gain, maintain, or expand customer relationships, all on…
- FISV (FISERV INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …$61 million, or 1%, and total operating margin decreased 120 basis points to 27.5% in 2025 compared to 2024. Operating income in our Merchant segment decreased $59 million, or 2%, and operating margin decreased 250 basis points to 34.5% in 2025 compared to 2024. The decrease in operating income and operating margin…
- FY2025 10-K: …coding), sales, operations (including customer service, technology support, and security) and management; access to financial and telecommunication networks; computers, servers, mainframes, microchips and other computer equipment; and Clover and other POS devices. We periodically review our resource requirements and…
- BR (BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …were on Broadridge's trading platforms in both the current and prior year periods. Position Growth and Internal Trade Growth are useful non-financial metrics for investors in understanding how management measures and evaluates Broadridge's ongoing operational performance within its Investor Communication Solutions…
- FY2025 10-K: …Revenues and Recurring revenue are useful metrics for investors in understanding how management measures and evaluates the Company's ongoing operational performance. See "Results of Operations" as well as Note 2, "Summary of Significant Accounting Policies" and Note 3, "Revenue Recognition" to our Consolidated…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.