VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC (VSH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $33.19, VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC (VSH) is priced for +21.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VSH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerVSH
CompanyVISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC
Current price$33.19/sh
CompositionMOSFETs 21% / Diodes 19% / Optoelectronic Components 7% / Resistors 25% / Inductors 12% / Capacitors 16%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.6%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)8.5%
Margin expansion (value-band)+0.1pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)2.4%
Implied growth21.7%
Multiple paid19x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.8pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.11σ
cohort percentile (of 187 peers)25
sustained it ~5 years at this level40%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset18.04x1expensive
Earnings2.38x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0.89x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$52.060.64xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.2B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 48.4x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 2003x), scenarios: 40.1x / 48.4x / 56.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$0.18184.39xyesBV/sh $15.10, ROE (TTM) 0.1%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$0.09368.78xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$29.131.14xyesRev $3.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.4x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.3594.83xyesEPS $0.01, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=57.23 (Overvalued) (excluded from median)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$13.942.38xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.32B × (1−40%) / WACC 7.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$0.06553.17xyesBV $15.10 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 0.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 0.1%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$1.8418.04xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.01 × BVPS $15.10) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.31B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$0.32103.72xyesEPS $0.01 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.9833.87xyesBV $15.10 × (ROIC 0.5% / WACC 7.5%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.19B × sector P/S 5.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$0.3789.70xyesEPS $0.01 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x (excluded from median)
Earnings YieldEarnings$0.11301.73xyesEPS $0.01 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) (excluded from median)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
MOSFETsoperatingenterprise$630.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Diodesoperatingenterprise$592.8mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Optoelectronic Componentsoperatingenterprise$216.6mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Resistorsoperatingenterprise$759.3m$2.8b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Inductorsoperatingenterprise$364.4m$1.9b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Capacitorsoperatingenterprise$505.6m$1.9b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$503.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.33x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.86x
Interest coverage6.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.4%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 8.5%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the gap between what the trailing numbers show and what the business actually is. On reported earnings Vishay looks broken, near-zero EPS, a 2.4% operating margin, the kind of figures that scream distress. But those are trough numbers from the bottom of a semiconductor and components cycle, not the steady-state economics of the company. On its own through-the-cycle margins the business earns closer to 8.5%, and the recovery is already underway. The reported numbers are the cycle, not the company.

What the company is, structurally, is a designed-in supplier across the entire electronics industry. Vishay's components are specified into customer products at the engineering stage, and once a part is "designed in to new end products," as the 10-K puts it, it tends to stay there for the life of that product. The breadth is the moat: the filing notes Vishay's "semiconductors and passive components can populate greater than 80% of the components on the circuit board in many applications," supported by a field-engineering sales force that offers "the complete breadth of the Vishay portfolio." That breadth is hard for a single-product competitor to match and gives Vishay a seat at the design table across automotive, industrial, and defense customers.

The demand tailwind behind the recovery is real and secular. The 10-K ties its capacity investment to "accelerated electrification, such as factory automation, electrical vehicles, A.I., and 5G infrastructure," all of which use more discrete and passive content per unit than the products they replace. Vishay is spending ahead of that demand, expanding internal and external capacity to scale with customers. If the cycle turns as the early order data suggests, the company emerges with more capacity, higher-margin mix, and the same designed-in positions, geared into an upturn it has been investing through.

Bear Case

The capital-allocation choice at the center of this story cuts both ways, and the bear sees the risk side. Vishay is spending heavily on capacity, the Vishay 3.0 expansion, precisely when its own profitability is at a cyclical low. The 10-K is candid about the danger: "capacity that we add during upturns in the business" can become a fixed-cost burden if demand disappoints, and a "slowdown in demand or recessionary trends in the global economy makes it more difficult for us to predict our future sales and manage our operations." Building capacity into a hoped-for recovery is the classic cyclical trap: get the timing wrong and the new plants sit underutilized, dragging margins lower for years. The company is making a large, irreversible bet on the cycle turning on schedule.

The price assumes that bet pays off and then some. At today's level the market pays about 36 times normalized operating income, which inverts to growth held near the self-funding ceiling for roughly twelve years. That is a long runway for a business whose end markets are inherently cyclical and whose pricing is exposed to Asian competitors in commoditized component lines. History is unkind to that duration: only about 15% of comparable fast-growers sustained this pace for even a decade. Strip the recovery assumption and the static value methods land far below the price, in the teens of dollars per share, because the earnings power at trough margins simply is not there.

The balance sheet is the saving grace and the constraint. Vishay carries net debt around $504 million, roughly two times operating income, with interest coverage near seven times, manageable but not fortress-like for a company funding a heavy capex program through a downturn. To its credit, the share count has edged down rather than up, so management is not diluting holders to fund the expansion. But that means the capacity is being financed from cash flow and the balance sheet, leaving less room for error if the cycle stalls. The bull case requires the upturn, the margin recovery, and the capex paying off all at once, and the price has already credited that sequence.

Valuation

Vishay is a cyclical business priced off its mid-cycle, not its trough, and getting that right is the whole valuation. Because trailing earnings are depressed by the downturn, the cleaner read uses the company's own through-the-cycle margins on current revenue: on that basis the price pays about 36 times normalized operating income, which inverts to operating growth held near its self-funding ceiling for roughly twelve years. The pace is within what Vishay has delivered in past upturns; the stretch is the duration.

The methods we use to triangulate are distorted by the trough and need to be read with that in mind. Anchored on near-zero trailing earnings, the earnings-based methods produce absurd multiples and tiny fair values, which is the math telling you the denominator has collapsed, not that the business is worthless. The more meaningful reads are the ones less sensitive to the trough: the forward-growth projection, crediting a revenue recovery, lands in the $40s to high $50s, near but mostly below the price, and the peer-multiple methods on enterprise value reach the low $30s. Even on the kindest forward frame the price sits at or above where the methods land, which is why the characterization is that the price is a bet beyond what the standard frames comfortably support. The bet is the recovery, and the price has already paid for it. The closest comparison is the broader semiconductor and components cohort, where the peer filings carry the same cycle-sensitive economics.

Solvency is the floor under the cyclical bet. Net debt near $504 million sits around two times operating income with interest coverage near seven times, and the share count has fallen slightly rather than risen. That is a company funding its expansion without diluting holders, which is the right discipline, but it also means the balance sheet, not outside capital, absorbs the cost if the upturn is late. The downside is bounded by real assets and a manageable debt load; the upside is entirely a function of the cycle the price has front-run.

Catalysts

Vishay's Q1 2026 print was the clearest sign yet that the cycle has turned. Revenue rose about 17.3% year over year to roughly $839.2 million, above the company's guidance, with gross margin recovering to about 21.0% and the company swinging to a GAAP profit of about $0.05 per share from a year-earlier loss. The forward demand signal was stronger still: total book-to-bill ran about 1.34, led by roughly 1.47 in semiconductors, meaning new orders are outpacing shipments across the portfolio.

Guidance pointed to continued recovery. For Q2 2026 management guided to revenue of roughly $875 million to $905 million with gross margin near 22%, a further sequential step up. Management framed the results as evidence that its Vishay 3.0 strategy is working, pointing to capacity investments in higher-growth, higher-margin products and demand strength in automotive, industrial, and aerospace and defense, with AI-related applications cited as a growth area. The watch items are the durability of the order momentum and whether the heavy capacity spending converts into the margin recovery the price already assumes.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

MOSFETs (reported)

Diodes (reported)

Optoelectronic Components (reported)

Resistors / Inductors / Capacitors (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call, 2026 · Q2 2026 guidance, 2026

View the full interactive VSH report on boothcheck