WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC. (WCN): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $164.49, WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC. (WCN) is priced for +13.0% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WCN
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | WCN |
| Company | WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC. |
| Current price | $164.49/sh |
| Composition | Commercial 31% / Residential 25% / Industrial and construction roll off 15% / Landfill 16% / Transfer 15% / Recycling 3% / E&P 7% / Intermodal and other 2% / Intercompany -15% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 4.6% |
| Operating margin today | 17.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -12.4pp |
| Implied growth | 13.0% |
| Multiple paid | 31x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~9.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.2 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.15σ |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 52% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.05x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 10.89x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.45x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.25x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $107.81 | 1.53x | yes | FCF base $1.3B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $157.58 | 1.04x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 15.5x / 17.5x / 19.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $113.37 | 1.45x | yes | P/E 25.81x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 39x), scenarios: 21.6x / 25.8x / 30.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $45.16 | 3.64x | yes | BV/sh $31.20, ROE (TTM) 13.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $53.84 | 3.06x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $131.77 | 1.25x | yes | Rev $9.8B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.6x / 4.3x / 5.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $145.25 | 1.13x | yes | EPS $4.15, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.12 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $15.11 | 10.89x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.32B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $55.71 | 2.95x | yes | BV $31.20 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.7%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $53.98 | 3.05x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.15 × BVPS $31.20) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $112.66 | 1.46x | yes | EBITDA $2.94B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $14.75 | 11.15x | yes | FCF $1232.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $11.38 | 14.45x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.15B (FCF $1.23B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $133.91 | 1.23x | yes | EPS $4.15 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $7.88 | 20.87x | yes | BV $31.20 × (ROIC 1.9% / WACC 7.6%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $76.92 | 2.14x | yes | Revenue $9.76B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $155.62 | 1.06x | yes | EPS $4.15 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $44.86 | 3.67x | yes | EPS $4.15 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $9.3b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 7.23x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.58x |
| Interest coverage | 4.8x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Waste Connections runs garbage collection and disposal in mostly exclusive or franchise markets and uses that position to push price: a 6% core price increase in the first quarter of 2026 carried revenue up 6.4% to $2.371 billion even as volumes dipped about 1.5%.
- The biggest risk is what the price assumes, not what the company does: at $154 the asset-value, earnings-power and peer-multiple methods all read the stock as expensive, and only the cash-flow methods that credit durable compounding reach the price.
- What to watch is the margin and acquisition cadence: adjusted EBITDA margin expanded 90 basis points to 32.5%, the company added $55 million of net acquisition revenue, and management is positioning for upside to its full-year outlook.
Bull Case
The reflexive worry about a garbage company is that it is a slow, capital-heavy commodity business with nowhere to grow. The first quarter of 2026 answered that worry directly. Solid waste volumes were down about 1.5%, half a point of it from outsized weather events, and yet revenue still rose 6.4% to $2.371 billion, because the company raised core price 6%. That is the whole bull case in one line: Waste Connections does not need volume growth to grow revenue, because it can price. The reason it can price is structural. The company operates in markets where it holds exclusive or franchise positions, and it states plainly in its filings that it seeks price increases necessary to offset rising costs, improve operating margins, and earn adequate returns on deployed capital, leveraging its franchise-based platforms to expand beyond its exclusive arrangements.
What that pricing power produces is margin, and the margin is widening. Adjusted EBITDA rose 8% to $769.5 million in the quarter, with the margin expanding 90 basis points to 32.5% of revenue. A solid-waste business throwing off EBITDA margins above 30% and still expanding them is converting its local monopolies into cash, and GAAP earnings followed, with first-quarter EPS of $1.23 ahead of expectations. This is the textbook profile of a moat: returns hold above the cost of capital year after year because nobody can easily build a competing landfill or win away an exclusive municipal contract.
On top of the organic engine sits a second growth lever the bull case should not undersell: acquisitions. The industry is fragmented, and Waste Connections is a consolidator, adding $55 million of net acquisition revenue in the quarter alongside 3.1% organic growth in solid waste, with management pointing to an active pipeline. Each tuck-in folds a smaller hauler into the company's disposal network and route density, where it earns the same pricing and margin discipline. Management explicitly framed the quarter as positioning for upside to the 2026 outlook on better organic growth and higher commodity benefits. The combination of price-led organic growth and a steady acquisition machine is why the market treats this as a compounder rather than a utility.
Bear Case
Strip away the quality of the business and the bear case is about a single dependency baked into the price: that Waste Connections keeps compounding at a pace its current earnings do not yet justify. The price embeds an assumption of durable mid-single-digit to low-double-digit growth holding for a long time, and the methods that value the company on what it earns today, rather than what it might earn for a decade, all land well below the quote. The most fragile piece of that assumption is pricing. The 6% core price increase is the engine of the whole story, and pricing that far above general inflation is not guaranteed to persist; municipalities renegotiate contracts, and the company's own filings concede that competitors may cut prices to win share or competitively bid municipal contracts, forcing it to either match the lower price or lose the business. If price normalizes toward inflation while volumes stay flat to negative, the revenue growth that supports the multiple compresses.
The volume side already shows the strain the price increases are masking. Solid waste volumes fell about 1.5% in the quarter. Some of that was weather and some was deliberate shedding of unprofitable work, but a waste business with structurally declining volumes is leaning entirely on price and acquisitions to grow, and both have limits. Acquisition-led growth requires a steady supply of targets at sensible multiples; when the company pays up for deals, the returns on that capital fade. The recycling operations add a commodity wobble on top, since the company markets collected paper, ferrous and aluminum to third parties, so a chunk of the reported upside in any quarter can be commodity prices the company does not control.
The balance sheet is where the durability bet carries real consequence. Waste Connections holds roughly $9.1 billion of net debt, more than five times trailing operating income, with interest covered only about five times by operating earnings. That is a load a high-margin, recession-resistant business can carry comfortably while it compounds, but it leaves less room for error if pricing power fades or the acquisition pipeline forces richer multiples. The bull case and the bear case agree on the facts: the company prices well and acquires steadily. They disagree on whether a price already paying for a decade of that compounding leaves anything on the table for the buyer.
Valuation
Waste Connections is priced as a compounder, and the inversion makes the bet concrete: at today's price the market is paying for the business to keep growing operating income at a low-double-digit pace, well above what a mature solid-waste hauler would normally command, sustained long enough to earn the premium. The company earns operating margins around 17.5% today; the price asks it to keep widening them and keep growing for years.
The method families sort cleanly into one pattern. The asset-value lenses, built off book value and the return spread over the cost of capital, land far below the price, near a third of it, which is unsurprising for an asset-light-relative-to-earnings business whose value is in its market positions rather than its balance sheet. The earnings-power method, which capitalizes today's profit with no growth, sits dramatically below the price, a reflection of how much of the quote rests on future growth rather than present earnings. Peer multiples land below the price as well. Only the cash-flow methods that project the growth forward, and the growth-adjusted earnings approach, reach $154. That is the signature of a durability premium: the static frames structurally cannot price a moat that holds returns above the cost of capital for a long time, so only the forward methods, which assume the compounding continues, touch the price. The pattern is not a warning that the company is bad; it is a statement that the price already credits the quality.
Leverage is the one place the premium meets a hard number. Net debt of roughly $9.1 billion sits at more than five times trailing operating income, with operating earnings covering interest close to five times. For a business with 32.5% adjusted EBITDA margins and recession-resistant demand, that is a serviceable load, and the company's cash generation supports it. The decisive question for the value is not any single method's figure but the durability of the 6% core pricing that drives the whole model. As long as the exclusive and franchise positions let the company price above inflation, the growth the price assumes is plausible; if that pricing fades toward inflation, the gap between today's earnings power and today's price is what has to close.
Catalysts
The April 2026 first-quarter report set the near-term tone and it was a beat with a constructive outlook. EPS of $1.23 topped the $1.19 expectation, revenue rose 6.4% to $2.371 billion on a 6% core price increase, and adjusted EBITDA grew 8% to $769.5 million with the margin expanding 90 basis points to 32.5%. Volumes were down about 1.5%, roughly half a point from outsized weather, so the growth was price-led and acquisition-led, with $55 million of net acquisition revenue and 3.1% organic solid waste growth. Management framed the quarter as positioning for upside to the full-year 2026 outlook on better organic growth and higher commodity benefits, against a prior full-year guide of roughly $9.90 to $9.95 billion in revenue and $3.30 to $3.325 billion in adjusted EBITDA.
The catalysts from here are the cadence of price realization and the acquisition pipeline. Whether the 6% core pricing holds through contract renewals, whether volume churn keeps improving, and whether the company can keep folding in tuck-in deals at sensible multiples are the variables that move the compounding story the price depends on. Recycling commodity prices add a swing factor to any single quarter's reported result. The next earnings report is the event that confirms or undercuts the positioning-for-upside framing.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- WM (Waste Management, Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …$ 425 million and $ 58 million, respectively. Total assets by reportable segment as of December 31 are as follows (in millions): 2025 2024 Collection and Disposal: East Tier $ 16,099 $ 15,328 West Tier 12,245 11,786 Other Ancillary 801 779 Collection and…
- FY2025 10-K: …The inability to adequately increase prices to offset increased costs and inflationary pressures, or otherwise mitigate the impact of these conditions on our business, will increase our costs of doing business and reduce our margins. The environmental services industry is highly competitive, and if we cannot…
- RSG (REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …the documents incorporated by reference, as the case may be, or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events. Risks Related to Our Business and Operations The environmental services industry is highly competitive and includes competitors that may have greater financial and operational resources, flexibility to…
- FY2025 10-K: …disposal of certain types of wastes, such as yard waste, at landfills. Further, many of our customers voluntarily are diverting waste to alternatives to landfill disposal, such as recycling and composting, while also working to reduce the amount of waste they generate. Many of the largest companies in 22 T a b l e o…
- CWST (CASELLA WASTE SYSTEMS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …market presence. However, in the larger, more densely populated markets where we operate, we typically compete against one or more of the large national solid waste companies, including Waste Management, Inc., Republic Services, Inc. and Waste Connections, Inc., any of which may be able to achieve greater economies…
- FY2025 10-K: …as numerous regional and local solid waste companies. Intense competition exists not only to provide services to customers, but also to acquire other businesses within each market. Some of our competitors have significantly greater financial and other resources than we do. From time to time, competitors may reduce…
- CLH (CLEAN HARBORS, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …and other event-driven special projects could also cause interim variations in our results. These events could adversely impact the ability of our suppliers and customers to conduct business activities and could ultimately do so for an indefinite period of time. As a result, we may be required to suspend operations…
- FY2025 10-K: …competed in 2025. Each of these competitors is able to provide one or more of the products and services we offer. Under federal and state environmental laws in the United States, generators of hazardous waste remain liable and responsible for the proper disposal of such waste. Although generators may hire various…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-013700 · Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · Q4 2025 guidance