Bristow Group Inc. (VTOL): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Bristow Group Inc. (VTOL) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VTOL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerVTOL
CompanyBristow Group Inc.
Current price$44.37/sh
CompositionOffshore Energy Services 66% / Government Services 25% / Other Services 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.4%
Operating margin today10.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.1pp
Multiple paid12x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~1.5%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.23σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)12
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.00x5justifies
Earnings1.92x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.36x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$40.411.10xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 6.2x / 8.2x / 10.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$41.291.07xyesBV/sh $35.23, ROE (TTM) 10.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$44.571.00xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$27.361.62xyesRev $1.5B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.9x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$7.865.65xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.07B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$45.200.98xyesBV $35.23 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.0%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$55.170.80xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.84 × BVPS $35.23) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.014437.00xyesFCF $59.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.014437.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.04B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$23.091.92xyesEPS $3.84 × (8.5 + 2×-0.7%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.714.57xyesBV $35.23 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 5.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.53B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$41.511.07xyesEPS $3.84 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Offshore Energy Servicesoperatingenterprise$990.5m$165.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Government Servicesoperatingenterprise$379.4m$5.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Other Servicesoperatingenterprise$120.6m$9.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$412.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.27x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.58x
Interest coverage3.6x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.6%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the biggest fear and then check whether the data supports it. The bear's headline worry is that Bristow is a leveraged play on offshore oil, a cyclical and structurally challenged end market, and that a downturn could gut the business. The fear is legitimate, but the current data points the other way. Offshore activity has been recovering, and crucially, the supply of the aircraft Bristow operates is tight. The company notes that "militaries and governments placing orders for helicopter models that share OEM production lines with civilian aircraft have contributed to longer lead times for new builds, in some instances taking upwards of" two years. When you cannot easily add the asset, the operators who own it gain pricing power. That is the opposite of a structurally doomed business; it is a supply-constrained one with rising rates.

The revenue mix is more defensive than the offshore label implies. About a quarter of the business is government services, primarily search-and-rescue contracts that the 10-K describes as customers who "primarily outsource SAR activities whereby we operate specialized helicopters." These are long-term, multi-year contracts with governments in the UK, Ireland, and elsewhere, providing a stable, contracted revenue base that does not move with the oil price. That stability underwrites the offshore exposure: even when energy customers pull back, the government book keeps flying.

The valuation is where the bull case gets concrete. At about $43 (June 28, 2026) the market pays only around 12 times operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a modest annual decline in operating profit would warrant. The price is supported by asset value and by the relative-multiple lens; this is a value name backed by a real, hard-to-replicate fleet, not a growth bet. Book value per share is near $35, so the equity trades at a modest premium to the net assets, and those assets are appreciating as new-build lead times keep the secondhand fleet scarce. Add a recovering offshore market, contracted government cash flow, and an early position in advanced air mobility, and the price looks like it is pricing decline into a business that is currently growing.

Bear Case

The bull case leans on a specific story, that tight aircraft supply and recovering offshore activity keep rates rising, and the bear's job is to ask which thread of that story is most fragile. The answer is the offshore demand assumption. The 10-K is unambiguous: demand is "substantially dependent on the level of offshore energy exploration, development and production activity," and a pullback in customer capital spending leads to "reduced demand for our services." Offshore oil is exactly the part of the energy complex most exposed to the long-term shift away from fossil fuels and to the boom-bust capital discipline of the majors. The current up-cycle in offshore rates is real, but it is a cycle, and the price already assumes the cash flow does not erode. If oil capital budgets tighten, the supply-constraint tailwind reverses into idle aircraft.

The government segment, the supposed ballast, carries its own dependency that the bull case understates. Government contracts are not the unconditional safety net they appear to be. The 10-K warns that contracting with public agencies carries "inherent risks," including the right of those agencies to "terminate contracts for convenience," or to "reduce, modify or cancel contracts." A multi-year SAR contract is stable until a government decides to rebid it, insource it, or trim it, and the renewal cliffs are concentrated events that can move a large slice of revenue at once. The contracted base is real, but it is not permanent.

The leverage and the earnings quality round out the caution. Net debt sits near $413 million, around two and a half times operating income, with interest coverage near three and a half times, manageable but not a fortress for a cyclical operator carrying expensive, maintenance-heavy assets. The earnings-power method, which capitalizes normalized profit with no growth, lands far below the price near $8, a reminder that the through-cycle profitability is thin and that today's reported earnings benefit from the favorable rate environment. The advanced-air-mobility optionality the company touts is years from revenue and should not be paid for today. Strip the cycle, and the durable earnings base is modest against the asset value the price leans on.

Valuation

Bristow is a value-and-asset name, and the inversion says so directly. At about $43 the market pays roughly 12 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. That is a bound, not a forecast: the price is not demanding growth, it is pricing in some erosion. For a business that is currently growing revenue and benefiting from tight aircraft supply, that is a conservative starting assumption.

The methods we use to triangulate cluster around the price from the value side. The asset-value methods, anchored on book value per share near $35 against a low-double-digit return on equity, land close to the price, around $41 to $45. The exit-multiple cash-flow method reaches just above it. The relative-multiple lens, comparing Bristow to a market-typical earnings multiple, lands well above the price near $75, suggesting the market is discounting the business relative to peers. The one frame that says expensive is the earnings-power method at about $8, which capitalizes a normalized profit that is thin through the cycle. The pattern is a price defended by the hard assets and the peer comparison, with the only bearish read coming from the conservative no-growth earnings lens. This is the signature of a value name, not a growth bet, and the spread is the gap between what the fleet is worth and what its average earnings capitalize to.

Solvency is adequate for the cycle but not generous. Net debt near $413 million at about two and a half times operating income, with interest coverage near three and a half times, leaves room in an up-cycle and would tighten in a downturn. Free cash flow is modest, reflecting the heavy maintenance and capital intensity of operating a helicopter fleet. The share count has crept up slightly. The downside is bounded by the asset value, which is real and currently appreciating as new-build lead times stay long; the risk is that the cycle, not the balance sheet, turns against the contracted and uncontracted revenue at once.

Catalysts

Bristow's Q1 2026 results showed the offshore and government engines both contributing. Total revenue rose about $11.4 million sequentially from the prior quarter, driven by higher activity in government services and improved rates across several offshore energy markets, while adjusted EBITDA dipped slightly sequentially on higher repairs, maintenance, and equipment costs. Management affirmed full-year 2026 guidance for total revenue of $1.6 to $1.7 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $295 to $325 million.

The structural catalyst is the tight helicopter supply. Management flagged that the fleet of offshore-configured heavy and super-medium helicopters remains tight, with new capacity constrained by long manufacturing lead times, which supports continued pricing strength in the offshore market. Longer term, Bristow continues to position itself as an early operator in advanced air mobility, the next generation of electric and hybrid-electric aircraft, leveraging its existing operating expertise, though that remains a future option rather than a current revenue driver. On capital returns, buyback activity has been minimal, with no repurchases in the first quarter of 2026 under the existing program. The watch items are offshore rate momentum and the renewal status of the multi-year government contracts.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Offshore Energy Services / Government Services (reported)

Other Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · company 10-K and earnings commentary, 2026 · company filings, 2026

View the full interactive VTOL report on boothcheck