Bristow Group Inc. (VTOL): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers Bristow Group Inc. (VTOL) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VTOL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | VTOL |
| Company | Bristow Group Inc. |
| Current price | $44.37/sh |
| Composition | Offshore Energy Services 66% / Government Services 25% / Other Services 8% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 6.4% |
| Operating margin today | 10.5% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -4.1pp |
| Multiple paid | 12x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~1.5%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.23σ |
| cohort percentile (of 221 peers) | 12 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.00x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 1.92x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 1.36x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $40.41 | 1.10x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.2x / 8.2x / 10.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $41.29 | 1.07x | yes | BV/sh $35.23, ROE (TTM) 10.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $44.57 | 1.00x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $27.36 | 1.62x | yes | Rev $1.5B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.9x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $7.86 | 5.65x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.07B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $45.20 | 0.98x | yes | BV $35.23 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.0%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $55.17 | 0.80x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.84 × BVPS $35.23) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 4437.00x | yes | FCF $59.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 4437.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.04B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $23.09 | 1.92x | yes | EPS $3.84 × (8.5 + 2×-0.7%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $9.71 | 4.57x | yes | BV $35.23 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 5.7%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $1.53B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $41.51 | 1.07x | yes | EPS $3.84 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offshore Energy Services | operating | enterprise | $990.5m | $165.6m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Government Services | operating | enterprise | $379.4m | $5.1m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Other Services | operating | enterprise | $120.6m | $9.8m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $412.7m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.27x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.58x |
| Interest coverage | 3.6x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Bristow flies people and equipment to offshore oil platforms and runs government search-and-rescue contracts; the 10-K describes energy customers chartering its helicopters "to transport personnel to, from and between onshore bases and offshore production platforms, drilling rigs and other installations."
- The defining risk is the energy cycle: demand is "substantially dependent on the level of offshore energy exploration, development and production activity," so a downturn in offshore spending feeds straight through to revenue.
- What to watch is the offshore pricing tailwind from a tight helicopter fleet: management affirmed full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $1.6 to $1.7 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $295 to $325 million.
Bull Case
Start with the biggest fear and then check whether the data supports it. The bear's headline worry is that Bristow is a leveraged play on offshore oil, a cyclical and structurally challenged end market, and that a downturn could gut the business. The fear is legitimate, but the current data points the other way. Offshore activity has been recovering, and crucially, the supply of the aircraft Bristow operates is tight. The company notes that "militaries and governments placing orders for helicopter models that share OEM production lines with civilian aircraft have contributed to longer lead times for new builds, in some instances taking upwards of" two years. When you cannot easily add the asset, the operators who own it gain pricing power. That is the opposite of a structurally doomed business; it is a supply-constrained one with rising rates.
The revenue mix is more defensive than the offshore label implies. About a quarter of the business is government services, primarily search-and-rescue contracts that the 10-K describes as customers who "primarily outsource SAR activities whereby we operate specialized helicopters." These are long-term, multi-year contracts with governments in the UK, Ireland, and elsewhere, providing a stable, contracted revenue base that does not move with the oil price. That stability underwrites the offshore exposure: even when energy customers pull back, the government book keeps flying.
The valuation is where the bull case gets concrete. At about $43 (June 28, 2026) the market pays only around 12 times operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a modest annual decline in operating profit would warrant. The price is supported by asset value and by the relative-multiple lens; this is a value name backed by a real, hard-to-replicate fleet, not a growth bet. Book value per share is near $35, so the equity trades at a modest premium to the net assets, and those assets are appreciating as new-build lead times keep the secondhand fleet scarce. Add a recovering offshore market, contracted government cash flow, and an early position in advanced air mobility, and the price looks like it is pricing decline into a business that is currently growing.
Bear Case
The bull case leans on a specific story, that tight aircraft supply and recovering offshore activity keep rates rising, and the bear's job is to ask which thread of that story is most fragile. The answer is the offshore demand assumption. The 10-K is unambiguous: demand is "substantially dependent on the level of offshore energy exploration, development and production activity," and a pullback in customer capital spending leads to "reduced demand for our services." Offshore oil is exactly the part of the energy complex most exposed to the long-term shift away from fossil fuels and to the boom-bust capital discipline of the majors. The current up-cycle in offshore rates is real, but it is a cycle, and the price already assumes the cash flow does not erode. If oil capital budgets tighten, the supply-constraint tailwind reverses into idle aircraft.
The government segment, the supposed ballast, carries its own dependency that the bull case understates. Government contracts are not the unconditional safety net they appear to be. The 10-K warns that contracting with public agencies carries "inherent risks," including the right of those agencies to "terminate contracts for convenience," or to "reduce, modify or cancel contracts." A multi-year SAR contract is stable until a government decides to rebid it, insource it, or trim it, and the renewal cliffs are concentrated events that can move a large slice of revenue at once. The contracted base is real, but it is not permanent.
The leverage and the earnings quality round out the caution. Net debt sits near $413 million, around two and a half times operating income, with interest coverage near three and a half times, manageable but not a fortress for a cyclical operator carrying expensive, maintenance-heavy assets. The earnings-power method, which capitalizes normalized profit with no growth, lands far below the price near $8, a reminder that the through-cycle profitability is thin and that today's reported earnings benefit from the favorable rate environment. The advanced-air-mobility optionality the company touts is years from revenue and should not be paid for today. Strip the cycle, and the durable earnings base is modest against the asset value the price leans on.
Valuation
Bristow is a value-and-asset name, and the inversion says so directly. At about $43 the market pays roughly 12 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. That is a bound, not a forecast: the price is not demanding growth, it is pricing in some erosion. For a business that is currently growing revenue and benefiting from tight aircraft supply, that is a conservative starting assumption.
The methods we use to triangulate cluster around the price from the value side. The asset-value methods, anchored on book value per share near $35 against a low-double-digit return on equity, land close to the price, around $41 to $45. The exit-multiple cash-flow method reaches just above it. The relative-multiple lens, comparing Bristow to a market-typical earnings multiple, lands well above the price near $75, suggesting the market is discounting the business relative to peers. The one frame that says expensive is the earnings-power method at about $8, which capitalizes a normalized profit that is thin through the cycle. The pattern is a price defended by the hard assets and the peer comparison, with the only bearish read coming from the conservative no-growth earnings lens. This is the signature of a value name, not a growth bet, and the spread is the gap between what the fleet is worth and what its average earnings capitalize to.
Solvency is adequate for the cycle but not generous. Net debt near $413 million at about two and a half times operating income, with interest coverage near three and a half times, leaves room in an up-cycle and would tighten in a downturn. Free cash flow is modest, reflecting the heavy maintenance and capital intensity of operating a helicopter fleet. The share count has crept up slightly. The downside is bounded by the asset value, which is real and currently appreciating as new-build lead times stay long; the risk is that the cycle, not the balance sheet, turns against the contracted and uncontracted revenue at once.
Catalysts
Bristow's Q1 2026 results showed the offshore and government engines both contributing. Total revenue rose about $11.4 million sequentially from the prior quarter, driven by higher activity in government services and improved rates across several offshore energy markets, while adjusted EBITDA dipped slightly sequentially on higher repairs, maintenance, and equipment costs. Management affirmed full-year 2026 guidance for total revenue of $1.6 to $1.7 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $295 to $325 million.
The structural catalyst is the tight helicopter supply. Management flagged that the fleet of offshore-configured heavy and super-medium helicopters remains tight, with new capacity constrained by long manufacturing lead times, which supports continued pricing strength in the offshore market. Longer term, Bristow continues to position itself as an early operator in advanced air mobility, the next generation of electric and hybrid-electric aircraft, leveraging its existing operating expertise, though that remains a future option rather than a current revenue driver. On capital returns, buyback activity has been minimal, with no repurchases in the first quarter of 2026 under the existing program. The watch items are offshore rate momentum and the renewal status of the multi-year government contracts.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Offshore Energy Services / Government Services (reported)
- SKYW (SKYWEST INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …payments received $ - $ - $ ( 151,320 ) Revenue recognized that was deferred in previous period 30,053 35,501 - Increase (decrease) in unbilled revenue 8,192 7,871 ( 12,601 ) Total non-lease revenue recognized (deferred) 38,245 43,372 ( 163,921 ) Lease fixed monthly payments: …
- FY2025 10-K: …Certain routes under the Company's prorate agreements are subsidized by the U.S. Department of Transportation under the Essential Air Service ("EAS") program, a program created to ensure small communities in the United States maintain a minimum level of scheduled air service. The EAS contracts are generally between…
- ALGT (ALLEGIANT TRAVEL COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …and fixed fee air transportation services. Sunseeker Resort Segment The Company's consolidated financial statements include the operating results of Sunseeker Resort through the completion of the sale of the Resort's assets on September 4, 2025. The Sunseeker Resort segment was operated as a single business unit and…
- FY2025 10-K: …by the decrease in average fuel prices year over year. Resort and other revenue. Resort and other revenue decreased $11.3 million or 15.6 percent primarily due to the sale of Sunseeker Resort on September 4, 2025, resulting in approximately four fewer months of revenue included in 2025 compared to 2024. Operating…
- JBLU (JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …is disruption to our information technology systems or loss, unlawful disclosure or misappropriation of, or unsanctioned access to, our customers', crewmembers', business partners' or our own information or other breaches of our information security. We rely on computer systems, hardware, software, technology…
- FY2025 10-K: DSS") and related requirements or rectify a security issue may result in fines and the imposition of restrictions on our ability to accept credit cards as a form of payment. Any such loss, disclosure or misappropriation of, or access to, customers', crewmembers' or business partners' information or other breach of our…
Other Services (reported)
- SKYW (SKYWEST INC)
- FY2025 10-K: ● disruptions in the credit markets, which may impact availability of price competitive financing; ● weather and natural disasters. The effect of any, or some combination, of the foregoing economic and industry conditions on our operations or financial condition is virtually impossible to forecast; however, the…
- FY2025 10-K: …outsourced maintenance services could delay our efforts to place stored aircraft back into service. Further, in the event that one or more vendors experiences labor shortages, aircraft part shortages, seeks bankruptcy protection, ceases operation or fails to perform as promised, replacement services may not be…
- ALGT (ALLEGIANT TRAVEL COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …for an additional cost to customers. These optional air-related services and products include larger seats, baggage fees, advance seat assignments, our own travel protection product, change fees, use of our call center for purchases, priority boarding, a customer convenience fee, food and beverage purchases on board,…
- FY2025 10-K: …fees for services many U.S. airlines have historically only bundled in their base fare. This pricing structure allows us to target travelers who are most concerned with low fare travel while also allowing travelers to customize their experience with us by purchasing only the additional conveniences they value. For…
- JBLU (JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …to book our premium economy offering on a single ticket through travel agents and online travel agencies. 8 Table of Contents Customers on select coast-to-coast, Caribbean and Latin American routes and all transatlantic flights have the option to purchase Mint ® , our lie-flat premium service. Each Mint ® seat…
- FY2025 10-K: DSS") and related requirements or rectify a security issue may result in fines and the imposition of restrictions on our ability to accept credit cards as a form of payment. Any such loss, disclosure or misappropriation of, or access to, customers', crewmembers' or business partners' information or other breach of our…
- WLFC (WILLIS LEASE FINANCE CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …are recorded as financial assets and classified as notes receivable under ASC 842, "Leases," as they are failed sale-leaseback transactions. The Company may sell its equipment classified as notes receivable, and the net gain or loss on such sales is recognized as revenue and consists of proceeds associated with the…
- FY2025 10-K: …and adversely affected if we were removed from these positions. We are the servicer and administrative agent with respect to engines in the WEST III, WEST V, WEST VI, WEST VII, WEST VIII, and WEST IX facilities and the servicer agent with respect to engines in WWFL. We receive monthly fees of 11.5% as servicer (3.5%…
- FTAI (FTAI AVIATION LTD.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Agreement; (ii) issued to the Former Manager (for itself and on behalf of the Master GP, as applicable) the Share Consideration; and (iii) purchased from Master GP all of its partnership interests in FTAI Aviation Holdco Ltd., a subsidiary of the Company, in exchange for $ 30 thousand. Following the Internalization,…
- FY2025 10-K: …in the United States, Canada and Europe. Our maintenance facilities could become unavailable either temporarily or permanently due to labor disruptions at any of our facilities or other circumstances that may be beyond our control, such as geopolitical developments or logistical complications arising from…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · company 10-K and earnings commentary, 2026 · company filings, 2026