VALVOLINE INC. (VVV): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $36.99, VALVOLINE INC. (VVV) is priced for +9.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VVV
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | VVV |
| Company | VALVOLINE INC. |
| Current price | $36.99/sh |
| Composition | Oil changes and related fees 73% / Non-oil changes and related fees 22% / Franchise fees and other 6% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.4% |
| Operating margin today | 15.3% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -11.9pp |
| Implied growth | 9.2% |
| Multiple paid | 24x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~22.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.12σ |
| cohort percentile (of 46 peers) | 85 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.92x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.60x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.41x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.08x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $10.96 | 3.38x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $40.77 | 0.91x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 18.6x / 23.6x / 28.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $13.80 | 2.68x | yes | P/E 22x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 51x), scenarios: 16.5x / 22.0x / 26.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 11.28x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $7.87 | 4.70x | yes | BV/sh $2.75, ROE (TTM) 26.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $13.48 | 2.74x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $34.37 | 1.08x | yes | Rev $1.9B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.6x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $8.19 | 4.52x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.30B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $11.76 | 3.15x | yes | BV $2.75 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 26.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $6.72 | 5.51x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.73 × BVPS $2.75) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 3699.50x | yes | EBITDA $0.28B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 3699.50x | yes | FCF $100.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 3699.50x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.09B (FCF $0.10B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $0.61 | 60.65x | yes | EPS $0.73 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $1.03 | 35.92x | yes | BV $2.75 × (ROIC 2.9% / WACC 7.6%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $17.37 | 2.13x | yes | Revenue $1.86B × sector P/S 1.2x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $7.89 | 4.69x | yes | EPS $0.73 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.42x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 6.41x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -8.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Valvoline is now a pure-play retail oil-change and quick-service auto chain after selling its products business, running "approximately 15-minute stay-in-your-car oil changes" plus batteries, wipers, and tire rotations across a growing store network.
- The defining risk is the leverage funding the expansion: net debt sits near $1.8 billion, more than six times operating income, as the company buys both new stores and its own shares.
- What to watch is store count and same-store sales: systemwide comparable sales rose about 8.2% in the latest quarter, and the network reached roughly 2,409 locations with management raising its full-year comp outlook.
Bull Case
Look at how far the price sits above the various ways to value the business, because the pattern tells you what kind of bet this is. The static methods, asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples, all land well below the current price. Only the growth-projecting methods reach it. That is the signature of a durable-compounding bet: the market is paying for a business that grows steadily for years, and the methods that ignore growth structurally cannot justify the price. For a company adding stores and comping mid-single to high-single digits, that premium is at least coherent.
The business model is a genuine retail compounder. Valvoline's customer proposition is convenience and trust: a fast, stay-in-your-car oil change at a branded location, a service people need regularly and largely cannot do themselves anymore as cars get more complex. The 10-K describes a focus on "convenience and quality service" that lets the company "preserve margins by adjusting its pricing in response to changes in costs." Pricing power in a recurring, low-ticket service is exactly what makes a retail rollout work. The company added 170 net new system-wide stores in fiscal 2025 and is acquiring its way into adjacencies, including mobile maintenance through NuBrakes and the Breeze Autocare network, extending the retail footprint in key North American markets.
Capital allocation reinforces the growth story. Valvoline has been shrinking its share count aggressively, at roughly 8% a year, buying back stock while it builds out stores. A company that is confident enough to lever up, expand the footprint, and retire shares simultaneously is signaling conviction that the unit economics compound. The implied bet, about 12% operating growth for five years, sits within what Valvoline has recently delivered, and roughly 56% of comparable fast-growers sustained that pace for five years, a far better base rate than the more demanding names. This is a recurring-service retail franchise with real pricing power, and the price is paying for the rollout to continue, not for a miracle.
Bear Case
The competitive thesis is the sharpest threat, and it has two fronts. Up close, the quick-lube market is crowded: Valvoline competes against other branded chains, dealer service departments, and a long tail of independent operators, all chasing the same recurring oil-change customer. The 10-K is candid that even its own service development faces "intense competition," with "no assurance that any of the services Valvoline is currently developing, or could develop in the future, will achieve substantial commercial success." A rollout story depends on each new store finding enough customers in its trade area, and as the best locations fill up, the marginal store competes harder for a smaller incremental customer base.
The longer-horizon disruption is the one the price cannot easily hedge: electric vehicles do not need oil changes. Valvoline's core service is tied to the internal-combustion engine, and every EV on the road is a customer the quick-lube model permanently loses. The near-term impact is modest, and the company correctly frames the immediate pressure as labor and input-cost inflation rather than EV adoption. But the price is paying for roughly a decade of compounding, and over that horizon the EV transition is a real headwind to the addressable market that the bull case has to talk past. A business growing units into a slowly shrinking long-run pool is running up a down escalator.
The balance sheet is the amplifier. Net debt near $1.8 billion at more than six times operating income, funding both store growth and buybacks, leaves limited room if same-store sales slow. The static value methods are stark: book value per share is only about $2.75, earnings power capitalizes to single digits, and the price near $38 (June 28, 2026) sits at a large multiple of every frame except the growth projection. If the comp momentum fades, or labor costs compress the service margin, the stock has a long way to fall back toward the methods that do not assume the rollout continues. The leverage that magnifies the buyback's effect today magnifies the downside if growth disappoints.
Valuation
The price is making a durable-compounding bet, and the inversion makes it concrete. At about $38 the market pays roughly 26 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to operating growth of about 12% a year for five years. That pace is within what Valvoline has recently delivered, and the base rate is comparatively forgiving: roughly 56% of similar fast-growers sustained it for five years. The bet is reasonable, not heroic, but it is still a bet on the rollout continuing.
The methods we use to triangulate point the same way, which is the clearest read on the premium. The asset-value methods, anchored on a book value per share near $2.75, the earnings-power method capitalizing normalized profit with no growth, and the peer-multiple lens all land well below the price. Only the forward-growth methods reach it: the future-market-cap projection lands near the price, and the exit-multiple cash-flow method reaches it by holding today's EV/EBITDA roughly flat. When only the growth frames reach the price and every static frame says richly valued, the premium is paying for durable compounding the static methods cannot price. That is a moat-and-rollout premium, and it is coherent for a recurring-service retailer with pricing power, but it is a premium nonetheless. The peer cohort assigned here is a set of refiners and chemical names that does not fit a retail-service business, so the cleaner comparison is Valvoline against its own store economics and comp trajectory.
Solvency is the constraint on the growth bet. Net debt near $1.8 billion at more than six times operating income is meaningful leverage, taken on to fund both expansion and an aggressive buyback that has cut the share count by roughly 8% a year. The company is not burning cash, and the recurring-service revenue is steady, but the debt leaves little cushion if same-store sales slow or service margins compress under labor costs. The downside is bounded by the recurring demand and the store base; the risk is that the leverage front-loads a payoff the rollout still has to deliver.
Catalysts
Valvoline's second quarter of fiscal 2026 showed the rollout firing on both growth levers. Net sales rose about 25% year over year to roughly $504 million, driven by systemwide same-store sales growth of about 8.2%, split between more transactions and higher ticket, with adjusted EPS of about $0.41 beating expectations. Much of the jump came from a full quarter of the Breeze Autocare acquisition, which management said integrated more smoothly than expected and is capturing overhead synergies.
Management raised the comp outlook and kept building stores. Full-year fiscal 2026 systemwide same-store sales guidance was lifted to about 5% to 6.5%, with net revenue guidance held at roughly $2.0 to $2.1 billion. The company added 31 stores in the quarter to reach about 2,409 locations, with openings weighted to the back half of the year and a development pipeline behind them. On the risk side, management framed the near-term pressure as labor and input-cost inflation rather than any sudden electric-vehicle shift, putting the EV question on a longer horizon. The watch items are store-opening cadence, comp durability, and whether service margins hold against rising labor costs.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- DRVN (DRIVEN BRANDS HOLDINGS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …fluctuations related to the sale of air conditioning and heating parts. In addition, customers may defer or forego vehicle maintenance, such as oil changes, during periods of inclement weather. In our locations that sell or rotate tires, sales decrease during the period from January through April and in September.…
- FY2025 10-K: …other revenue, and company-operated store sales. The Auto Glass Now segment provides auto glass repair, replacement, and calibration services to commercial, retail, and insurance customers within the U.S. The Auto Glass Now segment derives substantially all of its revenue from company-operated store sales. The…
- MCW (Mister Car Wash, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …opportunities. While the competition for skilled labor is intense and subject to high turnover, we believe our approach to wages and benefits will continue to allow us to attract suitable team members and management to support our growth. Factors Affecting the Comparability of Our Results of Operations Our results…
- FY2025 10-K: 4 6 % The increase in net revenues was primarily attributable to growth in UWC Members, favorable wash package mix, price increases, and the year-over-year addition of 34 locations. Cost of Labor and Chemicals Year Ended December 31, (Dollars in thousands) 2025 2024 $ Change % Change Cost of labor and chemicals $…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q2 FY2026 earnings release, 2026 · Q2 FY2026 guidance, 2026 · Q2 FY2026 earnings call, 2026