ULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC. (UGP): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers ULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC. (UGP) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UGP
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | UGP |
| Company | ULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC. |
| Current price | $6.26/sh |
| Composition | Ipiranga 90% / Ultragaz 9% / Ultracargo 1% / Hidrovias 1% / Others 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 1.8% |
| Operating margin today | 3.8% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -2.0pp |
| Multiple paid | 9x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.51σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.08x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.80x | 3 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.43x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.61x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $18.20 | 0.34x | yes | FCF base $0.8B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.3%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $10.25 | 0.61x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 35.2x / 37.2x / 39.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $6.99 | 0.90x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20.26x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $5.01 | 1.25x | yes | BV/sh $2.90, ROE (TTM) 16.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $6.50 | 0.96x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $5.88 | 1.06x | yes | Rev $26.2B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $14.49 | 0.43x | yes | EPS $0.42, growth 34% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.39 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $6.61 | 0.95x | yes | BV $2.90 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $5.24 | 1.19x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.42 × BVPS $2.90) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $2.43 | 2.58x | yes | EBITDA $0.17B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.79 | 0.80x | yes | FCF $732.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $13.56 | 0.46x | yes | EPS $0.42 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $61.23 | 0.10x | yes | Revenue $26.18B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $15.76 | 0.40x | yes | EPS $0.42 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.54 | 1.38x | yes | EPS $0.42 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.9b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.03x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.91x |
| Interest coverage | 2.8x |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Ultrapar is a Brazilian distribution conglomerate, built around Ipiranga fuel stations and Ultragaz LPG, that earns thin margins on enormous volume, a scale-and-logistics business rather than a high-margin one.
- Profitability is recovering: Q1 2026 net income jumped to R$914 million from R$363 million a year earlier, with Ipiranga volume up 8% on a gradual market recovery.
- The risk to weigh is balance-sheet stress at the edges: the Hidrovias subsidiary breached leverage covenants on certain debentures, restricting new borrowings and mandatory dividends though not accelerating existing debt, a reminder that this is a leveraged business in a volatile currency.
Bull Case
Ultrapar's moat is physical and hard to replicate: a national distribution network in a country where logistics are the barrier to entry. Ipiranga is one of Brazil's largest fuel distributors, with thousands of branded service stations, and Ultragaz is a leading bottled-LPG distributor reaching households across a vast geography. The advantage is not a product anyone can copy; it is the network of terminals, trucks, stations, and supply relationships that took decades to build. In a market the size of Brazil, that distribution footprint is the structural edge, because a new entrant would have to recreate the logistics, not just the brand.
The operating recovery is real and showing in the numbers. Q1 2026 consolidated net revenue reached R$36.75 billion against R$33.33 billion a year earlier, and net income more than doubled to R$914 million from R$363 million, with operating cash flow improving to R$1.10 billion. Ipiranga drove it, with total volume up 8% on a gradual market recovery and improved operational performance, particularly in the northern corridor. For a thin-margin distributor, volume is the lever that matters, and an 8% volume gain flowing through a fixed logistics base lifts profit disproportionately.
Management is investing for the next leg while diversifying the mix. Ultracargo, the storage-terminal arm, completed expansions at its Rondonopolis and OPLA bases, adding 25,000 cubic meters of capacity, and Ultrapar acquired a 43.75% interest in Virtu GNL for R$104 million as a joint venture, a step into liquefied natural gas. The methods anchored on assets, earnings power, and peer multiples all read the price as supported or cheap, which is the right profile for a deep-value distribution business: you are buying a recovering, cash-generative network at a low multiple, not paying up for growth.
Bear Case
The competitive pressure on Ultrapar is the structural feature of fuel distribution: it is a commodity business where the product is identical across sellers and the competition is relentless. Ipiranga competes against Brazil's other large distributors and against the informal market, and fuel distribution margins are perennially thin because customers buy on price and convenience. The 8% volume recovery is welcome, but volume can reverse as quickly as it rose if the Brazilian economy softens or competitors discount to defend share. A distributor with little pricing power is always one price war away from margin compression, and the price embeds a continued recovery that competition could interrupt.
The balance sheet is where the real fragility sits, and the quarter surfaced a concrete warning. The Hidrovias subsidiary did not comply with leverage covenants on certain debentures, which restricts new borrowings and minimum mandatory dividend payments, even though it does not accelerate the existing debt. A covenant breach anywhere in a group is a signal that leverage is being tested, and Ultrapar also faced working-capital requirements exceeding R$2 billion in the quarter, driven by higher fuel prices and increased imported volumes. A low-margin business that has to fund large working-capital swings when commodity prices rise is structurally exposed: the cash gets tied up in inventory and receivables precisely when input costs climb.
Then there is the currency and country risk that sits over everything for a US-listed Brazilian company. Ultrapar earns in Brazilian reais, and a US investor's return depends as much on the real-to-dollar exchange rate as on the company's operations. A weakening real, higher Brazilian interest rates, or political and regulatory shifts in fuel pricing can erode dollar returns regardless of how well Ipiranga and Ultragaz perform. Ultragaz EBITDA already fell 2% on higher LPG costs in the quarter, showing how input-cost and pricing dynamics squeeze the segments. The price looks cheap on the value methods, but cheap in a volatile currency with a leveraged balance sheet is cheap for reasons the methods do not fully capture.
Valuation
Ultrapar is a value-and-asset-supported name, and the methods we use to triangulate read it as cheap on nearly every lens. The asset-value, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and growth-cash-flow methods all land at or above the price, several of them well above it, which is the profile of a deeply discounted distribution business rather than an expensive one. The reason a low-margin distributor screens this way is that its value sits in a large, cash-generative asset base earning a thin spread on enormous volume; when the volume recovers, as it did this quarter, the earnings power the methods capture rises while the price has lagged.
The concrete bet here is that the operating recovery sustains and the balance-sheet stress stays contained. The price requires only modest, stable operating economics from a business that just doubled net income year over year, which is why the value methods find it cheap. The catch is that the headline cheapness is measured against earnings that are recovering off a low base and against a balance sheet showing strain at the Hidrovias subsidiary. The peer comparison is to other fuel and LPG distributors, against which Ultrapar's multiple is undemanding, but the discount reflects the leverage and the Brazilian currency and country risk, not a mispricing the market has simply missed.
Solvency is the decisive consideration and belongs at the close. The group carries meaningful net debt, the working-capital draw exceeded R$2 billion in the quarter on rising fuel prices, and a subsidiary has breached debenture covenants. None of that is an immediate liquidity crisis, the covenant breach does not accelerate the debt, but it is the reason a recovering, cash-generative distributor trades at a value multiple. The bet is that the recovery deleverages the group faster than the working-capital and currency swings strain it, and for a US investor that bet is taken in reais before it is earned in dollars.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 was a strong recovery quarter. Consolidated net revenue reached R$36.75 billion, up from R$33.33 billion a year earlier, and net income more than doubled to R$914 million from R$363 million, with basic earnings per share rising to R$0.8192 from R$0.3043 and operating cash flow improving to R$1.10 billion. Ipiranga led with an 8% increase in total volume sold on a gradual market recovery, while Ultragaz EBITDA slipped 2% on higher LPG costs.
The portfolio is being built out and diversified. Ultracargo completed capacity expansions at its Rondonopolis and OPLA bases, adding 25,000 cubic meters, and Ultrapar acquired a 43.75% interest in Virtu GNL for R$104 million as a joint venture, a move into liquefied natural gas.
The forward watch items are the Ipiranga volume trajectory as the Brazilian market recovers, the resolution of the Hidrovias covenant situation, and the working-capital and currency dynamics that swing with fuel prices and the real. For a US-listed investor, the exchange rate is itself a catalyst, because dollar returns hinge on the real as much as on the operating recovery the quarter showed.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- NGG (NGG)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BIP (BIP)
- FY2025 20-F: …from investment funds, operating companies acting as strategic buyers, construction companies, commercial and investment banks, and commercial finance companies. Many of these competitors are substantially larger and have considerably greater financial, technical and marketing resources than are available to us. Some…
- FY2025 20-F: …potentially result in reduced value for assets, or in extreme cases, a stranded asset." Marketing Our marketing efforts focus on leveraging our competitive advantages described and our group's world-class operating businesses described in Item 4.B "Business Overview". We also leverage our relationship with…
- CEG (CONSTELLATION ENERGY CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …energy prices, partially offset by lower load volumes • favorable retail load revenue of $75 primarily due to higher contracted energy prices and load volumes 68 Table of Contents 2025 vs. 2024 $ Change % Change Description Other Power Regions 77 1.4 % • favorable retail load revenue of $50 primarily due to higher…
- FY2025 10-K: ITEM 7. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS - Other Key Business Drivers for more information on the Russia and Ukraine conflict. Commodity Derivative Activity The following table provides detail on changes in our commodity derivative contract net assets (liabilities)…
- SE (Sea Ltd)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SO (SOUTHERN CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …to the customers of Southern Company Gas. See Notes 5 and 7 for additional information. The gas marketing services segment provides natural gas marketing to end-use customers primarily in Georgia through SouthStar. The "All Other" presentation includes operating segments and subsidiaries that fall below the…
- FY2025 10-K: …capacity between delivery points in order to serve its customers and various markets. NYMEX futures and OTC contracts are used to capture the price differential or spread between the locations served by the capacity to substantially protect the natural gas revenues that will ultimately be realized when the physical…
- NMR (NOMURA HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LNG (CHENIERE ENERGY, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …contract terms, to the extent customers elect to take delivery of their LNG, (2) adjustments to the consumer price index and (3) the outcome of certain contingent events, including the achievement of milestones upon which delivery of LNG under certain contracts is conditioned. 87 Table of Contents CHENIERE ENERGY,…
- FY2025 10-K: …Factors and Competition , we expect the scope and extent of our future climate and sustainability initiatives 17 Table of Contents to evolve accordingly. While we have not incurred material direct expenditures related to climate change, we are proactive in our management of climate risks and opportunities, including…
- EIX (EDISON INTERNATIONAL)
- FY2025 10-K: …tax positions in accordance with the authoritative guidance. Key Assumptions and Approach Used. In determining whether it is more likely than not that all or some portion of net operating loss and tax credit carryforwards can be utilized, management analyzes the trend of GAAP earnings and then estimates the impact of…
- FY2025 10-K: 7% of which was associated to counterparties with an investment grade rating of A or higher and 67.2% was associated with a CPUC approved electronic broker and exchange platform operating under a rigorous risk management framework. For more information related to credit risks, see "Notes to Consolidated Financial…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Ultrapar Q1 2026 results, 2026 · Ultrapar Q1 2026 earnings call, 2026 · Ultrapar Q1 2026 disclosures, 2026