UNIFIRST CORPORATION (UNF): what the price requires
At today's price, UNIFIRST CORPORATION (UNF) is priced for +5.3% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UNF
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | UNF |
| Company | UNIFIRST CORPORATION |
| Current price | $273.07/sh |
| Composition | Uniform & Facility Service Solutions 91% / First Aid & Safety Solutions 5% / Other 4% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 5.7% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 13.0% |
| Margin compression implied | -7.3pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | 6.1% |
| Implied growth | 5.3% |
| Multiple paid | 15x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.2pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.05σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 37 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.80x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 5.52x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.43x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.51x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $51.14 | 5.34x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.8%, WACC 8.6%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $211.37 | 1.29x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 14.8x / 16.8x / 18.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $184.32 | 1.48x | yes | P/E 23.57x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 37x), scenarios: 19.9x / 23.6x / 27.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $80.77 | 3.38x | yes | BV/sh $120.34, ROE (TTM) 6.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $64.78 | 4.22x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $180.96 | 1.51x | yes | Rev $2.5B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.0x / 2.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $63.67 | 4.29x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $62.65 | 4.36x | yes | BV $120.34 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.0%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $141.36 | 1.93x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.38 × BVPS $120.34) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $191.15 | 1.43x | yes | EBITDA $0.31B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $40.48 | 6.75x | yes | FCF $91.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $33.09 | 8.25x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.08B (FCF $0.09B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $6.19 | 44.11x | yes | EPS $7.38 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $11.22 | 24.34x | yes | BV $120.34 × (ROIC 0.8% / WACC 8.6%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $340.22 | 0.80x | yes | Revenue $2.47B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $79.78 | 3.42x | yes | EPS $7.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $157.5m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.66x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.49x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 76.6x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 13.0%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
- UniFirst rents, cleans, and delivers work uniforms and facility-service products on recurring routes, a subscription-like model its 10-K describes as renting and selling industrial wiping products, floor mats, facility service products and other non-garment items alongside the core uniform programs.
- Profitability is in a deliberate dip: fiscal 2026 reflects what management calls a temporary step back as the company invests in sales, service, and digital systems and absorbs new tariffs, with GAAP EPS guided to about $6.78 at the midpoint.
- The balance sheet is the cushion: UniFirst carries about $157 million of net cash, no gross debt, and a share count that has edged down, so it can fund the investment cycle without leaning on lenders.
Bull Case
Read UniFirst as what it is, a mature route-based services business, and the current numbers read differently than they first appear. A mature compounder's value lives in the recurring revenue and the returns on capital across a full cycle, not in a single depressed quarter. The model is the kind that compounds quietly: the company rents and cleans uniforms and facility products and delivers them on fixed routes, and its 10-K lists the breadth, from industrial wiping products, floor mats, facility service products to restroom and cleaning supplies and first aid cabinet services. Once a customer is on a route, the relationship renews, the truck is already passing the door, and each incremental product rides the same delivery cost. That is the economics of route density, and it is why this category rewards scale.
The margin compression that makes the trailing numbers look weak is self-inflicted and, by management's own framing, temporary. Fiscal 2026 carries a temporary step back in profitability as the company prioritizes building a foundation for future growth, investing in sales, service, and digital transformation while absorbing newly imposed tariffs. The trailing operating margin near 6.8% sits well below the low-teens this business has demonstrated through-cycle, and Q3 fiscal 2026 already showed the underlying margin running near 8.1% with a GAAP EPS beat at $2.23 against a $2.07 estimate. A mature business spending on its own systems is choosing lower reported earnings now for a more efficient operation later, and the cash flow funds it without strain.
The balance sheet is the part that lets management make that choice. UniFirst holds about $157 million of net cash, carries no gross debt, and earns interest coverage that is effectively unconstrained, with a share count that has drifted down about 1% a year. Book value sits near $120 a share. A debt-free company sitting on net cash can run an investment cycle on its own dime, return capital, and wait out the tariff noise without the financing risk that would pressure a leveraged peer. The bull case for a mature name like this is not a growth story. It is that the franchise economics are intact, the margin dip is a chosen investment rather than a competitive loss, and the balance sheet removes the one thing that turns a temporary setback into a permanent one.
Bear Case
The external variables with the most leverage on UniFirst right now are macro and policy, and both are pointing the wrong way. The company has flagged newly imposed tariffs as a direct drag, because it manufactures and sources garments, and tariff costs land in the same cost line that route density is supposed to leverage. Tariffs are outside management's control, they raise the cost of the very product the business rents, and they arrive precisely as the company is also spending on digital transformation, so two cost pressures stack at once. The result is the guided fiscal 2026 GAAP EPS of about $6.78 at the midpoint, a step down that fell well short of where analysts had been modeling.
The demand side carries its own cyclicality. Uniform rental volume tracks employment in the industrial, manufacturing, and service economy, because the number of uniformed workers is the number of garments on route. When hiring slows or a recession trims payrolls, the route revenue contracts with the workforce, and Q3 fiscal 2026 revenue of $614.4 million was already down 4% year over year. A business whose top line moves with its customers' headcount is a leveraged bet on the labor cycle, and the current revenue direction is down.
The valuation leaves little room for that combination. On trailing earnings depressed by the investment cycle, the asset and earnings-power methods land far below the price, and even the forward-growth methods do not fully reach it. The price is paying for the margin to recover to its through-cycle level and for the digital investment to pay off, neither of which is guaranteed on the current timeline. If the recovery to low-teens margins slips a year, or tariffs prove sticky, the earnings that justify the price arrive later and smaller. The balance sheet bounds the downside, with net cash and no debt meaning there is no solvency risk to speak of. The bear is not about survival. It is about paying a full price today for a margin recovery that the macro and policy backdrop can push further out than the market is assuming.
Valuation
The price is making a margin-recovery bet, and naming it that way is the key to reading the methods correctly. Inverting today's price of about $261 (June 28, 2026) implies the business needs to earn an operating margin near the mid-single digits with modest growth, which is close to what it earns today on depressed numbers and well below the low-teens it has shown through-cycle. So the bet is not heroic growth; it is that the current margin trough is temporary and reverts. That framing matters because the static methods, run on trailing earnings, look alarming in isolation.
Group the methods and the picture is dominated by the depressed trailing margin. The asset-based and earnings-power methods land far below the price, with normalized earnings power near $64 and the simple excess-return method near $81, because they capitalize a return on equity of about 6.2% that reflects the investment-cycle dip rather than the business's normal economics. The relative-multiple methods land in the high $100s to low $200s, with the EV/EBITDA-relative approach near $191 and the price-to-sales method actually above the price at about $340 on the sector multiple. The forward methods, the exit-multiple cash flow and the discounted future market cap, land near $173 to $203. The honest read is that on trailing depressed earnings no single family reaches the price, but the spread is an artifact of measuring a margin trough; on the through-cycle margin near the low teens the same methods move up materially.
The balance sheet is the floor and it is a sturdy one. UniFirst carries about $157 million of net cash and no gross debt, so the downside is bounded by a clean capital structure, and the company can self-fund the investment cycle without raising money on unfavorable terms. The cohort the screen routes to is a poor proxy for a uniform-rental franchise, whose true comparison is the small set of route-based facility-services operators; the relevant point against that real cohort is that scale and route density set the margin ceiling, and UniFirst sits below the category leader on margin even at its through-cycle level. What the buyer is underwriting is the timing of the margin recovery, with a debt-free balance sheet removing the financing risk but not the risk that the recovery simply takes longer than the price assumes.
Catalysts
The near-term catalyst is the fiscal third-quarter 2026 report and the margin trajectory it confirmed. Revenue came in at $614.4 million, down 4% year over year but a slight beat, with an operating margin near 8.1% and GAAP EPS of $2.23 ahead of the $2.07 estimate, a 7.3% beat. The headline that moved sentiment was the forward guidance: fiscal 2026 GAAP EPS guided to roughly $6.78 at the midpoint, well below where analysts had modeled, with management characterizing the year as a temporary step back as it invests in sales, service, and digital transformation and absorbs new tariffs.
The two live variables behind that guidance are the digital-transformation spend and the tariff impact. The first is discretionary and self-imposed, so the question is execution and payback timing; the second is policy-driven and outside the company's control, so the question is duration and whether costs can be passed through. Both feed directly into whether the margin returns to its through-cycle level on the assumed schedule.
The catalysts to watch are the sequential operating-margin prints, which signal whether the investment cycle is nearing its trough, and any update on tariff pass-through and route-level pricing. Revenue direction matters too, because the 4% decline ties to customer headcount and the broader labor cycle; a stabilization there would confirm that the weakness is margin-timing rather than demand erosion.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Uniform & Facility Service Solutions (reported)
- CTAS (Cintas Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ARMK (Aramark)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- VSTS (Vestis Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ABM (ABM INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
First Aid & Safety Solutions / Other (reported)
- CTAS (Cintas Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- VSTS (Vestis Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ARMK (Aramark)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ABM (ABM INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
UNF Q3 FY2026 earnings release, July 2026 · UNF Q3 FY2026 deep-dive, July 2026