United Therapeutics Corporation (UTHR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $518.86, United Therapeutics Corporation (UTHR) is priced for -1.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UTHR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerUTHR
CompanyUnited Therapeutics Corporation
Current price$518.86/sh
CompositionTyvaso DPI 41% / Nebulized Tyvaso 18% / Remodulin 17% / Orenitram 16% / Unituxin 7% / Adcirca 1% / Other 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.8%
Operating margin today45.3%
Margin compression (value-band)-38.5pp
Implied growth-1.7%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.9pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~4.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.72σ
cohort percentile (of 117 peers)21
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.58x5expensive
Earnings1.83x5expensive
Relative1.58x5expensive
Growth1.05x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$498.101.04xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$496.221.05xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.4x / 14.4x / 16.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$673.410.77xyesP/E 24x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 20.1x / 24.0x / 27.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$327.891.58xyesBV/sh $139.02, ROE (TTM) 21.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$500.501.04xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$386.441.34xyesRev $3.2B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.8x / 6.9x / 8.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$324.601.60xyesEPS $27.05, growth 8% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.12 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$274.511.89xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.20B × (1−14%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$471.201.10xyesBV $139.02 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 21.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$290.881.78xyes√(22.5 × EPS $27.05 × BVPS $139.02) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$574.730.90xyesEBITDA $1.46B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$284.101.83xyesFCF $1016.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$245.952.11xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.87B (FCF $1.02B − SBC $0.15B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$559.500.93xyesEPS $27.05 × (8.5 + 2×8.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$88.205.88xyesBV $139.02 × (ROIC 5.8% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$298.711.74xyesRevenue $3.17B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$328.241.58xyesEPS $27.05 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 12.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$292.431.77xyesEPS $27.05 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Biopharmaceuticalsoperatingenterprise3.2B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$2.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-1.74x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.50x (net cash)
Interest coverage87.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Look at where the price sits against the valuation methods, and United Therapeutics is the rare profitable biotech that does not require a leap of faith. At about $536 (June 28, 2026) a share, the price actually sits below where the sector relative-multiple method lands, near $606 on a 24x earnings multiple, and roughly in line with the EV/EBITDA-relative method near $517. For a company with a 45% operating margin and a 22% return on equity, trading at or below peer multiples is unusual; the market is not paying a stretched premium for the franchise. The growth-adjusted earnings method that uses the conservative Graham formula lands near $560, again above the price. The methods that call it expensive are the asset-based ones, which under-value any profitable drug franchise because the value is in the patents and the cash flow, not the book.

The cash-generation profile is exceptional and gives the company optionality most biotechs lack. United Therapeutics earns a 45% operating margin, generates over $1 billion of free cash flow, holds about $2.15 billion of net cash with zero debt, and interest coverage is effectively unlimited. It authorized a new $2 billion buyback, retiring shares at a price below peer multiples. A debt-free company throwing off cash and buying back stock at a reasonable multiple is compounding value the durable way, and the balance sheet funds both the defense of the core franchise and the moonshot pipeline.

The Tyvaso DPI franchise remains the growth driver even as the older formulation fades. In Q1 2026 Tyvaso revenue reached $458 million, with the dry-powder DPI version growing 9% year over year, offsetting much of the 22% decline in the older nebulized form. The DPI version is the more convenient, patent-protected delivery, and the company is extending the inhaled-treprostinil platform with new formulations. Beyond pulmonary hypertension sits the long-shot upside: United Therapeutics is the leader in xenotransplantation, manufacturing gene-edited pig organs, and received FDA clearance to begin the first clinical trial of pig organs for transplant. That program is unproven and years from commercialization, so it is optionality, not a number to bank, but it is a genuine second act backed by a balance sheet that can fund it. The bull case is a cash-rich, profitable franchise trading near peer multiples, with a self-funded transformational pipeline as the free option.

Bear Case

The competitive threat to United Therapeutics is concrete and named, which is the bear's spine. Pulmonary hypertension was United's near-monopoly for years; it is not anymore. Merck's Winrevair, a different mechanism, has emerged as a new standard of care for late-stage disease and competes for the same patient pool, forcing United to reposition Tyvaso as part of combination therapy rather than the sole option. At the same time, Liquidia's Yutrepia, an inhaled dry-powder treprostinil, launched in mid-2025 as a direct rival to Tyvaso DPI and has reportedly taken a meaningful early share of the treprostinil market. United's own 10-K acknowledges it operates in a highly competitive market in which several large pharmaceutical companies control many of the available PAH therapies. A franchise facing both a new-mechanism competitor and a direct formulation rival is fighting on two fronts at once, and the price assumes it holds its ground.

The recent numbers show the pressure arriving. Q1 2026 revenue slipped about 2% to $781.5 million, net income fell to $274.9 million from $322.2 million, and GAAP EPS of $5.82 missed expectations; the older nebulized Tyvaso fell 22% on weaker U.S. demand and softer international sales. Tyvaso DPI growth of 9% is offsetting that decline for now, but a single franchise carrying the whole company is a concentration risk: if Yutrepia continues taking share and Winrevair compresses the prostacyclin market, the growth that the price depends on stalls. The company pays MannKind a royalty on Tyvaso DPI net sales, so even the growing product shares its economics.

The valuation depends on durable compounding, and that is the assumption competition challenges. The price is reached only by the forward-growth methods; the asset and earnings-power methods land far below, with normalized earnings power near $247 and the simple excess-return method near $295. If the PAH franchise plateaus or declines under competitive pressure, the price has the forward-growth assumption to fall back on and little else. The xenotransplantation program is exciting but is years away, unproven commercially, and consumes cash today for a payoff that is bimodal and distant; it cannot be valued as a steady contributor. The balance sheet removes any solvency concern, with net cash and no debt, so the bear is not about survival. It is that a single-franchise specialist faces a named, well-capitalized competitive assault on its only profit engine, while the price still credits years of durable growth.

Valuation

The price embeds a surprisingly low bar for such a high-margin business. Inverting today's price near $536 implies almost no growth, around flat, on an operating margin near 8%, far below the 45% United Therapeutics actually earns. In plain terms, the price requires the franchise to barely grow and to give up most of its margin, which is a pessimistic embedded assumption for a company currently compounding Tyvaso DPI at 9%. That gap between the demanding-looking premium to the static methods and the modest embedded growth assumption is the key to reading the stock: the market is not paying for heroic growth, it is paying for the franchise to roughly hold.

The methods cluster more favorably than the headline premium suggests. The relative-multiple methods land at or above the price, with the sector price-to-earnings approach near $606 and the EV/EBITDA-relative method near $517 on a 16x multiple, so peer multiples roughly bracket or exceed the price. The growth-adjusted Graham formula lands near $560, also above. The forward-growth cash-flow methods land near $447 to $498, just below the price. The asset and earnings-power methods land far below, near $247 to $295, but those systematically under-value a patent-protected drug franchise whose worth is in its cash flow, not its book. The honest read is a profitable specialty pharma trading near where peer multiples land, with the static asset methods structurally too low for this kind of business.

The balance sheet is a genuine strength and bounds the downside firmly. United Therapeutics holds about $2.15 billion of net cash with zero debt and generates over $1 billion of free cash flow, so there is no solvency risk and the company self-funds both its franchise defense and its pipeline, including the $2 billion buyback. The peer set runs to other specialty and rare-disease drug makers, where the relevant question is franchise durability and pipeline, not relative cheapness. The xenotransplantation program is optionality the standard methods cannot price and should not be banked; it is a self-funded long shot on top of the cash-generative core. What the buyer is underwriting at this price is that the PAH franchise holds against named competition, with the pipeline and the cash a free option rather than the basis of the valuation.

Catalysts

The Q1 2026 report was the catalyst, and it showed the competitive pressure starting to register. Total revenue slipped about 2% to $781.5 million, net income fell to $274.9 million from $322.2 million, and GAAP EPS of $5.82 missed expectations. Within the franchise, Tyvaso reached $458 million with the dry-powder DPI version up 9% year over year, while the older nebulized Tyvaso fell 22% on weaker U.S. demand and softer international sales. The company also authorized a new $2 billion share buyback, leaning on its cash position to support the stock.

The competitive developments are the catalysts that matter most. Merck's Winrevair has established itself as a new standard of care in late-stage pulmonary hypertension, and Liquidia's Yutrepia launched in mid-2025 as a direct inhaled-treprostinil rival to Tyvaso DPI, taking early market share. United is responding with combination-therapy positioning and new inhaled-treprostinil formulations. The pace at which Yutrepia takes share and Winrevair penetrates the prostacyclin patient pool will drive the Tyvaso trajectory.

The other catalyst is the xenotransplantation program, where United received FDA clearance to begin the first clinical trial of gene-edited pig organs for transplant, following earlier compassionate-use UKidney and UHeart transplants. That program is the long-term optionality, and any clinical-trial progress would be a discrete catalyst, though commercialization remains years away. The near-term watch items are the quarterly Tyvaso DPI growth rate against Yutrepia's share gains and any data updates from the xenotransplantation trial.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Biopharmaceuticals (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

UTHR Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026 · UTHR FY2024 10-K

View the full interactive UTHR report on boothcheck