USA Compression Partners, LP (USAC): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $25.80, USA Compression Partners, LP (USAC) is priced for +1.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/USAC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerUSAC
CompanyUSA Compression Partners, LP
Current price$25.81/sh
CompositionContract operations revenue 97% / Retail parts and services revenue 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.2%
Operating margin today30.3%
Margin compression (value-band)-21.1pp
Implied growth1.9%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~17.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.29σ
cohort percentile (of 72 peers)47
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings3.56x4expensive
Relative0.83x5justifies
Growth0.82x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$45.420.57xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.7x / 10.7x / 12.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$27.980.92xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$23.871.08xyesRev $1.1B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.8x / 3.5x / 4.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$31.180.83xyesEPS $0.89, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.83 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$5.824.43xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.25B × (1−10%) / WACC 5.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$35.950.72xyesEBITDA $0.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$2.0112.84xyesFCF $302.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$28.740.90xyesEPS $0.89 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$18.701.38xyesRevenue $1.08B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$33.410.77xyesEPS $0.89 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$9.632.68xyesEPS $0.89 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Compression services (sole reportable segment)operatingenterprise1.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)10.00x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)9.03x
Interest coverage1.7x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the loudest objection, because it is the one that scares income investors away: USA Compression Partners carries about $3.0 billion of debt, roughly nine times operating income, and pays out essentially all its cash. On its face that is a fragile structure, the kind that snaps in a downturn. But look at what actually services that debt and funds the distribution, and the fear softens. The business is fee-based contract compression, not commodity-price exposure, and the fleet ran at 92.4% horsepower utilization at the end of 2024, near the practical ceiling. Compression is the unglamorous, essential equipment that keeps natural gas moving through pipelines and gathering systems; demand for it tracks gas throughput, which has been growing, not the gas price itself. High, stable utilization on fee contracts is exactly the cash-flow profile that can carry leverage.

The distribution coverage is the proof the structure is working. In Q1 2026 the partnership generated distributable cash flow of $130.8 million and declared a distribution of $0.525 per unit, for a coverage ratio of 1.72 times, up from 1.44 times a year earlier. Covering the payout 1.7 times means the distribution is funded with room to spare, and the coverage is improving, not deteriorating. For a high-yield MLP, rising coverage is the single best signal that the income is durable.

The J-W Power acquisition added scale to the same fee-based model. Q1 2026 revenue climbed to $331.3 million from $245.2 million a year earlier, net income rose to $38.3 million, and adjusted EBITDA reached $188.6 million, with the partnership reaffirming full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance of $770 million to $800 million and distributable cash flow of $480 million to $510 million. A larger fleet running at high utilization on contracts generates more fee cash to cover the distribution and service the debt. The bull case is that the leverage that frightens the casual observer is carried by stable, fee-based, highly-utilized cash flows, and the rising coverage ratio says the income stream is sturdier than the balance sheet looks in isolation.

Bear Case

The balance sheet is the bear case, and it is not a footnote. USA Compression Partners carries about $3.0 billion of total debt, roughly nine times operating income, with trailing interest coverage near 1.7 times. That is a structure with little margin between the cash the business generates and the interest it owes. The partnership operates under credit-agreement covenants requiring an interest coverage ratio of not less than 2.50 to 1.00 and a secured leverage ratio of not greater than 3.00 to 1.00. Covenants are the lender's tripwire, and a business operating with thin coverage lives closer to those tripwires than a conservatively financed one. A rise in interest rates on the $1.25 billion drawn under the revolving facility, or a dip in utilization that pressures cash flow, narrows the gap toward the covenant lines.

The distribution model compounds the rigidity. The partnership distributes essentially all of its available cash, and it states plainly that because it does so, it may not grow as quickly as businesses that are able to retain capital, and that if it cannot raise external capital efficiently, its ability to maintain or increase the level of distributions on our common units could be significantly impaired. That is the MLP's structural bind: it must keep tapping debt and equity markets to grow and to refinance, which leaves it exposed to the cost and availability of that capital. In a tight credit environment, a payout-everything model with high leverage has the least flexibility precisely when flexibility matters most.

The valuation reflects a business priced for stability that the balance sheet makes conditional. The earnings-power methods land far below the price, near $2 to $6, because there is little retained earnings power once the cash is distributed and the debt is serviced. Only the forward-growth and certain relative methods reach the price. The fleet is highly utilized today, but that is a strength that can only erode from here, not improve much, since 92.4% is near the ceiling. The peer comparison runs to other midstream and compression operators that share the same leverage-and-distribution dynamics. The bear is not that the distribution is about to be cut; the coverage is currently healthy. It is that a nine-times-levered, pay-everything structure is one downturn or one refinancing window away from the covenant math turning against it, and the price gives little credit for that fragility.

Valuation

The price is making a stability bet on a leveraged, fee-based cash flow stream. Inverting today's price near $25 (June 28, 2026) implies only modest operating growth, around 2% a year, on an operating margin near 9%, well below the 30% the partnership earns today. In plain terms, the price does not require growth heroics; it requires the fee cash flows to hold and the distribution to keep being covered. For a midstream MLP, that is a reasonable embedded assumption, but it rests entirely on the durability of utilization and the absence of a refinancing shock.

The methods are sparse and split, which is normal for a distribution-everything MLP. The earnings-power methods land far below the price, near $2 to $6, because the partnership retains almost nothing to capitalize after the payout and debt service. The relative and forward-growth methods reach toward the price, with the EV/EBITDA-relative approach near $36 on a sector multiple and the exit-multiple cash-flow method above the price at $45. The price-to-sales fallback, used because reported earnings per unit are negative after the partnership's capital structure, lands near $19. The honest read is that the standard equity methods are a poor fit here; the value of an MLP unit is the distribution stream and its coverage, and the relevant question is whether distributable cash flow keeps covering the $0.525 quarterly payout, which at 1.72 times it currently does.

Solvency is the entire story and must anchor the close. Net debt near $3.0 billion is roughly nine times operating income with interest coverage near 1.7 times, and the partnership runs against credit-agreement covenants of 2.50 times interest coverage and 3.00 times secured leverage. That leverage is the amplifier on both directions: it lifts the distribution yield in good times and tightens the covenant math in bad ones. The fleet's 92.4% utilization and the improving 1.72-times distribution coverage are the mitigants; the thin interest coverage and the pay-everything model are the risks. What the buyer is underwriting at this price is the durability of the fee-based cash flows that cover both the distribution and the debt, on a balance sheet that leaves little room if utilization slips or refinancing turns costly.

Catalysts

The Q1 2026 report and the J-W Power acquisition behind it are the key catalysts. Total revenue rose to $331.3 million from $245.2 million a year earlier, net income climbed to $38.3 million, and adjusted EBITDA reached $188.6 million, with much of the increase driven by the J-W Power acquisition that expanded the fleet. Distributable cash flow was $130.8 million, and the partnership declared a Q1 2026 distribution of $0.525 per unit, flat versus a year earlier, for a coverage ratio of 1.72 times, up from 1.44 times.

The partnership reaffirmed its full-year 2026 outlook of adjusted EBITDA of $770 million to $800 million and distributable cash flow of $480 million to $510 million, and disclosed total debt of $3.0 billion, including $1.25 billion drawn under the revolving credit facility and $1.75 billion of senior notes. The integration of J-W Power and its effect on fleet utilization and per-unit cash flow is the operating story to track.

The catalysts to watch are the quarterly distribution-coverage ratio, which is the cleanest signal of whether the income is durable, the horsepower-utilization trend, since the fleet is already near its ceiling, and any refinancing activity on the debt stack, because the cost of refinancing the revolver and senior notes feeds directly into coverage. The direction of natural-gas throughput and pipeline activity is the demand backdrop that determines whether utilization and contract pricing hold.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Compression services (sole reportable segment) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

USAC FY2024 10-K · USAC Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026

View the full interactive USAC report on boothcheck