VERIS RESIDENTIAL, INC. (VRE): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for VERIS RESIDENTIAL, INC. (VRE) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VRE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | VRE |
| Company | VERIS RESIDENTIAL, INC. |
| Current price | $18.99/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Price-to-FFO | 11.0x |
| FFO yield | 9.1% |
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr funds-from-operations decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.42σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 18 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.78x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 14.39x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.85x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=8)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $20.50 | 0.93x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 34.7x / 36.7x / 38.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $22.88 | 0.83x | yes | P/E 25.81x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 12x), scenarios: 21.6x / 25.8x / 30.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25.02x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $7.61 | 2.50x | yes | BV/sh $11.06, ROE (TTM) 6.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $6.21 | 3.06x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $15.06 | 1.26x | no | Rev $0.3B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.6x / 6.7x / 7.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $6.02 | 3.15x | yes | BV $11.06 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.1%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $19.83 | 0.96x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $1.58 × BVPS $11.06) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $4.86 | 3.91x | yes | EBITDA $0.09B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1899.00x | yes | FCF $76.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.32 | 14.39x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $17.08 | 1.11x | no | Revenue $0.29B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $17.08 | 1.11x | no | FFO/share $1.58 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $22.42 | 0.85x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.16B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 102M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt (REIT basis) | $1.4b |
| Net debt / FFO | 8.82x |
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $161.5m |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Veris Residential is a mature, single-market multifamily REIT concentrated in the New Jersey waterfront, priced near 12 times AFFO, the cash a property owner actually keeps after the recurring spending that keeps its buildings leasable.
- The dominant fact is corporate, not operational: an investor group led by Affinius Capital, partnered with Vista Hill Partners, took the company private at $19.00 a share in an all-cash deal that closed on May 27, 2026, so the listed shares no longer trade.
- The deal price, struck at a premium of more than 23% to the unaffected close, settled the public market's long-running discount to private-market apartment value rather than waiting for AFFO growth to do it.
Bull Case
Read the price the way a buyer of the whole company would, and Veris stops looking like a growth question. It is a mature, stabilized apartment owner: a concentrated portfolio of Class A multifamily on the New Jersey waterfront, leased and occupied, throwing off a steady stream of cash. At roughly 12 times AFFO, the cash a property owner keeps after the recurring capital spending that just keeps its existing buildings leasable, the listed price asked for very little. It did not ask the rent roll to grow quickly. It asked it not to shrink. For a stabilized portfolio in a supply-constrained market, that is a low bar, and it is the bar a private buyer was willing to clear.
The business that supports that bar is the New Jersey Gold Coast, the stretch of Hudson River waterfront across from Manhattan. Veris spent years narrowing itself to it, selling office and suburban assets to become a pure-play apartment owner in a market where new high-rise supply is slow, expensive, and politically hard to add. Net operating income, the rent a property collects after the cost of running it, is the engine here, and same-property NOI is how an apartment owner shows the existing portfolio is still pricing up. A buyer paying near private-market value for stabilized waterfront product is underwriting durability of that rent, not a reacceleration of it.
The strongest version of the bull case is the one that actually happened. On February 23, 2026 the company agreed to an all-cash take-private led by Affinius Capital with Vista Hill Partners, and the deal closed on May 27 at $19.00 a share. The price was a premium of more than 23% to the unaffected February close, which is the market's own admission that the listed shares had been trading below what the bricks were worth to a buyer who could finance and operate them privately. The asset-value lens told the same story before the deal: book-based measures of the equity sat well under the share price, but apartment buildings are worth their NOI and their replacement cost, not their depreciated carrying value, and a private bid is the cleanest proof of which number is real.
Bear Case
The variable with the most leverage over a leveraged apartment owner is the one Veris cannot control: interest rates. A multifamily REIT is a spread business. It owns long-lived buildings funded with mortgage and corporate debt, and its value is the gap between the cash those buildings produce and the cost of the money financing them. When financing costs rise, two things happen at once. Refinancing maturing debt gets more expensive, draining cash that would otherwise reach equity, and the capitalization rate buyers apply to apartment NOI widens, which lowers the price every building would fetch. The listed shares priced this exposure plainly: at around 12 times AFFO, in the lower half of the REIT group's price-to-funds-from-operations, the market was paying for almost no growth and discounting the rate risk into the multiple. That is the honest read of a cheap REIT in a higher-rate world, not a mispricing.
The balance sheet is where that macro sensitivity lands. Veris funds itself with property-level mortgage debt, and fixed-charge coverage, the cushion between the cash it earns and the fixed payments it owes, sat near 2.9 times. That is adequate, not comfortable, for a single-market owner with no second leg to lean on. The company also reports GAAP losses, the ordinary result of heavy property depreciation running through the income statement, but the consequence is real: the standard earnings-power and asset-value methods, which take book value and reported profit at face value, land far below the share price. Those methods understate an apartment owner, yet they also remove any earnings cushion if cash flow ever needs defending.
The deeper structural fragility is concentration. One metropolitan market, one property type, one rate cycle. There is no geographic diversification to absorb a regional shock, no second business to fund the dividend if waterfront occupancy or rents soften, and the dividend itself, at $0.08 a quarter, signals a company conserving cash rather than distributing it generously. The resolution to all of this was not an operating fix but a sale: the public discount persisted long enough that a private buyer, able to apply patient capital and private-market leverage, simply bought the whole thing. For a public holder, the bear case ended at $19.00 in cash, which is both the floor and the ceiling now that the shares have stopped trading.
Valuation
A REIT is valued on its adjusted funds from operations, AFFO, which is the cash a property owner actually keeps after the recurring maintenance spending that keeps its existing buildings leasable. That figure sits below funds from operations, FFO, because it subtracts that maintenance capital, and it is the right lens here because depreciation makes GAAP profit a poor guide to what an apartment portfolio earns. On that basis the listed price worked out to about 12 times AFFO, an AFFO multiple in the lower half of the REIT group, with FFO yielding roughly 9%. The peer cohort, which the sector quotes on FFO, trades across a wide band of multiples; Veris sat toward the cheaper end of it.
What that low AFFO multiple embedded is a bound, not a forecast. At roughly 12 times AFFO the price was so undemanding that it did not require AFFO per share to grow at all. It sat below what even a steady, low-single-digit annual decline in funds from operations would warrant. In plain terms, the market was paying for the existing rent stream to roughly hold, and discounting the rest into the multiple. The deal proves the reading: a private buyer paid $19.00 in cash, a premium of more than 23% to the unaffected close, which is what stabilized waterfront apartments were worth to an owner who did not have to mark them through a public market's rate-anxiety lens.
The methods we use to triangulate disagree in exactly the pattern you would expect for a cheap, leveraged real-estate owner. Asset-value measures built on depreciated book value land well below the price, because depreciation guts the recorded value of buildings that are worth their cash flow. Relative-multiple measures land closest to the price, since they read it against where comparable property cash flows trade. The cash-flow models that try to project forward were set aside as unreliable here, since reported GAAP losses tripped the distress filters those methods apply. The signal across that spread is consistent: the price was supported by what the buildings produce and what comparable cash flows fetch, while only the depreciation-driven book measures called it expensive. A private bid resolved the disagreement in cash, at $19.00 a share.
Catalysts
The catalyst already arrived and was terminal. On February 23, 2026, Veris Residential agreed to be taken private in an all-cash merger by an investor group led by Affinius Capital in partnership with Vista Hill Partners, at $19.00 a share, a premium of more than 23% to the unaffected February 4 closing price and an implied enterprise value near $3.4 billion. The board approved it unanimously after a review of strategic alternatives, which is the formal way of saying the public market had not been crediting the portfolio with its private-market worth.
The deal closed on May 27, 2026 at an implied enterprise value of roughly $3.5 billion, and the common stock ceased trading on the New York Stock Exchange. The last public results, for the first quarter of 2026, showed Core AFFO of $0.19 per diluted share alongside a $0.08 quarterly dividend, the kind of conservative, cash-conserving profile a board carries into a sale rather than out of one. For a public holder there are no further operational catalysts to watch: the price was settled in cash, and the only remaining event was the delisting itself.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Multifamily real estate (single segment) (reported)
- AVB (AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EQR (EQUITY RESIDENTIAL)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ESS (ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MAA (MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UDR (UDR, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CPT (CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IRT (INDEPENDENCE REALTY TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NXRT (NexPoint Residential Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Veris Residential 8-K, May 27, 2026 · Veris Residential merger announcement, February 23, 2026 · Veris Residential dividend declaration, Q1 2026 · Veris Residential Q1 2026 earnings release