VICI Properties Inc. (VICI): what the price requires
At today's price, VICI Properties Inc. (VICI) is priced for 9.1% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VICI
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | VICI |
| Company | VICI Properties Inc. |
| Current price | $26.34/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 9.1% |
| Return on equity now | 10.0% |
| ROE gap | -0.9pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.00x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of equity with 2.6% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.55σ |
| cohort percentile (of 10 peers) | 60 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 79% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.77x | 4 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.83x | 3 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.41x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.90x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $29.29 | 0.90x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 12318.4x / 12320.4x / 12322.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $74.38 | 0.35x | yes | P/E 24.63x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 9x), scenarios: 20.8x / 24.6x / 28.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 44x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $61.46 | 0.43x | yes | Stage 1: 19% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $31.41 | 0.84x | yes | BV/sh $26.38, ROE (TTM) 11.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $34.15 | 0.77x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $18.36 | 1.43x | yes | Rev $4.0B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.9x / 7.0x / 8.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $55.47 | 0.47x | yes | EPS $2.92, growth 19% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.48 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $34.68 | 0.76x | yes | BV $26.38 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $41.63 | 0.63x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.92 × BVPS $26.38) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 2634.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.00B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $10.54 | 2.50x | yes | FCF $2550.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $94.22 | 0.28x | yes | EPS $2.92 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $22.69 | 1.16x | yes | Revenue $4.04B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $83.20 | 0.32x | yes | EPS $2.92 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 19.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 28.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $31.57 | 0.83x | yes | EPS $2.92 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 11.6% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- VICI owns the real estate under marquee casinos and experiential venues, including Caesars Palace and the Venetian, and leases it back on long, triple-net terms with built-in rent increases, the filing noting escalation of "2.0% per annum (with escalation equal to the greater of 2.0% and the change in CPI (capped at 3.0%))" on the MGM Master Lease.
- The defining risk is tenant concentration plus rates: a handful of large gaming operators pay most of the rent, and the filing warns that if a tenant fails, contractual remedies "may not be paid in full," while higher interest rates raise the cost of the debt that funds new deals.
- What moves the story next is AFFO growth and the dividend: first-quarter 2026 AFFO per share rose to $0.61, management raised full-year AFFO guidance to $2.44 to $2.47 per share, and the dividend has increased every year since the 2018 IPO at about a 7% pace.
Bull Case
The market prices VICI as a steady, inflation-protected rent collector, and the contracts behind it justify that read. VICI does not run casinos; it owns the buildings and land underneath them and leases them back to operators like Caesars and MGM on triple-net terms, meaning the tenant pays taxes, insurance, and maintenance while VICI collects rent. Those leases are long, often decades, and they carry built-in escalators. The filing spells out the MGM Master Lease "escalation of 2.0% per annum (with escalation equal to the greater of 2.0% and the change in CPI (capped at 3.0%) beginning at the same time as the MGM Master Lease in 2032)," which means rent rises every year regardless of how the casinos perform, with inflation protection layered on. That is contractually growing cash flow with very little operational risk attached.
The portfolio is irreplaceable in a way that ordinary real estate is not. VICI owns trophy assets on the Las Vegas Strip and across regional gaming markets, properties that cannot be rebuilt or relocated and that anchor their operators' entire businesses. Because the rent obligation, in the filing's words, "will generally continue to apply regardless of the amount of cash flows generated by the properties," VICI sits ahead of the operator's own profits in the payment waterfall. A tenant struggling for a quarter still pays the rent because the alternative is losing a flagship property. That seniority is why VICI's cash flows have been remarkably stable through cycles that battered the operators themselves.
The numbers show a REIT compounding steadily and rewarding holders. First-quarter 2026 revenue rose 3.5% to $1.0 billion and AFFO, the cash measure that matters for a REIT, grew 5.7% to $650.9 million, or $0.61 per share, prompting management to raise full-year AFFO guidance to $2.44 to $2.47 per share. The dividend, yielding around 6.6%, has risen every year since the 2018 IPO at roughly a 7% compound rate, with an AFFO payout ratio near 75% that leaves room to keep raising it. Every valuation family now supports the price, marking VICI as asset-and-income-supported rather than a stretched bet. The bull case is straightforward: a portfolio of irreplaceable experiential real estate throwing off contractually escalating, inflation-linked rent, paying a well-covered and growing 6%-plus dividend, at a price the conservative methods can defend.
Bear Case
VICI's stability rests on a short list of tenants, and that concentration is the structural concern a capital-allocation lens surfaces. A handful of large gaming operators, with Caesars and MGM the biggest, pay the overwhelming majority of VICI's rent. The filing is candid that if a tenant runs into trouble, VICI's "contractual remedies, including any claim for damages under the applicable lease, loan agreement or guarantee," as well as foreclosure, "may not be paid in full." The triple-net model concentrates risk in the credit quality of those few operators: as long as they prosper, the rent is secure, but gaming is a cyclical, discretionary-spending business, and a deep recession or a structural shift in casino demand would pressure the very tenants whose rent underwrites VICI's dividend. There is no diversification across thousands of small tenants here; the portfolio's fate is tied to a concentrated set of large ones.
The growth model depends on continuously deploying capital, and rates make that harder. A net-lease REIT grows by acquiring more properties and by funding tenants' expansion projects, and both require capital raised through debt and equity. When interest rates are high, the cost of that capital rises while the cap rates VICI earns on new deals do not always keep pace, compressing the spread that drives external growth. The filing details floating-rate exposure tied to SOFR, so a higher-for-longer rate environment raises interest costs directly. The escalators protect the existing rent roll, but they top out around 2% to 3%, so a REIT relying on internal growth alone grows slowly; the faster growth requires accretive acquisitions, which are precisely what high financing costs constrain.
On valuation the calibrated point is that VICI is fairly valued rather than cheap, with a real ceiling on upside. Every method family supports the current price, which means the stock is not mispriced low; it is a reasonable price for a stable income asset. The implied bet is modest continued AFFO growth, and the value here is the dividend yield plus low-single-digit escalation, not capital appreciation from a re-rating. The risk is asymmetric in a particular way: the upside is capped by the slow contractual growth, while the downside, though low-probability, is real if a major tenant falters or if rates stay high enough to choke off the acquisition engine. A buyer is underwriting steady income, and the bear case is simply that the income is only as secure as a few large casino operators and an accommodating capital market, neither of which is guaranteed.
Valuation
VICI is best read as an income asset priced for what it is, a stable net-lease REIT, rather than for a re-rating. Every family of method supports today's price near $26 (June 28, 2026): asset value, earnings power, peer multiples, and forward growth all sit at or above it. For a REIT, the asset-value and income lenses are the relevant ones, and their support says the market is paying a fair price for the underlying real estate and the rent it produces, not a premium for growth the business cannot deliver.
What the price embeds is modest, contractually-driven growth. As a net-lease REIT, VICI's value is the capitalized stream of its rent, and that rent grows by the lease escalators, roughly 2% to 3% a year, plus whatever accretive acquisitions management adds on top. The cash measure that matters, AFFO, grew 5.7% in the quarter to $0.61 per share, and management's raised full-year guidance of $2.44 to $2.47 implies continued mid-single-digit growth. The total-return math is straightforward: a roughly 6.6% dividend yield plus low-to-mid-single-digit AFFO growth, with the dividend well covered at an AFFO payout ratio near 75%. The price is not betting on a multiple expansion; it is paying for that income stream to continue and escalate.
Capital structure is the lever to watch in a REIT, and it is also where the growth ceiling sits. VICI funds acquisitions and tenant development projects with debt and equity, carries floating-rate exposure tied to SOFR, and depends on the spread between its cost of capital and the cap rates it earns on new deals. The peer frame is other large net-lease and experiential REITs, where VICI's distinction is its concentration in irreplaceable gaming and entertainment real estate on long leases with strong escalators. The bet reconciles to paying a fair, income-supported price for a portfolio of trophy experiential properties, on the expectation that the few large tenants keep paying, the escalators keep lifting rent, and the capital markets stay open enough to let management add accretive deals on top of the contractual base.
Catalysts
The first quarter beat and the guidance raise are the live catalysts. VICI reported first-quarter 2026 revenue of $1.0 billion, up 3.5% year over year, with AFFO of $650.9 million, up 5.7%, and AFFO per diluted share of $0.61. Management raised full-year 2026 AFFO guidance to $2.665 to $2.695 billion, or $2.44 to $2.47 per share, signaling confidence the escalator-plus-acquisition growth engine continues through the year.
The dividend is the steadiest catalyst and the core of the total-return case. VICI declared a quarterly dividend of $0.45 per share, an annualized $1.80 yielding about 6.6%, and the payout has risen every year since the 2018 IPO at roughly a 7% compound rate, supported by an AFFO payout ratio near 75%. Continued dividend growth depends on AFFO growth, which in turn depends on the escalators and on management sourcing accretive new deals.
The watch items are rates, deal flow, and tenant health. The cost and availability of capital determine how much external growth VICI can add on top of its contractual escalators, and the credit health of its concentrated gaming tenants underpins the rent. Barclays raised its price target to $34 with an Overweight rating, reflecting confidence in the model. The next checkpoint is the second-quarter print in mid-2026, which will show whether AFFO growth held and whether management announced new acquisitions to extend the growth runway.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Real estate investment (single segment) (reported)
- GLPI (Gaming and Leisure Properties, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EPR (EPR PROPERTIES)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- O (REALTY INCOME CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WPC (W. P. Carey Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NNN (NNN REIT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ADC (Agree Realty Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EPRT (Essential Properties Realty Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FCPT (Four Corners Property Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 29 2026 · Barclays note, 2026