Virtu Financial, Inc. (VIRT): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $58.56, Virtu Financial, Inc. (VIRT) is priced for 16.4% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VIRT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | VIRT |
| Company | Virtu Financial, Inc. |
| Current price | $58.57/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 16.4% |
| Return on equity now | 29.6% |
| ROE gap | -13.2pp |
| Price-to-book | 2.72x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~2.7pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.27σ |
| cohort percentile (of 83 peers) | 39 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 56% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.71x | 4 | justifies |
| Earnings | 1.00x | 4 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.35x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.52x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $338.14 | 0.17x | yes | FCF base $0.6B, growth 21% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $90.48 | 0.65x | yes | P/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 9.8x / 12.0x / 14.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $67.96 | 0.86x | yes | BV/sh $21.32, ROE (TTM) 29.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $124.83 | 0.47x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $67.07 | 0.87x | yes | Rev $4.1B, growth 21% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $210.70 | 0.28x | yes | EPS $6.02, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.27 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $103.35 | 0.57x | yes | BV $21.32 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 29.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $53.74 | 1.09x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.02 × BVPS $21.32) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $53.39 | 1.10x | yes | FCF $521.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $38.11 | 1.54x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.40B (FCF $0.52B − SBC $0.12B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $194.25 | 0.30x | yes | EPS $6.02 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $139.72 | 0.42x | yes | Revenue $4.08B × sector P/S 3.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $225.75 | 0.26x | yes | EPS $6.02 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $65.08 | 0.90x | yes | EPS $6.02 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.5% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Virtu is an electronic market maker that earns the bid-ask spread on millions of trades, income its filing says "is typically proportional" to trading volumes, so the business thrives when markets are volatile and active.
- The defining feature is that volatility is a fickle fuel: the first quarter of 2026 was Virtu's best ever, with record adjusted net trading income of about $787 million, but a record quarter built on market turbulence is not a run-rate, and calm markets compress the spreads it lives on.
- What moves the story next is volatility itself plus capital deployment: Virtu expanded its trading capital by over $500 million in seven months, runs a high return on invested capital, and pays a steady $0.24 quarterly dividend while buying back stock.
Bull Case
The clearest way into Virtu is where the price sits against the methods, because for a market maker that comparison tells you what kind of bet you are making. Group the valuation approaches by what they measure and the asset-value, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and growth families all support the current price; none of them call it expensive. That matters because Virtu just posted the best quarter in its history, and the methods still find the stock reasonable, which means the market is not extrapolating the record. Total revenue rose 30.7% to $1,095.3 million, net income reached $346.6 million, and adjusted net trading income hit a record $787 million, about $12.9 million per trading day. The business converts that activity efficiently: adjusted EBITDA margin was 66.2%, and return on invested capital ran above 100%.
The model is a technology and scale advantage applied to the plumbing of markets. Virtu earns the bid-ask spread as a market maker and commissions as an agent, and the filing is explicit that its execution and agency services "depend on our ability to offer cutting edge technology and risk management solutions." That technology edge, built over years and applied across thousands of securities and venues globally, is hard to replicate, and it lets Virtu profit from the flow whether prices rise or fall. The Execution Services segment, where Virtu transacts as an agent for banks, brokers, and asset managers, adds a steadier, fee-based revenue stream alongside the more volatile market-making line, giving the business a second leg that does not depend purely on spread capture.
Capital discipline turns the cash flow into shareholder value. Virtu expanded its trading capital by more than $500 million over seven months, deploying capital into a business earning triple-digit returns on it, while still returning cash through a steady $0.24 quarterly dividend and continued buybacks that have shrunk the share count at roughly 6% a year. A company that both reinvests at high returns and retires shares compounds per-share value from two directions. The bull bet is that Virtu is a structurally advantaged, high-return market maker that benefits from the long-term growth in electronic trading and from periodic spikes in volatility, priced at a level the conservative methods can defend even after a record quarter.
Bear Case
Virtu's competitors are not just other firms; they are calm markets and the relentless compression of trading economics, and that is where the bear case begins. Trading income, the filing explains, "represents revenue earned from bid/ask spreads" generated "in the normal course of our market making activities and is typically proportional" to volumes. In plain terms, Virtu makes the most money when markets are turbulent and active, and far less when they are placid. The record first quarter of 2026 was a product of unusual market volatility, not a new baseline. A quarter built on turbulence is the opposite of recurring revenue: when volatility subsides, as it always eventually does, spreads narrow and the trading-income line that drove the record falls back. A buyer extrapolating the recent quarter is extrapolating the weather.
The structural pressure on the business is the long-run erosion of spread economics. Electronic market making is fiercely competitive, dominated by a handful of sophisticated, technology-heavy firms all racing to be faster and cheaper, and the steady-state direction of bid-ask spreads is tighter, not wider. Virtu must keep spending to maintain its technology edge just to hold position, and any rival that gains a speed or cost advantage takes share directly. The agency execution business the bull cites as a stabilizer is itself a low-margin, competitive commission business under the same pricing pressure. So the bear sees a company whose best results depend on episodic volatility it cannot control, set against a structural backdrop where the per-trade economics grind lower over time.
Regulation and the inherent risk of the model add tail exposure. The filing notes inquiries from regulators that "could lead to administrative or court proceedings" and require substantial resources, and a high-frequency, high-volume trading operation carries operational and risk-management exposures that can produce sudden losses. On valuation, the methods supporting the price are partly reading off recently elevated earnings, so the support is softer than it looks: normalize trading income to a calmer environment and the same earnings-based methods would land lower. The dividend and buybacks are funded by cash flows that swing with volatility, so they are less certain than a stable financial's. The bear case is coherent: the price looks reasonable only because it is measured against record, volatility-juiced results, the underlying spread economics erode over time, and the earnings that justify the valuation are among the most cyclical in finance.
Valuation
Virtu is a market maker whose price looks reasonable today precisely because it is being measured against the best quarter in its history, and that timing is the key to the read. Grouped by what they measure, every family of method supports the current price near $63 (June 28, 2026): asset value, earnings power, peer multiples, and forward growth all sit at or above it. For most companies that unanimity would signal clear value, but for a firm whose earnings spike with market volatility, the earnings-based supports are anchored to elevated recent results, so the apparent cheapness is partly a function of the cycle being near a high.
The honest framing is that Virtu's normalized earnings power matters more than its trailing one. The first quarter delivered record adjusted net trading income of about $787 million on unusual volatility, and the value methods that lean on recent earnings will look generous against that base. The right question is what Virtu earns across a full cycle of calm and turbulent markets, not what it earned in a turbulent quarter. The price implies that the business sustains a healthy level of profitability, and the buyer is betting that the long-run growth of electronic trading plus periodic volatility spikes keep the through-cycle earnings power high enough to defend the valuation, even as individual quarters swing widely.
The business carries the unusual balance-sheet profile of a market maker, where the relevant capital is the trading capital deployed against positions rather than conventional leverage, and Virtu reported expanding that capital by over $500 million while earning triple-digit returns on it. The peer frame is other capital-markets and exchange businesses, where Virtu's distinction is its pure-play market-making model and its sensitivity to volatility, which makes its earnings more cyclical than an exchange's fee-based stream. The bet reconciles to paying a value-supported price for a technology-advantaged, high-return market maker, on the understanding that the supporting earnings are volatility-driven and mean-reverting, so the real question is the durability of through-cycle trading income, not the strength of any single record quarter.
Catalysts
The first quarter was a record, driven by market conditions. Virtu reported total revenue of $1,095.3 million, up 30.7% year over year, net income of $346.6 million, and adjusted net trading income of about $787 million, or $12.9 million per trading day, the highest quarterly total in the company's history. Adjusted EBITDA rose to $520.6 million at a 66.2% margin, and earnings per share of $2.24 far exceeded the roughly $1.51 expected. The beat reflected elevated market volatility, which widens the spreads Virtu captures, more than any structural shift in the business.
Capital deployment and return are the steady catalysts. Virtu expanded its trading capital by more than $500 million over seven months, putting capital to work in a business earning a return on invested capital above 100%, and the board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.24 per share alongside ongoing buybacks that have reduced the share count. Those moves compound per-share value, though the cash funding them rises and falls with trading conditions.
The dominant variable is market volatility itself, which is not forecastable and which drives the quarter-to-quarter swings in trading income. Regulatory developments in market structure and trading practices are a secondary watch item, since they can affect the economics of market making. The next checkpoint is the second-quarter print, which will show whether the volatility that powered the record first quarter persisted or whether trading income reverted toward a calmer-market level.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- BGC (BGC Group, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …many of which have greater market presence, marketing capabilities and financial, technological and personnel resources than we have, which could lead to pricing pressures that could adversely impact our revenues and as a result could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of…
- FY2025 10-K: …and sell their products and services; • provide a lower cost structure and lower commissions and fees; • provide access to trading in products or a range of products that at any particular time we do not offer; and • develop services that are preferred by our customers. In addition, new competitors may emerge, and…
- LPLA (LPL Financial Holdings Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to control the fee amounts charged to customers. Interest Income, net The Company earns interest income primarily from client margin loans, cash and equivalents segregated under federal or other regulations and advisor repayable loans and pays interest on certain client cash balances held in the client cash account.…
- FY2025 10-K: …in our efforts to attract and retain the advisors needed to achieve our growth objectives. More broadly, we are subject to competition in all aspects of our business from: • brokerage and investment advisory firms, including national and regional firms, as well as Independent RIAs; • asset management firms; •…
- PIPR (PIPER SANDLER COMPANIES)
- FY2025 10-K: The financial services industry remains highly competitive, and our revenues and profitability may suffer if we are unable to compete effectively. We generally compete on the basis of such factors as quality of advice and service, reputation, price, product selection, transaction execution and financial resources.…
- FY2025 10-K: …markets. In turn, these decisions may affect our business results. With respect to financial market activity, our profitability is sensitive to a variety of factors, including the demand for investment banking services as reflected by the number and size of advisory transactions, equity and debt corporate financings,…
- SF (STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …leading to price competition and decreased trading margins. Our trading margins have been further compressed by the shift from high- to low-touch services over time, which has created additional competitive pressure. We believe that price competition and pricing pressures in these and other areas will continue as…
- FY2025 10-K: …our competitors. See "Item 1 - Business - Competition" of this Form 10-K for additional information about our competitors. We compete directly with other national full-service broker-dealers, investment banking firms, commercial banks, and investment managers, and to a lesser extent, with discount brokers and dealers…
- HOOD (Robinhood Markets Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …that could attract our current and prospective customers and potentially result in intensified competition within our markets. We continue to experience aggressive price competition in our markets, and we might not be able to match the marketing efforts or prices of our competitors. In addition, our competitors might…
- FY2025 10-K: …We believe that we are changing the consumption patterns for financial products and services and growing the market, but will continue to face competition from other firms including large legacy financial institutions, large technology companies, and smaller, new financial technology entrants. We believe that the key…
- FRHC (FREEDOM HOLDING CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …brokerage customers as of March 31, 2025 as compared to approximately 530,000 as of March 31, 2024. • We had approximately 2,515,000 bank customers at our Freedom Bank KZ subsidiary as of March 31, 2025 as compared to approximately 904,000 as of March 31, 2024. The operating results for any period are not necessarily…
- FY2025 10-K: .7 million, respectively, representing 56% and 45% of our total fee and commission income for those fiscal years, and we earned interest income from margin loans to customers from such customer in an amount of approximately $32.8 million and $99.6 million, respectively, representing 15% and 57% of our total interest…
- TW (Tradeweb Markets Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …serve in particular, and we expect competition with a broad range of competitors to continue to intensify in the future. Within the electronic financial services industry in which we operate, we compete based on our ability to provide a broad range of solutions, trading venues with a broad network of market…
- FY2025 10-K: …have made acquisitions and/or entered into joint ventures and consortia to improve the competitiveness of their electronic trading offerings. If, as a result of industry consolidation, our competitors are able to offer lower cost and/or a wider range of trading venues and solutions, obtain more favorable terms from…
- NDAQ (Nasdaq, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …without a regulated market listing and can consider trading their shares on smaller markets and quoting facilities. Our Index business offers Nasdaq-branded indices and financial products and faces competition from providers of various competing financial indices. For example, there are a number of indices that aim…
- FY2025 10-K: …Technology and Financial Crime Management Technology offerings are primarily influenced by regulatory changes and the financial strength and growth plans of our clients at any given time, and such demand may be adversely affected by economic, political and geopolitical market conditions. Trading volumes and values…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 29 2026