VSE CORPORATION (VSEC): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $215.09, VSE CORPORATION (VSEC) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~13.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VSEC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerVSEC
CompanyVSE CORPORATION
Current price$215.09/sh
CompositionProducts 63% / Services 37%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.1%
Operating margin today8.3%
Margin compression (value-band)-0.2pp
Must persist for13.6y
Multiple paid53x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.2 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~10.3 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: high

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.91σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)94
sustained it ~10 years at this level14%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset11.13x3expensive
Earnings8.84x3expensive
Relative2.81x5expensive
Growth5.28x2expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$23.339.22xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.0B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$101.462.12xyesP/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 120x), scenarios: 31.7x / 39.6x / 47.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 22.45x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$19.3211.13xyesBV/sh $95.79, ROE (TTM) 1.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$10.7420.03xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$160.151.34xyesRev $1.2B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.1x / 5.1x / 6.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$24.368.83xyesEPS $2.03, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=107.60 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$24.328.84xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.05B × (1−15%) / WACC 8.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$7.7827.65xyesBV $95.79 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.2%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$66.143.25xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.03 × BVPS $95.79) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$76.672.81xyesEBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$65.503.28xyesEPS $2.03 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$16.1013.36xyesBV $95.79 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 8.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$106.062.03xyesRevenue $1.18B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$76.132.83xyesEPS $2.03 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$21.959.80xyesEPS $2.03 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Aviation (whole-company)operatingenterprise1.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$878.4m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-10.55x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-8.98x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)21.4%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

VSE's moat is the boring, durable kind: it is the middleman aviation cannot skip. The company buys the rights to distribute specific aircraft parts, often exclusively, and performs the maintenance and repair that keeps planes flying, and once it controls a part line and the supplier relationships behind it, switching costs and certification barriers make that position hard to dislodge. The 10-K describes the business as serving "private and commercial aircraft owners, other aviation MRO providers, and aviation original equipment manufacturers," recognizing revenue "for the sale of aircraft parts at a point in time when control is transferred to the customer" and "for MRO services over time as the services are transferred." That is a recurring, consumable-driven demand stream tied to the global fleet, not to any single aircraft program.

The strategic reset is the bull case in motion. VSE has shed its lower-margin, capital-heavy legacy businesses and concentrated entirely on aviation aftermarket, a market with structurally higher margins and steadier demand. The Honeywell distribution relationship, amended in 2026 to expand the scope of rights and extend the useful lives of the acquired assets, is the kind of OEM partnership that anchors a distribution franchise. Each bolt-on acquisition adds part lines, geographic reach, and supplier relationships that compound: the Precision Aviation Group deal alone took the platform to 61 locations across eight countries spanning commercial, business, general aviation, and rotorcraft.

The operating results are validating the strategy. Q1 2026 revenue rose about 27% year over year with GAAP net income more than doubling, and management raised full-year guidance to revenue growth of 57% to 61% with adjusted EBITDA margins targeted in the 18% range and a long-term goal above 20%. A company expanding both its top line and its margin while building scale in a consolidating market is doing the hard part of a roll-up correctly. If the integration holds, the aftermarket platform VSE is assembling is the kind of asset that compounds for years.

Bear Case

The balance sheet is where the bull story meets its bill. VSE has funded its transformation with a mix of cash, large equity raises, and term debt, and the cost shows up in the share count, which has grown at roughly a 21% annual pace. Existing holders own a steadily smaller slice of the company even as it gets bigger. The Precision Aviation Group acquisition alone, at about $2.025 billion, was financed partly with a $900 million senior secured Term Loan B, so the company is layering acquisition debt on top of dilution. A roll-up works only if the acquired businesses earn more than the cost of the capital used to buy them, and that math is unproven until the deals are fully integrated and the synergies show up in margins rather than slides.

Integration is the operational risk the price ignores. Trailing earnings are depressed, with reported EPS near $2.03 against a price of $220 (June 28, 2026), because acquisition, financing, and integration costs are running through the income statement faster than the acquired profits have ramped. The 10-K names the competitive pressure plainly: "some of the Company's original equipment manufacturer competitors have greater name recognition than VSE, as well as complementary lines of business and financial, marketing and other resources that the Company does not have." A distributor squeezed between large OEMs above and consolidating MRO customers below has to keep proving its independent value.

There is also concentration that the diversification story papers over. The 10-K discloses "material customer concentration within its business operations," with "a group of affiliated customers under common ownership" accounting for a material portion of revenue. Lose or renegotiate that relationship and the growth math changes. The hardest fact is the valuation itself: no standard method reaches the price. Asset value, earnings power, peer multiples, and even forward-growth projections all land below $220. The price is a bet that the integration succeeds, the margins hit the 20% target, and the acquired businesses compound, all at once. That is a high bar, and the methods that do not assume it leave a long way to fall.

Valuation

The price is making an unusually demanding bet. At $220 the market pays about 59 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to operating growth held near its self-funding ceiling for roughly fifteen years. The near-term pace is within what VSE has recently delivered, helped by acquisitions, but sustaining it for that long is the stretch: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers held this pace for even a decade.

The methods we use to triangulate are unanimous in one direction, which is itself the signal. No family reaches the price. The asset-value methods, anchored on book value per share near $96 against a depressed trailing return on equity, land in the teens to low $20s. The earnings-power method, capitalizing normalized profit with no growth, lands near $24. The peer-multiple methods reach the $76 to $106 range. Even the forward-growth projection, which credits 30% revenue growth, lands around $163, still below the price. When every standard frame says expensive and even the growth extrapolation does not reach the price, the premium is a bet beyond what any method supports. In plain terms, the price already credits the roll-up working flawlessly and the margins climbing to their long-term target. The closest peer comparison is the broader aerospace aftermarket cohort, where companies like Heico and StandardAero carry their own filings on the same distribution-and-MRO economics.

Solvency reads as net cash, but that is a snapshot in the middle of a financing cycle. VSE held about $878 million of net cash at the reporting date, a figure inflated by recent equity raises ahead of the acquisitions that figure is meant to fund. The truer picture is a company taking on term debt to buy growth while diluting equity to fund the rest. Interest coverage near nine times is comfortable today, but the leverage and dilution are the real cost of the strategy, and the price has front-run the payoff.

Catalysts

VSE's Q1 2026 print showed the strategy gaining momentum. Total revenue rose about 27% year over year to roughly $324.6 million, GAAP net income roughly doubled to about $29.1 million, and adjusted diluted EPS reached about $1.17, up 50% and beating expectations by more than 30%. Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to revenue growth of 57% to 61% with adjusted EBITDA margins targeted at 18.1% to 18.5%, and set a longer-term goal of consolidated adjusted EBITDA margins above 20%.

The acquisition engine is the main driver and the main risk to watch. VSE completed the roughly $2.025 billion purchase of Precision Aviation Group, expanding the platform to 61 locations across eight countries, financed with cash, equity, and a $900 million senior secured Term Loan B. On March 28, 2026 the company amended its asset-purchase and license agreement with Honeywell, originally signed in September 2023, to expand the scope of distribution rights and extend the useful lives of certain acquired assets, deepening the OEM relationship that anchors the parts business. The integration of these deals, and whether the margins climb toward the stated targets, is what the next several quarters will test.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Aviation (whole-company) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, 2026 · company acquisition announcement, 2026 · company 8-K, March 2026

View the full interactive VSEC report on boothcheck