Waters Corporation (WAT): what the price requires
At today's price, Waters Corporation (WAT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~11.0 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/WAT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | WAT |
| Company | Waters Corporation |
| Current price | $371.98/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin today | 16.0% |
| Must persist for | 11.0y |
| Multiple paid | 69x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.3 years.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +2.88σ |
| cohort percentile (of 177 peers) | 92 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 14% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 8.40x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 9.57x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 3.22x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.03x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=12)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $153.87 | 2.42x | yes | FCF base $0.4B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $362.69 | 1.03x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 52.8x / 54.8x / 56.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $176.95 | 2.10x | yes | P/E 32.92x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 68x), scenarios: 26.3x / 32.9x / 39.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 24.85x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $59.37 | 6.27x | yes | BV/sh $186.17, ROE (TTM) 2.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $35.31 | 10.53x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $433.51 | 0.86x | yes | Rev $3.8B, growth 29% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.4x / 8.0x / 9.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $25.15 | 14.79x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.73B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $26.21 | 14.19x | yes | BV $186.17 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.9%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $181.91 | 2.04x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.90 × BVPS $186.17) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $36.24 | 10.26x | yes | EBITDA $0.64B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 37198.00x | yes | FCF $351.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 37198.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.29B (FCF $0.35B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $6.62 | 56.19x | yes | EPS $7.90 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $115.63 | 3.22x | yes | Revenue $3.80B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $85.41 | 4.36x | yes | EPS $7.90 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $5.0b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 10.39x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 8.21x |
| Interest coverage | 5.3x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Waters just transformed itself, closing the roughly $18.8 billion combination with BD's Biosciences and Diagnostic Solutions businesses in February 2026, more than doubling its revenue base and reorganizing into four segments.
- The defining feature is the recurring-revenue razor-and-blade model: Waters sells chromatography and mass-spectrometry systems, then earns for years on "chromatography columns, other consumable products" and service on the installed base.
- The biggest risk is the price and the integration together: the stock trades at a multiple at the very top of its peer group, and a deal this size has to be absorbed cleanly to justify it.
Bull Case
The most surprising thing in Waters' numbers is how little the trailing figures tell you about the company that now exists. The reported operating margin and return on equity look mediocre, but they are an artifact of a transformational acquisition that just closed: in February 2026 Waters combined with BD's Biosciences and Diagnostic Solutions businesses in a roughly $18.8 billion deal that more than doubled its revenue base and loaded the balance sheet with merger accounting. The trailing income statement describes the old Waters plus the cost of the deal; the forward business is far larger and broader. Reading this company off its trailing margins is reading the wrong company.
The underlying franchise is one of the best in scientific instruments. Waters sells high-performance liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry systems, the 10-K describing its core as "high-performance liquid chromatography, ultra-performance liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry technology systems and support products, including chromatography columns, other consumable products." That last clause is the moat: once a pharmaceutical lab validates a Waters instrument into its regulated workflow, it buys Waters consumables and service for the life of the machine, because re-validating on a competitor's system is costly and risky. That razor-and-blade recurring revenue is exactly what makes the business compound, and the BD combination extends it across diagnostics and bioscience research, broadening the installed base the consumables ride on.
The early execution supports the bull case. In the first quarter of 2026 organic revenue grew about 13% as reported, the acquired businesses contributed materially, and management raised full-year guidance, pointing to strong demand in pharmaceutical markets and targeting revenue synergies from the combination. Pharma and biotech R&D and quality-control spending is durable, and Waters sits at the analytical heart of it. The price implies growth held near the self-funding ceiling for about eleven years, a demanding bet, but for a business with this recurring-revenue moat, just broadened by a transformative deal and showing double-digit organic growth, the durability the price pays for is at least plausible.
Bear Case
The sector cycle is the threat the recurring-revenue story tends to underweight. Analytical instruments are capital equipment, and the systems half of Waters' business moves with customers' capital budgets. When pharmaceutical and biotech companies tighten R&D spending, or when academic and government labs face funding cuts, instrument orders slow first and sharply, and the 10-K acknowledges that customer "strategies" shifts "could adversely impact the Company's results of operations or financial condition." The consumables annuity cushions the downturn, but it does not eliminate the cyclicality of the instrument placements that grow the installed base. A multi-quarter pharma capex pause would hit the systems line and slow the very installed-base growth the recurring revenue depends on, and the business has seen demand cycles before.
The integration is the freshly added risk, and it is large. Absorbing an $18.8 billion business that more than doubles revenue is among the hardest things a company can attempt, and the BD businesses arrived with their own cultures, systems, sales forces, and customer relationships to merge. The 10-K notes the company has "reorganized the existing and new business units into the following four segments" following the close, which is the start of integration, not the end. Deals this size routinely take years to deliver promised synergies, and they distract management from the core business while they do. The market noticed: the acquired business arrived softer than some had modeled, a reminder that the combination is a bet, not a settled win.
The valuation leaves no room for either risk to bite. Even setting aside the merger-distorted trailing numbers, the multiple sits at the very top of the instrument peer group, well beyond the upper quartile, and the price implies a pace of growth that runs well above what Waters has historically delivered. Only about 14% of comparable fast-growers sustained this pace for a decade. The static value methods land far below the price because the trailing earnings power, even normalized, does not support it, and the balance sheet now carries net debt around five billion dollars, more than eight times trailing operating income, from funding the deal. If the integration stumbles or pharma capex softens, the premium has a long way to compress, and the static methods are where the stock falls back toward.
Valuation
The price is making a durable-compounding bet, but the headline multiple is distorted and must be read with the merger in mind. At about $356 (June 28, 2026) the trailing figure is roughly 66 times operating income, which inverts to growth held near the self-funding ceiling for about eleven years. That trailing multiple, though, is measured against an income statement that includes the cost of a transformative acquisition without the full benefit of the acquired earnings, so it overstates the richness. The cleaner read is that this is a premium-quality instruments business, now larger and broader, priced at the top of its sector for durability.
The methods we use to triangulate all sit below the price, which is the signature of a quality-growth premium. The earnings-power method, capitalizing normalized profit with no growth, lands near $26, and the asset-value methods, distorted by the merger-inflated book value and depressed trailing return, land lower still. The peer-multiple methods reach the $36 to $172 range depending on the lens. Only the forward-growth methods approach the price: the exit-multiple cash-flow method roughly reaches it by holding today's high EV/EBITDA flat, and the future-market-cap projection, crediting strong revenue growth, lands near it. When only the growth frames reach the price and every static frame says richly valued, the premium pays for durable compounding the static methods cannot frame, which for a recurring-revenue instruments leader is coherent but full. The peer cohort here, high-quality instrument and measurement names like Mettler-Toledo and Veralto, trades at premium multiples too, and Waters sits at the top of that group.
Solvency now carries the deal. Net debt around five billion dollars, more than eight times trailing operating income, is the cost of the BD combination, and while interest coverage near five times is serviceable, the leverage is real and the deleveraging depends on the combined business generating the cash the deal promised. The company is not burning cash, and the recurring consumables revenue is a stable base, but the balance sheet has less cushion than it did before the acquisition. The downside is bounded by the franchise and the recurring revenue; the risk is that the price has paid for an integration and a growth pace that both still have to be proven.
Catalysts
The defining event for Waters is the BD combination, closed February 9, 2026. Waters completed the roughly $18.8 billion acquisition of BD's Biosciences and Diagnostic Solutions businesses, a deal that more than doubles its revenue base and extends the company across diagnostics and bioscience research.
The first quarter under the new structure showed momentum. Waters reported net revenue of about $1.267 billion, with organic revenue of about $747 million up roughly 13% as reported and 11% in constant currency, and the acquired businesses contributing about $520 million on an owned-period basis. Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to organic constant-currency revenue growth of about 6.5% to 8.0% and total reported revenue of about $6.405 to $6.455 billion, including roughly $3 billion from the acquired businesses and about $50 million of first-year revenue synergies. The watch items are the integration of the BD businesses, whether the acquired operations meet the modeled contribution after arriving softer than some expected at close, the pace of synergy capture, and pharmaceutical capital-spending demand, which drives the instrument-placement half of the business.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Waters (single reportable segment) (reported)
- A (AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TMO (THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MTD (Mettler-Toledo International Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BRKR (BRUKER CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BIO (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company merger announcement, February 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, 2026 · Q1 2026 guidance, 2026