ULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC. (UGP): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers ULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC. (UGP) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UGP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerUGP
CompanyULTRAPAR HOLDINGS INC.
Current price$6.26/sh
CompositionIpiranga 90% / Ultragaz 9% / Ultracargo 1% / Hidrovias 1% / Others 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.8%
Operating margin today3.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.0pp
Multiple paid9x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.51σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.08x4expensive
Earnings0.80x3justifies
Relative0.43x5justifies
Growth0.61x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$18.200.34xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.3%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$10.250.61xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 35.2x / 37.2x / 39.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$6.990.90xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20.26x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$5.011.25xyesBV/sh $2.90, ROE (TTM) 16.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$6.500.96xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$5.881.06xyesRev $26.2B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$14.490.43xyesEPS $0.42, growth 34% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.39 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$6.610.95xyesBV $2.90 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$5.241.19xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.42 × BVPS $2.90) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$2.432.58xyesEBITDA $0.17B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.790.80xyesFCF $732.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$13.560.46xyesEPS $0.42 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$61.230.10xyesRevenue $26.18B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$15.760.40xyesEPS $0.42 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$4.541.38xyesEPS $0.42 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.03x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.91x
Interest coverage2.8x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Ultrapar's moat is physical and hard to replicate: a national distribution network in a country where logistics are the barrier to entry. Ipiranga is one of Brazil's largest fuel distributors, with thousands of branded service stations, and Ultragaz is a leading bottled-LPG distributor reaching households across a vast geography. The advantage is not a product anyone can copy; it is the network of terminals, trucks, stations, and supply relationships that took decades to build. In a market the size of Brazil, that distribution footprint is the structural edge, because a new entrant would have to recreate the logistics, not just the brand.

The operating recovery is real and showing in the numbers. Q1 2026 consolidated net revenue reached R$36.75 billion against R$33.33 billion a year earlier, and net income more than doubled to R$914 million from R$363 million, with operating cash flow improving to R$1.10 billion. Ipiranga drove it, with total volume up 8% on a gradual market recovery and improved operational performance, particularly in the northern corridor. For a thin-margin distributor, volume is the lever that matters, and an 8% volume gain flowing through a fixed logistics base lifts profit disproportionately.

Management is investing for the next leg while diversifying the mix. Ultracargo, the storage-terminal arm, completed expansions at its Rondonopolis and OPLA bases, adding 25,000 cubic meters of capacity, and Ultrapar acquired a 43.75% interest in Virtu GNL for R$104 million as a joint venture, a step into liquefied natural gas. The methods anchored on assets, earnings power, and peer multiples all read the price as supported or cheap, which is the right profile for a deep-value distribution business: you are buying a recovering, cash-generative network at a low multiple, not paying up for growth.

Bear Case

The competitive pressure on Ultrapar is the structural feature of fuel distribution: it is a commodity business where the product is identical across sellers and the competition is relentless. Ipiranga competes against Brazil's other large distributors and against the informal market, and fuel distribution margins are perennially thin because customers buy on price and convenience. The 8% volume recovery is welcome, but volume can reverse as quickly as it rose if the Brazilian economy softens or competitors discount to defend share. A distributor with little pricing power is always one price war away from margin compression, and the price embeds a continued recovery that competition could interrupt.

The balance sheet is where the real fragility sits, and the quarter surfaced a concrete warning. The Hidrovias subsidiary did not comply with leverage covenants on certain debentures, which restricts new borrowings and minimum mandatory dividend payments, even though it does not accelerate the existing debt. A covenant breach anywhere in a group is a signal that leverage is being tested, and Ultrapar also faced working-capital requirements exceeding R$2 billion in the quarter, driven by higher fuel prices and increased imported volumes. A low-margin business that has to fund large working-capital swings when commodity prices rise is structurally exposed: the cash gets tied up in inventory and receivables precisely when input costs climb.

Then there is the currency and country risk that sits over everything for a US-listed Brazilian company. Ultrapar earns in Brazilian reais, and a US investor's return depends as much on the real-to-dollar exchange rate as on the company's operations. A weakening real, higher Brazilian interest rates, or political and regulatory shifts in fuel pricing can erode dollar returns regardless of how well Ipiranga and Ultragaz perform. Ultragaz EBITDA already fell 2% on higher LPG costs in the quarter, showing how input-cost and pricing dynamics squeeze the segments. The price looks cheap on the value methods, but cheap in a volatile currency with a leveraged balance sheet is cheap for reasons the methods do not fully capture.

Valuation

Ultrapar is a value-and-asset-supported name, and the methods we use to triangulate read it as cheap on nearly every lens. The asset-value, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and growth-cash-flow methods all land at or above the price, several of them well above it, which is the profile of a deeply discounted distribution business rather than an expensive one. The reason a low-margin distributor screens this way is that its value sits in a large, cash-generative asset base earning a thin spread on enormous volume; when the volume recovers, as it did this quarter, the earnings power the methods capture rises while the price has lagged.

The concrete bet here is that the operating recovery sustains and the balance-sheet stress stays contained. The price requires only modest, stable operating economics from a business that just doubled net income year over year, which is why the value methods find it cheap. The catch is that the headline cheapness is measured against earnings that are recovering off a low base and against a balance sheet showing strain at the Hidrovias subsidiary. The peer comparison is to other fuel and LPG distributors, against which Ultrapar's multiple is undemanding, but the discount reflects the leverage and the Brazilian currency and country risk, not a mispricing the market has simply missed.

Solvency is the decisive consideration and belongs at the close. The group carries meaningful net debt, the working-capital draw exceeded R$2 billion in the quarter on rising fuel prices, and a subsidiary has breached debenture covenants. None of that is an immediate liquidity crisis, the covenant breach does not accelerate the debt, but it is the reason a recovering, cash-generative distributor trades at a value multiple. The bet is that the recovery deleverages the group faster than the working-capital and currency swings strain it, and for a US investor that bet is taken in reais before it is earned in dollars.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 was a strong recovery quarter. Consolidated net revenue reached R$36.75 billion, up from R$33.33 billion a year earlier, and net income more than doubled to R$914 million from R$363 million, with basic earnings per share rising to R$0.8192 from R$0.3043 and operating cash flow improving to R$1.10 billion. Ipiranga led with an 8% increase in total volume sold on a gradual market recovery, while Ultragaz EBITDA slipped 2% on higher LPG costs.

The portfolio is being built out and diversified. Ultracargo completed capacity expansions at its Rondonopolis and OPLA bases, adding 25,000 cubic meters, and Ultrapar acquired a 43.75% interest in Virtu GNL for R$104 million as a joint venture, a move into liquefied natural gas.

The forward watch items are the Ipiranga volume trajectory as the Brazilian market recovers, the resolution of the Hidrovias covenant situation, and the working-capital and currency dynamics that swing with fuel prices and the real. For a US-listed investor, the exchange rate is itself a catalyst, because dollar returns hinge on the real as much as on the operating recovery the quarter showed.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Ultrapar Q1 2026 results, 2026 · Ultrapar Q1 2026 earnings call, 2026 · Ultrapar Q1 2026 disclosures, 2026

View the full interactive UGP report on boothcheck