V. F. CORPORATION (VFC): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers V. F. CORPORATION (VFC) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/VFC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerVFC
CompanyV. F. CORPORATION
Current price$15.24/sh
CompositionWholesale 56% / Direct-to-consumer 44% / Royalty 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)7.1%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)13.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.1pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)6.0%
Multiple paid8x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.24σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)10
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.84x4expensive
Earnings1.95x3expensive
Relative—0—
Growth—0—

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=7)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$28.760.53xnoFCF base $0.7B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.9%, WACC 5.3%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$19.040.80xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 9.9x / 11.9x / 13.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.7x / 22.0x / 25.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$6.942.20xyesBV/sh $4.66, ROE (TTM) 13.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$8.391.82xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$10.441.46xnoRev $9.6B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$7.681.98xnoEPS $0.64, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=22.60 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$16.950.90xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.72B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$8.671.76xyesBV $4.66 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$8.191.86xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.64 × BVPS $4.66) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——noEBITDA $0.86B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.801.95xyesFCF $671.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.702.67xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.59B (FCF $0.67B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$20.650.74xyesEPS $0.64 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.7121.46xyesBV $4.66 × (ROIC 0.8% / WACC 5.3%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $9.61B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$24.000.64xnoEPS $0.64 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$6.922.20xnoEPS $0.64 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Outdooroperatingenterprise$5.7b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Activeoperatingenterprise$2.7b—withheldunresolved no unit value
All Otheroperatingenterprise$1.1b—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.73x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.16x
Interest coverage7.6x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.3%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 13.2%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The standard valuation methods are looking at VF through a rear-view mirror, and the rear view is the worst of the downturn. Group the methods by what they measure and the asset-value and trailing earnings-power lenses call the stock expensive, because they are anchored to depressed margins from the years when Vans was shrinking and the balance sheet was stretched. What those frames miss is that VF just inflected. For the first time in three years the company returned to full-year revenue growth, fourth-quarter revenue rose 3% with the Americas accelerating to 10%, and the brand that had dragged for years, Vans, returned to growth after nearly four years of decline. A trailing multiple cannot see a turning point; it just averages in the bad years.

The portfolio underneath has real winners that are doing the heavy lifting. The North Face delivered 7% overall growth and 16% in the Americas, with five straight quarters of double-digit footwear growth, and Altra grew 45% in the quarter and over 30% for the year. The filing lays out the structure plainly, organizing "VF's brands by reportable segment" with The North Face leading the Outdoor segment in "performance and performance-inspired outdoor apparel." Owning a stable of distinct brands across outdoor, skate, work, and run gives VF multiple shots on goal: even while one brand resets, others compound, and the company can shift marketing and shelf space toward whatever is working.

The most concrete proof the turnaround is real is the balance sheet. Net debt fell from $5.8 billion to $2.7 billion, cutting leverage from 5.1 times to about 2 times in two years, a full two turns. Deleveraging of that scale does two things: it removes the existential risk that hung over the stock during the downturn, and every dollar of debt retired shifts enterprise value from creditors to shareholders. Management reinstated annual guidance for fiscal 2027, pointing to continued growth and roughly 8% adjusted operating margin, and maintained the dividend. The bull bet is that VF is a portfolio of durable brands at an early stage of a margin and revenue recovery, where the trailing methods are penalizing it for a past it has begun to leave behind.

Bear Case

The methods disagree on VF, and the disagreement is the bear's anchor. Sorted by what they measure, only the peer-multiple lens supports the price; the asset-value and trailing earnings-power lenses both read it as expensive. A buyer at $17 (June 28, 2026) is leaning on the comparison to other apparel companies while the methods that count VF's own book value and its own earnings power say the stock is not cheap. That is a meaningful tell, because the bull thesis rests on a recovery that has only just begun, and a price already supported only by relative comparison leaves little cushion if the recovery stalls. The implied bet is modest growth from here, but the burden is that even modest growth has to actually persist after three years in which it did not.

The recovery is fragile precisely because VF's value is its brands, and brands are perishable. The filing is direct that the business "could be harmed if VF is unable to maintain the image of its brands," noting its success "has been due in large part to the growth" of those brands. Vans is the cautionary tale: a brand that was a growth engine became a multi-year drag, and the recent return to growth is one or two quarters, not a re-established trend. Apparel is fashion-exposed and discretionary, so a brand can lose cultural relevance quickly, and a consumer pullback hits the whole portfolio at once. The filing's own impairment work reflects this, citing "financial projections and future cash flows that considered recent actual results lower than previous internal forecasts, slower recovery from the recent downturn," which is management acknowledging in writing that the recovery has been slower than it once hoped.

The leverage, while much improved, still magnifies any stumble. VF carries about $3.6 billion of gross debt against $824 million of liquid assets, net debt near $2.7 billion, which is still roughly five times trailing operating income, with interest coverage around three and a half times. The deleveraging is real progress, but at this level a downturn in discretionary apparel spending or a relapse at a major brand would squeeze both the operating line and the capacity to keep paying down debt and the dividend at the same time. The bear case is coherent: the price needs a still-young turnaround to hold, the brands that drive value can fade as fast as they recover, the leverage remains high enough to hurt in a downturn, and the conservative methods that count actual assets and earnings already say the stock is not a bargain.

Valuation

VF is a turnaround priced on the comparison rather than on its own depressed numbers, and that is the key to reading it. Grouped by what they measure, the peer-multiple lens reaches the price near $17, while the asset-value and trailing earnings-power lenses call it expensive. The reason is timing: the trailing methods average in the years when Vans was shrinking and margins were compressed, so they undervalue a company that has just returned to growth. The relative lens, which compares VF to other apparel names on forward earnings power, is the one that credits the recovery. The honest read is that the price embeds the turnaround continuing, not a discount to demonstrated value.

What the price requires is reassuringly modest in growth terms, which is the calibrated point. The inversion reads the price as needing only low-single-digit operating growth, around 4%, sustained from here, with management's reinstated guidance pointing to roughly 8% adjusted operating margin in fiscal 2027. That is not a heroic assumption, which is what makes the setup interesting: the bet is less about explosive growth and more about whether the early-stage recovery in revenue and margin proves durable across the brand portfolio. The peer cohort of apparel makers trades on its own brand-and-margin profiles, and VF sits at the recovering end, with The North Face and Altra leading and Vans stabilizing.

Solvency is the swing factor and the clearest evidence of progress. Net debt has fallen from $5.8 billion to $2.7 billion, cutting leverage from 5.1 times to about 2 times by the company's measure, though against trailing operating income the net-debt multiple is still near five times and interest coverage sits around three and a half times. The deleveraging removed the balance-sheet tail risk that defined the stock during the downturn, and each further turn of debt reduction transfers value to equity. The bet reconciles to paying a relative-multiple price for a deleveraging apparel portfolio in the early innings of recovery, on the condition that the brand momentum holds and the company keeps converting growth into both margin expansion and continued debt paydown.

Catalysts

The fiscal-year close confirmed the turnaround narrative. VF returned to full-year revenue growth for the first time in three years, with fourth-quarter revenue up 3%, the Americas accelerating to 10% growth, and Vans returning to growth after nearly four years of decline. The North Face grew 7% overall and 16% in the Americas with five consecutive quarters of double-digit footwear growth, and Altra posted 45% growth in the quarter, evidence the portfolio's healthy brands are accelerating while the troubled one stabilizes.

The balance-sheet and capital signals reinforced it. Net debt dropped from $5.8 billion to $2.7 billion, leverage fell from 5.1 times to about 2 times over two years, and the board authorized a quarterly dividend of $0.09 per share. Management reinstated annual guidance effective fiscal 2027, expecting another year of growth and roughly 8% adjusted operating margin, the first forward framework the company has offered since the downturn.

The watch items are brand durability and the consumer. The recovery in Vans is early and needs to hold, and apparel demand is discretionary and fashion-sensitive, so a consumer pullback or a relapse at a major brand would test the thesis. The next checkpoint is the first fiscal-2027 quarterly print, which will show whether the brand momentum carried past the initial inflection and whether margin expansion and debt reduction continued on the path management laid out.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Outdoor (reported)

Active (reported)

All Other (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q4 FY2026 earnings release, May 20 2026

View the full interactive VFC report on boothcheck